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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
I. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Bargaining Unit Determination,
Management and Supervisory Trainees: United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB*
Sections 8(a)(1) 1
 and 8(a)(5)2 of the National Labor Relations Act (Act)
guarantee the right of employees to bargain collectively with employers.' Those
sections make it in unfair labor practice for employers to refuse to bargain col-
lectively,* or to interfere with employee organization efforts.' The Act,
however, requires the employee bargaining unit to be an "appropriate" one. 6
The highly discretionary' task of determining whether a particular bargaining
unit is "appropriate" falls upon the National Labor Relations Board (Board). 8
By Thomas L. Barrette, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW..
' 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(1) (1976). The relevant portion of the section states, "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; ... " Id.
The relevant portion of 5 157 states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, ... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
2
 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1976). The section provides, "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer — (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id.
Section 159(a) provides, in relevant part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: .
29 U.S.C. 5 159(a) (1976).
3 See notes 1 and 2 supra.
4
 Section 158(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1976), expressly prohibits employers from
refusing to bargain collectively. See note 2 supra for the text of 5 158(a)(5).
Section 158(a)(1) protects employee organization efforts by its reference to 5 157. 29
U.S.C., 158(a)(1) (1976).
Section 157 reads, in pertinent part, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, ..." 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
6 29 U.S.C. 5 159(a) (1976). Section 159(a) reads in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: ...
Id.
7 See 18C T. KNEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 5 14.0111] (1981).
Kheel writes, "The Board has not formulated rigid or constrictive regulations for dealing with
such cases. Instead, it exercises a wide ranging discretion, weighing and balancing the
numerous, often conflicting considerations." Id. (footnotes omitted).
13 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). Section 159(b) states, in pertinent part; "The Board shall
decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
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The primary test which the Board has employed in determining whether a
bargaining unit is appropriate is whether the members of the bargaining unit
share a sufficient "community of interest." 9 If a consideration of various fac-
tors, such as the wages, hours, duties, and skills of the members of the bargain-
ing unit indicates that those members do not have significant common in-
terests, then the Board will not find the unit to be appropriate and the
employer's refusal to bargain with that unit will not have violated the Act."
The underlying policy of the community of interest test is to prevent internal
conflicts which might impair the unit's ability to bargain." Prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. ,l 2 Board decisions
often relied on a lack of common interests to keep management employees from
being part of rank-and-file bargaining units."
Bell created an alternative to the community of interest test in those cases
where management employees claimed to be part of a bargaining unit, by
holding that managers were not even within the protection of the Act." After
Bell, an employer who allegedly has failed to bargain with a unit can still argue
that the unit is inappropriate because its members have no community of in-
terest. Bell, however, gives the employer the option of arguing that some or all
of the unit's members are "management", and therefore cannot claim that the
Act protects their right to bargain. A similar option to argue that certain
members were not protected by the Act, rather than just inappropriate to the
unit, existed even before Bell, if unit members could be characterized as
"supervisors." The Act expressly does not extend its protection to that
group," by excluding supervisors from its definition of employee." Logically,
rights guaranteed by this supchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: ..." 29 U.S.C. 5
159(b) (1976).
9 18C T. KHEEL, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW 5 14.02 & n.3.
'° Id. See Franklin Mint Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 11, 106 L.R.R.M. 1156, 1158
(1981); Mock Road Super Duper, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B., 983, 985, 61 L.R.R.M. 1173, 1175
(1966). 
" See Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
173 (1971).
12 416 U.S. 267 (1973).
" See Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 160 N.L.R.B. 1504, 1509, 63 L.R.R.M.
1196, 1198 (1966) (field auditors excluded from bank employee bargaining unit because interests
closely related to management); Diana Shop of Spokane, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 743, 745, 40
L.R.R.M. 1256, 1256 (1957) (management trainees and credit managers not included in rank-
and-file bargaining unit).
14 Id. at 289.
15 29 U.S.C.	 152(11) (1976). Section 152(11) defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.
16 29 U.S.C. 5 152(3) (1976). Section 152(3) specifically provides, "[t]he term
`employee' ... shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor, . . ." 29 U.S.C.
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the question of whether members of a bargaining unit are within the protection
of the Act should be a threshold issue, preceding any determination of whether
there is a sufficient community of interest for the unit to be appropriate. From
a practical point of view, however, this threshold question of employment
status may be more difficult to resolve than the matter of community of in-
terest. Namely, there may be cases where the management/supervisory status
of certain employees is unclear, but the existence of significant common in-
terests between those employees and other members of the bargaining unit is
easily determined. Therefore, the theory advanced by a party, or relied upon
by a court in making its decision, may well depend on which of these two
arguments is easier to make. A significant body of cases has been decided by
the Board in which this practical problem has arisen in the context of a union
claim that supervisory/management trainees are part of its bargaining unit." In
some trainee cases the Board has applied the common interest test," while in
others it has focused on whether the trainee already fits the definition of super-
visor' 9 or manager, 2° and was thus excluded from the protection of the Act."
During the Survey year, a federal court of appeals considered for the first
time the problem of determining whether management/supervisory trainees
could be part of a rank-and-file bargaining unit." In that case, United States Steel
Corporation v. NLRB, 23
 the Third Circuit did not discuss as a separate issue
152(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
Section 141(b) goes on to provide, "[i]t is the purpose and policy of this chapter, ... to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations. ... " (emphasis
added). 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1976).
" See generally Curtis Noll Indus., Div. of Curtis Noll Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 1447, 89
L.R.R.M. 1417 (1975); Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 160 N.L.R.B. 1504, 63 L.R.R.M.
1196 (1966); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 1436, 48 L.R.R.M. 1276 (1961).
16 See Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 160 N.L.R.B. at 1510, 11 & n.16, 63
L.R.R.M. at 1198; Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. at 1440, 48 L.R.R.M. at
1277-78; United States Steel Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 820, 820, 104 L.R.R.M. 1015, 1016 (1980).
19
 "Supervisor" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976), set out at note 16 supra. In
Dooley Equip. Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 1, 3-5, 105 L.R.R.M. 1527, 1528 (1980), the
Board affirmed the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the administrative law judge (ALJ) who
had focused on the definition of supervisor to determine whether the trainee was protected by the
Act. Id. at 1, 4. The ALJ found that "Knorr [the employee in question] had not assumed the full
duties and responsibilities of the position, but remained a trainee working under close supervi-
sion ... and bound by pricing policy guidelines, with little discretion to determine prices . . . or
... departmental policy." Id. at 4.
20 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. at 290 n.19
(Supreme Court left task of defining "managerial" to Board). The following cases determined
whether a job was "managerial," rather than, or in addition to, using a community of interest
analysis: Dooley Equip. Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 20 at 1, 4; Barnes and Noble Bookstores,
Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1326, 1341 (1977).
2 ' See Dooley Equip. Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 20 at 1, 3-5; Barnes and Noble
Bookstores, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. at 1326, 1341-42.
22
 The only other circuit court to mention the issue whether a trainee can be part of a
bargaining unit was the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Kent Corp., 564 F.2d 186, 188, 96 L.R.R.M.
3373, 3374 (5th Cir. 1977). That-court, however, was rejecting a party's attempt to raise the
issue for the first time on appeal. Id.
23
 644 F.2d 286, 106 L.R.R.M. 3045 (3d Cir. 1981).
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whether the trainees were within the protection of the Act. 24 Instead, the court
seemed to assume that if the trainees had no community of interest with other
unit members, then they were outside the protection of the Act." This impor-
tant aspect of the decision is analyzed below, following a discussion of the case
itself.
In United States Steel the court stated that management/superviiory trainees
can have no community of interest with rank-and-file employees if a reasoned
analysis," based on four factors," shows a disparity of interests." Under this
analysis, the four factors to be considered are: (1) whether hiring of the trainees
was selective, based on education or experience; (2) whether the employment
opportunities of the trainees were limited to accepting a management position
or leaving the employer; (3) whether there was a planned training program;
and (4) whether the wages and working conditions of the trainees were
distinguishable from those of other employees. 29 The court held that the
trainees before it did not, under the test, have a community of interest with
members of a rank-and-file bargaining unit."
The community of interest issue in United States Steel arose in the context of
a training program for unlicensed seamen." Certain steel companies employed
both licensed and unlicensed seamen on ore carriers in the Great Lakes." A
local of the United States Steel Workers of America represented unlicensed
personnel on the ships," while the licensed personnel were either represented
by a separate organization, or were unrepresented. 34 In the summer of 1978,
the steel companies and the licensed personnel's representative jointly
established a program to prepare selected unlicensed personnel to take the
Coast Guard licensing examination." The employers selected candidates for
the school on the basis of recommendations by supervisors. 36 The employers
subsidized the travel and living expenses of the trainees, who also received sixty
percent of their regular pay while enrolled in the training program." Under the
terms of the program, the trainees would receive the balance of their pay if they
returned to work for their employer for at least thirty days." The trainees were
not, however, otherwise obligated to return to work for their employers." In
24 See id. at 288-89, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3047-48.
25 See id. at 289 & n.6, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048 & n.6
26 Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
27 Id. at 289-90, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
28 Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
29 Id. at•289-90, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
39 Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.




35 Id. at 287-88, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3046-47.
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addition to receiving a partial salary with an option to recover full pay and ex-
penses, the trainees also accrued vacation and bonus benefits as required by
the collective bargaining agreement between the unlicensed seamen's union
and the steel companies." The employers did not, however, continue their
usual practice of either deducting union dues from the trainee's salary, or issu-
ing a separate check for the dues. 4 t Under the terms of the program, if a trainee
was unsuccessful in obtaining a licensed position, he or she could return to his
or her old, unlicensed job.'"
Because the unlicensed seamen's collective bargaining contract made no
specific provision for the summer training program," the union representing
the unlicensed seaman filed unfair labor practice charges in July, 1978, alleg-
ing that the steel companies had refused to bargain concerning the employment
conditions of the summer program." An administrative law judge (ALJ) con-
sidered the union's complaint." He made preliminary conclusions that the
trainees had no community of interest with the unlicensed personnel," and
that they were training for positions which would be supervisory and/or
managerial. 47 The ALJ did not find it necessary to determine whether the
trainees were "employees" entitled to the protection of the Act, in view of his
other findings." Without further explanation, the judge concluded that the
employers' "refusal" to bargain on the conditions of the summer program was
not a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)" of the Act."
After the ALJ's unfavorable decision, the union brought the case to the
Board, 51 which disagreed with the judge's conclusion that the trainees had no
community of interest with the other members of the bargaining unit." That
conclusion, the Board stated, was based on cases which could be distinguished
from the case at hand." The Board noted that in two cases cited by the ALJ,
Curtis Noll Industries54 and WTOP, Inc., 55
 the trainees had no ability to remain
with the employer if they were not put into the position for which they were be-
ing trained." After distinguishing Curtis Noll and WTOP in this fashion, the
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
43 Id. at 288, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3047.
44 Id.
45 United States Steel Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 820, 823 (1980) (decision of administrative
law judge).




 See text and notes at notes 1-8 supra for a discussion of the Act's protection of
employees' right to bargain collectively.
" 248 N.L.R.B. at 827 (decision of administrative law judge).
31 Id. at 820, 104 L.R.R.M. 1015, 1016 (decision of Board).
52 Id.
55 Id.
54 218 N.L.R.B. 1447, 89 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1975).
55 115 N.L.R.B. 758, 37 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1956).
56
 248 N.L.R.B. at 820 n.4, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1016 n.4.
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Board then listed other aspects of the training program in United States Steel,
such as continued fringe benefits and the accrual of vacation time," which led
it to find that the trainees were appropriate members of the unlicensed
seamen's bargaining unit." Based on this finding, the Board concluded that
the terms and conditions of the summer training program were a mandatory
subject for collective bargaining" and that the employers had violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by taking unilateral action on the subject. 6° The Board
ordered the employers to bargain over the summer training program. 61
Rather than bargain, the employers petitioned the Third Circuit to set
aside the Board's order. 62 The court set aside the order, holding that the
trainees had no community of interest with the bargaining unit." There was no
evidence, the court asserted, to support the Board's opposite conclusion." The
court stated that it would use a "community of interest" analysis based on a
long series of Board decisions regarding the bargaining unit status of manage-
ment trainees." It found that the Curtis Islall66 case had synthesized this analysis
into a four-factor test." Under this test, the court continued, the training must
be examined with regard to its selectivity, whether it limited the employment
prospects of trainees, how the program was planned, and what distinctions in
wages and hours existed between the trainees and other employees." The court
applied the test and concluded that the trainees had no community of interest
with the unlicensed seamen." According to the court, the training program
fulfilled three of the four factors." It was selective because the employers
operating the program controlled admissions and considered the employee's
experience, past record and recommendations in selecting trainees!' It was
strictly planned because the program was a formal ten- to thirteen-week
course!' Finally, there were many distinctions between trainees and other
employees. The trainees were physically separated from the other employees,
received lower pay, did different work, and were on a different payroll." When
considering this last factor, the court found it "most" significant that the
37 Id. at 821, 104 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
58 Id.
39 Id.
60 Id., 104 L.R.R.M. at 1016-17.
81 Id. at 822.
62 United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d at 287, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3046 (1981).
63 Id. at 291, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
64 Id. at 289, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3047.
65 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3047-48.
66 218 N.L.R.B. 1447, 89 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1975). See text and notes at notes 54-58
supra, for a description of the Board's reading of Curtis Noll.
67 See text and notes at note 29 supra.
68 644 F.2d at 289-90, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
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trainees were studying for positions which would place them outside the
bargaining unit.'* The court subsequently referred to this body of facts as a
"disparity between the interests of the students attending the summer school
and the unlicensed seamen. " '"
The court then addressed the Board's conclusion that the summer training
program's lack of an "up or out" requirement indicated that the trainees still
had a community of interest with the bargaining unit employees." The court
explicitly rejected making this one factor of the analysis determinative, as it
claimed the Board had done. 77 Instead, the court read Curtis Noll as requiring
the consideration of all four factors." This reading of Curtis Noll was justified,
according to the court, because Curtis Noll did not purport to created a new text
for determining trainee status," but rather synthesized the factors which had
been developed in previous Board cases." Thus, because three of the four Cur-
tis Noll factors were fulfilled, the court concluded that the trainees had interests
apart from the unlicensed seamen. 8 ' On that basis, the summer licensing pro-
gram run by the employers was in full compliance with sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(5) of the Act. a2
A concurring opinion agreed completely with the majority's conclusion
that the trainees had no community of interest with their old bargaining unit."
The concurring judges, however, would have focused on the preliminary issue
of whether language in the union contracts, or language in the NLRB certifica-
tions which defined the bargaining unit, could be read to include the trainees in
the bargaining unit." The terms of the parties' agreements and of the NLRB
certifications emphasized that the members of the bargaining unit were to be
unlicensed employees on the ships." The opinion concluded, therefore, that the
trainees were never intended by the union or steel companies to be part of the
bargaining unit." Thus, a community of interest analysis was of quite second-
ary importance to the concurring judges. 87
The Third Circuit's decision, in United States Steel, to adopt the Curtis Noll
community of interest test and to hold that the trainees had no community of
74 Id.
" Id.
76 Id. The court's restatement of the Board's conclusion as turning solely on a lack of
"up or out" requirement is oversimplified, since the Board listed a number of other factors after
using the lack of "up or out" to distinguish certain cases. See text and notes at notes 51-61 for a
description of the Board's reasoning.
" 644 F.2d at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
78 Id.
" Id. at 11, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049 n.11,
80 id.
8' Id., at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
82 Id. at 290-91, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
83 Id. at 291, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049 (Garth, J., concurring).
$4 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
" Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049-50.
86 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
" Id. at 292, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3050.
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interest with the rank-and-file employees even when not all four factors of the
Curtis Noll test were met, was correct. The correctness of these aspects of the
United States Steel decision, and some of the deficiencies in the court's reasoning,
can best be understood by analyzing the court's main authority, Curtis Noll.
Curtis Noll concerned the allegedly illegal discharge of management
trainees for union organizational activities." The Board in Curtis Noll upheld
the discharge," adopting the ALJ's conclusion that the trainees were part of
management and therefore were unprotected by the Act." To support this con-
clusion, the ALJ first developed a four-factor community of interest test from
cases" which had considered the issue of whether management/supervisory
trainees were appropriate members of the bargaining units of rank-and-file
employees." The ALJ then applied this test to the facts of the case and deter-
mined that there was no community of interest between the trainees and the
bargaining unit workers." Without further discussion, the ALJ added that this
result meant that the trainees' interests were so aligned with the interests of
management that the trainees were outside the protection of the Act."
A key aspect of the Curtis Noll analysis is that the cases used to synthesize
the four factors were not concerned with whether the trainees were actually
managers or supervisors," but rather focused on whether the trainees' interest
in such positions prevented them from having a sufficient community of in-
terest with other employees to be appropriate members of the bargaining
unit." The four factors — selective hiring," no future alternative other than
management," a planned training program," and different working condi-
tions'°° — reflect this emphasis. These factors identify underlying interests
which are likely to be more important to a management/supervisory trainee
than his or her current working conditions. Thus, the Curtis Noll Board found
that the management trainees in its case were working side by side with other
88 218 N.L.R.B. at 1450 (decision of administrative law judge).
89 Id. at 1447, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1417 (decision of Board).
98 Id. at 1453 (decision of administrative law judge).
" See id. at 1452 (citing Big N Dept. Store No. 333, 199 N.L.R.B. 174, 81 L.R.R.M.
1190 (1972); Henrikson, Inc., d/b/a Gibson Discount Center, 191 N.L.R.B. 622, 77 L.R.R.M.
1835 (1971); Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 160 N.L.R.B. 1504, 63 L.R.R.M. 1196 (1966);
Rish Equip. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1185, 58 L.R.R.M. 1274 (1965); Montgomery Ward & Co.,
131 N.L.R.B. 1436, 48 L.R.R.M. 1276 (1961); Diana Shop of Spokane, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B.
743, 40 L.R.R.M. 1256 (1957); WTOP, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 758, 37 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1956)).
92 218 N.L.R.B. at 1452 (decision of administrative law judge).
93 Id. at 1453.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., WTOP, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. at 759, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1388 (floor directors
without supervisory authority still have interest of supervisors).
96 See id.; Rish Equip. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. at 1202 (The Board found that a managerial
trainee had interests aligned with managers, not with employees in the appropriate unit. Id.
(decision of trial examiner).
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employees, and were doing the same tasks as other employees,'°' but upon ap-
plication of the factors the Board found no community of interest. 1 °2
Although the four Curtis Noll factors serve to determine the relevant in-
terests of management trainees, they do little or nothing to indicate whether a
trainee is acting as a supervisor or manager. The statutory definition of super-
visor focuses on factors such as whether the individual has the power to hire or
discharge, and whether he or she uses independence in exercising that authori-
ty. 1 °5 Board decisions determining whether an employee is a manager have
focused on that employee's day-to-day work,'" which is not even a factor in the
Curtis Noll test.'" Yet the Board in Curtis Noll went beyond its finding that there
was no community of interest between the management trainees and other
employees, i°6 to rule that the trainees were part of management.'" Therefore,
under Bell Aerospace,'° 8 those trainees were not protected by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. 1 °9 The Board did not recognize the difference between
identifying the trainees' interests and determining whether they fit the defini-
tions of supervisor and/or manager. Instead, after determining that the
trainees, on the basis of the four factors, had interests aligned with manage-
ment,"° the Board simply added the finding that the trainees were part of
management."' As the dissenting opinion in Curtis Noll noted," 2 exclusion of
trainees from a unit of rank-and-file employees on the basis of qualifications
and working conditions is not dispositive of whether those persons have a pro-
tected right to organize for self benefit."'
In contrast to Curtis Noll, the issue before the circuit court in United States
Steel was whether the trainees in question were appropriate members of a cer-
tain bargaining unit.'" Since this was also the main issue in the cases used to
develop the Curtis Noll four-factor test, 15 the use of that test was more ap-
propriate in United States Steel than in Curtis Noll. Like the Curtis Noll Board,
however, the United States Steel court does not appear to have distinguished be-
tween identifying the interests of trainees and determining their status as
'°' Id. at 1451.
1 °2 Id. at 1453.
1 " 29 U.S.C. S 152(11) (1976).
1 °' See Dooley Equip. Corp. 252 N.L.R.B. No. 20 at 1, 4; Barnes and Noble
Bookstores, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. at 1326, 1341; Curtis Noll Indus., Div. of Curtis Noll Corp.,
218 N.L.R.B. at 1448, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1418 (The dissenting opinion argued that determination
of whether an employee is a manager depends on day-to-day work.).
i°' See 218 N.L.R.B. at 1452 (decision of administrative law judge).
104 Id. at 1453.
107 Id.
1 " 416 U.S. at 289.
'n 218 N.L.R.B. at 1453 (decision of administrative law judge).
" 0 Id.
'' Id.
" 2 Id. at 1448, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1418 (dissenting opinion).
"S Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1418.
" 4 See 644 F.2d at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
"5 See text and notes at notes 91-92 supra, for a description of the Board's use of earlier
cases in Curtis Noll.
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managers or supervisors. This confusion is apparent from a passage in the
court's opinion which discussed a number of cases which had decided whether
trainees were appropriate members of a bargaining unit." 6 After reviewing
those cases, the court then introduced Curtis Noll as a case which "once again"
found management trainees to be excluded from the protection of the Act.'"
The court also noted that the jobs for which the training program prepared the
seamen had been held by the Board to be supervisory.'" It later labelled as
"most" significant the students' purpose of becoming licensed officers." 9
These aspects of the opinion at least suggest that the Third Circuit would hold
that trainees fulfilling the Curtis Noll analysis are already managers or super-
visors, and thus outside the protection of the Act."°
United States Steel is significant because of the Third Circuit's decision
therein to adopt the Curtis Noll four-factor test to determine whether
management/supervisory trainees are appropriate members of a rank-and-file
bargaining unit. Yet the precedential value of United States Steel is questionable
because employing the community of interest test may have been unnecessary
under the facts of the case. The concurring opinion questioned whether a four-
factor community of interest analysis was necessary at all. 12 ' It observed that
the bargaining unit stipulated in the unlicensed seamen's contract and certified
by the Board did not appear to contemplate the summer training program,'"
and therefore could not be an appropriate unit for the trainees.'" Thus,
another court wishing to discount the apparent endorsement of Curtis Noll by
the Third Circuit could point to the concurrence in United Slates Steel and hold
that United States Steel was not the proper case in which to adopt the Curtis Noll
test.
In addition to the Third Circuit's decision to adopt the Curtis Noll test,
United States Steel is significant because of the court's assertion that not all four
factors of that test have to be met to show that trainees are inappropriate
members of a bargaining unit. In Curtis Noll, the training program at issue was
found to exhibit, to at least some extent, all four factors developed in that
case.' 24 In contrast, the United States Steel court found that there was no com-
munity of interest between the trainees and the other employees,' 25 even
though the "up or out" factor was missing. 126 This finding was reasonable,
however, in view of the subjective nature of community of interest analysis. 127
"6 644 F.2d at 289, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
"? Id.	 •
18 Id. at 289 n.5, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3047 n.5.
Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
120 See 218 N.L.R.B. at 1453 (decision of administrative law judge).
121 See 644 F.2d at 291, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049 (Garth, J., concurring).
122 Id.
' 23 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3049.
124 218 N.L.R.B. at 1452-53 (decision of administrative law judge).
12° 644 F.2d at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
' 26 Id. at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
127 See text and notes at notes 7-8 supra.
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Furthermore, the other Curtis Noll factors'all were quite obviously met in United
States Steel,'" especially apparent being the utterly different working conditions
of the students.'" When the issue is not one of deciding on an appropriate
bargaining unit, but rather one of classifying trainees as supervisors or
managers, meeting all four factors may become more important. The "up or
out" requirement, for example, would be particularly relevant in determining
whether trainees have interests so closely aligned with managers and/or super-
visors that they should be considered managers or supervisors.' 3°
For the practitioner, United States Steel's importance seems to lie in its
agreement with Curtis Noll' s holding that when management/supervisory
trainees have no community of interest with the rank-and-file, they are so iden-
tified with management and/or supervision that they are no longer protected
by the Act."' This result might be significant, for example, where a union at-
tempted to organize a separate bargaining unit for trainees, or in a case like
Curtis Noll, where the issue of the appropriateness of unit was secondary to the
issue of protection under the Act. The practitioner should be aware, however,
that acceptance of the four-factor community of interest test by the United States
Steel court does not make the Curtis Noll conclusions regarding the Act's protec-
tion of trainees flow automatically. United States Steel's central concern was real-
ly only whether there was an appropriate bargaining unit. Its determinations
with respect to the use of the community of interest test to decide whether a
trainee is a manager or supervisor and therefore outside the Act's protection
are mere dicta.
B. Enforceability of Prehire Agreements:
Contractors Health and Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co.*
As a general rule, an employer outside the construction industry does not
commit an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' by refusing to bargain with a union which has
not proven that it represents the majority of the employer's workers.' In fact,
an employer commits an unfair labor practice by signing a collective bargain-
ing agreement with a union which does not have established majority status. 3
129 See 644 F.2d at 290, 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
19 See id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 3048.
"° See generally 218 N.L.R.B. at 1453 (decision of administrative law judge).
13 ' See 218 N.L.R.B. at 1453.
* By Andrew C. Griesinger, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
2
 R. J. Smith Constr. Co., Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694, 77 L.R.R.M. 1494, 1494-95
(1971), enforcement denied sub nom., Engineers Local 150 v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M.
2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See NLRB v. Local 103, International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Or-
namental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333, 2337 (1978).
3
 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736-37, 48
L.R.R.M. 2251, 2253 (1961).
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Congress has recognized, however, that prohibiting agreements in the con-
struction industry between employers and unions not having majority status is
inappropriate due to the transitory and occasional nature of the employer-
employee relationship in that industry.* Accordingly, in 1959 Congress
enacted section 8(f) of the NLRA. 5 Under section 8(f), employers in the con-
struction industry are permitted to make voluntary agreements with unions
which do not have majority status. 5 The employer may execute such
agreeinents before it has actually hired any construction workers.'
The degree. to which section 8(f) prehire agreements are enforceable
against signatory employers is somewhat unclear. In fact, it is possible that
such agreements may not be enforceable at all. The only Supreme Court deci-
sion to discuss the enforceability of prehire agreements at length is NLRB v.
Local 103, International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers. 8
The Supreme Court held in Local 103 that a union which had failed to establish
majority status committed an unfair labor practice when it attempted to en-
force a prehire agreement by picketing a signatory employer.' Immediately
after the employer and the union in Local 103 had signed a prehire agreement,
the employer formed a new company, created for the express purpose of using
* See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1959); H.R. REP. NO. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY],
at 423-24 & 777-78 (1959).
' 29 U.S.C. S 158(f). Section 8(f) provides, in part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction in-
dustry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a
labor organization of which building and construction employees are members
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of
this section as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such
labor organization has not been established under the provisions of section 159 of
this title prior to the making of such agreement. ...
The history of 5 8(f) is well described in NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 82
L,R.R.M. 3015 (3d Cir. 1973):
Section 8(f) was enacted as Section 705 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. ... Section 8(f) was
adopted to meet specific problems which had arisen in the construction industry
under prior law because of the transitory nature of the employer-employee rela-
tionship in that industry. During the Wagner Act period the Board had declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the industry. In 1947, after passage of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, the Board applied the provisions of the Act to the industry with con-
sequent difficulties.
Id. at 1267, 82 L.R.R.M. at 3016. Because construction workers generally work
for a specific employer for only a short time, it was difficult for the Board's election
procedures to be applied effectively in the construction industry. See NLRB v.
Haberman Constr. Co., 618 F.2d 288, 304, 105 L.R.R.M. 2059, 2069 (5th Cir.
1980). It was therefore often impossible for construction workers to exercise their
right to select a bargaining representative. Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2069-70. This
result necessitated the enactment of 5 8(f).
' See the text of 5 8(f) at note 5 supra.
434 U.S. 335, 97 L.R.R.M. 2333 (1978).
Id. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2335-36.
96	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
nonunion labor.'° The union picketed a construction project where work was
being performed by the new company." This picketing persisted for more than
thirty days, during which the union did not file a petition for a representation
election.' 2
 The employer filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB,
alleging that the union's picketing violated section 8(b)(7)(C) of the NLRA.' 3
Section 8(b)(7)(C) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to picket an
employer for recognitional purposes for more than 30 days without filing for a
representation election)* The NLRB found that any picketing to enforce a
prehire agreement was recognitional in nature, and therefore violated section
8(b)(7)(C). 15
 The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's position.' 6
 Dicta in the
Court's opinion suggested that a prehire agreement or any provisions within it
would be completely unenforceable in a contract action unless, after the agree-
ment is signed, the union attains the support of a majority of the employees to
be represented." As a result of this dicta in the Local 103 decision, the lower
courts have divided on the issue of whether a prehire contract can ever be en-
forced by a union which has not achieved majority status."
10 Id. at 339, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2334.
" Id.
12 Id., 97 L.R.R.M. at 2335.
" Id.
14
 Section 8(b)(7)(C), 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(7)(C) (1976) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... (7) to picket or
cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer
where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or re-
quiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as
their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is cur-
rently certified as the representative of such employees: where such picketing has
been conducted without a petition under section 159(c) of this title being filed
within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commence-
ment of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the
Board shall forthwith ... direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be
appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in
this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publici-
ty for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organiza-
tion ....
" Local 103, Ironworkers (Higdon Contracting Co.), 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 46, 88
L.R.R.M. 1067, 1069 (1975).
16
 434 U.S. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2335-36.
17 The Court observed:
It would not be inconsistent with Lion Dry Goods [Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n. v, Lion
Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 49 L.R.R.M. 2670 (1962)] for a court to hold that
the union's majority standing is subject to litigation in a 5 301 suit to enforce a 5
8(f) contract, just as it is in a 5 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice proceeding, and that
absent a showing that the union is the majority's chosen instrument, the contract
is unenforceable.
434 U.S. at 351-52, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2340. Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. & 5 185 (1976), gives federal district courts jurisdiction to hear suits to en-
force labor contracts.
18 See note 36 infra.
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During the Survey year, in Contractors Health and Welfare Plan v. Associated
Wrecking Co. , 19
 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a union
may enforce fringe benefit provisions contained in a prehire agreement by
bringing a breach of contract suit pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 2° regardless of whether the union has
achieved majority status among the employer's workers. 21 In so holding, the
Associated Wrecking court disregarded the dicta in Local 103 which suggested that
prehire agreements would never be enforceable by a union representing a
minority of the employer's workers.
Associated Wrecking concerned a prehire agreement signed by Omaha-
Council Bluffs Local No. 1140 (the union) and Associated Wrecking & Salvage
Company (the employer) which, by its terms, incorporated the fringe benefit
provisions in collective bargaining agreements signed by the union and several
employers' associations. 22 The agreement required the employer to make con-
tributions to various employee benefit trusts. 23 After a period of time the
employee trust funds (collectively, the trusts) brought suit against the employer
in federal court pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, alleging that the
employer owed contributions to the trusts. 24 The employer moved for sum-
mary judgment, contending that since the trusts had failed to establish that the
union represented a majority of the employer's workers, the prehire agreement
could not be enforced." The district court granted the motion, finding that the
Supreme Court's decision in Local 103 precluded the minority union from at-
tempting to enforce the prehire agreement."
The court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that Local 103 was
not controlling for three reasons. First, the court found the holding of Local 103
to be limited to the enforceability of section 8(f) agreements where the union
19 638 F.2d 1128, 106 L.R.R.M. 2257 (8th Cir. 1981),
20
 Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), provides in relevant part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
" Id. at 1134, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260-61.
22 Id. at 1129, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2257.
," Id. The funds involved were the Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters and Engineers
Health & Welfare Plan, the Omaha-Council Bluffs Laborers Local No. 1140 Holiday Trust, the
Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters and Engineers Pension Plan, and the Laborers Training
Fund. Id.
24 Id. at 1130, 106 L,R.R.M. at 2257.
25 Id.
" 484 F. Supp. 582, 585-87, 104 L.R.R.M. 2128, 2131-32 (D. Neb. 1980). The court
in Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816, 104
L.R.R.M. 2653 (D.D.C. 1980), interpreted Local 103 similarly, and found that an obligation to
pay fringe benefits in a prehire agreement is unenforceable when the union fails to demonstrate
that it represents a majority of the employer's workers. Id. at 819, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2655. That
court relied on the district court's opinion in Associated Wrecking for support, however. Id. at 818,
104 L.R.R.M. at 2654-55.
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had engaged in picketing which violated section 8(b)(7)(C). 27 Local 103 was
therefore inapplicable to a case which did not implicate section 8(b)(7). 29 Sec-
ond, the court found that the litigation in Local 103 concerned an unfair labor
practice charge filed by the employer, while, in contrast, the litigation in
Associated Wrecking concerned a breach of contract action filed by the union. 29
The court noted that while the Supreme Court had held in Local 103 that a
union which has not established majority status may not file an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer for breach of a duty to bargain," the
Court had not considered whether and to what extent prehire agreements
might be enforceable in breach of contract actions. 3 ' Finally, the Associated
Wrecking court found that the underlying policy reason for the holding in Local
103 — that of protecting the complete freedom of employees to choose their
bargaining representative — was not present in Associated Wrecking. 32 The ac-
tion taken by the union in Local 103 was essentially an attempt to gain recogni-
tion by an employer without first obtaining the consent of his employees. 33 In
Associated Wrecking, however, since the union could not gain recognition merely
be requiring the employer to pay into employee trust funds, no congressional
policy would be furthered by denying the trusts the opportunity to enforce the
fringe benefit provisions in the prehire agreement. 34 As the court noted, the
fringe benefit provisions were not recognitional because the payments sought
by the trusts would inure to the benefit of the individual employees at the time
of employment, regardless of whether the union had majority status." Having
2 ' 638 F.2d at 1132-33, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2259-60.
" Id. at 1133, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2259-60.
" Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
3° 434 U.S. at 341, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2335-36.
31 638 F.2d at 1133, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260. In Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry
Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 49 L.R.R.M. 2670 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a union need
not represent a majority of an employer's workers before it can bring an action under § 301(a) of
the LMRA to enforce a labor agreement. Id. at 25-27, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2673-74. The validity or
enforceability of prehire agreements, the Court noted, was intended by Congress to be litigated
in § 301 suits. Id. at 27, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2674. The Local 103 decision made clear, however, that
the holding of Lion .07 Goods was limited to addressing the question of whether federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear § 301 suits concerning prehire agreements, and did not address questions
concerning the enforceability of prehire agreements. 434 U.S. at 351, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2340.
" 638 F.2d at 1133, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
" NLRB v. Local 103, Intl Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. at 346-48, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2338.
" 638 F.2d at 1133, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260.
" Id. Neither the opinions of the district court nor the circuit court in Associated Wrecking
specifically state whether the nonunion workers were entitled to payments from the trusts. If a
fringe benefit provision was to provide that only union workers were entitled to benefits from the
contributions made by the employer, then the provision would arguably be recognitional in
nature. Although such a provision would not cause an employer to recognize the union, it could
cause nonunion workers to become union members in order to receive benefits. It is doubtful,
however, that many prehire agreements contain or incorporate fringe benefit provisions of this
type. Typically, an employer who has agreed to make contributions to union trust funds must
pay into the trusts a specified amount for each hour worked by each of his employees. After a
specified employee has worked a specified number of hours, the trusts are required to pay his
benefits, regardless of whether he has become a union member. See Florida Marble Polishers
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distinguished Local 103 on these grounds, the Associated Wrecking court held that
the fringe benefit provisions of the prehire agreement would be binding in spite
of the union's failure to establish majority status. 36
The Associated Wrecking court's holding that fringe benefit provisions con-
tained in prehire agreements may be enforced in a section 301 contract action
effectuates the purpose of section 8(f). If the broad interpretation of the Local
103 decision advanced by the district court in Associated Wrecking were accepted,
unions could be prevented from enforcing prehire agreements in most, if not
all, circumstances. The statutory authorization of prehire agreements found in
section 8(f) would become meaningless if prehire agreements are found by the
courts to be completely unenforceable." The statutory authorization of prehire
agreements was intended to benefit construction industry employers in two
ways: (1) by allowing employers bidding for construction jobs to know their
Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Megahee, 102 L.R.R.M. 2740, 2741 (M.D. Fla. 1979);
Eastern Dist. Council V. Blake Constr. Co., 457 F. Supp. 825, 826 n.1, 99 L.R.R.M. 3257,
3258 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1978); Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Security Trust Funds v.
Hillis Homes, Inc., 612 P.2d 436, 441, 107 L.R.R.M. 2897, 2898 (1980). In fact, the trusts may
be required to pay benefits for an employee even though his employer never made contributions
in his behalf. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, 255 N.L.R.B. No. 83,
106 L.R.R.M. 1399, 1401-02 (1981).
36 638 F.2d at 1134, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2260-61. Several courts considered the question
of the enforceability of fringe benefit provisions in prehire contracts prior to the release of the
Associated Wrecking decision. The decisions of these courts are inconsistent with one another. See,
e.g., Florida Marble Polishers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Megahee, 102 L.R.R.M. 2740
(M.D. Fla. 1979) (oral opinion finding fringe benefit provisions enforceable in 301 suit);
Eastern Dist. Council v. Blake Constr. Co., 457 F. Supp. 825, 99 L.R.R.M. 3257 (E.D. Va.
1978) (fringe benefit provisions in international agreement which is "in the nature of a prehire
agreement," id. at 829, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3259, are enforceable); Western Wash. Cement
Masons Health & Security Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 612 P.2d 436, 107 L.R.R.M.
2897 (1980) (trustees of trust funds may, as third party beneficiaries, bring suit to enforce fringe
benefit provisions). But see Vermeer v. Aloha Contractors, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M. 2895 (D. Or.
1980) (fringe benefit provisions in prehire contracts are unenforceable until the union establishes
majority status); Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325 (D. Or. 1980) (majority status is condi-
tion precedent to enforcement of fringe benefit provisions); Baton Rouge Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 534, 106 L.R.R.M. 2040
(M.D. La. 1980) (absent proof of majority status, prehire agreements are unenforceable);
Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Security Trust Fund. v. McDowell, 103
L.R.R.M. 2219 (W.D. Wash. 1979). In the months following the Associated Wrecking decision,
the Tenth Circuit has found, in accord with Associated Wrecking, that fringe benefit provisions in
prehire agreements may be enforced in a contract action regardless of whether the union can
prove majority status. See Trustees of the Teamsters Constr. Workers Health and Welfare Trust
Fund v. Hawg n Action, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M. 2865 (10th Cir. 1981); N. M. Dist. Council of
Carpenters v. The Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2931 (10th Cir. 1981). See also International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, 255 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 106 L.R.R.M. 1399 (1981)
(union may picket to enforce fringe benefit provision in prehire contract without violating
8(b)(7)(C)). See note 35 supra for further discussion of the Board's decision in International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, Local 150.
37 In Western Wash Cement Masons Health & Security Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes,
Inc., 612 P.2d 436, 107 L.R.R.M. 2897 (1980), the court commented: " [W]e feel that refusal to
allow enforcement of a prehire agreement by a lawsuit would effectively render 5 8(1) mean-
ingless, and would, therefore, run counter to the rule that statutes are to be construed so as to
give effect to every word." Id. at 441, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2900 (citations omitted).
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labor costs in advance, 38 and (2) by enabling employers to have a known quan-
tity of skilled crafts workers available for construction work." If Congress in-
tended prehire agreements to serve these purposes effectively, then prehire
agreements must have been intended to be enforceable to some extent against
unions. Furthermore, Congress must have intended prehire agreements to be
enforceable at least to some extent against employers as well, since no union
truly serving the interests of its members would be eager to enter into an agree-
ment with an employer if it knew the employer could always disregard the
terms of the agreement with impunity.
The holding of Associated Wrecking furthers general congressional aims in
enacting labor legislation because it helps to preserve stable and peaceful labor
relations on the employer's worksite. 4° Once a union establishes majority
status on a worksite, a prehire agreement has the binding effect of a collective
bargaining agreement. 4 ' If the union does not represent a majority of the
employer's workers, however, the employer, as a result of the Local 103 deci-
sion, presumably may disregard the terms of a prehire agreement without com-
mitting an unfair labor practice. 42 Yet severe inequities would result if the
3a
	 REP. No. 187 at 186 H.R. REP. NO. 741 at 19, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 424 & 776.
39 Id.
'° The Supreme Court has commented that "[tihe goal of federal labor policy, as ex-
pressed in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, is the promotion of collective bargaining; to en-
courage the employer and the representative of the employees to establish, through collective
negotiation, their own charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and thereby to minimize
industrial strife." Local 24, International Bd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295, 43
L.R.R.M. 2374, 2379 (1959) (citations omitted).
4 ' NLRB v. Local 103, International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. at 349-50, 97 L.R.R.M. at 2339; NLRB V. Haberman Constr. Co., 618
F.2d 288, 294-95, 105 L.R.R.M. 2059, 2062 (5th Cir. 1980). When the employees which the
union seeks to represent do not work at a single location on a permanent or stable basis, the
union must prove majority status on each individual jobsite covered by the agreement. Cor-
rugated Structures, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 105 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1980). It is not entirely
clear whether the union, once it has established majority status, is entitled to an irrebuttable
presumption of majority status for the duration of the prehire agreement. The Board's original
position was that the union was not entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of majority status.
R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 691, 77 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1971), enforcement denied, 480
F.2d 1186, 83 L.R.R.M. 2706 (D.C. Cir. 1973), remand accepted, 208 N.L.R.B. 615, 85
L.R.R.M. 1187 (1974). However, the Board has recently held that a union which has established
majority status in a permanent and stable workforce is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption of
majority status for the duration of the agreement. See, e,g., Hageman Underground Constr., 253
N.L.R.B, No. 7, 105 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1980); Precision Striping, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 34,
102 L.R.R.M. 1264 (1979), enforcement denied, Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144,
107 L.R.R.M. 2009 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit found that the Board's current position
is "inconsistent with the Act, inconsistent with prior decisional law, and irrational." Id. at 1147,
107 L.R.R.M. at 2010. Hence, the Ninth Circuit has held that a union is only entitled to a rebut-
table presumption of majority status, at least in cases where it is apparent that the union obtained
majority status through operation of a union security clause contained in a prehire agreement.
Id. at 1148, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2011.
42 See, e.g., Corrugated Structures, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1392
(1980) (finding that an employer does not violate S 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act when it repudiates a
prehire agreement by unilaterally reducing the wages of certain employees and by withdrawing
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union is precluded from bringing a section 301 contract action against the
employer, and the employer, accordingly, is allowed to escape his contractual
obligations. An employer could promise to pay his workers at a certain rate and
to provide set benefits in a prehire agreement. Subsequently, after the workers
had relied on the employer's promise and at least partially fulfilled their obliga-
tions under the prehire agreement, the employer could renege on his promise.
Without a section 301 contract action, the employees would have no legal
remedy against the employer. Frustrated workers left without a legal remedy
against an employer who disregards a prehire agreement would perhaps resort
to violent illegal action against the employer. Such action would engender in-
dustrial strife in the construction industry, a result which seems contrary to
Congress' intent in authorizing section 8(1) prehire agreements."
recognition of the union which has not established majority status). After the Supreme Court's
decision in Local 103, it seemed apparent that unions would be completely foreclosed from at-
tempting to enforce prehire agreements through the use of picketing. Yet, in International Union
of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150 (Tri-City Excavating), 255 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 106 L.R.R.M.
1399 (1981), in an opinion released by the Board several months after Associated Wrecking had
been decided, the Board held that a union did not commit an unfair labor practice by picketing to
enforce a fringe benefit provision in a prehire contract. 106 L.R.R.M. at 1403. The Board
distinguished Local 103 by finding that picketing to enforce fringe benefit provisions was
nonrecognitional in nature. Since 5 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits only recognitional picketing, see note 14
supra, the Board concluded that 8(b)(7)(C) had not been violated. Id.
The decision of the Board in Tri-City Excavating that fringe benefit provisions are
nonrecognitional in nature was proper. Furthermore, the Board was correct in finding that those
provisions in prehire agreements which are nonrecognitional in nature arc enforceable. See text
and notes at notes 44-45 infra. There is a possibility, however, that the courts may refuse to adopt
the Kard's position that the unions may use economic action, such as picketing, to enforce
prehire agreements in cases where the picketing is nonrecognitional in nature. Language in
various decisions indicates that the courts would prefer to enforce prehire contracts in the context
of a 5 301 contract action rather than in the context of an unfair labor practice suit. See, e.g.,
Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F,2d 1145, 1147 n.3, 107 L.R.R. M. 2009, 2010 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1981); Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Security Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes,
Inc., 612 P.2d 436, 440, 107 L.R.R.M. 2897, 2900 (1980). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
indicated that economic coercion may be completely unavailable as a method of enforcing prehire
agreements. In Local 103, the Supreme Court regarded 5 8(f) to be similar to 5 8(e) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. 5 158(e) (1976), and noted that unions in the construction industry may not use
economic coercion to enforce hot cargo clauses which are authorized by the construction industry
proviso to 5 8(e). 434 U.S. at 349 n.11, 97 L.R.R. M. at 2339 n.11. It should be noted, however,
that the hot cargo clauses authorized by 8(e) generally require a construction industry employer
to subcontract work only to subcontractors who agree that their employees will become members
of the union after working for a certain period of time on the construction site. Such clauses,
unlike fringe benefit provisions, are obviously recognitional in natue.
" See King & LaVaute, Current Trends in Construction Industry Labor Relations — The
Double-Breasted Contractor and the Prehire Contract, 29 SvRACuSE L. REV. 901, 940 (1978):
The concept of an employer waiting with open arms to have his employees
represented by a union runs contrary to practical labor relations experience and
contrary in fact to the premises upon which our national labor laws were estab-
lished. Surely, it should not be solely the employer's option to determine whether
he will be subject to collective bargaining or whether he will remain bound to his
collective bargaining agreement. ... If the current trend is permitted to continue
it will have a substantial adverse impact on the interests of construction industry
labor unions and the employees they represent and, it is submitted, on the in-
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The Associated Wrecking decision suggests that the following general princi-
ple should be applied by the courts in section 301 suits for enforcement of
prehire agreements. When the provisions in a prehire agreement which the
union is seeking to enforce in a section 301 contract action are not recognitional
in nature, the provisions should be enforced regardless of whether the union
can show that it represents a majority of the employer's workers." For exam-
ple, wage and benefit provisions are generally not recognitional, so long as
both union and nonunion workers received the same wages and benefits." No
useful purpose is served when a court refuses to enforce such provisions merely
because the union has not obtained majority status. When the provisions in
question are recognitional, however, the union should be required to show that
it represents a majority of workers before it can prevail in a section 301 suit to
enforce them. Union signatory clauses, which require nonunion workers to
become members of the union after a specified period of time, are an example
of provisions which are clearly recognitional in nature. A useful purpose is
served when a court refuses to enforce such provisions prior to a showing by the
union that it represents a majority of the employer's workers. If such a provi-
sion were enforced before the union represents a majority of workers, the union
could gain majority status even though a majority of the workers had been
unable to choose freely whether to become union members.
One question not directly confronted by the Associated Wrecking court is
whether an employer may affirmatively repudiate its obligations under a
prehire agreement without risking liability in a section 301 suit brought by the
union." Assuming that the courts draw a distinction between recognitional
and nonrecognitional provisions in prehire contracts, recognitional provisions
— unenforceable so long as the union does not have majority status — could
obviously be repudiated by employers if the union is unable to prove that it has
achieved majority status. An argument can be made that the employer's
repudiation should also relieve the employer from his obligation to honor
nonrecognitional provisions in prehire contracts.'" However, the congressional
terests of the vast majority of employers in the construction industry who still
regard a labor contract as a contract.
Id. In New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. the Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2930 (10th
Cir. 1981), the court commented that "the employer who subjects himself to a 8(f) agreement
reaps the benefits of industrial peace at his worksite and should not complain when he is asked to
honor the agreement that made such benefits possible." Id. at 2933-34.
" A union which does not represent a majority of the employer's workers may be
foreclosed from enforcing a prehire agreement through unfair labor practice proceedings. See
text and note at note 42 supra.
45 See note 35 supra.
" In order to repudiate a prehire agreement, an employer should give the union notice
that he does not intend to honor the agreement. In Trustees of the Teamsters Constt'. Workers v.
Hawg n Action, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M. 2865 (10th Cir. 1981), the court found that an employer
could not repudiate fringe benefit provisions in a prehire contract merely be failing to make
payments as required by the provisions. Id. at 2867.
47
 In Precision Striping, Inc. v NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 107 L.R.R.M. 2009 (9th Cir.
1981), the Ninth Circuit indicated that an employer may repudiate a fringe benefit provision in a
prehire contract whenever the union does not have majority status. See id. at 1147, 107
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labor policy of protecting an employee's freedom to choose a bargaining
representative is not furthered by allowing an employer to renege on his prom-
ise to pay set wages or fringe benefits." Moreover, both nonunion and union
employees would lose their entitlement to set wages and fringe benefits, even
though their employer had voluntarily agreed to pay them. Therefore, the
courts should be willing to enforce nonrecognitional provisions in prehire
agreements until the date of the prehire agreement's termination."
It is now possible that a union which has not achieved majority status may
not enforce a prehire agreement by bringing an unfair labor practice charge
against a recalcitrant employer, or by resorting to economic coercion. 50 Prior to
Associated Wrecking, no federal court of appeals had considered whether provi-
sions in prehire agreements should be enforced in contract actions brought pur-
suant to section 301. 5 ' The Associated Wrecking decision can be interpreted as
setting positive guidelines for future application of the law in this area. The en-
forceability of provisions in prehire agreements other than fringe benefit provi-
sions must, of course, be decided on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, in all
cases where the enforceability of provisions in prehire agreements is in ques-
tion, the practitioner should recognize that courts may, in section 301 contract
actions, enforce provisions in prehire agreements even though the union is
unable to prove that it has majority status.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. Representation at Investigatory Interviews:
Lennox Industries v. NLRB
Appalachian Power Co.*
In 1975, in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. , 1 the United States Supreme Court
_ruled that if an employee is' refused union representation during an in-
vestigatory interview which he reasonably fears may result in discipline, the
L.R.R.M. at 2010.
49 In fact, Congress has recognized a national public interest in the protection of
employee benefit rights. See 29 U.S.C. 1001 (1976).
49 The enforcement of nonrecognitional provisions in prehire agreements should not
impose an unfair burden on employers. Most prehire agreements are effective on a year-to-year
basis. If the employer gives proper notice, usually three months prior to the termination date of
the agreement, he may terminate the agreement. See International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
255 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 106 L.R.R.M. 1399, 1400 n.3 (1981). Thus, employers generally would
be required to pay fringe benefits for, at the maximum, one year before they would no longer be
bound by their prehire agreement.
'° See note 42 supra.
5.1 The Tenth Circuit has since heard several cases on substantially the same issue as
Associated Wrecking, and has followed the position adopted by the Associated Wrecking court. See
note 36 supra.
* By Edith A. Goldman, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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employee has a statutory right to decline to participate in the interview. 2 The
Court upheld the decision of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) that
an employer's denial of a request for union representation at an investigatory
interview constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 3 because it interferes with the
employee's right, protected by section 7 of the NLRA, 4 "to engage in other
concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection. ... "5
The Weingarten Court also approved four limitations of the right to
representation which the Board, in other decisions,s had delineated.' First, the
Court ruled, the right to representation arises only at the employee's requests
Consequently, the employee may choose to participate in the interview without
representation. 9 Second, this right to request representation exists only where
the employee reasonably believes that the investigation will result in discipli-
nary action.'° According to the Court, this reasonable belief is measured "by
objective standards under all the circumstances of the case."" Third, the
employer has no obligation to explain his refusal to allow union representation
and may continue the investigation without interviewing the employee." It is
thus the employee's decision whether to forego any benefit which might be af-
forded by the interview." Finally, the employer has no duty to bargain with the
union representative at an investigatory interview, and may insist on hearing
only the employee's version of the situation.'l
2 Id. at 266-67.
Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
of this title;" 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1) (1976).
4 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976) provides: .
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
420 U.S. at 252-53 (citing J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 82 L.R.R.M.
1559 (1973)). The Weingarten Court deferred to the Board's expertise and found the Board's con-
struction of 7 to be permissible. 420 U.S. at 266-67. The Court noted that it is the Board's
responsibility to determine whether the need for union assistance exists in light of changing in-
dustrial practices and its experience in dealing with labor-management relations. Id. at 266.
6 Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), enf't denied, 482
F.2d 842, 83 L.R.R.M. 2823 (7th Cir. 1973); Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79
L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enft denied, 481 F.2d 1018, 83 L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub
nom. Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
7
 420 U.S. at 256.
8
 Id. at 257.
9 Id.
to Id.
" Id. at 257 n.5 (quoting Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 n.3, 79 L.R.R.M.
1269, 1271 n.3 (1972)).
12 420 U.S. at 258.
" Id.
14 Id. at 260.
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The criteria Weingarten' imposed on the right to representation were high-
lighted by two cases which arose during the Survey year. In Lennox Industries v.
NLRB," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered what constitutes
an investigatory interview in order to determine whether the requirement for
union representation is triggered even when no discipline is intended by the
employer. 16 The Fifth Circuit held that when an interview is designed to elicit
information which might reasonably result in immediate or future discipline,
the right to a union representative exists. 17 According to the Lennox court, when
an interview focuses on poor work or an employee-supervisor altercation, the
risk of discipline is inherent and the right to representation attaches, even
though no discipline is contemplated by the employer."
In Lennox, the complaining employee, Paul Nestle, was an assembly line
worker supervised by Leo Ary. Fred Boenker was manager of final assembly
and Ary's superior." Nestle had recently been transferred from a different as-
sembly line and was having difficulty increasing his production speed in the
new line." He was assigned to different tasks on the line and was told by Ary
that if he did not increase his speed, Ary would have to take some action
,against him. 2 ' On February 16, 1978, Ary informed Nestle that he wanted to
speak with him. 22 On the way to Ary's desk, Nestle said that he would like a
union representative present but Ary indicated it would be unnecessary." As
they walked, Nestle said something which Ary interpreted as a threat. Ary then
took Nestle directly to Boenker's office. 21 In Boenker's office, Ary complained
that Nestle had threatened him but Nestle denied this." After it was deter-
mined that there had been no witnesses to the conversation between Ary and
Nestle, Boenker suggested that they discuss the production problem." While
Boenker answered a telephone call, Ary and Nestle expressed their animosity
toward one another." When Boenker completed his call, he suggested to
Nestle and Ary that they get along in spite of their personal differences since he
was interested in improved production." Boenker pointed out that he had ob-
served Nestle and believed that he and a co-employee were causing a slowdown
in production. 29 At this point, Nestle requested union representation. Boenker
responded that he would get a representative if it were necessary."° Bocnker
15 637 F.2d 340, 106 L.R.R.M. 2607 (5th Cir. 1981).
16 Id. at 342, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2608.
17 Id. at 344, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610.
16 Id.
19 Id. at 342, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2608.









29 244 N.L.R.B. at 608, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
30 637 F.2d at 342, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2608.
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then stated that Nestle would continue to work under Ary's supervision and
that he did not want continued disharmony. 3 ' Finally, Boenker instructed
Nestle that his production would have to improve, but indicated that this was
not meant as a threat."
The union filed charges alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA. The National Labor Relations Board found that, under Weingarten, the
denial of union representation was an unfair labor practice." The Fifth Circuit
upheld the Board's decision. In so doing, the court acknowledged that when
the purpose of a meeting is supervisory rather than investigatory, no right to
union representation inheres." Nevertheless, the court maintained that the
questioning of Nestle about both his poor work performance and the confronta-
tion with his supervisor was designed to elicit responses which could be used in
a future disciplinary action." The Lennox court concluded that such an inter-
view is by nature "an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline
reasonably inheres."" The court then rejected the test applied by other circuits
that the right to representation arises only when a significant objective of the
interview is to elicit facts to support disCiplinary action which is probable or is
being seriously considered." The Lennox court noted that often management
does not determine whether to consider disciplinary action seriously until after
the employee has been questioned. 38
 Consequently, according to the court, the
risk of discipline inheres at such an interview. 39 A rule which requires
discipline to be probable or at least seriously considered in order for the
employee's right to union representation to vest would thus unduly limit the
protection afforded by Weingarten."
At first glance, Lennox may appear to be simply an application of the
Weingarten rule to a particular set of facts. Under Weingarten, the reasonableness
of the employee's belief that discipline may result is measured objectively,
based on all of the circumstances of the case. In view of the critical statements
made by Ary in the weeks prior to the interview and the animosity that existed
between Ary and Nestle, a belief that disciplinary action would result was a
31 Id.
" Id.
9 ' 244 N.L.R.B. at 608, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
'4
 637 F.2d at 343.44, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2609,
" Id. at 344, 106 L,R,R.M. at 2609-10.
33 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S, at 262). The Lennox court
also held that Nestle's request for union representation while on the plant floor was sufficient to
require a representative at both meetings. 637 F.2d at 345, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610-11. Since
Ary, a company official, was aware of the request and present at both meetings and since the two
meetings were part of a "single interrelated episode," one request was sufficient, Id.
" 637 F.2d at 344, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610. See AAA Equip. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 598
F.2d 1142, 1146, 101 L.R.R.M. 2381, 2383 (8th Cir. 1979); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB,
587 F.2d 403, 410, 99 L,R.R.M. 2841, 2845 (9th Cir. 1978).
Je 637 F.2d at 344, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610.
ss
14.
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reasonable one. "Substantial evidence on the record as a whole, "41 then, exists
to support the Board's finding that Nestle reasonably feared discipline, 42
While the result in Lennox appears to be consistent with the Weingarten
holding, the language used by the court indicates a willingness to expand the
right to union representation to situations not necessarily envisioned by the
Weingarten Court. In Weingarten, the Court pointed out that since the right to
union representation is limited to situations where the employee reasonably
believes that discipline will result, the . rule does not apply to everyday shop-
floor conversations which include training and correction." A key fact noted by
the Court in Weingarten was that the interview at issue related to an allegation of
dishonesty for which the employee could have been discharged without further
notice." There was no question that the employee might reasonably believe
that discipline would result." In holding that representation is required if the
interview is "designed to elicit information which might reasonably result in
discipline — either immediately or at some time in the future ... , "46 the Lennox
court appears to have broadened the category of interviews where it will
recognize a right to representation. The court viewed the risk of discipline as
inherent in an interview focusing on poor work or on an employee-employer
confrontation even if disciplinary action does not appear to be imminent." The
Weingarten rule, the court suggested, was designed to protect employees from
inadvertent answers given during such interviews."
Based on the language of Lennox, it is difficult to imagine a supervisory
counseling conference in which the right to representation would not exist. It is
questionable, however, whether in finding a right to union representation at
the counseling stage of supervisor-employee relations the Lennox court properly
applied the Weingarten "reasonable belief" test. By adding the words "or at
some time in the future" to the Weingarten standard, the court changed the
nature of that standard. Moreover, a right to representation during a super-
visory counseling conference does not further the purposes enunciated in
Weingarten. There, the Court noted that the absence of a union representative
at an investigatory interview would perpetuate the inequality of bargaining
power which the National Labor Relations Act was designed to eliminate. 49 In
addition, union representation in an investigatory interview, according to the
Weingarten Court, is helpful to both the employee and the employer." Such rep-
41 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
42 637 F.2d at 344-45 n.8, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2610 n.8.
41 420 U.S. at 257-58.
44 Id, at 258 n.5.
4s Id.
46 637 F.2d at 34/, 106 L.R.B.M. at 2614 (emphasis added).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 420 U.S. at 262.
59 Id. at 262 & n.7.
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resentation may help resolve the issues in an underlying incident and avoid
needless disciplinary actions and grievances that might otherwise occur."
The Weingarten decision, then, appears to have been directed at interviews
investigating particular incidents or repeated failures to improve work rather
than at conferences designed for early counseling on poor work performance.
There is serious question whether employee-employer relations would be
served by recognizing the right to union representation during the initial stages
of such counseling, as suggested by Lennox. Normally, such a conference would
be geared to working out the problems which stand in the way of improved per-
formance. The introduction of a third party, present for the purpose of
representing the employee, in a situation where the employer is not contem-
plating discipline, would be likely to encourage a more adversarial atmosphere
and thus would not be conducive to greater harmony between supervisor and
employee.
Apart from the sound labor policy considerations which support a cautious
approach to the expansion of the right to union representation, it is important
also to note that it is the National Labor Relations Board, not the courts, that is
entrusted with the task of determining whether a need for union representation
exists "in light of changing industrial practices and the Board's cumulative ex-
perience in dealing with labor-management relations." 52 There is no evidence
that the Board is interested in broadening the scope of the Weingarten protection
to the extent suggested by the language in Lennox. The Board's decision that
Lennox committed an unfair labor practice was based on Nestle's reasonable
fear of discipline in view of Ary's prior statement that action would be taken
against Nestle if his performance did not improve. 53 The Board applied the
Weingarten standard and used none of the expansive language suggested by the
Fifth Circuit. The court should defer to the Board's expertise in this area and
refrain from modifying the standard the Board has adopted.
in contrast to the Fifth Circuit approach, the Ninth Circuit, in an earlier
case, used much more limiting language in upholding a Board determination.
5 ' Id. at 262-63.
' 2 Id. at 266. The Board . has the function of applying the general provisions of the
NLRA to the complexities of industrial life. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236
(1963). The Board's decisions are given deference because of its expertise in the labor-
management field, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965), and the
balance it strikes in reconciling the conflicting interests is subject to limited judicial review,
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
The Weingarten Court also noted that the recognition of a statutory right to representation at
investigatory interviews went along with provisions in many collective bargaining agreements.
420 U.S. at 267. The Court quoted language from the Bethlehem Steel Corp. and United
Steelworkers Agreement of 1971, Art. XI, 4(d), which provided: "Any Employee who is sum-
moned to meet in an enclosed office with a supervisor for the purposes of discussing possible
disciplinary action shall be entitled to be accompanied by the Assistant Grievance Commit-
teeman. ... " Id. at 267 n.11. This right of representation in a conference held for the purposes of
discussing possible disciplinary action is far more limited than that suggested by the Fifth Circuit as a
statutory right.
" 244 N.L.R.B. at 608, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1300.
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In Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB," the Board held that the employer violated
section 8(a)(1) by denying union representation at counseling sessions which
were an integral part of and a preliminary stage in the disciplinary procedure."
The Lewis court distinguished interviews in which the right to representation
inheres from those in which it does not, in the following manner:
It should be acknowledged that a supervisory interview in which the
employee is questioned or instructed about work performance in-
evitably carries with it the threat that if the employee cannot or will
not comply with a directive, discharge or discipline may follow; but
that latent threat, without more, does not invoke the right to the
assistance of a union representative. The right of representation
arises when a significant purpose of the interview is to obtain facts to
support disciplinary action that is probable or that is being seriously
considered."
The Lewis court recognized that inherent in any supervisory counseling session
is the risk of future discipline. This threat, however, does not rise to the level of
demanding a Weingarten right to representation until disciplinary action is prob-
able or seriously considered. In spite of this more restricted standard, the Lewis
court found substantial evidence for the Board's conclusion that the employees
had a right to union representation in view of the atmosphere of intimidation
and the part the counseling sessions played in the disciplinary process. The
language of the Lewis decision and the application of its standard to the facts of
the case demonstrate a close adherence to the Board's and Weingarten's "rea-
sonable belief" standard.
The question of where the line is to be drawn between supervisory and in-
vestigatory interviews remains open. The issue is whether the latent threat of
discipline, present in any supervisory interview designed to improve work per-
formance, is sufficient to invoke the right to union representation. By stating
that the right inheres when discipline might reasonably result at some time in
the future even when no discipline is contemplated by the employer, the Fifth
Circuit appears ready to take an expansive view of the Weingarten right. Until
the Board and/or the Supreme Court defines more clearly the limits of the
Weingarten right, employers and unions will continue to be uncertain of when
the right to representation exists.
Another of the elements of the Weingarten right to union representation was
highlighted during the Survey year in a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. In Appalachian Power Co. , 57
 the Board held that a shop steward could not
invoke an employee's right to union representation in an investigatory inter-
view when no confirmation of the request was made by the employee and the
54 587 F.2d 403, 99 L.R.R.M. 2841 (9th Cir. 1978).
55 Id. at 410, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2845-46.
56 Id. The Eighth Circuit adopted this language in AAA Equip. Serv. Co. v. NLRB,
598 F.2d 1142, 101 L.R.R.M. 2381 (8th Cir. 1979).
57 253 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 106 L.R.R.M. 1041 (Dec. 22, 1980).
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supervisory person involved was not informed of the request." The Board thus
declined to extend the Weingarten right to representation which arises only at
the employee's request."
Appalachian Power Co. involved a shift supervisor, Charles Harrison, who
asked employees Parsons and Noffsinger to repair a high pressure water
heater." Parsons, afraid that the heater was unsafe, objected. His refusal was
reported to Hill, the maintenance superintendent. 61 Hill requested that the
employees report to his office. 62 Parsons paged Goff, the shop steward, asking
him to meet them at Hill's office. 63 While on their way to his office, Parsons
and Noffsinger met Hill in the corridor." Hill began to question them about
their refusal to repair the heater. 65 While this conversation ensued, Goff, the
shop steward, entered the corridor and spoke to Harrison, the shift supervisor,
who was standing approximately 1 5 feet away from where Hill, Parsons, and
Noffsinger were speaking." Goff told Harrison that he had come for the
meeting. He was then ordered to leave by Harrison. Employees Parsons and
Noffsinger made no comment and Goff left. 67 No evidence was presented in-
dicating that Hill was aware of Goff s presence. The discussion between Hill
and Parsons and Noffsinger continued in the hall for several minutes and
culminated in the employees' suspension for refusing to work on the heater. 68
The union filed a charge alleging that the Appalachian Power Company
had denied Parson's and Noffsinger's request for union representation in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(1) of the Labor Management Relations Act. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose rulings, findings, and conclusions were
affirmed by the Board, concluded that the employer had not committed an un-
fair labor practice by conducting the meeting even though the steward was told
to leave. 69 The ALJ determined, as a factual matter, that the employees had
made no specific request to Hill for union representation. 7° Furthermore, the
ALJ maintained that a request for representation must be initiated by the
employees involved and must be directed to the management official who is
conducting the interview." The ALJ pointed out that Weingarten had
" Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 1041-42.
59 420 U.S. at 257.
" 253 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
61 Id. On the previous day, Parsons had also refused to repair the heater, claiming that
it was unsafe. Id. After a meeting between Parsons, his union steward, and the production super-








69 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
70 Id,
7 ' Id.
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underscored the Board's view that the employee could forego his right to
representation. 72 The ALJ reasoned that to allow the union steward to invoke
the employees' Weingarten rights would deprive those employees of the oppor-
tunity to evaluate whether the steward's presence would be to their benefit." It
is the employee who has the vested interest in the outcome of the interview and,
according to the ALJ, it should be his right to determine if he would like union
assistance. 74
 The union's interest in attending the interview is not identical to
that of the employee. In addition to protecting this employee's interests, the
union must also assure other employees that they will be represented in similar
circumstances." The ALJ concluded that if the union could assert the
employee's right to be represented, the employee would be unable to determine
if this representation benefited his interests and one of the fundamental pur-
poses of the rule would be undermined."
Prior Board decisions consistently have held that the employee must in-
itiate the request for representation." The ALJ acknowledged that the union
did not initiate the request for representation on its own." Nevertheless, the
ALJ concluded that the employees showed no continuing interest in represen-
tation, pointing out that Parsons did not renew his request for representation
or communicate it directly to Hill, who was unaware of Parsons' call to Goff."
In addition, the employee must direct the request for representation to the
management official with whom the interview is to take place since this official
alone knows the reason for the interview and can assess whether or not to grant
the request. 8° Hill, whose back was turned toward Goff and Harrison, was
unaware of Goff's presence as well as of the interchange between the two.
Therefore, according to the ALJ, Parsons' and Noffsinger's silence during the
interchange could not be considered a ratification of Goff's statement that he
was there to represent them. 81 Since Parsons did not communicate to Hill a





77 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 1042. See, e.g., Kohl's Food Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 75, 104
L.R.R.M. 1063 (1980); First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 103 L.R.R.M.
1317 (Feb. 19, 1980).
78 253 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
79 Id.
86 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 1042. In Lennox Indus., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 607, 102
L.R.R.M. 1298 (1979), the Board held that no Weingarten violation was committed when the
employer interviewed an employee in the absence of union representation. (This portion of the
Board's Lennox decision was not addressed in the appeal discussed in text and notes at notes 15-53
supra, which related to a different employee.) In this part of the case, the employee indicated to
the employer's industrial relations manager that he wanted representation but then spoke with
the manager without renewing his request for representation. The Board emphasized that the
person asking to meet with the employee must be informed of the demand, since only that in-
dividual knows the subject of the meeting and is in a position to determine how to proceed. Id. at
609, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1301.
81 253 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1042.
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desire for representation, the employer did not unlawfully deny union
representation during a disciplinary meeting."
Appalachian Power is premised on the reasonable notion that the right to
representation belongs to the employee. According to this view, it is not the
union's bargaining rights but the individual employee's rights which are
violated by a denial of representation. This approach has had an uncertain
history in NLRB and court decisions. In 1967, in Texaco, Inc. ," the Board
found that the denial of union representation in an investigatory interview was
an unlawful refusal to bargain with a union. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals disagreed, explaining that the purpose of the interview was to question
the employee, not to bargain with him." The court recognized the right to
union representation at a disciplinary interview as a function of the right to
bargain collectively regarding terms and conditions of employment. 85 Since an
investigatory interview deals with eliciting facts rather than the consequences
of those facts, the court found no bargaining rights and consequently no right
to representation in such an interview." The Board later adopted the Fifth Cir-
cuit's position. For example, in 1975, in Quality Manufacturing Co. ," the Board
stated that in the case of a purely investigatory interview, denial of representa-
tion did not violate the bargaining rights of the union but did violate the
employee's individual right to be represented by his union." Investigatory in-
terviews, however, continued to be distinguished from disciplinary interviews.
The Weingarten Court, for example, indicated that the employer only had a
duty to bargain with the union representative at a disciplinary interview, not at
an investigative interview."
In 1979, in Baton Rouge Water Works Co.," however, in the course of
holding that no right to union representation exists when the employer simply
meets with the employee to inform him of previously determined discipline, the
Board abandoned the distinction between investigatory and disciplinary inter-
8' Id. The type of disciplinary interview involved here is to be distinguished from the
type of disciplinary meeting involved in Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 161,
103 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Dec. 14, 1979). The Board in Appalachian Power took care to note that Baton
Rouge had not held that there was no right to representation at a disciplinary interview. 253
N.L.R.B. No. 135 n.1, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1042. Rather, Baton Rouge had held that a meeting held
for the sole purpose of informing the employee of a previously made disciplinary decision did not
demand union representation. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058. In an interview
of the type involved here, Weingarten rights would apply since the interview included the
employer's attempt to question the employees about their acts. Nevertheless, the Board in this
case found ample justification for the result based on its facts.
83
 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967).
" Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 70 L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969).
85 Id. at 144-45, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3046.
88 Id. at 145, 70 L.R.R.M. at 3046-47.
" 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Garment Workers v.
Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
88 Id. at 198-99, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1270-71.
89 420 U.S. at 259-60.
246 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 103 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Dec. 14, 1979).
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views. 9 ' The Board determined that the same Weingarten right is to be accorded
to an employee whether the interview is investigatory or disciplinary in nature
as long as the interview is not held solely for the purpose of informing an
employee of a previously made disciplinary decision. 92
 It appears that, by
abandoning the disciplinary-investigatory distinction, the Board abandoned
the theory that the union has a right which must be protected. The Board, in
fact, noted that in a situation where discipline is being effected, the interests of
the other employees are best served through the use of the grievance
procedure." Currently, the Board seems to view the right to representation at
the disciplinary or investigatory interview as solely the employee's individual
right. If the right to representation does indeed belong to the employee rather
than the union, it is reasonable to require the employee to notify the employer
that he wishes representation. Moreover, the union should not be allowed to
assert the employee's right to representation in the absence of an indication
that the employee wishes to exercise the right.
It is arguable that the only way to insure representation for an inar-
ticulate, intimidated employee is to allow the union to assert the employee's
right. Such an employee could easily incriminate himself, even if innocent, if
pressured in a situation which he finds uncomfortable. The employee may not
know of his right to representation or he may be too intimidated to invoke the
right. Yet, to permit the union to assert the employee's right to representation
allows the union to have too much control over the average employee. The
employee involved in the interview is in the best position to evaluate how the
interview is progressing and what the potential impact of interposing a union
representative might be. The employee must decide what will best serve his in-
terests in any particular situation based on the circumstances and the in-
dividuals involved. The union's interests, which are those of its entire member-
ship, are not necessarily identical to the employee's in all instances. Conse-
quently, a rule which allows the union to make the representation decision runs
counter to the rights of the individual employee. An option apparently not con-
sidered by the Board would be to require the employer to notify the employee
whenever the union attempts to assert the employee's right to representation.
Such an approach gives the employee the opportunity to make the ultimate
decision. This would remedy the problem of the ill-informed or intimidated
employee without permitting the union to control the employee's right.
Though some employees might feel pressured by their fellow employees to be
represented by the union, this risk seems minimal when compared to the prob-
lems inherent in requiring that the initial request come from the employee.
Apart from the possible improvement of requiring that the employee be
informed of a union attempt to assert the employee's right to representation,
91 Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
92 Id.
98 Id„ 103 L.R.R.M. at 1058 n.6.
114	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
the remainder of the Board's decision in Appalachian Power is sound. It is
reasonable to require that the demand for representation be made directly to
the management official involved in the interview." Only that individual is in
a position to evaluate whether the interview will be of a type that necessitates
representation. Therefore, he is the only person in a position to make an in-
formed decision regarding the request. In addition, the management official in-
volved in the interview is the only person in a position to evaluate the various
options available — whether to grant the request for representation, cancel the
interview, or offer a choice to the employee. To allow a request to another
management official to suffice would limit these options guaranteed by
Weingarten and would place unrealistic and unnecessary burdens on manage-
ment.
ciplinary and investigatory interviews alike, recognizing the right to represen-
tation as an individual employee right rather than a union bargaining right.
The Board has declined to allow a union to assert an employee's Weingarten
right and continues to require that an employee notify the management per-
sonnel involved in the interview of his request for union representation. The
opportunity remains, however, for the Board to require notification to the em-
ployee when the union attempts to invoke the employee's right to representa-
tion.
2. Representation During Hiatus Period: Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB*
In order to promote some degree of equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees,' section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) provides, inter alia, that employees have the right to engage in concerted
activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. 2 Furthermore, under sec-
" See text and notes at notes 79-82 supra.
• By Barbara Rohan Gilmore, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' See 29 U.S.C. 5 151 (1976) which provides:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
See also NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975).
2 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist
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tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, employers may not interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of concerted activities. 3 The courts and the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) agree that the actions of a single employee
may be concerted activities.* The federal courts of appeals are split, however,
over the question of whether the individual employee's acts must have both a
concerted purpose and effect to fall within the Act's protection or whether
merely a concerted effect is sufficient.' Without resolving this question, the
Supreme Court, in NLRB v. J. Weingarteri, 6 held that a single employee's re-
quest to have a representative from the certified bargaining unit present at an
investigatory interview was a concerted activity.' In that case, the Court
agreed with the Board that an employee had the right to request union
representation when the employee reasonably believed the interview could
result in discipline. 8 During the Survey year, in Anchortank v. NLRB, 9 the Fifth
Circuit held that an employee's request for similar representation prior to a
union's certification as the bargaining representative but after the union had
won a challenged election was concerted activity protected by section 7. 10
In Anchortank a representation election was held at a facility of the
employer, Anchortank, Inc." Although the union appeared to have won the
election, five of the votes cast were challenged." Because these votes could af-
fect the outcome of the election, the union could not be certified until the Board
settled the challenge. After a period of almost ten months, the Board ruled that
although two of the challenged votes were invalid, the outcome of the election
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
' Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) provides: It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights granted in section 157-of this title."
' See Weingarten supra note I.
5 See text at notes 20-27 infra.
6 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
' Id. at 260-61.
8 Id. at 260. The Board defined the parameters of the right to union representation at
an interview as follows: (1) the right is based on 5 7 of the Act; (2) the right only arises upon the
employee's request for representation; (3) the right is limited to interviews that the employee
reasonably believes will result in discipline; (4) the right doee_not preclude the employer from
forcing the employee to chose between attending the interview without representation or having
no interview; and (5) the right does not compel the employer to bargain with the union represent-
ative. Id. at 256-60. See Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 79 L.R.R.M. 1303 (1972), con-
sidered in Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975); Mobil Oil Corp., 196
N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972). Set generally Brodie, Union Representation and the
Disciplinary Interview, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment, Union Presence in
Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1974).
9 618 F.2d 1153, 104 L.R.R.M. 2689 (5th Cir. 1980).
10 Id. at 1162, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2695.
1 ' Id. at 1156, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2690.
2 Id.
116	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:82
remained the same.' 3 During this interim period Anchortank had made
unilateral changes in the working conditions at its facility." In addition, the
company refused the requests of two employees to have a union representative
(presumably a non-employee of Anchortank") present at interviews concern-
ing their behavior." One of these interviews was for the purpose of investiga-
tion and the other was of a disciplinary nature.' 7 The Anchortank court, with lit-
tle discussion, affirmed the Board's finding that unilateral changes in working
conditions made by the employer during the hiatus period caused by the elec-
tion challenge constituted an unfair labor practice." The court cited ample
precedent from its own decisions for the proposition that an employer who
makes unilateral changes during a hiatus does so at his own risk." The court
had no such precedent, however, to answer the question of whether Anchor-
tank's denial of the requests for union representation was an unfair labor prac-
tice. The Supreme Court's holding five years earlier in Weingarten was not
dispositive of the issue, since in that case the union already had been certified
as the official bargaining unit at the time the employee requested representa-
tion. Therefore, in order to determine if the employee's right to union
representation extended to interviews conducted during the hiatus period, the
court undertook its own examination of the scope of section 7 and concerted ac-
tivity.
The Anchortank court began its inquiry by examining the circumstances in
which the actions of an individual employee may be deemed to be concerted.
The circuit courts of appeals are divided over this question. Some circuits have
taken a strict apprOach requiring that a two-part test be met. The acts of a
single employee must be carried out for the purpose of affecting the group and
the acts must in fact have an impact upon the group. 2° Other circuits have
taken a more liberal approach in defining concerted activity, and found that
section 7 protects acts that have only a group effect. 2 '
Id. See Anchortank, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 295, 96 L.R.R.M. 1539, 1540 (1977).
" 618 F.2d at 1156, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2690. Anchortank changed its method of com-
puting vacation pay, eliminated holiday pay, decreased its work day from 8% to 8 hours, re-
quired employees to punch in and out for lunch breaks, added a swing shift and reclassified
employee's job classifications. Id.
15 Id. at 1158 n.6, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2692 n.6.
" Id. at 1156, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2692.
' 7 Id., 104 L.R.R.M. at 2690-91.
18 Id. at 1157, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2691.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., Construction Products Division, 571 F.2d
279, 282, 98 L1R.R.M. 2001, 2003 (5th Cir. 1978); General Electric Co., Battery Products,
Capacitor Department v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 713, 729, 69 L.R.R.M. 2081, 2092-93 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969); NLRB v. Laney and Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369
F.2d 859, 869, 63 L.R.R.M. 2552, 2558 (5th Cir. 1966).
20 See, e.g., Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718, 101 L.R.R.M. 2153, 2156 (6th Cir.
1979); Keokuk Gas Service Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 334, 98 L.R.R.M. 3332, 3336 (8th Cir.
1978); Dreis v. Krump, 544 F.2d 320, 327, 93 L.R.R.M. 2739, 2743-44 (7th Cir. 1976).
21 See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir.
1967). See also Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights.. The Northern Metal-
Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152 (1972).
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The Anchortank court cited Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB 22 as the
leading case for the stringent definition of concerted activity. In Mushroom the
Court of Appeals for the. Third Circuit held that an employee's conversation
with other employees informing them of their rights under the existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement as well as violations of that agreement was not con-
certed activity within the meaning of section 7." Reversing the decision of the
NLRB, the court, on appeal, adopted a standard of review which provided that
the acts of an individual employee are concerted if "at the very least it was
engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group ac-
tion or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees. "24
The Anchortank court found a more expansive definition of concerted ac-
tivity, commonly characterized as constructive concerted activity, in the Sec-
ond Circuit case of NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc. 25 In Interboro, an
employee's attempt to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment was found to be a concerted activity because of the effect such an act had
on other employees. 26 It was immaterial to the Interboro court whether the
employee acted solely for his own benefit" or whether his fellow employees had
demonstrated any interest in the activity." The court concluded that even if
the claims raised by the employee were'not meritorious, the employee's actions
still were protected under section 7 since there was evidence that he had a
reasonable basis for believing the claims were legitimate ones. 29
After exploring these two divergent definitions of concerted activity, the
Anchortank court concluded that the denial of union representation during the
hiatus period would be interference with the employee's right to engage in con-
certed activity under either standard. 3° In so concluding, the court noted that
the request for union assistance demonstrated to other employees that they also
could call upon the representative in similar situations. 3 ' The court further
stated that the presence of the union representative would prevent the
employer from developing a pattern of disciplining any employee unjustly. 32
Thus, according to the court, the request had a concerted effect. This concerted
effect, without more, the court concluded, satisfies only the Interboro standard,
however. In continuing its analysis, the court reasoned that once the union had
won an election, even if the election were challenged, the union representative
22 330 F.2d 683, 56 L.R.R.M. 2034 (3d Cir. 1964).
23 Id. at 685, 56 L.R.R.M, at 2035.
24 Id.
25 388 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir. 1967).
26 Id. at 499-500, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2087.
27 Id.
28
29 Id. at 500 n.7, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2087 n.7. Accord NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co.,
398 F.2d 459, 463, 68 L.R.R.M. 2842, 2845 (2d Cir. 1968).
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"stands in for all the unit employees." 33 Therefore, the single employee's re-
quest for union representation was done for the purpose of enlisting the aid of
the entire bargaining unit and thus met the Mushroom standard as well.
After concluding that the employee's request to have union representation
at an interview that could result in discipline satisfied either the Mushroom or In-
terboro tests, the court balanced the right of the employee to engage in such a
concerted activity against conflicting rights of the employer." Specifically, the
court balanced the employer's right to exclude non-employees from his proper-
ty against the employee's right to have a non-employee present at an
interview." The court concluded that prior to any representation election the
employer may lawfully exclude any non-employee from his property." The
court based this conclusion upon its reading of Weingarten, i.e. , that an
employee has the right to have another employee present at the interview." The
court reasoned that since an employee who is prevented from bringing a non-
employee to an interview is not prevented from being accompanied by a fellow
employee, the employee's rights under section 7 can be preserved without
disrupting the employer's property rights. Consequently, in the period prior to
the representation election any rights that the employee may claim to have a
non-employee present at an interview is insufficient to overcome the property
rights of the employer."
Once the union has won a representation election, however, the court
ruled that the employee's right to union representation, even when the union
representative was a non-employee, outweighed the employer's property
rights. 39
 The court concluded that this was true even if the union had won a
challenged election." Thus, the court held that the refusal to allow an employee
to bring a representative to an investigation during the hiatus was done at the
employer's risk.'" If the challenge to the election subsequently proved unsuc-
cessful, the employee's right would be preeminent. Yet, the Anchortank court
went further in its analysis and stated that an employee's request is protected if
he reasonably believes that the interview will result in discipline even if the
union loses the election challenge." Therefore, a denial of that right violated
section 8(a)(1) if the employee reasonably believed those interviews would
result in discipline.'"
33 Id., 104 L.R.R.M. at 2695.
34 Id. at 1164, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2696-97.
" Id.
36 Id. at 1163, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2696.
' Id. at 1157, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2691.
" Id. at 1163, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2696.
39 Id.
4° Id. at 1164, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2697.
" Id.
42 Id. at 1165 n.22, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2697 n.22.
43 Id. at 1165, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2697. The court concluded that any interview, except
one conducted solely to inform an employee of a previously-made disciplinary decision, would
fall within the ambit of protected interviews. Id. at 1166, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2699.
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The Anchortank court's holding that the employer may not undertake
unilateral changes during a hiatus period is a fair one. A contrary holding
would allow an employer to raise frivolous challenges in order to gain time in
which to effectuate such changes. Clearly this would be contrary to one of the
purposes of the Act, i.e., to promote change through collective bargaining.**
Since the Supreme Court has recognized the employee's right to have a
union representative present at an interview that could result in discipline, 45
the Anchortank decision is correct in holding that the right exists during the
hiatus period for employees whose bargaining unit subsequently is certified. If
the union wins the challenge, the right will be found to have existed during the
hiatus. If the employer interferes with that right, even though the employer
cannot know for a fact that the right existed at the time of the interference, he
must bear the responsibility. If, however, the union is not certified, the
employer should not be held liable for barring another person, who is in reality
a spectator, from a disciplinary interview. Indeed the Anchortank court
acknowledged that should the union lose the election challenge, the employer's
denial would outweigh the employee's right to have union representation dur-
ing the hiatus. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the employee's request
was concerted regardless of whether the union wins the election challenge. 46
Thus, the Anchortank court would allow employer interference with the con-
certed activities if the union loses the challenge.
While the Anchortank court arrives at the correct result given the specific
facts in the case, the court's analysis raises some difficulties for the legal practi-
tioner. The court's discussion of Weingarten indicates that the Fifth Circuit is in-
terpreting the scope of that decision too broadly. The Anchortank court has to
look to the dissent in Weingarten to support its statement that an employee has
the right to have another employee present at the interview. 47 It is suggested
that Weingarten should not be read so broadly. Although an employee who is a
member of a certified bargaining unit engages in concerted activity by re-
questing union representation at an interview that he reasonably believes could
result in discipline, it does not follow that an employee who is not entitled to
any such representation has the right to have another employee present during
the interview. The presence of an employee who does not have the special
status or authority of a union representative cannot be said to be mustering the
support of his fellow employees. He is there only to provide support and aid to
the employee being interviewed. While the presence of another employee could
serve to equalize the bargaining position between the employer and the
employee and does not disrupt the property rights of the employer, the request
for his presence does not have a concerted purpose and thus, does not satisfy
44 See note 1 supra.
" 420 U.S. at 260.
46 618 F.2d at 1165 n.22, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2697 n.22.
47 Id. at 1157, 104 L.R.R.M. at 2691, quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 269 & n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the two-part Mushroom standard for concerted activity. The presence of another
employee might meet the Interboro test, however, since it would indicate to
other employees that they can enlist the help of fellow workers. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, reading Weingarten as granting to an employee the right to request that
another employee be present, necessarily interprets Weingarten as supporting
the Interboro approach. Consequently, although the Fifth Circuit had previously
used the Mushroom standard for determining concerted activity, it is probable
that in the future that circuit will adopt the Interboro approach, applying the
constructive concerted activity definition. Yet because the Anchortank court
declined to embrace either standard in this case, it has not helped to resolve the
Mushroom-Interboro split.
The Anchortank court's use of a balancing test adds to the confusion on the
issue of when an individual's actions are concerted. Neither the language of the
Act nor the decision in Weingarten mentions such a device. Prior to Anchortank,
once the employee's acts were found to be concerted, the employer was ex-
pressly forbidden from interfering with those acts." After Anchortank, however,
at least in the Fifth Circuit, it appears that employers may be able to show in-
terests sufficient to outweigh the employee's right to act in concert. Thus, the
employer may use his right to secure his property from intrusion by non-
.— • employees in such a way as to interfere with the protected activities of the
employees. Such a possibility negates the very purpose of the Act, namely, to
achieve some equality of bargaining strength.
Because of the ambiguity and apparent inconsistencies in the Anchortank
opinion, the decision ought to be read narrowly by confining its application
solely to cases in which the union wins a challenged election.
3. Presumptive Relevance Requiring Employer Disclosure of Information:
IUE v. NLRB (Westinghouse) and
IUE v. NLRB (White Farm Equipment)*
Under the National Labor Relations Act (Act), it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees.' In order to accomplish the Act's goal of promoting industrial
4 420 U.S. at 261.
• By Anne C. Haberle, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1976). The relevant section provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer — ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id. The meaning of the
phrase "to bargain collectively" is defined at subsection (d):
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obliga-
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stability, the bargaining process guaranteed must be an effective one. 2 Each
party to the bargaining process must have sufficient information to permit it to
"deal meaningfully with bargainable issues." 3 The employer's statutory
obligation to bargain collectively therefore includes the obligation to provide
employee representatives with the information necessary to participate effec-
tively in the bargaining process. 4 The scope of such information is defined,
with reference to the union, as that necessary to the proper performance of the
union's duties.'
The union's duties to represent its members extend beyond the contract
negotiation period to include the term during which the agreement is in force."
After the collective bargaining agreement has been reached, the union has the
duty to ensure that its provisions are carried out.' The union's continuing
obligation to enforce the contract imposes an ongoing duty upon the employer
to provide the information necessary to the proper performance of the union
duties. 9 An employer's failure to provide data requested by the union between
contract negotiation periods may therefore constitute an unfair labor practice. 9
Certain aspects of employment, such as wages and hours, are deemed fun-
damental to the employer-employee relationship."' Information related to such
terms and conditions of employment is therefore presumed to be relevant to the
union's duties of negotiating the agreement and monitoring its performance."
If the information requested by the union is presumed to be relevant, the em-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession.	 .
29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1976).
Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aero. Div. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68, 59 L.R.R.M.
2433, 2437 (3d Cir. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Curtiss-Wright].
' Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB
(Oakland Press), 598 F.2d 267, 271, 101 L.R.R.M. 2036, 2039 (D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Oakland Press].
4 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967). [hereinafter cited as Acme
Indus.] ("the general obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed by the
bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties," id.); United Aircraft Corp.
v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 1198, 1204, 75 L.R.R.M. 2692, 2692-97 (2d Cir. 1970) (duty imposed upon
the employer by 8(a)(5) "includes an obligation to provide the employees' bargaining repre-
sentative with information that is necessary and relevant to the proper performance of its duties,
including effective administration of the collective bargaining agreement in force," id. (citations
omitted)).
See, e.g., Oakland Press, 598 F.2d at 271 & n.4, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2038 & n.4.
6 Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 436.
Id. ("the duty to bargain unquestionably extends beyond the period of contract
negotiations and applies to labor-management relations during the term of an agreement," id.
(citations omitted)); Curtiss- Wright, 347 F.2d at 68, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2437 ("the well settled
obligation of the bargaining agent not only to negotiate new contracts but also to police and ad-
minister existing agreements," id.).
B San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867 n.5, 94
L.R.R.M.. 2923, 2926 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977); see Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 435-36..
9 See, e.g., Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 435, 439; NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149,
153 (1956).
1 ° Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310, 1315, 102 L.R.R.M. 2128,
2130 (8th Cir. 1979).
11 Id.; Curtiss- Wright, 347 F.2d at 69, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2437.
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ployer bears the burden of proving that the information is not relevant, or of es-
tablishing sound reasons for his inability to provide the information. 12
 If the re-
quested information is not presumed to be relevant, or if the employer succeeds
in rebutting the presumption, then the burden shifts to the union, which must
establish why the information is relevant to the performance of its duties as
representative of its members. 13
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit decided the question whether information related to race
and sex discrimination was presumptively relevant to the union representa-
tives' duties of negotiating or administering collective bargaining agreements,
when the contracts the parties were negotiating contained provisions pro-
hibiting such discrimination. In IUE v. NLRB (Westinghouse) 14 and IUE v.
NLRB (White Farm Equipment)" the court held that statistical information on
the employment of women and minorities was presumed relevant in such cir-
cumstances,' 6 but that the evaluative portions of an employer's affirmative ac-
tion plan," and information potentially identifying the plaintiffs in discrimina-
tion complaints,I 8
 were not presumed relevant.
In International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers (IUE) v. NLRB
(Westinghouse) 19
 the court consolidated the appeals of two employers, Westing-
house and General Motors (GM), from the holdings of the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) that each had committed an unfair labor practice by
refusing to provide requested information to the union." The union had insti-
tuted its own nationwide program against discrimination in March, 1973. 2 ' Its
collective bargaining agreements with GM and with Westinghouse each con-
tained specific provisions against discrimination." While renegotiating its con-
tract with GM in July of 1973, the union made the first of a series of requests
for detailed information on the percentages of women and minorities compos-
ing the job categories within the workforce at GM, and on the wages paid to
female and minority employees." The union's stated reason for requesting the
information was to determine whether discrimination existed within GM's pro-
motional system. 24
 By the time the dispute with GM came before the Board,
12 San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d at 867, 94 L.R.R.M. at
2926.
13 Id.; Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2437-38.
14 648 F.2d 18, 105 L.R.R.M. 3337 (D.C, Cir. 1980).
15 650 F.2d 334, 105 L.R.R.M. 3344 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16 IUE v. NLRB (Westinghouse), 648 F.2d at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341; see IUE v.
NLRB (White Farm Equip. Co.), 650 F.2d 334, 335, 105 L.R.R.M. 3344, 3345, aff'g White
Farm Equip. Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1375, 101 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472 (1979).
" IUE v. NLRB (Westinghouse), 648 F.2d at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3344.
" Id. at 26-27, 105 L.R.R.M, at 3342-43.
" Id. at 18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3337.
" Id. at 22-24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3339-40.
21 Id. at 21, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3338.
22 Id. at 21, 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3338, 3339.
23 Id. at 21, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3338-39.
24 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3339.
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the union had also asked GM for copies of its affirmative action plan, copies of
all discrimination complaints filed against GM by union members, and
statistics on recent hirings, seniority, job classifications, and promotions,
broken down by race and sex. 25 GM complied in part with each of the union's
requests, including those made after the renegotiation of the contract was com-
plete, and those made after the union filed an unfair labor practice charge in
April, 1975. 23 GM, however, refused to provide the union with either the com-
plete text of its affirmative action plan," the copies of discrimination com-
plaints filed against it, or the full range of statistical information as requested
by the union." The Board, in a decision issued in June, 1979, held that GM
had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to provide the union with re-
quested information relevant to its duties under the collective bargaining
agreement. 29 The Board therefore ordered GM to supply the union with copies
of all discrimination complaints filed against GM by employees represented by
the union, deleting only the names of the charging parties." Furthermore, the
Board ordered GM to disclose the statistical information for the previous year
" regarding hiring, composition, seniority, job classifications, and promotions
of employees the [u]nion represent[ed], arranged by sex and certain racial
groupings. . ." 3 ' The Board permitted GM to withhold from the union the
full text of its affirmative action plan, requiring GM to disclose only the most
recent versions of the section entitled "Work Force Analysis.""
The Union's claim against Westinghouse had arisen from the company's
refusal to honor fully a June, 1972, request for information on the present com-
position of the work force, broken down by sex, race, wage scale, and job cate-
gory, for similar data on persons hired or promoted during the previous year,
and for copies of all discrimination complaints pending against
Westinghouse. 33 The union had requested the data between contract negotia-
tion periods," stating that it needed the information to monitor the antidis-
crimination provisions of the collective bargaining agreement in force between
it and Westinghouse. 33 Westinghouse initially refused to comply, but later re-
sponded to the union's inquiries by offering to provide detailed information on
" Id.
26 Id. at 21-22, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3339.
77 Id. GM provided the union with only the Work Force Analysis of its affirmative ac-
tion plans, and only on the condition that the union keep the information confidential. Id. at 22,
105 L.R.R.M. at 3339.
28 Id. at 21-22, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3339.
29 243 N.L.R.B. 186, 186-87, 101 L.R.R.M. 1461, 1463 (1979).
" Id. at 187, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1463.
31 Id. at 186, 101 L,R.R.M. at 1462 (footnote omitted).
37 Id. at 187, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1463. The Board described the contents of the work
force analyses as "a listing of all job titles in a plant with the corresponding wage rates shown in
lines of progression and a listing of the number of incumbents by sex and minority designation."
Id. at 187, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1463.
33 TUE v. NLRB (Westinghouse), 648 F.2d at 23, 105 L.R.R.M at 3339.
'4 See Id. at 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3339.
' Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3340.
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the condition that the union keep the information confidentia1. 36
 When the
union refused to guarantee confidentiality, Westinghouse withdrew its offer."
In a ruling issued October 31, 1978 the Board found that Westinghouse had
committed an unfair labor practice by withholding from the union requested
information that was "relevant and necessary to its role as collective-bar-
gaining representative."" The Board therefore ordered Westinghouse to sup-
ply the union with (1) statistics showing the composition of the workforce,
broken down by race, sex, job classification, basis for wages, and recent pro-
motions; (2) a list of all discrimination complaints filed against Westinghouse
regarding plants represented by the union; (3) copies of all discrimination
charges relating to employees in those plants, deleting only the names of the
charging parties; and (4) copies of the work force analyses that Westinghouse
had filed with its most recent affirmative action plans."
The cases came before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit on petitions by the employers for review; and cross-applications by the
unions for enforcement, of the Board's orders." In a single opinion issued for
both cases, Chief Judge Markey, writing for the court, affirmed those parts of
the Board's orders requiring the employers to produce the requested statistical
information on the distribution and advancement of women and minority em-
ployees in units covered by the collective bargaining agreements,'" and those
requiring the production of the work force analysis section of the affirmative ac-
tion plans.*2
 Judge Markey modified the portions of the Board's orders com-
pelling production of pending discrimination complaints, and permitted the
employers to submit instead abstracts revealing only the number and nature of
the complaints."
The court reasoned that, since the union's collective bargaining agree-
ments with both GM and Westinghouse included specific antidiscrimination
provisions, the statistical information on the distribution and promotion of
women and minorities within the work force of GM and Westinghouse was
presumptively relevant to the union's duty to bargain and to ensure that GM
and Westinghouse complied with the terms of the contract.** The employers
thus had a duty to provide the union with the information because, the court
concluded, it was necessary for the union to perform its duties owed to its mem-




 239 N.L.R.B. 106, 107, 99 L.R.R.M. 1482, 1485.
39 Id. at 115, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
4°
 648 F.2d at 21, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3338.
4' Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342.
42 Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343.
43 Id. at 27, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343.
" Id. at 24-25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341.
" Id. at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341.
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failure to provide the numerical data pertinent to race and sex discrimination
constituted an unfair labor practice.'" Since the work force analyses of the af-
firmative action plans consisted of essentially the same statistical information
the union had requested, the court concluded that witholding the contents of
the work force analyses also constituted a refusal to provide the union with in-
formation relevant to its duties. 47 Consequently, the court required the
employers to provide the work force analyses to the union."
Westinghouse and GM attempted to rebut the Board's finding that the
statistical information on the distribution of women and minorities within the
workforce was presumed relevant to the union's duties.'" The employers con-
tended that the union planned to use the data against the employers in the
pending litigation over the discrimination complaints, and that this prospective
use effected an election of remedies, precluding making any claims to the infor-
mation under the collective bargaining agreement. 5° In addition, the
employers argued, ,success in obtaining the statistical data by means of an un-
fair labor practice charge would provide the union with information for use in
the litigation that the union could not have obtained under the discovery
rules." The employers claimed, furthermore, that preparing the requested in-
formation would impose an excessive burden upon them, both in preparation
time and in costs." The potential use of the information in the discrimination
cases, and the difficulties involved in compiling the information, combined to
rebut any presumption of relevance, the employers maintained.
The court rejected the employers' proffered rebuttals. 53 The court found
that the proposition that the availability of remedies under Title VII precluded
the pursuit of remedies under the Act could not be maintained given the
legislative history of Title VII, and the recent Supreme Court decisions on the
subject." According to the court, the possible use of the statistical data in pend-
ing lawsuits was irrelevant to the employers' duty to provide the union with in-
formation necessary to proper performance of its functions. 55 Furthermore,
since federal regulations required preparation of most of the information re-
quested by the union, the court concluded that providing the requested data to
the union would not present an excessive burden to the employers. 56 Because
GM and Westinghouse had failed to rebut the presumption of relevance, the
46 Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342.
4' Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343.
46 Id.
49 Id. at 25-26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341-42.
" Id. at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341.
51 Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342. ,
52 Id.
53 Id. at 25-26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341-42.
54 Id. at 25 & nn.8-9, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3341-42 & nn.8-9 (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974)).
" 648 F.2d at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342.
56 Id.
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court affirmed the Board's order requiring them to provide the union with the
statistical information it had requested."
Regarding the union's request for copies of all discrimination complaints
filed by union members against the employers, however, the court concluded
that the employers had given sound reasons for nondisclosure. The court rea-
soned that deleting the name of the plaintiff from the filed complaint would
provide inadequate protection for the privacy interests of those who had
charged discrimination." The threat of such disclosure would interfere, ultim-
ately, with the congressional intent that the filing of such complaints be unin-
hibited, the court observed." The court therefore modified the Board's order,
permitting the employers to submit abstracts of the complaints filed, rather
than actual copies. 6°
The court's discussion of the discrimination complaints emphasized the
employees' interest in maintaining confidentiality. Turning to the disclosure of
the employers' affirmative action plans, the court found that the employers
likewise had valid interests in partially withholding their contents. 6 ' As govern-
ment contractors, 62 the employers prepared affirmative action plans with spe-
cific content requirements imposed by federal regulations. 63 The court con-
cluded that the affirmative action plans included information on the employers'
future goals and commitments that were not pertinent to the union's duties as
the representative of its members." Furthermore, the court reasoned, the em-
ployers' anticipation of eventual disclosure of the full contents of the affirma-
tive action plans would inhibit the candid self-assessment desirable in affirma-
tive action plans." The court found, however, that the Work Force Analysis
section, a required component of the employers' affirmative action plans, con-
sisted only of statistical information equivalent to the data whose disclosure was
required by the Act. 66
 The court therefore affirmed the Board's order requiring
only that the employers provide the union with the Work Force Analysis sec-
tions of the affirmative action plans."
In International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB (White
Farm Equipment)" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit im-
plicitly applied the reasoning of the Westinghouse decision to evaluate the charge
" Id.
58
 Id. at 27, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342-43.
59 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343.
60 id.
61 Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3344.
62
 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. at 112, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1489; see General
Motors Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. at 187, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1463.
" E.g. 41 C.F.R. 5 60-2.11(a) (1980); 41 C.F.R. 5 60-2.23 (1980) (discussed in the
Court of Appeals' opinion, 648 F.2d at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3342).
64
 648 F.2d at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3344.
65 Id.
66 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343.
69 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3343-44.
68 650 F.2d 334, 335, 105 L.R.R.M. 3344, 3345, aff'g White Farm Equip. Co., 242
N.L.R.B. 1373, 1375, 101 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472.
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that an employer had committed an unfair labor practice by withholding infor-
mation related to possible race and sex discrimination. In a summary opinion
issued the same date as Westinghouse, the court affirmed the Board's finding
that the employer, White Farm Equipment, had committed an unfair labor
practice by refusing to provide information that a union attorney had alleged
was relevant to determining whether the employer had engaged in race or sex
discrimination in its selection and treatment of employees. 69 This type of dis-
crimination was explicitly prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement."
In White Farm Equipment, the collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the employer included a provision forbidding discrimination "in
any manner whatsoever against any employee" because of race or sex." In
June, 1974, a union attorney requested statistics showing the race and sex of
job applicants and new employees for the preceeding six months. 72 The union
attorney requested, in addition, copies of the employer's master insurance
agreements, and summary booklets describing the insurance plan." The at-
torney's request preceded the scheduled renegotiation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement between the union and White Farm Equipment, negotiations in
which he never participated. 74 Since the employer's application forms did not
record race, and no data had been compiled on the race of job applicants,
White Farm Equipment explained to the union, the information regarding job
applicants was unavailable. 75 White Farm Equipment complied in part with
the union's request, however, by informing the union that three employees had
been hired since January 1, 1973, and .that the current bargaining unit con-
sisted of eleven white males and one black male." The employer also supplied
the union with summary booklets describing the insurance plans, but withheld
copies of the master insurance agreements."
The union nonetheless filed an unfair labor practice charge against White
Farm Equipment in October, 1974, alleging that White Farm Equipment had
breached its duty to bargain collectively by refusing to provide the union with
the requested information." The Board heard the charge, and found that
White Farm Equipment had violated the Act." In its order of June, 1979, the
Board held that the information in the master insurance agreements, and the
data on those who applied for jobs at White Farm Equipment as well as those
69 Id. at 336, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3345.
70 The provision reads in full: "Neither the Company nor the Union shall discriminate
in any manner whatsoever against any employee because of race, sex, political or religious affilia-
tion, nationality, marital status, or membership or non-membership in any labor or other lawful
organization." 650 F.2d at 335 n.5, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3345 n.5 (Markey, J., dissenting).
Id. See also note 75 infra.
72 Id. at 336, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3345.
" Id.
74 Id.	 •
" Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 3346.
76 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 337, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3346.
79 Id. at 337-38, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3347.
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who were ultimately hired, were presumptively relevant to the union's duties
as the bargaining representative of its members. 8° The Board therefore ordered
the employer to disclose the insurance agreements and hiring statistics to the
union.$'
The case came to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit on petitions for review and cross-application for enforcement. 82 The ma-
jority of the court concluded summarily that "the issues presented occasion no
need for an opinion. . . . "83
 Since substantial evidence supported the Board's
order, and no reversible error appeared below, the court granted the Board's
application for enforcement." The majority of the court, by issuing this sum-
mary opinion, therefore implicitly agreed with the Board's finding that White
Farm Equipment had refused to bargain collectively by failing to supply the
union with information necessary to the performance of its duties.
Chief Judge Markey dissented to the White Farm Equipment decision,
because he concluded that the Board had applied the doctrine of presumptive
relevance too broadly, and failed to give sufficient weight to the actual cir-
cumstances of the case." If the information on job applicants was relevant to
collective bargaining, the Judge observed, the union was obliged to raise the
issue of discrimination during the bargaining process, and to request the infor-
mation at the bargaining table. 86
 Judge Markey concluded that even if the
80 White Farm Equip. Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 1373, 1374-75, 101 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1472.
The union's execution of the new collective-bargaining agreement without the requested infor-
mation was held not to preclude a finding of relevance, but merely to indicate that the union
preferred the advantages of securing a contract without waiting for White Farm Equipment to
provide the information. Id. at 1374, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1471. The Board rejected the union's de-
mand that White Farm Equipment explain its failure to hire more women and minorities. Id. at
1375, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1472.
a' Id. at 1375-76, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1472. Board Member Murphy agreed that the con-
tents of the insurance agreements were presumptively relevant, but dissented on the question of
the employment statistics, arguing that discrimination was properly a matter for the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's expertise. Id. at 1376-77, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
n 650 F.2d at 335, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3345.
" Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 338, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3347 (Markey, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 338-39, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3348. Judge Markey cited Westinghouse Elec. Sup-
ply Co. v. NLRB, 196 F.2d 1012, 1014, 30 L.R.R.M. 2169, 2170-71 (3d Cir. 1952), for the pro-
position that the union must make requests for information relevant to the bargaining process at
the bargaining table. IUE v. NLRB (White Farm Equip. Co.), 650 F.2d at 339, 105 L.R.R.M,
at 3348. Several years after the Westinghouse Elec. Supply decision, however, the Third Circuit
reversed its position and held that, in order to foster an effective bargaining process, a union
could properly request data from management prior to actual negotiations. Curtiss-Wright, 347
F.2d 61, 68, 59 L.R.R.M. 2433, 2437 (3d Cir. 1965). This position has support in NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1967). In Acme the Court held that where a collective
bargaining agreement forbids discrimination by the employer, the time for the union to request
information pertinent to discrimination cannot be limited to the period of renegotiation. Id.
Rather, the period should extend throughout the term of the contract so that the union can deter-
mine whether to initiate action against the employer for discrimination. Id. Under the facts of the
White Farm Equipment case, therefore, Judge Markey should have considered the entire period of
the contract in determining when the union would be entitled to the information.
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issue had been raised, the contract provision making hiring a management
prerogative would prevent the union from asserting that the hiring process was
relevant to its duties." Regarding the master insurance agreements, Judge
Markey agreed with the employer that only the fact of providing negotiated in-
surance benefits, and not the specific manner of providing them, was within
the scope of the collective bargaining agreement." The burden in this case,
under Judge Markey's analysis, had shifted to the union 89 to demonstrate why
information on subjects outside the collective bargaining agreement had
become relevant. 9° Judge Markey therefore disagreed with the majority on all
points, except its conclusion that the employer was not required to explain its
past hiring practices.
Read in conjunction, the Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment decisions
indicate that, where a collective bargaining agreement contains provisions for-
bidding race or sex discrimination in employment practices, objective informa-
tion related to race and sex discrimination, such as statistics on the percentages
of female and minority employees composing the workforce, will be presumed
relevant to the union's duty to represent its members effectively. Since that
duty includes the obligation to monitor the performance of the agreement, the
union's request for information need not arise during the bargaining process.
The effect of the presumption is that, unless the employer provides an effective
rebuttal, the failure to disclose the information constitutes a failure to bargain
collectively, and thus an unfair labor practice under the Act. The employer
may rebut the presumption of relevance by establishing valid reasons for non-
disclosure. The confidentiality of employees' discrimination complaints, and of
selected sections of an employer's affirmative action plan, effectively rebuts the
presumption of relevance.
Certain Supreme Court precedents provide the framework for evaluation
of the White Farm Equipment and Westinghouse decisions. Two decisions illustrate
the Court's approach to the range of subjects included in the employer's duty
to bargain collectively under the Act. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB," the Court considered whether an employer had breached its duty
under the Act by refusing to bargain with union representatives regarding the
67 IUE v. NLRB (White Farm Equip. Co.), 650 F.2d at 339, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3348.
Judge Markey argued that the provision making hiring a management prerogative, combined
with the absence of a hiring-related provision in the contract for the union to administer, left hir-
ing questions within the sole discrection of management. Id. The hiring provision, however, was
expressly qualified by a clause subjecting it to the other provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 335 rm. 4-5, 105 L.R.RM. at 3345 nn.4-5. To the degree that hiring was a
management prerogative, therefore, the antidiscrimination clause required the employer's
privilege to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Be Id. at 339-40, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3348-49.
BB The union had argued that its attorney's suggestion that he meet with White would
satisfy this burden because it constituted an attempt to engage in mid-term renegotiation of the
contract. Id. at 341, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3350. Judge Markey rejected this characterization of the
union attorney's contacts with the employer. Id.
9° Id. at 340, 105 L.R.R.M. at 3349.
Bi 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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employer's arrangements to contract out certain work performed by union
members upon the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agree-
ments. 92 The Court based its conclusion on three factors. First, the Court rea-
soned, assigning the work to an outside party would terminate employment for
those employees presently performing the tasks; contracting the work out was
therefore a "condition" of employment" even though the subject was not
specifically provided for in the existing collective bargaining agreements." Sec-
ond, the Court considered the Act's purpose of avoiding industrial conflict by
subjecting labor-management disputes to the negotiation process. The Court
found that this goal would be promoted by a holding that contracting work to
parties outside the collective bargaining agreement was included among the
subjects of collective bargaining. 95 Finally, observing that contracting out work
frequently appeared in collective bargaining agreements in industrial practice,
the Court concluded that the subject had become part of the collective bargain-
ing framework." The Court held, therefore, that contracting out the union
members' work constituted a term and condition of employment regarding
which the employer was obliged to confer with the employees' representative
under section 8(d) of the Act." The holding of the Fibreboard Products case in-
dicates that the subjects of collective bargaining are not limited by the specific
provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargain-
ing may also include "conditions of employment" which have significant im-
pact on the employees, or which are settled effectively by negotiation.
Whether the "conditions of employment" included matters affecting
those who were not currently employees provided the subject for the Court's
decision in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America Local .1 u. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. 98 The Allied Chemcial decision concerned the attempted renegotiation
of an employee health insurance plan in which retired employees
participated. 99
 The insurance program had been in effect for fifteen years when
the Medicare program was enacted in 1965. 100
 Instead of negotiating with the
union to adjust the insurance plan for retired employees in light of the enact-
.
ment of the Medicare program, the employer wrote directly to the retired
employees, proposing to make supplemental Medicare payments if the retiree
92 Id. at 204-06.
93 Id. at 210.
9+ The Court's account of the facts of the case does not discuss such a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 205-08. If such a provision existed, there would not have
been an issue for the Court to consider, since the employer's action would merely have been a
question arising under the collective bargaining agreement, requiring the parties to bargain col-
lectively under 4 8(d) of the Act.
" 379 U.S. at 210-11.
96 Id. at 211-12 & n.7.
97 Id. at 215. See also text and note at note 3 supra.
99 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
99 Id. at 160-61.
'°° Id. at 161.
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withdrew from the negotiated insurance plan."' The union brought an unfair
labor practice charge, alleging that the employer had circumvented the union
as the collective bargaining representative, which the Board decided in the
union's favor.' 02 Holding that the retired employees could not be included
either among the employees of the company"' or within the bargaining unit,'"
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
order. 105
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.'" Reviewing the
legislative history of the Act, the Court concluded that the employer's duty to
bargain collectively did not extend to the interests of retired employees.'°' Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
in force between the employer and the union indicated that the bargaining unit
included only active employees.'" The Court distinguished the cases in which
applicants for work had been protected under the Act by characterizing job ap-
plicants as "members of the active work force available for hire and [who] at
least in that sense could be identified as 'employees'. . . ." 109 Contrasting the
nature of the benefits at issue in the Allied Chemical case with those in the
Fibreboard opinion, the Court emphasized its earlier finding that the contracting
out of work in Fibreboard entailed the loss of jobs."° In Allied Chemical, however,
the possible reduction in insurance benefits for active employees resulting from
the exclusion of retired members from the group insurance program, was too
"speculative and insubstantial" an effect to be considered a "term or condi-
tion of employment.""' The Court's holding in Allied Chemical indicated that
the collective bargaining process guaranteed by the Act covered only terms and
conditions of employment with substantial impact on currently active members
of the bargaining unit.
The Supreme Court addressed the role of antidiscrimination policy in
labor law in its 1975 decision, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Organization." 2 In Emporium Capwell, the Court determined whether
minority employees discharged for attempting to bargain with the employer
separately from the union over alleged race discrimination could be protected
under the Act." 3 The Court held that the employees could not claim protection
under the Act for activities that undermined the union's role as exclusive
101 Id. at 162.
100 177 N.L.R.B. 911, 918-19, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433, 1441 (1969).
103 427 F.2d 936, 944, 74 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2431 (6th Cir. 1970).
104 Id. at 946, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2432 (6th Cir. 1970).
100 Id. at 947, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2433
"6 404 U.S. 157, 160 (1971).
10" Id. at 166.
1" Id. at 172.
' 09 Id. at 168.
10 Id. at 180.
111 Id.
112 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
" 3 Id. at 52.
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bargaining agent." 4 In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court noted that
the Act must be construed in favor of the broad national labor policy against
discrimination whenever possible. 15
In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB," 6 the Supreme Court considered an
employer's effort to rebut the presumption of relevance, where a union had re-
quested information pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The issue in this case concerned promotions on bases other than seniori-
ty. The contract in force between the union and the employer at the time the
case arose required that promotions within any unit were to be made on the
basis of seniority within the unit, whenever the candidates' qualifications were
not significantly different otherwise.'" Any management decision to promote
on a basis other than seniority within the unit was subject to the collective
bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, which provided for arbitration
where it was charged that the promotion had been arbitrary or dis-
criminatory. " 8
The employer used written psychological aptitute tests to evaluate can-
didates for promotions to a certain job classification."° When an opening in
that category occurred at one of the plants, certain employees within the unit
applied for the position."° All were rejected because they had received unac-
ceptable aptitude test scores."' The union filed a grievance on behalf of those
rejected, alleging that the testing procedure used was unfair, and that the
employer had violated the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement re-
quiring that promotion be based on seniority within the unit.'" After the
employer rejected the grievance, the union took its claims to arbitration.' 23
Preparing for the arbitration, the union requested copies of the test questions
and answer sheets, and the completed answer sheets of the aggrieved
employees with the employees' names and test scores attached. 124 Upon
Detroit Edison's refusal to provide this data to the union unless certain condi-
tions were met," the union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that
" 4 Id. at 70.
" 5 Id. at 66. The Court observed that "national labor policy embodies the principles of
nondiscrimination as a matter of highest priority, ... and it is a commonplace that we must con-
strue the NLRA in light of the broad national labor policy of which it is a part." Id. at 66 (cita-
tions omitted).
16 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
'" Id. at 304-05.
"E' Id. at 305.
"9 Id. at 305-06.




"4 Id. at 307-08.
"9
 While the complaint was under arbitration, Detroit Edison agreed to disclose the
scores of identified employees only if the employee waived confidentiality. Id. at 308. At the ad-
ministrative hearing that began the unfair labor practice proceedings, the company offered to
submit the test questions and answer sheets to an industrial psychologist of the union's choice. Id.
at 309. The union rejected these conditions. Id. at 308-09.
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the company had violated the Act by withholding information that was relevant
and necessary to the arbitration of the grievance. 126 The Board ordered the
employer to provide all of the information requested directly to the union
because of its potential value to the union in the performance of its duties."'
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding. 128
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. ' 25 The Court found that section
8(a)(5) of the Act did not obligate the employer to supply the union with copies
of the test questions and answers.' 3° The validity of the testing procedure, in
which the employer had invested a considerable amount of time and money,' 3 '
depended upon keeping the test questions secret, the Court observed. 132 In the
absence of enforceable sanctions for breach of the union's guarantees of
secrecy, the Court concluded, the risk of disclosure was too great to uphold the
Board's order that the employer provide the union with the test questions and
answer sheets."' Regarding the disclosure of the completed tests, with the ex-
aminee identified, the Court agreed with Detroit Edison that the sensitivity of
the individual to 'the disclosure of information evaluating his competence
justified the employer's refusal to supply the tests to the union without the
employee's permission. 134 The Court expressly rejected the argument that
establishing a union interest in such information would override any other in-
terests.' 35 The Detroit Edison case established that under some circumstances the
employer could rebut the presumption of relevance by demonstrating sound
reasons for maintaining confidentiality.
In light of these Supreme Court precedents, the Westinghouse decision was
correct in its treatment of the significance of information related to race and sex
discrimination. Construing the Act to find that such information was presump-
tively relevant to the union's duties in representing its members followed the
policy of the Supreme Court as stated in the Emporium Capwell decision.'" Per-
mitting Westinghouse and GM to withhold copies of the discrimination com-
plaints filed by employees was amply supported by the Supreme Court's
"6 Id. at 308.
127 The Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1024, 89 L.R.R.M. 1515, 1519
(1975).
129 NLRB v. Detroit Edison Co., 560 F.2d 722, 727, 95 L.R.R.M. 3341, 3344 (6th Cir.
1977).
129 440 U.S. at 320.
' 3° Id. at 316-17.
131 Id. at 313.
132 Id. at 315.
193 Id. at 315-16.
'" Id. at 318-19.
135 Id. at 318. The Court stated:
The Board's position appears to rest on the proposition that union interests in
arguably relevant information must always predominate over all other interests,
however legitimate. But such an absolute rule has never been established, and we
decline to adopt such a rule here. There are situations in which an employer's con-
ditional offer to disclose may be warranted. This we believe is one.
Id.
136 420 U.S. 50. See text and notes at notes 112-15 supra.
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reasoning in the Detroit Edison case. The Court had concluded, in Detroit Edison,
that the employee's interest in restricting information evaluating his com-
petence outweighed the union's interest in determining how those evaluations
were made.'" An employee who has filed a discrimination complaint against
his employer has a similar interest in avoiding the harassment and reprisals
from his supervisors and co-workers that could be the consequence of
disclosure of his complaint. In addition to the employee's interest in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of the test results, the employer's interest in maintaining
a valid testing procedure had been considered among the factors rebutting the
presumption of relevance in the Detroit Edison case.'" The Westinghouse court
gave much weight to the employers' interest by permitting them to withhold
the discrimination complaints and the affirmative action plans. Thus,
Westinghouse was in keeping with the precedent established by Detroit Edison.
While the court of appeals was correct in allowing GM and Westinghouse
to retain their affirmative action plans and the text of the discrimination com-
plaints, its requirement that White Farm Equipment . provide information on
the race and sex of job applicants contravenes the principles established in Em-
porium Capwell. Although the Court stated, in Emporium .Capwell, that the Act
should be construed, where possible, to implement a policy against discrimina-
tion in employment, the Court's holding prevented the discharged minority
employees from claiming protection under the Act. The Court's objective was
to preserve the union's role as exclusive bargaining agent and the collective
bargaining structure mandated by the Act.'" The Emporium Capwell holding
indicates that provisions of the Act must not be distorted in order to favor the
goal of equal employment.
Under the Act, the principles governing the presumption of relevance in
union requests for information provide that, if the employer presents bona fide
objections to the union's request, the union must enunciate specific reasons for
its request for the information in that form.'" Even if the information had been
demonstrated, rather than presumed, to be relevant to the union's duties, the
employer might prevail by providing other justifications for nondisclosure,
such as the confidentiality interests established in Detroit Edison. The interests of
both the employers and the bargaining representatives could be accommodated
under this model.
The result in the White Farm Equipment case, however, departs from these
principles. White Farm Equipment had not kept records on the race of job ap-
plicants.'" In disclosing the race and sex of current bargaining unit employees,
and the number of persons hired during the period in question, White Farm
Equipment complied with the union's request to the best of its abilities. The
'" See text and notes at notes 129-34 supra.
''s See text and notes at notes 131-32 supra.
"9 See text and note at note 114 supra.
"° See, e.g., Emeryville Research Center, Shell Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 885,
77 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2047 (9th Cir. 1971); see also text and notes at notes 12-13 supra.
14 ' See text and note at note 75 supra.
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court of appeals nonetheless upheld and enforced the Board's order requiring
White Farm Equipment to provide data on the race and sex of job applicants.
The court of appeals' holding in White Farm Equipment indicates that the
court considers the interests implicated in allegations of discriminatory employ-
ment practices sufficient to outweigh the principles governing the rebuttal of
the presumption of relevance under the Act. The court's requirement that
White Farm Equipment provide the union with information on the race and
sex of job applicants that the employer had not maintained, strains the prin-
ciples of construction established under the Act. Although the purpose of the
court evidently was to effectuate equal employment policy, the result oversteps
the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Emporium Capwell.
The court of appeals' holding that information related to race and sex
discrimination is presumptively relevant to the union's duties is not limited to
the facts of the Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment decisions. In each of the
cases before the court of appeals, the collective bargaining agreements in force
at the time the union requested the information included specific antidis-
crimination provisions. The employers' obligation to provide information on
race and sex discrimination was premised in part on the union's duty to
monitor existing agreements. The precedents to the court of appeals' decision
suggest that the presence of an antidiscrimination provision in the collective
bargaining agreement is not a prerequisite to a finding that information related
to race and sex discrimination is presumptively relevant to the union in
representing its members.
Under the Act, the employer and the bargaining representatives are re-
quired to bargain collectively over the "terms and conditions of employment"
as well as over the terms of existing contracts.' 42 The Supreme Court cases in-
terpreting the phrase "term or condition of employment" support the argu-
ment that discrimination in hiring and promotional practices constitutes a con-
dition of employment.' 43 If the issue of race and sex discrimination comes
within the definition of a condition of employment, the subject is one regarding
which the employer and the union must bargain collectively. As a subject of
collective bargaining, race and sex discrimination is an issue upon which the
employer must provide information at the union's request, even without an ex-
isting provision addressing the matter.
The factors considered by the Supreme Court in the Fibreboard and Allied
Chemical decisions on the range of collective bargaining apply to the subject of
race and sex discrimination. In Fibreboard, the Court reasoned that, since the
employer's arrangements to contract work out would terminate employment
for union members, such arrangements must be considered a term or condition
of employment. Similarly, if the employer's discriminatory practices result in
the exclusion of certain individuals from employment and promotions, such
discrimination erects barriers to, and therefore creates conditions of, employ-
"2 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976). See note 1 supra.
'" See text and notes at notes 91-111 supra.
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ment. Whether the collective bargaining agreement specifically prohibits race
and sex discrimination or not, employer practices creating conditions of
employment for minorities and females would require collective bargaining
under the Fibreboard analysis. In addition, the Westinghouse and White Farm
Equipment decisions demonstrate that the subject of race and sex discrimination
generates conflict in labor-management relations. In order to implement the
Act's goal of avoiding industrial strife, therefore, the issue of race and sex
discrimination must be included within the meaning of the phrase "terms or
conditions of employment" in order to be subjected to the negotiation process.
Finally, as the union-employer contracts in Westinghouse and White Farm Equip-
ment illustrate, antidiscrimination provisions are appearing with greater fre-
quency in collective bargaining agreements. The topic of race and sex
discrimination has become part of the collective bargaining framework and is
therefore among the terms and conditions of employment subject to the re-
quirements of collective bargaining established under the Act.
The issue of race and sex discrimination satisfies the standards for a condi-
tion of employment established by the Allied Chemical decision. Where
discrimination operates as a barrier to employment or to promotions, its effects
upon members of the bargaining unit are not tenuous or insubstantial. Rather,
such discrimination has significant impact on the working environment for all
employees. Even where the employer's discriminatory practices affect only in-
dividuals who are not members of the bargaining unit, the union, under the
Allied Chemical analysis, may assert its right to bargain collectively with the
employer over such discrimination because of its impact on union members
and on currently active members of the work force.
Under the Supreme Court precedents to the Westinghouse and White Farm
Equipment decisions, therefore, the court of appeals' holdings are not limited in
application to instances where the collective bargaining agreement contains an
antidiscrimination provision. A union reasonably may argue that race and sex
discrimination is a term or condition of employment requiring collective
bargaining under section 8(d) of the Act. As a subject of collective bargaining,
the issue of race and sex discrimination obligates the employer to disclose rele-
vant information requested by the union even without an antidiscrimination
provision in the existing collective bargaining agreement.
The court of appeals' decisions in Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment
may result in hardships for certain employers encountering a union's request
for information related to race and sex discrimination. The court of appeals
held, in the Westinghouse decision, that providing detailed statistical information
on the composition of the work force did not impose a burden upon the
employers sufficient to rebut the presumption of relevance. Westinghouse and
GM were required, as government contractors, to compile affirmative action
plans that included such data, and therefore already had compiled the re-
quested statistical information. For an employer who is not required to submit
such information to the federal government, however, meeting a union's re-
quest for statistical information comparable in detail to that required in an af-
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firmative action plan may present a substantial burden. The principles govern-
ing the presumption of relevance under the Act ordinarily would provide the
employer with grounds to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that fur-
nishing the union with such information imposed significant difficulties. The
result in White Farm Equipment, however, indicates that even employers who are
not required by federal regulations to maintain detailed records on the percen-
tages and distributions of female and minority employees within the work force
may be required to produce such information at the union's request.
The Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment decisions establish the union's
right to access to information regarding race and sex discrimination as a sub-
ject of collective bargaining under the Act. As a result of these decisions, such
information is presumed relevant to the union's duties to represent its
members in the negotiation and administration of its collective bargaining
agreements. The Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment cases both considered
situations where the collective bargaining agreement included specific provi-
sions against discrimination. Precedents decided under the Act indicate,
however, that such a provision is not a requirement for the union's right to in-
formation regarding race and sex discrimination. The union may be entitled to
such information as a consequence of its duty to monitor the terms and condi-
tions of employment. While the Westinghouse and White Farm Equipment deci-
sions broaden the scope of information that is presumed relevant to the union's
duties, the employer retains the opportunity to rebut the presumption of
relevance by demonstrating the confidentiality interests of certain information.
The holding in White Farm Equipment, however, indicates that an employer's
assertion that statistical information on the race and sex of job applicants is
unavailable fails to satisfy the employer's duty to provide the union with re-
quested information relevant to its duties. As a result of the White Farm Equip-
ment and Westinghouse decisions, therefore, every employer subject to the Act
must be prepared to maintain and disclose a range of statistical information in-
cluding the distribution by race and sex of employees and job applicants, in
order to fulfill its duty under the Act to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of its employees.
4. Res Judicata in Section 10(1) Proceedings:
Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)*
Section 10(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides for
officers or regional directors of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to
petition a district court for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary in-
junction when a party files an unfair labor practice with the Board under sec-
tions 8(b)(4)(A)(B) or (C).' The district court in a section 10(1) proceeding
By Cindy A. Laquidara, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
29 U.S.C. S 160(1) provides in relevant part:
Boycotts and strikes to force recognition of uncertified labor organiza-
tions; injunctions; notice; service of process
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decides the limited question of whether there is reasonable cause to believe a
violation of the NLRA has occurred which warrants injunctive relief. 2 If there
is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has occurred, in-
junctive relief will be ordered and will remain in effect until the Board has
reached a final determination on the merits of the claim. 3 Until that time the
potential for conflicting results from different district courts exists if the activity
underlying the allegations affects persons and entities in various regions.' In
such situations, one district court may deny an inunction while another district
court may issue one. The result of these conflicting determinations is to allow
activity in one region that has been enjoined in another. As early as 1959 a few
federal courts had noted the relevance of res judicata principles in such cases. 5
The applicability of res judicata principles to section 10(1) proceedings,
however, was not addressed directly in those decisions. 6
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B) or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or
section 158(c) of this title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary in-
vestigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other
cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is
referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that
a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United
States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question
has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or trans-
acts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the
Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restrain-
ing order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law;
Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-C10, 630 F.2d 864, 868, 105
L.R.R.M. 2809, 2812 (1st Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C.
	 160(1), supra note 1.
* 630 F.2d at 869, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2812-13.
Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1959). In Madden v. Perry, the regional
director, Madden, requested the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus
directing Judge Perry of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, to vacate supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 170.
Judge Perry had entered the supplemental findings in response to a request by the local union
after dismissing regional director Madden's 5 10(1) petition because of Madden's refusal to
testify and produce subpoenaed records, Id. It appears that the local unions requested the find-
ings in order to make clear that Madden was barred from reinstituting the action. Id. at 172.
Madden requested that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacate Judge Perry's supplemental
findings because they purported to decide the merits of the petition, and thus would act as a bar
to instituting a 5 10(1) petition. Id. at 173. The Seventh Circuit vacated the supplemental find-
ings as being outside the authority of Judge Perry, Id. at 174, without deciding whether res
judicata would bar a subsequent 10(1) petition if the supplemental findings had been properly
entered. Id. In Consentino v. Local 28, 268 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1959), the respondent had argued
both the merits of the case and res judicata at the district court level. Id. at 649. The court de-
clined to address the res judicata issue and based its holding on Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. at 652. In NLRB v. Acker Indus., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir, 1972), Acker
argued that collateral estoppel should be applied to a 5 10(j) proceeding because of a prior 5 10(b)
hearing. Id. at 651. The court held collateral estoppel inapplicable because 5 10(1) and 10(j)
hearings are not equivalent. Id. at 652.
6
 Madden v. Perry, 264 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1959); Cosentino v. Local 28, 268 F.2d 648
(8th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Acker Indus., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir, 1972).
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During the Survey year, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Walsh v. In-
ternational AFL-CIO,' addressed the role of res judicata principles in section
10(1) proceedings. The Walsh court held in a unanimous decision that a deter-
mination by a district court on a section 10(1) petition brought by one regional
director would bar a subsequent section 10(1) petition made by a different re-
gional director. 9
 Crucial to the court's decision were its findings that the in-
junction requested in Walsh went to the same underlying issue as the injunction
requested in the previously decided suit, 9
 and that the International Long-
shoremen's Association (ILA) was,named as a defendant in each action."
The issues which formed the basis for the section 10 (1) petition in Walsh
arose out of a boycott of Russian cargo." The boycott was called by the presi-
dent of the ILA after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in response to
demands by union members that they stop loading Soviet cargo." The boycott
resulted in three different organizations filing charges with the Board. Each
charge alleged that the activity constituted a secondary boycott's and as such
was prohibited under section 8(b)(4).' 4 Acting on these charges, three regional
directors brought section 10(1) petitions in three different federal district courts
requesting preliminary injunctions against the ILA and local Unions."
The first petition was filed by Regional Director Baldovin in the United
States District Court for the District of Texas, and was decided on February
15, 1980; 16 the second petition was filed by Regional Director Mack in the
United States District Court for the District of Georgia, and was decided on
March 4, 1980;" the third petition was brought by Regional Director Walsh in
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on March 26,
1980. 18 In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Texas district court in
Baldovin v. ILA 19 denied an injunction because the challenged activity was not
▪ 630 F.2d 864, 105 L.R.R.M. 2809 (1st Cir. 1980).
g Id. at 871-72, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2814-15.
9 Id. at 874.75, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816-17.
10 Id. at 872-73, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2815-16.
" Id. at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810.
12 Id. at 866 & n.1, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810 & n.l.
13 A boycott is termed a secondary boycott for the purposes of S 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when the
action taken by the union pressures an employer with whom the union has no dispute. Baldovin
v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 1980). This activity, "tactically calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere," is secondary activity. Woodwork Mfrs. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644-45
(1967). Secondary boycotts are subject to an "affecting commerce" requirement. Id. This re-
quirement is necessary to avoid unenforceable judgments such as those that would be entered if
the secondary boycott action were aimed at obtaining concessions that could not be resolved by
domestic action (e.g., altering actions of United States workers), or under the National Labor
Relations Act. Id. at 450.
" 630 F.2d at 866 n.1, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810 n.l.
15 Id.
Baldovin v. ILA, Civil No. 80-259 (D.C. Houston).
17 Mack v. ILA, Civil No. 480-051 (D.C. Savannah).
18 630 F.2d at 867, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2811. The memorandum opinion is reported at
488 F. Supp. 524, 104 L.R.R.M. 2730.
Baldovin v. ILA, Civil No. 80-259 (D.C. Houston).
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within the definition of "in commerce" in section 8(b)(4)." In Mack v. ILA, 2 '
the Georgia district court issued an injunction prohibiting the boycott in the
Savannah and Brunswick, Georgia ports. 22 The Mack court rejected the ILA
assertion that the adjudication in Texas operated as a bar to the Mack action
under principles of res judicata." The court also rejected the argument that the
Board lacked jurisdiction because the matter was not in commerce. 24 The
regional directors in both Mack and Balclovin appealed their respective district
court decisions."
The district court in Walsh also rejected the union's assertion of res
judicata. 26 Nevertheless, the court denied the injunction because it failed to
find reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice had occurred. 27
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court findings
and ordered the court to dismiss the case on the basis of res judicata." In
reaching its conclusion, the circuit court discussed the principles of res
judicata" and analyzed the validity of the application of those principles to sec-
tion 10(1) decisions. 3 ° Section 10(1) proceedings, the court noted, are limited in
scope to a finding of a reasonable belief that an unfair labor practice has oc-
curred. 31 Because of this limitation, the court continued, a section 10(1) deci-
sion is not final as to the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice charge. 32
Thus, the court stated, such decisions do not bar further action on the underly-
ing charge either before the Board or the court of appeals." Yet the limited
scope of section 10(1) proceedings, the court continued, does not preclude ap-
plication of res judicata to district court adjudication of a section 10(1)
petition. 34 The court noted that in such cases the district court does decide the
narrow issue of reasonable cause for the purposes of determining whether to
'° 630 F.2d at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810.
21 Mack v. ILA, Civil No. 480-051 (D.C. Savannah).
22
 630 F.2d at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810-11.
23 Id. at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810. The court found that subsequent activity removed
the case from res judicata principles. See the Walsh court's discussion of the Mack district court
findings where the First Circuit noted that the subsequent conduct was broader and more far-
reaching than the conduct which led to the original complaint." 630 F.2d at 873, 105 L.R.R.M.
at 2816.
24 630 F.2d at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810.
25 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2811. The decision by the Fifth Circuit, affirming the district
court in Baldovin and reversing the district court in Mack, is reported at 626 F.2d 445, 105
L.R.R.IVI. 2549 (5th Cir. 1980).
26




 The court of appeals noted that it used the term res judicata as a general term to in-
clude both issue and claim preclusion, as well as collateral estoppel. 630 F.2d at 867 n.5, 105
L.R.R.M. at 2811 n.5.
3° 630 F.2d at 867-70, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2811-13.
31 Id. at 868, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
92 Id.
" Id. and cases cited therein.
34
 630 F.2d at 869, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
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allow injunctive relief." On this issue, the court pointed out, the parties have
an opportunity to be heard 36 and to appeal a denial to the court of appeals."
Since the opportunities to be heard and to appeal are available to section 10(1)
litigants, the court noted, there is no reason to allow a party to bring further
petitions against the same respondent based on the same underlying charge."
This approach, according to the court, would result in the type of repetitive
litigation which res judicata was designed to prevent. 39 The court concluded
that the potential for such repetitive suits, and for inconsistent decisions, is just
as present in section 10(1) proceedings as in other areas of the law, and,
therefore, res judicata is applicable. 46
After discussing the applicability of res judicata principles, the First Cir-
cuit applied those principles to the facts of the Walsh case. The court noted that
a proper application of res judicata principles requires: (1) a prior decision on
the merits; (2) identical parties in both actions; and (3) the same cause of action
in both suits'". If the cause of action is not the same, the court continued, the
action may still be barred if an issue decided in the earlier case disposed of the
later claim. 42 The Walsh court examined each of these factors to determine
whether res judicata was applicable." First, resolving whether the Baldovin
decision was on the merits, the court pointed out that Baldovin was disposed of
on a jurisdictional ground." While a jurisdictional disposition of a case is
usually not a disposition on the merits, the court noted, this rule is generally
applicable where a presiding court is defining its own jurisdiction. 45 In
Baldovin, the court stated the district court was called upon to determine the
Board's jurisdiction, and not its own.'" Since the finding that the Board lacked
jurisdiction necessarily meant that no violation of the Act had occurred, the
Walsh court concluded that Baldovin more closely resembled a decision on the
merits than a disposition for lack of federal court jurisdiction.'" Under this
analysis, the Baldovin decision was held by the Walsh court to be on the merits
for res judicata purposes. 48
The court then turned to the second factor — identity of parties. 49 The
court found that the regional directors should be considered the same party for
purposes of res judicata because they were all representatives of the United
35 Id. at 868-69, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
36 Id. at 869, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2812.
37 Id.
36 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
39 Id.
4° Id.
4 ' Id. at 870-74, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2813-16.
42 Id. at 873-74, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.






49 Id. at 870-72, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2814-15.
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States, pursuing the same government iiiterest." That the claims were brought
by different regional directors, the court concluded, did not make them non-
identical parties for res judicata purposes." Nor did the court find it persuasive
that different parties had filed the unfair labor charges with the Board. 52 While
the charging parties have a substantial interest in the proceedings, the court
reasoned, they do not have a private right of action under section 10(1) and
therefore cannot be termed the actual petitioners." The court also noted that
the Board must act in the public interest and not solely in the interest of the
party who files the charge with the Board to initiate the bringing of a . section
10(1) petition by a regional director. 54 These factors combined to support the
determination that in form and substance the petitioner in both Baldovin and
Walsh was the Board."
After finding the petitioners to be identical in both cases, the court ex-
amined whether the respondents were the same in Walsh as they were in
Baldovin. 56
 The regional directors in both Baldovin and Walsh had named the
ILA as respondent. 57
 Under the traditional rules of res judicata, both the plain-
tiff and the defendant in the two suits had to be identical." The court found
that the requirement of mutuality was not a barrier to the application of res
judicata in the case before the court since in both Baldovin and Walsh the ILA
was a named respondent."
The court then focused on the third factor — whether the cause of action
was identical in Baldovin and Walsh. Each case arose out of a challenge by a
Board official to the ILA policy of boycotting Soviet cargoes and ships. 6° The
Board had argued that the bringing of three separate actions, each of which
was against both local and national ILA union members, constituted actions
based on such varying fact patterns that res judicata principles were inap-
propriate. 6 ' In response to this argument, the court stated that it was un-
necessary to decide whether Baldovin and Walsh stemmed from the same cause
of action for res judicata purposes, finding instead that the principle of col-
lateral estoppel could be applied. 62
 The Board argued that collateral estoppel
5° Id. at 870, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2814.






Ss Id. at 872, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
56 Id. The court noted that mutality may no longer be required. Id. It appears that
mutuality is no longer a necessary element in a federal suit where a party is alleging issue preclu-
sion. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971) (defensive estoppel); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (offen-
sive estoppel).
" 630 F.2d at 872-73, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2815-16.
56 Id. at 872, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2815,
59 Id. at 872-73, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2815-16.
69 Id. at 873, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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could not be applied because the ship involved in Walsh was of United States
registry, but the ship involved in Baldovin was of foreign registry." This dif-
ference in registry, the Board concluded, was a "controlling fact" and thus the
jurisdictional issue litigated in Baldovin was not the same as the issue before the
court in Walsh."
The court agreed that collateral estoppel could not be used where there ex-
ists a difference in controlling facts" but found that the registry of the ships was
not a controlling fact." Since the Baldovin court had not expressly limited the
scope of its relief to United States ships, the circuit court declined to infer that it
had addressed the issue of registry." The court instead reasoned that the con-
trolling fact in defining the Board's jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign
ships is the nature of the underlying dispute." The court then determined that
the underlying issue in both Baldovin and Walsh was the ILA's policy toward
Soviet cargo. 69
 Therefore, since the underlying issues were the same in both
Baldovin and Walsh, the First Circuit found collateral estoppel applicable. Ap-
plying collateral estoppel, the court held that the Baldovin decision precluded a
judicial determination of the Walsh suit." The court then vacated the findings
of the district court and ordered the Walsh petition dismissed on the ground of
res judicata."
The application of res judicata principles, including both claim and issue
preclusion, to section 10(1) proceedings produces a proper legal result. In order
for res judicata to bar a suit, a court must find that there has been a final ad-
judication on the merits of a prior action brought by the parties or their
privies." These requirements are capable of being met in a section 10(1) pro-
ceeding, as was illustrated in Walsh. Section 10(1) proceedings are limited in
scope to a determination of whether a reasonable basis exists to believe that an
unfair labor practice has occurred." This determination, although binding
only until the Board has reached a decision on the merits of the charge, is made
by a district court and is a final judgment from which an appeal can lie. 74 Thus,
63 Id. at 874, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 874-75, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
67 Id. at 875, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2817.
66 Id. at 874, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2817. The court also stated that the location of the
underlying dispute was a controlling fact. Id. The court did not address the location of the dispute
presumably because in both Baldavin and Walsh the dispute involved American workers in
American ports over an issue of Soviet foreign policy. See text and notes at notes 10-11 supra.
69 Id. at 875, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2817. The court also found that there was no
equitable bar to applying collateral estoppel to the Walsh case. Id. at 875, 105 L.R.R.M. at
2816-17.
" 630 F.2d at 875, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2817-18.
71 Id. at 875, 195 L.R.R.M. at 2818.
72 Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
73 630 F.2d 864, 868, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2809, 2812.
74 Id.
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so long as res judicata applies only to the determination of reasonable cause,
the application of the doctrine is sound.
Because a judgment under a section 10(1) petition is valid only during the
time that the section .8(b)(4) petition is pending before the Board, it is res
judicata to another section 10(1) petition only during that limited period. Dur-
ing this time a party challenging a decision by a district court in a section 10(1)
proceeding is able to appeal that decision to the circuit court:75 This avenue of
appeal provides the parties with a remedy for errors made at the district court
level, and obviates the need for a de novo determination of the same issue by a
different district court. The right of appeal, therefore, further counsels that
there is no need to carve out an exception to res judicata principles in order to
protect the rights of the parties in section 10(1) proceedings.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was correct in holding that the
Walsh petition was barred by the prior adjudication of the Baldovin petition. By
explaining its decision in terms of res judicata and collateral estoppel, however,
the court did not follow the clearest route to its final determination. Rather, the
court framed its decision in a manner which may give rise to ambiguity
concerning the definition of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim
preclusion can be invoked when a suit is being brought on a cause of action that
has already been litigated between the same parties. 76 The application of claim
preclusion prevents the relitigation of any issue that could have been brought
under the cause of action of the earlier suit." Issue preclusion differs from
claim preclusion in that, under issue preclusion, the cause of action need not
have been the same between the parties in the earlier action. 78 Any issue actu-
ally litigated between the parties in the previous litigation, however, is pre-
cluded from relitigation. 79
The Walsh court stated at the outset of its opinion that it was using the
term res judicata in the general sense as embodying both claim and issue
preclusion. 80
 After discussing the difficulties in determining whether the causes
of action were identical, the court stated that it was shifting to a separate
analysis, using collateral estoppel.°' The express mention of this shift indicated
that the court was no longer applying the term res judicata in its general sense,
yet the court would have been more precise had it used the terms claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion throughout its opinion. For example, when the court
spoke of applying res judicata to the case, it was considering only claim preclu-
78 29 U.S.C. 5 160(1) (1976).
76 Purdes v. Carvel Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (D.C. Iowa 1969). See Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of III. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
77 Id.
16 Segal v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1979).
Purdes v. Carvel Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. at 1260; Segal v. American Tel. and Tel.
Co., Inc. 606 F.2d at 845. See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332 (1979).
80 630 F.2d at 867, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2811,
81 Id. at 873-74, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
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sion; 82 where it spoke of applying collateral estoppel, it was considering only
issue preclusion." Such a shift in analysis warranted explanation by the court.
Because the court did not use proper terminology, it is unclear to what extent
either of these principles — issue and claim preclusion — will be used to bar
repetitious section 10(1) litigation. It is suggested that courts should use these
terms in any future application of res judicata principles to section 10(1) pro-
ceedings. The following discussion uses the terms claim preclusion and issue
preclusion in analyzing the Walsh opinion.
The circuit court in Walsh expressly declined to decide whether the same
cause of action was at issue in Baldovin and Walsh, thus preventing it from
applying claim preclusion. 84 In lieu of determining whether the requirements
of claim preclusion were met, the circuit court applied the principles of issue
preclusion. 85 Thus, the court concluded that since the question of whether the
Board had jurisdiction over the action was litigated adversely to the Board in
Baldovin," litigation of that issue was barred in Walsh." In this case, however,
application of claim preclusion wouild have led to the same result, since the
jurisdictional question was dispositive — e.g., without jurisdiction, the Board
could not have brought suit at all."
It is possible, however, that at times issue preclusion will not be dispositive
of a case although claim preclusion would be. As noted earlier, issue preclusion
applies only to issues actually litigated." Claim preclusion applies to issues that
could have been litigated as well as to those that were actually litigated." The
broader reach of claim preclusion can be demonstrated by examining claim
and issue preclusion in the context of a case where judgment is unaccompanied
by findings. For example, if the Board's jurisdiction had not been litigated in
Walsh, and further, if claim preclusion had been applied to the Walsh case, a
finding that the causes of action were the same would bar the Walsh suit even if
jurisdiction of the Board had not been raised in Walsh. This result would follow
from the application of claim preclusion because under that doctrine any issue
that could have been raised in the previous litigation may be barred in the later
suit. 9 ' Such a result would not follow from applying issue preclusion where the
question of the Board's jurisdiction was not actually litigated in the earlier
87 This was evident in the court's discussion of whether the causes of action were iden-
tical, id. at 873, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816, which is the analysis needed for a determination of claim
preclusion. Purdes v. Carvel Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. at 1260.
83 This was evident when the court considered whether the issue decided in Baldovin was
the same issue as that presented in Walsh. 630 F.2d at 845.
84 630 F.2d at 873-74, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816. See text at notes 61-62 supra.
85 See text at notes 63-64 supra.
86 Id. at 866, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2810.
87 Id. at 874-75, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816-17.
88 See Id. at 870, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2813.
89 Id. at 864, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2809. See text at notes 78-79 supra.
98 Id. at 867-868, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2811-12. See text at notes 76-77 supra.
Purdes v. Carve] Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. at 1260.
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case. Thus, the application of issue preclusion instead of claim preclusion may
sometimes change the outcome of a challenge that a section 10(1) proceeding is
barred. Given these potential discrepancies, the broader doctrine of claim pre-
clusion should be applied when its requirements are met in order to effectuate
consistently the Walsh holding that res judicata principles are applicable to sec-
tion 10(0 proceedings.
In declining to find that the causes of action in Baldovin and Walsh were the
same, the Walsh court created the possibility that claim preclusion — requiring
the same cause of action — will not be applied in section 10(1) suits. The court
stated that both Baldovin and Walsh arose out of the general ILA policy of refus-
ing to handle Soviet cargo and goods. 92 The Board argued that the causes of
action were different because each regional director named different local
unions as defendants in his pleadings. 93 Taken to its logical outcome, the
Board's reasoning would result in the following situation: where a national
union policy had to be fulfilled by the actions of local union members, thus re-
quiring in turn the actions of various regional directors to challenge the na-
tional policy, a court could not find such a national embargo by a national
union to give rise to a single cause of action. Rather, each action brought by
each regional director concerning the same embargo would have to be treated
as separate causes of action. This result would always follow because, as a
practical matter, the national union can stop work only through its local
unions. While the Walsh court questioned whether courts would be prevented
from finding an identical cause of action solely because the plaintiff named
local unions, the court did not address this issue directly."
Walsh is a strong case for finding that the same cause of action existed and,
therefore, that claim preclusion ws applicable. Although different regional
directors were parties to the suits, each director was challenging the same na-
tional policy of the same national union. Whenever a national policy is
challenged by a regional director, that challenge is carried out by the actions of
local units of the national union. The mere fact that the national policy
challenged is effectuated by different members of a union should not preclude
a finding that the same cause of action is at issue. A contrary finding would
restrict severely the possible application of res judicata principles. Thus, for
claim preclusion to have any effect in section 10(1) controversies, as the Walsh
court ruled it should, the petitions brought by different regional directors con-
cerning a single union policy must be found to spring from the same cause of
action.
A finding that the cause of action in Walsh was the same as that in Baldovin
is supported by the facts of both cases. A cause of action is defined as a situation
92 630 F.2d at 873, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816.
93 Id,
94
 Where activity subsequent to the prior adjudicated activity is challenged, and relief
sought only as to that subsequent conduct, the second action may not be barred even though the
second action is of the same nature as the first. See Kiglar v. Colber County Bd. of Ed., 578 F2d
1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1978).
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or state of facts which would entitle a party to sustain an action and give him a
right to seek a judicial remedy in his behalf. 95 In both Baldovin and Walsh, a
regional 'director sought to prevent the ILA from carrying out its policy of
boycotting Soviet cargoes. In order for there to have been different causes of
action, the activity challenged in each of the section 10(1) proceedings at issue
would have to have changed substantively. Although the Board alleged that the
same cause of action was not at issue, it offered no proof that the character of
the activity challenged had changed from local union to local union. As there
was no proof of a change in the challenged activity, the activity was the same
for claim preclusion purposes in each case. As a practical matter, the national
policy of the ILA could be fulfilled only if each local union boycotted the cargo.
In order to end the boycott, the regional director had to enjoin each local
union. 95 Each separate injunction, however, arises from the same cause of ac-
tion. The Supreme Court has defined a cause of action as " . . a single
wrongful invasion of a primary right of the plaintiff, namely, ... whether the
acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex. " 97 The
challenges by the regional directors fall within this category.
In sum, while the court's determination that res judicata principles apply
to section 10(1) proceedings fosters the principles of res judicata without any
negative equitable effects on the parties, further clarification of the extent of the
standard's application is necessary. While the circuit court correctly found that
Walsh was barred by Baldovin, the court may inadvertently have limited the
future application of res judicata principles to the more narrow doctrine of
issue preclusion by not applying claim preclusion to the Walsh facts. 98 For the
time being, under facts similar to those in Walsh, it is clear only that issue
preclusion is applicable. The court should clarify the role of claim preclusion in
section 10(1) proceedings at the first opportunity.
5. Burden of Proof in Discriminatory Discharge Cases:
Wright Line Co. v. NLRB*
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibits
discrimination in hiring, firing, or in other conditions of employment on the
basis of union activity.' For an employee to prevail in a suit against an
95 Thompson v. Zurich Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D.C. Minn. 1970). This
definition seems similar to the "underlying issue" determination cited by the court as requiring
issue preclusion. See text and note at note 64 supra.
96 See 29 U.S.C. 5 160(1) quoted at note 1 supra.
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 13 (1951) (quoting Baltimore S.S.
Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)).
'a 630 F.2d at 873, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2816. See text at notes 76-78 supra.
* By Cindy A. Laquidara, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1976), which states in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be an un-
fair labor practice for an employer — ... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization."
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employer under section 8(a)(3), he must demonstrate that a causal connection
exists between his union activities and his dismissal.' While the National Labor
Relations Board (Board) and circuit courts of appeal have agreed that the
employee must bear the burden of demonstrating this causal connection,' a
uniform standard to determine whether that burden has been met has not yet
been agreed upon. Consequently, considerable difficulty has arisen in ascer-
taining whether the employee has made a showing of causation sufficient to
prove a violation of the NLRA. The major difficulty with determining whether
causation has been proved arises when an employer has both an anti-union and
a legitimate business reason for the dismissal. It is in these "dual motivation"'
cases that the Board and the courts must reconcile the competing interests of
protecting an employee under the NLRA with that of allowing management to
make business decisions free from unnecessary interference.'
In the past, when reconciling these competing interests, the Board has ap-
plied the "in-part" test. 6
 In contrast, the courts of appeal have applied, inter
alia, the "dominant-motive" test.' While both tests require that the employee
bear the burden of persuasion that a violation of section 8(a)(3) has occurred,
the tests differ significantly on the level of proof necessary to meet that burden.
Under the in-part test, the employee must demonstrate that some part of the
dismissal decision was generated by his union activities. 8
 Thus, the application
of the in-part test could result in a finding for the employee even though the
employer would have dismissed the employee absent the protected conduct, so
long as anti-union motivation or animus contributed, in part, to the dismissal
decision. 9
 In comparison, under the dominant-motive standard, an employee
must demonstrate that the protected union activity was the primary cause of
the dismissal. The First Circuit, for example, has stated that under the
dominant-motive test the employee must give an "affirmative and persuasive
reason why the employer rejected the good cause and chose the bad cause. , 710
Wright Line Co. v. NLRB, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169, 1170
(1980).
Id. at 7, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1173.
' Id. at 4, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170. An employer's actions are in the dual motivation
category if both anti-union animus and a legitimate business reason caused the dismissal. Id.
When faced with a dual motivation case, the Board and some courts have attempted to determine
whether the employer justifications are "pretextual." An employer justification is considered
pretextual when the alleged business reason for the dismissal was in reality only a sham. Id. If the
employer is able to demonstrate that the employer justification for the dismissal was a pretext, no
countervailing policy would militate against judgment for the employee. Id. The characterization
of the employer's justifications for the dismissal as either pretext or dual motivation does not aid
in the determination of causation, however, because the characterization could not be made until
the parties presented their respective proof on the cause of the dismissal. Id.
251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 5, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
6 Id. at 5-6 n.5, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170 n.5.
E.g., Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 1293 (1st Cir. 1977); Midwest
Regional Joint Bd., 564 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir., 1977).
" 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 6, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170.
g Id.
10 Coletti's Furniture v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 1293 (1st Cir. 1977).
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Thus, the dominant motive test requires that the employee prove the dismissal
would not have occurred absent the protected activity. To add to the confusion
over the appropriate test in section 8(a)(3) cases, several courts have employed
a combination of the two standards, while others have chosen one or the other
for specific determinations."
During the Survey year, in Wright Line Co. v. NLRB," the Board adopted a
new standard to be applied in all section 8(a)(3) suits." In Wright Line the
Board held that the shifting burden of proof standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in the first amendment case of Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle" was to be applied in such suits. Under this test, an employee is required
first to make a prima facie case that protected conduct — such as union activity
— was a motivating factor in his dismissal." After this showing the burden
shifts to the employer who must prove that the employee would have been
dismissed for legitimate business reasons even absent the protected conduct."
In Wright Line, employee Lamoureux was discharged for violating a plant
" See 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 9-10, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1171-72 and cases cited therein.
In NLRB v. Eastern Smelting and Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1970), the First Circuit
adopted the Mt. Healthy standard, see note 14 infra, for use in S 8(a)(3) decisions. In Wright Line,
251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 9 n.7, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1171 n.7, the Board noted that the First Cir-
cuit had adopted the Mt. Healthy standard, but did not purport to be following that circuit's view.
This passing recognition of the First Circuit activity may be the result of the references to the
Board's treatment of 5 8(a)(1) and 5 8(a)(3) cases when the First Circuit was applying the
dominant-motive test, a practice that strained the relations between the two decisionmakers.
E.g.: "Over the years we have observed that our decisions restricting the Board are rarely cited
by it, no matter how pertinent, a seemingly symbolic bookburning, difficult to subscribe to over-
sight." 598 F.2d at 670 n.7. "The Board's persistent disregard of the principles governing mixed
motive cases ultimately led to our announcing that we would no longer 'rescue [it] if it does not
both articulate and apply our rule.' " Id. at 671. "It is altogether inexplicable that at this late
date, ... an ALJ could say 'The existence of justifiable grounds for the layoff is no defense if the
motivation for the layoff was in part because of the employee's participation in union
activities.' " Id. at 674 n.18. The Wright Line decision thus serves to reconcile the differences be-
tween the Board and the Court by adopting the same burden of proof standards.
The Seventh Circuit has refused to follow the Eastern Smelting decision. Pelton Casteel,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 627 F.2d 23, 27 (7th Cir. 1980). Pelton Casteel, Inc. is a pre- Wright Line deci-
sion, however, and it is possible that the Seventh Circuit will now follow the Board in the interest
of uniformity.
" 251 N.L.R.B. No., 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980).
" Id. at 3, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1170. The Board announced that the standard used in Mt.
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), would be applied to S 8(a)(3) alleged
violations. Id. The Board then applied the standard to the 5 8(a)(3) allegations of the Wright Line
case. 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 3, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1169.
14 In Mt. Healthy, a school teacher was not rehired following an incident where he turned
an intra-school memorandum over to a local radio station which broadcast it as a news item. 429
U.S. at 282. Although the school board presented several non-constitutionally protected in-
cidents that may have been grounds for dismissing Doyle, such as arguing with another teacher
and making an obscene gesture at students, id. at 281, the district court ordered him reinstated
because the constitutionally protected radio incident played a "substantial part" in the school
board's decision to dismiss him. Id. at 285. The Supreme Court rejected the substantial part test
and developed the Mt. Healthy standard shifting burden of proof. Id. at 287.
" 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 13, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1172-73.
" Id.
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rule against knowingly altering time cards." Apparently Lamoureux was not
working on jobs at the times listed on his time card. 18 Lamoureux conceded
that he may not have been present at the jobs during the times listed, but main-
tained that the jobs had been performed at different times that same day." The
company in turn conceded that Lamoureux was not discharged for failing to
perform assigned work." Indeed, the record showed that during the more than
ten years" that Lamoureux had been employed by Wright Line, he had been
producing better than average work. 22 The record further showed that his final
paycheck had already been prepared when management asked for an explana-
tion of the discrepancies on his time card."
The Board applied the Mt. Healthy standard of review to these facts and
ordered Lamoureux reinstated with back pay." Under Mt. Healthy,
Lamoureux first had to prove that his union activities were a motivating factor
in the dismissal." In concluding that Lamoureux had sustained that burden,
the Board noted that no other employee had been dismissed under the plant
rule for knowingly altering time cards even though other employees followed
similar practices." The Board found that two employees who had deliberately
falsified their time cards were only reprimanded." In addition, the Board
noted, it was undisputed that Wright Line was aware of Lamoureux's union
activities28
 and that Lamoureux was dismissed only two months after the 1977
union election." Furthermore, the Board cited evidence that Wright Line had
previously exhibited anti-union animus. 3° Consequently, the Board found that
Lamoureux had met his burden of proof by making a prima facie case that his
union activity was a motivating factor in his dismissal."
The Board next considered whether Wright Line had carried its burden of
proof to show that Lamoureux would have been dismissed notwithstanding the
union activities." The Board ruled that the company had not made such a




" Id. at 23 & n.17, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175 & n.17.
" Id. at 22, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
22 Id.
a Id. at 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
24 Id. at 27, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
23 Id. at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
25 Id. The Board noted that two employees had been dismissed under the rule in the
past for embezzlement and for forgery. Id. There was no contention that Lamoureux could have
financially benefitted from his time-card discrepancies. Id. at 25 n.19, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176
n.19.
22
 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
93 Id. at 24-25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175-76.
29 Id. at 25-26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
3° Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175-76.
3 ' Id. at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
32 Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
33 Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175-76.
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had been ordered to check on Lamoureux without any proof that Lamoureux
had done anything to justify that surveillance. 34 This fact suggested to the
Board that a predetermined plan existed to find a reason to dismiss
Lamoureux. 35 The Board also found that there was no business reason for the
disparate treatment of Lamoureux, since no other employees had been dis-
missed for the same offense: 35 The Board indicated that the company's defense
was further weakened because such timekeeping discrepancies were common-
place." Accordingly, the Board determined that Wright Line had not shown
that it would have dismissed Lamoureux absent his union activity. 38
Board member Jenkins concurred specially to highlight the difficulties in
separating motives in mixed, as opposed to dual, motive cases. 39 Jenkins
agreed that the Wright Line test would suffice in most cases, but noted that there
may be cases where many justifications, only one of which violates the NLRA,
culminated in the discharge." Jenkins termed such instances "mixed" motiva-
tion cases.'" In such cases, the absence of any one of the justifications may have
operated to prevent the dismissal." Nevertheless, Jenkins contended, if a
single motive cannot be isolated as the cause of the dismissal and the unlawful
motive was found to be part of the discharge, the discharge should be found in
violation of section 8(a)(3). 43 Jenkins remarked that if the Mt. Healthy test, as
applied in Wright Line, would not require reinstatement of the employee in a
mixed motivation case, he would require that the test be modified. 44
The adoption of the Mt. Healthy standard by the Board will considerably
clarify the proper application of the burden of proof in section 8(a)(3) dismissal
cases. If followed by the circuit courts," Wright Line will bring both uniformity
of standards and more consistent findings. One favorable aspect of the stand-
ard is its ability to reconcile the competing interests of the employee and the
employer in dual motivating dismissals. These competing interests — the right
of the employee to partake in activity that is protected under the NLRA, and
the right of the employer to dismiss an employee for legitimate business reasons
— cannot be reconciled through the use of either the in-part or the dominant-
motive test. As noted above," the in-part test cannot be used to reconcile such
34 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 27, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
" Id.
3' Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
40 Id. at 28-29, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
4' Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
47 Id. at 29, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
43 Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176.
44 Id. at 29, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1176-77.
" See NLRB v. Burns Motor Freight, 635 F.2d 312, 106 L.R.R.M. 2018 (4th Cir.
1981) (court declining to decide whether it will adopt Wright Line standard).
16 See text at note 9 supra.
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interests. If anti-union animus plays a part in the dismissal decision, the in-
part test requires judgment for the employee regardless of any countervailing
business reasons that may have existed.*' Because legitimate business reasons
for the dismissal are not considered under this standard, its application tends to
penalize employers unfairly."
In contrast to the in-part test, the dominant-motive test recognizes the
need to assess whether a legitimate business concern of the employer was in fact
the reason for the dismissal even though protected activity may have played
some part in the decision." Two difficulties with the test, however, render it
less desirable than the Mt. Healthy standard. First, the employee is required to
show that the protected union activity was in fact the employer's "dominant"
motive in the dismissal. When many motivating factors exist, including
business reasons, this is an exceptionally difficult task. Second, this task is par-
ticularly onerous because, by necessity, the determination is a highly subjective
one. These difficulties, in addition to the employee's shouldering of the burden
of proof, make it questionable whether section 8(a)(3)'s objective of protecting
employees from union-based discrimination can be met. The flaw in the
dominant-motive test, then, is that it does not adequately preserve the rights of
workers.
Reconciliation of the rights of both the employee and the employer,
however, is attainable through the application of the Wright Line test. Under
the first step of the test, the employee must make a prima facie case that pro-
tected conduct was a motivating factor in the dismissal." This first step thus
forces the Board to consider whether it is likely that the employee's rights under
the Act have been infringed. After the employee has met this burden, the
burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the employee would
have been dismissed for legitimate business reasons absent the protected con-
duct. 51 This second step allows the Board to consider and weigh the interests of
the employer in dismissing the employee.
The two-step process adopted by the Board in Wright Line requires that the
initial burden of proof be on the employee, as was the case under both the in-
part and dominant-motive standards." Under Wright Line, however, the
employee need only establish a prima facie case that a dismissal was motivated
by anti-union animus for the burden of proof to shift to the employer. This low
threshold of proof is, in effect, a shift of the risk of nonpersuasion to the
47  See M.S.P. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 166, 173-74 (10th Cir. 1977). The ap-
plication of the in-part test may advantage an employee merely because of the exercise of her
rights under the NLRA. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 285-86 (1977).
48 See Wright Line v. NLRB, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 7, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1171
(1980).
4 ' Id. at 7-8, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1171.
'' Id. at 20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
31 Id. at 19, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
52 See, e.g., NLRB v. Billen Shoe Co., Inc. 297 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1968) (dominant
motive standard); The Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976)
(in-part standard).
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employer. 53 Although the Board stated that the employee still carries the
ultimate burden of proof, 54 in practice, this ultimate burden may be carried
simply by proving a prima facie case in the first instance. The failure of the
Board to acknowledge this shift in burdens does not alter the application of the
Wright Line standard. It does suggest, however, that the Board did not intend
its new standard to impose a greater burden of proof on the employee than did
the in-part test.
While the adoption of the Wright Line test brings with it a much needed
clarification of the burden of proof in section 8(a)(3) dismissals, uncertainties
exist as to its future application due to the ambiguities concerning the nature of
the prima facie case. Without further clarification by the Board, the prima facie
standard could be used to detract from the simplicity of the Mt. Healthy stand-
ard, affecting both the application of the standard and the fairness of its results.
While the Board in Wright Line intimated that the burden of proof necessary to
meet the prima facie standard be that of a motivating factor," no in-depth
discussion of the level of proof was undertaken. Furthermore, the Board noted
that the motivating-factor test did not require a showing that the discrimina-
tory motive was the sole cause of the dismissal."
In order to further the purpose of the Act without unduly burdening
employers, the•Board should retain the in-part standard as the first step of the
shifting burdens standard adopted in Wright Line." While the Supreme Court
" Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wallace, 158 Or. 210, 213, 75 P.2d 942, 947 (defining
prima facie case as one that will prevail until contradicted and overcome by other evidence).
54 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 18 n.11, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174 n.11.
55 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 14-15, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1173 (discussing Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Village
of Arlington Heights, the Court found that the plaintiffs, who had alleged a denial of zoning changes
because of racial discrimination, had failed to establish that racial discrimination was a
motivating factor in the refusal. Id. at 270.
56 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 19, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
" But cf., Statler Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 108 L.R.R.M. 2513
(1st Cir. 1981) (employee must satisfy significant-factor test in order to make a prima facie
S 8(a)(3) case). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in S 8(a)(3) suits, an employee
must prove protected conduct was a significant factor in the employer's decision before the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the dismissal would have resulted even absent the pro-
tected activity. Id. The incorporation of the significant-factor test thus would result in the Board
applying the same standard for section 8(a)(3) violations as the First Circuit. Therefore, the in-
corporation of the significant-factor test would obviate the concern of the First Circuit over the
failure of the Board to apply First Circuit standards. See text and note at note 11 supra. It is
notable, however, that the Board in Wright Line did not express any concern over a conflict with
the First Circuit. The Board was not attempting to reconcile its position with that of the First Cir-
cuit.  Instead, the Board was attempting to reconcile employee protection, mandated by the
NLRA, with the right of employers to dismiss employees for legitimate business reasons. In order
to reconcile employee-employer interests, it is necessary to allow the employer to demonstrate
that the employee would have been dismissed absent his protected activity. It should also be
noted that the Board may consider the terms "in-part" and "significant" to have the same
meaning for purposes of reviewing S 8(a)(3) cases. See Wright Line v. Lamoureux, 251 N.L.R.B.
No. 150 at 6 (1980).
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in Mt. Healthy rejected the in-part standard as a one-step test, it did not
preclude its use as the standard by which, the employee might meet his initial
burden of proof. There are several reasons for incorporating the in-part stand-
ard. Most importantly, the incorporation of the in-part test would require the
employer to come forward with affirmative proof that the employee was not
discharged because of his union activities." Also, the adoption of the in-part
standard would address the difficulties implicit in mixed motive dismissals
which concerned the concurring Board member Jenkins in Wright Line. As
noted earlier, Jenkins voiced concern over the equity of the application of the
Mt. Healthy standard where the employer had several justifications for the
dismissal." If, for example, the union activity was one of the five reasons for
the dismissal, and the union activity occurred two years prior to the dismissal,
the in-part standard would be met. Since section 8(a)(3) was passed to prevent
an employee from being discriminated against because of union activity, the
proper test to be applied in section 8(a)(3) dismissals is one which protects the
employee from dismissal if any part of the decision to dismiss him was based on
his union activity. The incorporation of the in-part standard into the Mt.
Healthy test would provide the employees with this protection while allowing the
employer to prove that the employee's union activity did not affect the
dismissal decision.
As noted earlier, 6° a test which requires a prima facie case that consists only
of a showing that anti-union animus played some part in a dismissal, is a test
which, as a practical matter, shifts the ultimate burden of proof onto the
employer." While this result does run counter to the Board's expressed intent
in Wright Line to maintain the ultimate burden of proof on the employee , 62 the
ability of the employer to prevail by demonstrating a legitimate business reason
for the dismissal obviates any possible inequities.
In sum, the Mt. Healthy standard of review in discriminatory discharges
will bring both clarity and uniformity of results to section 8(a)(3) suits.
Unanswered questions exist, however, as to the standard of proof necessary for
an employee to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. Incor-
poration of the in-part test as the standard that an employee must meet before
the burden of proof shifts to the employer, would clarify the application of this
standard and further the purpose of the Act.
" 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 17-18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
59 See text at notes 39-44 supra.
6° See text and note at note 53 supra.
61
 This shift appears to be particularly detrimental to the employer in cases where the
employee uses inferences of past anti-union animus to support the prima facie showing. See J .P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 106 L.R.R.M. 2145, 2147 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussion of inferences in
proving anti-union motivation).
62 251 N.L.R.B. No. 150 at 18, n.11, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1174 n.11.
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6. Selective Discipline of Union Officials:
NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc.'
When labor unions engage in illegal strikes, employers may wish to
discipline union officials more severely than the rank-and-file union members.
Before 1977, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had held that it was
permissible for union officials to be disciplined more severely than the rank-
and-file, because the officials had a greater duty than did the rank-and-file to
uphold their obligations to the employers.' In the 1977 case of Precision Castings
Co. , 2 the NLRB adopted a contrary view. In that case, union officials had par-
ticipated in an illegal strike, although they had an obligation, under their col-
lective bargaining agreement, to take reasonable steps to thwart any work stop-
page. 5 Upon returning to work, the union officials were singled out and
disciplined because of their status as union officials and their resultant obliga-
tions.' In spite of the contractual obligations of the union officials, the NLRB
held that the employer could not selectively discipline union officials based on
their union status. 3  Such selective discipline was held to be a violation of the
employee's right to participate in union activity. 6 According to the Board, such
selective I discipline is, therefore, an unfair labor practice, in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 7
Although the Precision Castings case was not itself reviewed by the courts,
the NLRB's new position — that union officials cannot be disciplined selective-
ly — has been reviewed by the Third and Seventh Circuits. 8 Both circuits have
refused to accept this position and, thus, have not enforced NLRB orders in ac-
• By Edward J. Neville, III, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
I See, e.g., Russell Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194, 195-97, 48 L.R.R.M. 1608,
1608-09 (1961).
2 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 96 L.R.R.M. 1540 (1977).
3 Id. at 183, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1541-42.
Id. at 183-84, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1542.
5 Id. at 184, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1542.
6 Id.
7 The pertinent sections of the NLRA provide:
157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations ... and to engage in other concerted activities for ... other
mutual aid or protection ...
29 U.S.C. 1 157 (1976).
158. Unfair labor practices.
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer —
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
right guaranteed in Section 157 of this title;
• • •
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization.
29 U.S.C. $ 138 (1976).
Gould, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 103 L.R.R.M. 2207 (3d Cir. 1979); Indiana &
Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 101 L.R.R.M. 2475 (7th Cir. 1979).
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cord with this position. 9 These courts have reasoned that, because union of-
ficials are under a greater duty to uphold their contracts, the officials may be
disciplined more severely when they breach their contracts.'° Furthermore,
since there is no employee right to engage in illegal strikes, the courts have held
that no employee right is violated by the discipline of officials who strike illegal-
ly." Therefore, these courts have rejected the view adopted by the NLRB in
Precision Casting.
During the Survey year, the issue of whether union officials may be selec-
tively disciplined was before the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Armour-Dial, Inc.' 2
The Eighth Circuit joined the Third and Seventh Circuits by holding that
selective discipline of union officials was permissible under the Labor-
Management Relations Act.' 3 Now that three circuits have held that selective
discipline is permissible, it seems unlikely that the NLRB's position to the con-
trary will become the law.
The Armour-Dial case arose when the union which represented Armour-
Dial's employees threatened to stop handling materials from Iowa Beef Pro-
ducts.' 4 The threatened work stoppage by the Armour employees was in fur-
therance of a dispute between an affiliated union and Iowa Beef Products.' 5
Thus, the threats were illegal under the secondary boycott prohibition of the
NLRA.' 6
The dispute between Armour and the union climaxed when an Iowa Beef
truck arrived at Armour's loading dock." The union president informed com-
pany officials that Armour's employees would no longer handle Iowa Beers
products. 18 The company persistently tried to convince the union president and
vice-president to prevent the impending work stoppage.' 9 When no agreement
was reached, a meeting was scheduled between the company and the union's
president, vice-president, chief steward, and executive committee. 2° This
meeting also failed to resolve the dispute, although the company argued that
the union officials had an obligation to prevent any work stoppage. 2 ' When it
became clear that the union officials would not halt the work stoppage, the
company suspended the union representatives, each for varying lengths of
t i me. 22
9
 Gould, 612 F.2d at 730, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2208; Indiana, 599 F.2d at 228, 101
L.R.R.M. at 2476.
Gould, 612 F.2d at 733, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2210; Indiana, 599 F.2d at 230, 101
L.R.R.M. at 2477.
" Gould, 612 F.2d at 732-33, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2210; Indiana, 599 F.2d at 230, 101
L.R.R.M. at 2477.
12
 638 F.2d 51, 106 L.R.R.M. 2265 (8th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 55-56, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267-68.
14 Id. at 53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2265.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 55, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267.





22 Id. at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2266.
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In response to the suspension of the union officials, a complaint was filed
against Armour-Dia1. 23 The complaint alleged that the suspensions
discriminated against the union officials solely on the basis of their status in the
union. 24 Such discrimination was allegedly an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. 25 The NLRB agreed with this allegation and held that the suspension
of the union officials was prohibited by the NLRA. 26 Thus, the company was
ordered to cease its unfair practices, to provide the suspended officials with
back pay, to erase all reprimands issued to the officials, and to post an ap-
propriate notice. 27
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, enforcement of the NLRB's order was
denied." The court recognized that an employee may not be disciplined merely
because he holds a union office." The court found, however, a "crucial
distinction between discipline which is imposed because of union . . . office and
discipline which is imposed for acts, otherwise punishable, which were commit-
ted ... while exercising union . . . office." 3° In the Armour-Dial case, the court
determined that the discipline fell in the latter category. Since the threatened
boycotts were illegal under the NLRA, the company had a right to discipline
the union officials, regardless of their status within the union. 3 ' Because non-
official employees could have been disciplined for such activity as well, there
was no reason for the court to "shield union officers from disciplinary measures
to which they would otherwise be subject." 32
In holding that selective discipline was acceptable under the NLRA, the
Armour court explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana
& Michigan Electric Company v. NLRB." In Indiana, the court permitted the
selective discipline of union officials because such officials are under a greater
duty to uphold the union's contractual obligations than are the rank-and-file."
Furthermore, the officials' actions have a broader effect on other employees,
and thus, harsher discipline is justified. 35 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
stricter treatment of officials does not violate any employee right because no




25 Id. at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2266-67. See the pertinent sections of the NLRA at note
6 supra.
26 638 F.2d at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267. The Board held that the suspension of the
union president, unlike the suspensions of the other union officials, was not a violation of the
NLRA. Id. The Board did not offer any explanation as to why the president's suspension was ac-
ceptable. Id.
27 Id. at 53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2265.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 54-55, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267.
3° Id. at 55, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267.
31 Id.
32 Id.
" 599 F.2d 227, 101, L.R.R.M. 2475 (7th Cir. 1979).
3* Id. at 230, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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It is unquestionable that no employee has the right to engage in an illegal
strike. Participation in illegal strikes, however, was not the issue in either the
Armour-Dial case or the Indiana & Michigan Electric case. The issue in both cases
was whether, after union officials supported an illegal strike, employers could
discipline those union officials more severely than other employees." In other
words, the issue was whether stricter sanctions, directly related to status in the
union, were per se unfair labor practices. Therefore, the courts' reasoning that
no employee has the right to engage in an illegal strike sidestepped the real
issue in the case.
In order to discipline some, but not all, unlawful strikers, an employer
must have some reasonable basis for selecting certain employees to be disci-
plined." That reasonable basis cannot, however, be related to an employee's
status in the union. 39 In both the Indiana and Armour cases the circuit courts
found the reasonable basis for selectively disciplining union officials to lie in
their greater responsibility to uphold union contracts." According to the ra-
tionale of these courts, however, this greater responsibility flows directly from
the officials' status as officials. Furthermore, it is only union status that gives
rise to the greater responsibility. 4 ' Therefore, finding that officials have a
"greater responsibility" simply obscures the de facto result of permitting an
employer to punish union status. It can be only union status that is punished
when union officials are treated more harshly than non-officials who have com-
mitted the same illegal act. Therefore, unless the Indiana and Armour courts
could impute higher responsibility to the union officials from another factor
besides their mere status as officials, the Indiana and Armour courts actually
allowed the punishment of union status.
There are certain instances where something other than status may give
rise to a heightened responsibility for union officials. For example, in Gould v.
NLRB, 42
 the selectively disciplined union officials had a specific contractual
obligation to take affirmative steps to terminate any work stoppage." Although
the Gould court did not find the contractual provision essential to allow selective
discipline, the union officials in the Gould case certainly had an obligation
which the other employees did not share.'" In such instances, it is logical to
" 638 F.2d at 53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2265; Indiana, 599 F.2d at 228, 101 L.R.R.M. at
" Gould, 612 F.2d at 732, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2210.
99 Id.
4° 638 F.2d at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267; Indiana, 599 F.2d 227, 101 L.R.R.M. at
4 ' 638 F.2d at 54, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267; Indiana, 599 F.2d at 231, 101 L.R.R.M, at
42
 612 F.2d 728, 103 L.R.R.M. 2207 (3d Cir. 1979).
43 Id. at 730, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2208.
44
 It is interesting to note that the NLRB takes the more radical position, that even with
a specific contract provision requiring union officials to thwart a strike, there cannot be differen-
tial discipline of union officials. See Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 184, 96
L,R.R.M. 1540, 1541-42 (1977). This result is illogical, however, as the employer has given con-
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single out union officials for discipline, for the union officials had a specific con-
tractual duty to the employer. Breach of the heightened responsibility justifies
harsher discipline since the union official has committed a greater wrong by
striking than has the rank-and-file employee."
There are other instances where the result in Armour may be correct.
Where a union official actually behaves differently from the rank-and-file
employees during the course of the illegal strike, the employer again may be
justified in meting out harsher discipline to the union official. For example, the
union officials may induce the strike or they may continue to stay out of work
after the rank-and-file has returned. In addition, the union official, as an in-
dividual, may behave differently than the other employees during the course of
the strike. In cases such as these, where the union officials' behavior is more
repugnant than that of the other striking employees, differential treatment also
may be justified.
In the Indiana case, quoted extensively in the Armour decision, there was no
allegation that the union officials had behaved differently than had the rank-
and-file employees. 46 There also was no contractual obligation for the union of-
ficials to take affirmative steps to thwart a strike. 47 Rather, the court found the
justification for treating the union stewards differently from the other
employees in prior NLRB case law." The old NLRB cases had held that union
officials had a higher responsibility to uphold their contracts than did the rank-
and-file. 49 The Armour court quoted the portion of the Indiana opinion that
justified the higher responsibility by relying upon old NLRB cases. 5 °
Therefore, the Armour court also depended upon previous NLRB holdings to
find the heightened responsibility in union officials. The NLRB decisions
relied upon by the Armour court, however, do not support the imposition of
such heightened responsibility since those decisions had been overruled by the
NLRB." The Supreme Court has specifically held that the NLRB may over-
rule its own adjudication, and that the NLRB is not bound by its own previous
decisions." Therefore, if there had been a duty according to prior NLRB case
law, the NLRB was free to change its position. The NLRB did change its posi-
stoppage. If the employer cannot discipline the union officials who breach their contract, the con-
tract itself is worth nothing to the employer. See Note, Harsher Discipline for Union Stewards than
Rank-and-File for Participation in Illegal Strike Activity, 56 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1175, 1191
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Note].
45 612 F.2d at 730, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2208.
46 599 F.2d at 228-29, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
42 Id. at 230, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
48 Id. at 230-31, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2477-78.
49 See, e.g., Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 629, 629, 24 L.R.R.M. 1333,
1334 (1949).
56 The courts relied on NLRB cases prior to Precision Castings, although they
acknowledged that Precision Castings was a departure from the precedent of previous NLRB cases.
See, e.g., Indiana, 599 F.2d at 230, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
" The courts relied on NLRB cases that predated Precision Castings, although they
acknowledged that Precision Castings was a departure from previous NLRB cases. See, e.g., Indiana,
599 F.2d at 230, 101 L.R.R.M. at 2476.
52 NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc,, 420 U.S. 251, 265-67 (1975).
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tion in Precision Castings, and it adhered to its new position in its own rulings in
the Armour and Indiana cases. Therefore, a duty requiring union officials to act
differently from the rank-and-file cannot be found in current NLRB case law.
With no duty to act differently, no differential punishment based on union
status can be justified.
Under the facts of the Armour case, however, the suspension of the union
officials may be justifiable for other reasons. The court found that the union of-
ficials induced, rather than merely participated in, the illegal strike." Since the
union officials arguably committed a greater wrong than did the rank-and-file,
the harsher discipline imposed upon the officials may have a reasonable basis.
The Armour opinion also suggests that under the Eighth Circuit's opinion,
mere acquiescence in the strike by the union officials could have justified the
harsher discipline. 54 Such a broad statement may alter the present relationship
between labor and management. From a management viewpoint, it will be
easier to deter illegal strikes after the Armour case because the opinion implies
that union officials have an affirmative duty to thwart such threatened strikes."
It is suggested that this duty will have negative consequences for the unions,
however, because they will find it more difficult to find members willing to ac-
cept such a responsibility."
B. Union Unfair Labor Practices
1. Employee. Remedies For Unlawful Discharge:
Sheet Metal Workers' Union, Local 355*
A union that causes an employer to discriminate against an employee in
regard to conditions of employment is guilty of an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).' Once the
National Labor Relations Board (Board) finds that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes the Board to issue a
cease and desist order and to take affirmative action, including reinstatement
of employees with or without hack pay, that will effectuate the policies of the
NLRA. 2
 In the 1950 case of Pen and Pencil Workers Union, Local 19593, 3
 the
Board fashioned a remedy to be applied where a union alone was found to have
unlawfully caused an employer to discharge an employee.' The Board explain-
ed that it possessed only limited power to order direct remedial action because
" 638 F.2(1 at 56, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2267-68.
54 Id.
55 Accord, Chicago Note, supra note 40, at 1175.
se
	id. at 1194-96.
* By Cheri L. Crow, Staff Member, BOSTON coi..r.EoF: LAW REVIEW,
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
• 91 N.L.R.B. 883, 26 L.R.R.M. 1583 ( 1950).
4 Id. at 889-90, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1586.
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the employer had sole control over the employment of its employees. 5 Since the
employer was not a party to the proceeding, the Board could not order the
reinstatement of the discharged employee. 6 Instead, the union was required to
remove the barrier it had erected which prevented the employee from retaining
his previous position.' To this end, the Board ordered the union to notify both
the employer and the employee that the union had no objection to the
employee's immediate reinstatement.' The Board also ordered the union to
make the employee whole for all losses of pay suffered by reason of the union's
unlawful conduct beginning from the date of the employee's discharge to five
days after the date the union gave notification that it no longer objected to the
employee's reinstatement. 9 This remedy, limiting the union's back pay liabili-
ty to five days after notification, has been consistently applied in subsequent
cases where the union was found solely liable for the discriminatory discharge
of an employee.'"
During the Survey year, in Sheet Metal Workers' Union, Local 355," the
Board considered whether the remedy set forth in Pen and Pencil Workers ade-
quately compensated an employee for his losses suffered because of unlawful
discharge . 12 The Board expressly overruled Pen and Pencil Workers Union, Local
19593 13 and held that henceforth a union would be required to make an
employee whole for lost wages and benefits suffered by the employee as a result
of the union's discrimination until the employee is reinstated or finds substan-
tially equivalent employment elsewhere. 14 This holding is significant because it
abolishes the remedy which had been applied for thirty years: termination of a
union's liability five days after notification by the union that it no longer ob-
jects to the employee's reinstatement.
The Sheet Metal Workers' Union case was originally heard before an ad-
ministrative law judge who found that acts by the union led to the discharge of
Gilson, an employee of Zinsco Electrical Products.' 5 The judge also found that
these acts constituted a breach of the union's fiduciary duty to deal fairly with
Gilson and that the union unlawfully caused Gilson's discharge in violation of
sections 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. 16 Since the employer was not a
party to the proceedings, the union alone was held responsible for Gilson's
Id. at 888, 26 L.R.R,M. at 1585.
Id.
Id. at 889, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1585.
8 Id., 26 L.R.R.M. at 1585-86.
9
 Id. at 889-90, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1586.
'° See, e.g., Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70, 212
N.L.R.B. 714, 87 L.R.R.M. 1757 (1974); Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 130 N.L,R.B. 184, 47
L.R.R.M. 1301 (1961); Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Int'l Union, Local 12, 115 N.L.R.B.
1542, 38 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1956).
1 ' 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 106 L.R.R.M. 1137 (1981).
' 2 Id.
13 91 N.L.R.B. 883, 26 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1950).
' 4 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 5, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
15 Id. at 2, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
16 Id.
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discriminatory discharge." The judge applied the remedy established in Pen
and Pencil Workers Union," ordering the union to remedy this violation by mak-
ing Gilson whole for any loss of wages and benefits, such liability to end five
days after the union notified both Gilson and Zinsco Electrical Products that it
no longer objected to Gilson's reinstatement. i 9
The sole issue addressed by the Board in its decision was whether the
remedy ordered by the administrative law judge was inadequate for failing to
make the employee, Gilson, whole for all losses stemming from his unlawful
discharge." The Board noted that the remedy fashioned in Pen and Pencil
Workers Union, Local 195932 ' was first applied in Pinkerton's National Detective
Agency, Inc." In Pinkerton, both the employer and the union were found to have
violated the NLRA and as a result were held jointly and severally liable for
wages the employees lost due to the unlawful discharges." The Sheet Metal
Workers' Union Board explained that the union's back pay liability was ter-
minated after it gave notification in Pinkerton because it would be inequitable to
hold the union responsible for further back pay if it ceased its past discrimina-
tion and the employer refused promptly to reinstate the employees. 24
Therefore, after the union's liability was tolled, the employer would have the
responsibility of either reinstating the employees or continuing to pay the
employees' lost wages and benefits."
In Sheet Metal Workers' Union, the Board recognized that, unlike Pinkerton
where the employer remained liable after the union's liability had ended," the
termination of the union's liability where the union alone was found culpable
would result in the employee bearing the burden of any remaining damage."
In other words, applying the Pen and Pencil Workers' Union remedy, the
employee would be forced to bear the loss of wages and benefits if the employer
refused to reinstate him and he could not obtain substantially equivalent
employment within five days after the union withdrew its objection to his
reinstatement." The Board declared that this result was inconsistent with the
statutory policy requiring a wrongdoer to bear the consequences of his illegal
acts."
' 7 Id.
" 91 N.L.R.B. 883, 26 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1950).
19 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 2, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
22 Id.
21 91 N.L.R.B. 883, 26 L.R.R.M. 1583 (1950).
22 90 N.L.R.B. 205, 26 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1950).
23 Id. at 213, 26 L.R.R.M. at 1196.
24 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 3, 106 L.R.R.M. 1137, 1137 (1981). See Pinkerton's Nat']
Detective Agency, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205, 213, 26 L.R.R.M. 1193, 1196 (1950).
25 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 3-4, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
26 90 N.L.R.B. 205, 213, 26 L.R.R.M. 1193, 1196 (1950).
27 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 4, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
28 Id_
" Id. at 4-5, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
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As a result, the Board refused to adhere to the remedy set forth in Pen and
Pencil Workers' Union." Instead, the Board overruled Pen and Pencil Workers'
Union and all related cases to the extent that such cases provided a remedy in-
consistent with the new remedy established by the Board in Sheet Metal Workers'
Union. 3 ' This new remedy would be applied in cases where a union unlawfully
caused an employer to discharge an employee in violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A)
and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA32 and the employer was in no way culpable." In such
instances, a union must notify the employer and the employee that the union
no longer objects to the employee's reinstatement. 34 In addition, the union
must affirmatively request that the employer reinstate the employee. 35 Finally,
the union is required to pay lost wages and benefits to the employee until the
employee is reinstated by the employer or the employee obtains substantially
equivalent employment elsewhere. 36
Section 10(c) of the NLRA commands the Board to take such affirmative
action in correcting unfair labor practices as will effectuate the policies of the
Act." The remedy created by the Board in Sheet Metal Workers' Union is a
superior remedy to the remedy applied in Pen and Pencil Workers' Union because
it better effectuates the policies of the Act. The declared public policy of the
NLRA is to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by en-
couraging collective bargaining." This policy is promoted in part by deterring
employers and unions from committing unfair labor practices by imposing
sanctions upon them for violations of the NLRA." Compensating employees
for losses suffered on account of unfair labor practices has also been recognized
as one of the policy goals of the Act." In addition, Congress left the effectua-
tion of such policies to the Board, subject to limited judicial review.'" Thus, the
Board, in exercising its discretion, determined that the best way to effectuate
the above-stated objectives was to create a new remedy making the union bear
the full burden of its wrongful acts. This remedy has the advantage of making
" Id. at 5, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
31 Id.
" 29 U.S.C. $$ 158(b)(1)(A), 158(b)(2) (1976).




37 29 U.S.C.	 160(c) (1976).
3" Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941); National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940).
39 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 258, 265 (1969); NLRB v.
Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2581 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 972 (1966).
4° NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Nathanson v.
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941);
NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 175, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2581 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
41 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1969); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp, v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 198.200 (1941).
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the union, rather than the innocent employee, liable for the employee's actual
losses, as well as providing for the imposition of stronger sanctions against the
discriminating union.
The Board's decision to abolish the severance of a union's liability five
days after notification in Sheet Metal Workers' Union is a fair one because the new
remedy does not necessarily unduly burden the union. Although the union will
have to pay lost wages to the unlawfully discharged employee until he is
reinstated or finds substantially equivalent employment, the employee will not
be entitled to such payments if he unjustifiably remains idle. A discharged
employee has a duty to seek new employment.'" The policy adopted by the
Board and reviewing courts is that an employee has a duty to minimize
losses." This obligation will be satisfied if the employee makes reasonable ef-
forts to find new employment that is substantially equivalent to the position
from which he was discharged and is suitable to a person of his background and
experience." The burden is on the union or employer to show that the
employee has failed to make a reasonable search for other employment." The
determination as to which types of employment fit the standard depends upon
the circumstances of each case. 46 The existence of an employee duty to search
for alternative employoment minimizes the union's back pay obligation
without sacrificing the remedial objectives of the back pay order. 47
Several issues remain unresolved by Sheet Metal Workers' Union. First, the
decision does not explain the meaning of "substantially equivalent employ-
ment." 48 The duty to minimize losses, which has heretofore only been applied
to interim employment, will now also apply to permanent alternative employ-
ment. Yet, the Sheet Metal Workers' Union decision does not specify whether the
standards for accepting permanent alternative employment will be the same as
42
 Phelps Dodge Corp. v, NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198, 199-200 (1941).
43 See NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575, 62 L.R.R.M.
2155, 2158 (5th Cir. 1966); Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 773, 38 L.R.R.M.
1317, 1319 (1956), remanded, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
821 (1957). See also NLRB v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1317-21, 80 L.R.R.M.
3377, 3382-86 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44 See cases cited at note 43 supra.
4' See NLRB V. Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 493 F.2d 103, 107, 85 L.R.R.M. 2826,
2829 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1318, 80 L.R.R.M.
3377, 3383 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 366 F.2d 809, 812-13, 63
L.R.R.M. 2208, 2211 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v, Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569,
575-76, 62 L.R.R.M. 2155, 2158-59 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Interurban Gas Co., 354 F.2d
76, 77, 61 L.R.R.M. 2052, 2053 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Ellis & Watts Prods., Inc., 344 F.2d
67, 69, 58 L.R.R.M. 2790, 2791 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447,
454, 52 L.R.R.M. 2115, 2120 (8th Cir. 1963); Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769,
770, 38 L.R.R.M. 1317, 1318 (1956), remanded, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
46 See NLRB v. Rice Creamery Co., 365 F.2d 888, 894, 62 L.R.R.M. 2332, 2336
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 773, 38 L.R.R.M. 1317, 1319
(1956), remanded, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
" Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 771, 38 L.R.R.M. 1317, 1318 (1956),
remanded, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957).
" See 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 5, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1138.
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those already enunciated for seeking and accepting interim employment. The
Board has announced several standards concerning the duty to minimize losses
by obtaining interim employment. First, the duty only requires the employee
to accept employment which is suitable to his background and experience."
Second, an employee may refuse employment which is dangerous, distasteful
or essentially different from his previous employment. 5° Further, an employee
does not have to •accept a job with more onerous terms and conditions of
employment. 5 ' Finally, an employee is not obliged to accept employment at a
distance from his home and it is up to the Board to determine when location is a
factor which may reasonably be taken into account. 52 A dispute exists over
whether or not an employee must "lower his sights" by seeking less
remunerative employment after unsuccessfully attempting for a reasonable
period of time to obtain the kind of employment to which he was accustomed."
And yet, even the supporters of such a duty emphasize that this duty does not
require an employee to accept anything but "suitable" interim employment.
Such "suitable" employment must be consonant with the employee's skills,
background and experience and must not involve more onerous conditions
than the previous employment. 54
Problems may arise if these same standards are applied to the employee
who is seeking permanent alternative employment. If the standards of "in-
terim" employment are applied to permanent employment, a union's back pay
liability could drag on interminably while the employee remained out of the
work force. The mitigation doctrine is based largely on the public policy of pro-
moting production and employment." The Board will have to decide whether
a discharged employee who has not found substantially equivalent employment
after a reasonable period of time should accept lower wages, consider another
field of employment or seek employment in another geographical location. In
" See NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569, 575, 62 L.R.R.M.
2155, 2158 (5th Cir. 1966); Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769, 773, 38 L.R.R.M.
1317, 1319 (1956), remanded, 242 F.2d 697, 39 L.R.R.M. 2647 (6th Cit.), cm. denied, 355 U.S.
821 (1957).
" See Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 221, 65 L.R.R.M. 2047, 2050
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 179,
181, 6 L.R.R.M. 780, 782 (4th Cir. 1940).
" See Waukegan-North Chicago Transit Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 802, 802 n.4, 98
L.R.R.M. 1074, 1075 n.4 (1978).
52 Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 221, 65 L.R.R.M. 2047, 2050 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). See NLRB v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307,
1319, 80 L.R.R.M. 3377, 3384 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d
170, 179, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2584(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966); F.M. Broad-
casting Corp., 233 N.L.R.B. 326, 329, 96 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1977); Nickey Chevrolet Sales, Inc.,
160 N.L.R.B. 1279, 1280, 63 L.R.R.M. 1135, 1135 (1966).
" See NLRB v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1320-21, 80 L.R.R.M.
3377, 3385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 242 F.2d 697, 700, 39
L.R.R.M. 2647, 2749 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821 (1957); NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill
Co., 224 F.2d 702, 705-06, 36 L.R.R.M. 2534, 2537 (4th Cir. 1955).
54 NLRB v. The Madison Courier, Inc., 472, F.2d 1307, 1320-21, 80 L.R.R.M. 3377,
3385 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200 (1941).
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making these determinations, it is important that the Board balance the social-
ly desirable goals of making the employee whole for losses sustained because of
an unfair labor practice and promoting production and employment. 56
Another issue which was not explicitly decided by the Board is whether
this new remedy will also apply to a union that, prior to a Board finding of an
unfair labor practice, voluntarily notifies the employer and the employee that it
has no objection to the employee's reinstatement. Under the Pen and Pencil
Workers' Union remedy, such voluntary notifications were deemed to terminate
a union's back pay liability. 57 Since such a rule is based on the Pen and Pencil
Workers' Union remedy, it is unlikely that the Board will terminate the union's
liability where it voluntarily gives notice. In such situations, there is no
guarantee that the employee would actually be reinstated and the employee
would personally bear that burden just as he would under forced compliance. 58
In addition, if voluntary compliance were deemed to terminate a union's
liability, unions fearing a Board order would give voluntary notification before
an order was issued, escaping liability and leaving the employee to bear the
burden. This result would circumvent the policy professed by the Board.
The new remedy created by the Board in Sheet Metal Workers' Union fur-
thers the policies of NLRA by requiring a union to bear the full burden of its
wrongful acts. The legal practitioner, however, will have to be concerned with
the ramifications of this new remedy. The meaning of "substantially
equivalent employment" under the union's extended liability and the effect of
voluntary notification remain unanswered and will have to be determined by
the Board in later cases.
2. Secondary Consumer Picketing
a. New Restrictions:
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001*
Consumer picketing at a secondary site occurs when striking employees of
one business picket at the site of another, neutral business in an effort to per-
suade customers of the neutral business to stop buying goods supplied to the
neutral by the struck ("primary") employer, or to boycott the neutral business
entirely.' The immediate aim of secondary site picketing is to force neutral par-
ties to stop doing business with employers with whom the picketing unions are
engaged in a dispute. The ultimate purpose of such picketing is to effectively
" Id. at 198.
" See H.C. Macaulay Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1198, 1202, 95 L.R.R.M.
2581, 2583 (9th Cir. 1977); Westwood Plumbers, 131 N.L.R.B. 562, 562, 48 L.R.R.M. 1097,
1097-98 (1961).
58 See Sheet Metal Workers' Union, Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. No. 92 at 4, 106
L.R.R.M. 1137, 1138 (1981).
• By Steven D. Eimert, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' See R. GORMAN, LABOR LA w 5 1 at 240 (1st ed. 1976).
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enlist the economic power of neutral employers in the picketing unions' strug-
gle against primary employers. Secondary site picketing thus tends to expand
the scope of labor disputes by embroiling neutral parties in those disputes.
In an effort to prevent such coerced involvement of neutral employers in
the labor disputes of others, Congress in 1959 enacted section 8 (b)(4)(ii)(B) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Landrum Amendment). 2 The Landrum
Amendment essentially provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union
to coerce a neutral enterprise into terminating its business relations with any
other person, such as a primary employer. Although its legislative history is
somewhat inconclusive, the Landrum Amendment was apparently intended to
substantially restrict, if not entirely prohibit, consumer picketing at secondary
sites. 3 The Supreme Court, however, in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
2 29 U.S.C. S 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976) The provision reads as follows:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
(4)
	
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is —
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person. . . .
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have the effect
of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport
any goods, or not perform any services, at the establishment of the employer
engaged in such distribution;
The legislative history of the Landrum Amendment does not clearly indicate whether
Congress intended the Amendment to ban all secondary site picketing or merely to proscribe
secondary site picketing explicitly aimed at convincing consumers to boycott the neutral enter-
prise. Senator John F. Kennedy, chairman of the conference committee which reconciled the dif-
ferences between the House and Senate bills addressing, among other things, secondary site
picketing, explained the compromise embodied in the conference bill as follows:
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of
that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agreee that the union
shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing. In other words,
the union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in news-
papers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity
short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.
105 CONG. REC. 17898-99 (1959).
While Senator Kennedy's explanation of the conference bill would seem to indicate that
it was intended to ban all secondary site picketing, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (Tree Fruits), refused to read the Landrum
Amendment so broadly. The Tree Fruits Court saw nothing in the legislative history prior to the
convening of the conference committee which demonstrated any congressional concern with con-
sumer picketing beyond that with the "isolated evil" of its use to cut off the business of a second-
ary employer as a means of forcing him to stop doing business with the primary employer. Id. at
68. The Tree Fruits Court dismissed Senator Kennedy's explanation of the conference bill's im-
pact on secondary site picketing by declaring that:
This explanation does not compel the conclusion that the Conference Agreement
contemplated prohibiting any consumer picketing at a second site beyond that
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 (Tree Fruits), read the Landrum Amendment's restriction on secondary
site consumer picketing more narrowly-than its legislative history seemed to
warrant. Specifically, the Tree Fruits Court ruled that where unions involved in
a dispute with Washington state apple wholesalers peacefully picketed stores
selling such apples, urging only that consumers not buy the apples, and not re-
questing patrons to boycott such stores entirely, the Landrum Amendment was
not violated. 5
During the Survey year, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 6
(Retail Store), the Supreme Court refined its interpretation of the Landrum
Amendment. The Retail Store Court held that picketing at a secondary site,
even if restricted solely to the product of the struck primary employer and not
directed against the neutral enterprise selling the primary product,' is an unfair
labor practice under the Landrum Amendment if such picketing can be ex-
pected to cause the neutral enterprise substantial economic loss. 8
The controversy in Retail Store arose when the Retail Store Employees
Union (the Union), the certified bargaining representative for certain
employees of Safeco Title Insurance Company (Safeco), called a strike when
contract negotiations between it and Safeco reached an impasse. 9
 The Union
did not, however, confine its picketing to the premises of Safeco. Rather, the
which urges the public, in Senator Kennedy's words, to "refrain from trading
with a retailer who sells such /primary/ goods." To read into the Conference
Agreement, on the basis of a single statement, an intention to prohibit all con-
sumer picketing at a secondary site would depart from our practice of respecting
the congressional policy not to prohibit peaceful picketing except to curb "isolated
evils" spelled out by the Congress itself.
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 70 (1964).
While a majority of the Tree Fruits Court thus concluded that Congress did not intend the
Landrum Amendment to prohibit all secondary site consumer picketing, Justices Black, Harlan,
and Stewart read the legislative history of the Amendment in the opposite fashion and concluded
that the Amendment was indeed meant to proscribe all such picketing. Id. at 76, 92. Whatever
the intention of Congress in passing the Landrum Amendment, the Court has never read that
provision as broadly as did Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart.
4 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
Id. at 60, 71.
6 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980). The Court in Retail Store was split as follows: six Justices held
that secondary site picketing of a primary product sold by a neutral enterprise is, under the Lan-
drum Amendment, an unfair labor practice if such picketing can be expected to cause the neutral
substantial loss. Id. at 2377. The same six Justices (two in separate concurrences) viewed the
Landrum Amendment as being constitutional when read in this way. Id. at 2378-79. Three
Justices dissented, being of the opinion that the Landrum Amendment does not ban any second-
ary consumer appeal that is restricted  to advocacy of a boycott of the product(s) of the struck
employer, regardless of the harm that such a boycott will predictably inflict on the neutral enter-
prise selling that product. Id. at 2380-82 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dis-
sent did not, however, consider the constitutionality of the Landrum Amendment as construed
by the Retail Store majority.
The term "primary product" simply means the product of the employer with whom
the union is involved in a labor dispute.
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372, 2376-77
(1980).
9
 Id. at 2374-75.
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Union also picketed at five local title companies.'° Each of these title companies
depended on sales of Safeco insurance for over 90 percent of their gross in-
come. The remainder of their income was generated by providing services an-
cillary to the sale of Safeco insurance, such as title searches and escrow serv-
ices." In addition, Safeco owned between 12 and 53 percent of the outstanding
stock of each of the five title companies," and officers of Safeco served on the
board of directors and in the management of each of the companies." The
Union pickets patrolling on or near the premises of the title companies carried
signs and distributed handbills which stated that the Union did not have a con-
tract with Safeco, and which requested that Safeco policyholders cancel their
policies." The picketing did not, however, result in any work stoppage or
obstruction of deliveries at any of the title companies.' 5
In a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (the Board),
Safeco contended that the secondary consumer picketing by the Union,
although directed only at the product of the struck employer — Safeco in-
surance policies — violated the Landrum Amendment because the picketing
would, if successful, destroy at least 90 percent of the title companies'
business." Indeed, Safeco charged that its insurance policies had become so
"incorporated" into the business of the land title companies that a consumer
boycott of those policies would lead to a complete boycott of the neutral com-
panies.' 7
In response to Safeco's attack on its picketing, the Union advanced three
arguments to support the legality of that picketing. The Union contended first
that its secondary site activity was actually a kind of primary picketing explicitly
exempted from the operation of the Landrum Amendent.' 8 The Union claimed
that its picketing of the land title companies was protected primary activity
because the title companies could not reasonably be considered neutrals in light
of their extensive corporate and commercial ties to Safeco. 1 ° Secondly, the
Union claimed that even if the land. title companies were neutrals entitled to
the protection of the Landrum Amendment, its picketing was not an unfair
labor practice because it was directed at the product of the struck employer and
not at the land title companies selling that product. 2° Finally, the Union
asserted that its activity, even if proscribed by the Landrum Amendment, was
protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution."
1 " Id. at 2375.




14 Id. at 755, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1338.
15 Id.




20 Id. at 755-56, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1339.
21 Id. at 756, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1339.
170	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
The Board rejected the Union's first and second arguments and failed to
consider the third. Responding to the Union's first argument, the Board ruled
that the title companies were "neutral and separate employers with respect to
Safeco's dispute with" the Union. 22 The Board reasoned that although there
were substantial corporate and commercial ties between Safeco and the title
companies, the factors tending to create an identity of interests between Safeco
and the title companies were outweighed by the lack of any interchange of
employees between Safeco and the companies and by the absence of any con-
trol exercised by Safeco over the daily operations or labor relations policies of
the title companies." By ruling that the title companies were neutral in the
Union's dispute with Safeco, the Board necessarily concluded that the com-
panies were entitled to the protection of the Landrum Amendment. 24
Having ruled that the title companies were neutral employers, the Board
then held that the Union's secondary site picketing of Safeco insurance policies
violated the Landrum Amendment's prohibition on the coercion of neutrals."
Noting the land title companies' dependence on sales of Safeco insurance for 90
to 95 percent of their revenue, the Board concluded that the Union's secondary
site picketing, while nominally restricted to the primary product, was in fact
reasonably calculated to convince customers to entirely boycott the neutral title
companies." Such a boycott would likely be so economically devastating to the
title companies as to drag them into the Union's dispute with Safeco in the
hope of settling the matter and thus ending the boycott. This kind of coerced
participation in the labor disputes of others was, according to the Board, incon-
sistent with the Landrum Amendment." The Board therefore ordered the
Union to cease its secondary picketing and take certain corrective measures as
well."
22 Id. 93 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
29 ,td.
" Id.
25 Id. at 757, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
25 Id.
" Id.
28 Id. The Board's decision in Retail Store was consistent with, and predictable in the light
of, its decision in the case of Local 14055, United Steelworkers of America, 211 N. L. R.B. 649,
86 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1974), enforcement denied, sub nom., Local 14055 United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 524 F.2d 853, 90 L. R.R. M. 3281 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, sub nom., Dow
Chem. Co. v. Local 14055, United Steelworkers, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), complaint dismissed on re-
mand, sub nom., Local 14055 United Steelworkers of America, 229 N.L.R.B. 302, 96 L.R.R.M.
1090 (1977) (Dow Chemical). In Dow Chemical, the Board ruled that the Landrum Amendment was
violated when a union striking against a gasoline refiner (a division of Dow Chemical Company)
picketed neutral gas stations that derived most of their revenue from sales of Dow's gasoline, and
urged the public not to buy Dow's fuel. 211 N,L.R.B. 649, 650, 86 L.R.R.M. 1381, 1382
(1974). The Board found that the picketing, while nominally directed against only the primary
employer's gasoline, would likely coerce the neutral stations selling that fuel. Id. at 651-52, 86
L.R.R.M . at 1383-84. The Board reasoned that some of the neutral gasoline stations, "at least,
would predictably be forced out of business if the picketing were successful, and all would pre-
dictably be squeezed to a position of duress, escapable only by abandoning Dow. . . ." Id. at
651, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1383.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia set aside the Board's order." The court agreed with the Board that the five
title companies were indeed neutrals entitled to the protection of the Landrum
Amendment. However, the court read the Supreme Court's decision in Tree
Fruits as leaving neutral enterprises vulnerable to whatever adverse economic
consequences might flow from secondary consumer picketing directed solely at
the product of the struck employer."
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case for
enforcement of the Board's order. 3 ' The Court read Tree Fruits more narrowly
than did the court of appeals, concluding that the Tree Fruits decision merely
stood for the proposition that "§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not prohibit all peaceful
picketing at secondary sites. "32 While it was unwilling to overrule Tree Fruits
and hold that the Landrum Amendment bans all primary product picketing at
secondary sites, the Retail Store Court did rule that the Amendment proscribes
such picketing when it can be "expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss. . . "33 The Court determined that where secondary con-
sumer appeals threaten neutral enterprises with economic devastation, such
secondary activities violate the Landrum Amendment's prohibition against the
use of coercive tactics to force neutral parties to cease "using, selling, han-
dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of" employers with
whom the picketing unions are involved in a dispute."
Measuring the Union's conduct against this reinterpretation of the
Landrum Amendment, the Retail Store Court ruled that the Union's secondary
site picketing of the Safeco's insurance policies was coercive of the neutral title
companies, and thus violative of the Amendment. 35 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Retail Store Court emphasized that in the case at bar the neutral em-
ployers sold only the product being picketed and services closely related to that
product." The title insurance companies in Retail Store were thus particularly
likely to be coerced economically by a successful consumer boycott appeal
against the struck primary product — Safeco insurance.
After ruling that the Landrum Amendment prohibits any secondary site
picketing of primary products that is likely to cause substantial loss to neutral
employers selling such products, the Retail Store Court held that the statute, so
interpreted and applied, does not violate the first amendment." The Retail Store
Court concluded that the federal government's interest in confining a labor
29 Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 1133, 1148, 101
L.R.R.M. 3084, 3094 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
3° Id. at 1145-46, 101 L.R.R.M. at 3092.
" NLRB. v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (1980).
32 Id. at 2375.
33 Id. at 2377.
34 Id. See note 2 supra for the text of the Landrum Amendment.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2376.
97 Id. at 2378.
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dispute to the primary antagonists was sufficient to validate the incidental
restriction on expression imposed by the Landrum Amendment."
Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed separate concurring opinions in
which they agreed with the majority that the Landrum Amendment does pro-
hibit the kind of secondary picketing present in the case at bar. Both Justices,
however, expressed concern that the compatibility of that provision with the
first amendment presented a question that deserved more thoughtful con-
sideration than it received in the opinion of the Court." Justice Blackmun
found the Landrum Amendment to be constitutional because it strikes a
"delicate balance" between "union freedom of expression and the ability of
neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced par-
ticipation in industrial strife. ',40 Justice Stevens, in contrast, found the
Landrum Amendment to be a constitutional restraint on union conduct, not
expression.'" After observing that picketing is frequently effective not because
of the persuasive force of the picketers' articulated ideas, but rather because of
the intimidating nature of the picketers' conduct, .Justice Stevens carefully ex-
amined the regulatory scope of the Landrum Amendment.'" In doing so,
Justice Stevens found the Amendment to restrict only certain types of union
conduct — picketing. Further, the restriction applied only to narrowly-defined
geographical areas — the sites of neutral employers, leaving unions free to
employ other methods to publicize their grievances against primary
employers." Justice Stevens therefore found the Landrum Amendment's
restriction on union conduct to be justified by the governmental purpose of
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2378-79 (Blackmun, Stevens, JJ., concurring).
1° Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2379 (Stevens, J., concurring). There is a recognized distinction between "con-
duct" and "speech" in first amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court upheld the defendant's conviction for violating a federal
statute prohibiting the deliberate destruction or mutilation of one's draft card. Id. at 372. In
upholding the statute against a claim that it unconstitutionally abridged the defendant's right to
express his opposition to the war in Vietnam, the Court held that "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376.
In validating the Landrum Amendment's restriction on peaceful secondary site
picketing of primary products, Justice Stevens apparently adopted a kind of analysis similar to
that employed by the Court in O'Brien. That is, while secondary picketing against primary pro-
ducts obviously involves elements of conduct and speech, the government's interest in preventing
the coerced involvement of neutrals in the labor disputes of others is sufficiently important to
justify imposition of limitations on such picketing. This is particularly true since the conduct ele-
ment of such picketing is the focus of the regulation. In addition, a union's right to publicize its
grievances against a primary employer (and his product(s)) by means other than picketing is in
no way impaired by the Landrum Amendment. See note 3 supra for Senator Kennedy's explana-
tion of the rights of unions to publicize their grievances with primary employers under the con-
ference bill that became the Landrum Amendment.
42
 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S, Ct. 2372, 2379 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
43 Id.
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protecting neutral parties from coerced involvement in the labor disputes of
others." A six-man majority of the Court thus interpreted the Landrum
Amendment as constitutionally proscribing secondary consumer picketing of
primary products if that picketing is likely to be very harmful to neutral busi-
nesses selling such products.
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall read the Landrum Amendment's
ban on coercive activity much more restrictively than did the Retail Store majori-
ty and consequently dissented. 45 Justice Brennan, who sixteen years earlier
had authored the Court's Tree Fruits opinion, read Tree Fruits as exempting
from the strictures of the Amendment any secondary site picketing which is di-
rected solely at convincing consumers not to purchase the product of the struck
employer." The dissent did agree with the Retail Store majority that the Lan-
drum Amendment bans secondary site consumer appeals aimed at coercing a
neutral enterprise into joining a union's struggle against the primary
employer. 47 The dissenting Justices took the position, however, that Tree Fruits
had correctly determined that where secondary site picketing is directed against
the product of the struck primary employer rather than against the neutral
sellers of that product, there simply can be no coercion of neutral employers in
violation of the Landrum Amendment." Rather, in the dissent's view, if the
neutral employer suffers harm as a consequence of a boycott of the primary
product it sells, the neutral has merely sustained incidental damage as a result
of its decision to entwine its economic fate with that of the primary employer."
Justice Brennan's willingness to find coercion of neutral employers only
where secondary picketing is explicitly directed against the neutral itself
elevates form over substance. Such an analysis ignores the practical fact that a
secondary consumer appeal nominally directed only against products which ac-
count for all or substantially all of the sales revenue of the neutral is likely to be
just as coercive of the neutral as a boycott openly directed against its entire
operation. Justice Brennan's formalistic analysis of secondary site consumer
boycott appeals is therefore inconsistent with the Landrum Amendment's pro-
scription of the coercion of neutral employers.
Unlike the dissent, the Retail Store majority clearly recognized that a
secondary consumer appeal directed against a primary product which accounts
for 90 to 95 percent of a neutral employer's sales revenue promises to be every
bit as coercive of the neutral as a boycott appeal that explicitly names the
neutral as its target. Focusing on the substance and predictable effect of the
boycott appeal in question, rather than on its form and nominal target, the
Retail Store majority determined that the kind of de facto coercion of neutrals
44 Id.
" Id. (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 2379-82 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
* 7 Id. at 2380 (Brennan, White; and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
" Id. at 2380-82 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
49 Id. at 2380 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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present in the instant case was as repugnant to the language and purpose of the
Landrum Amendment as a secondary boycott appeal explicitly directed against
the neutral itself. 50 The Retail Store Court thus concluded that where a second-
ary consumer appeal is nominally restricted to the struck product sold by the
neutral(s), the applicability of the Landrum Amendment turns on the predict-
able effect of that appeal rather than on its putative aim. If such a secondary
appeal is likely to cause the neutral seller substantial loss, the Landrum
Amendment's proscription of coercion of neutral employers makes the appeal
an unfair labor practice. 5 '
Unlike Justice Brennan's unduly narrow approach to the concept of coer-
cion, the analysis of the Retail Store majority fully appreciated and effectuated
the Landrum Amendment's purpose of preventing the coerced participation of
neutrals in labor disputes. In addition, the Retail Store decision implicitly
weighed, in the context of a secondary site consumer appeal, the competing in-
terests of neutrals, unions, and the public. In balancing these interests, the
Retail Store Court apparently concluded that the economic devastation of enter-
prises not directly involved in a labor dispute was too high a price for society to
pay merely to allow striking unions to employ secondary picketing as a device
to express their wish that consumers join the union's battle against struck
primary employers. The conclusion that the scales tip against such economical-
ly destructive activity seems sound for a number of reasons. First, secondary
site consumer picketing is but one of many methods unions may adopt in order
to appeal to the public for support in their disputes with primary employers.
The Landrum Amendment itself expressly exempts from its prohibition
"publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the
public, including consumers . , that ... products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
distributed by another employer. . . "52
 Given the freedom unions enjoy to
publicize their cause by means other than secondary site consumer picketing,
denying striking unions the use of such picketing in no way weakens them in
their disputes with primary employers. Second, to allow the kind of picketing
contested in Retail Store would doom many neutral enterprises to economic
destruction — with all of the adverse economic and social consequences that
business failures entail. Accordingly, the Retail Store Court concluded that it
was reasonable to read the Landrum Amendment as denying unions one of the
many weapons they may legitimately employ in a labor dispute, at !east in
those situations where a failure to deny unions use of that weapon would mean
economic ruin for neutral enterprises. The Retail Store decision therefore struck
an intelligent and careful balance between the many competing interests pres-
ent in the case at bar.
'° Id. at 2376-77.
5 ' Id. at 2377.
52 See note 2 supra for the text of the Landrum Amendment.
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In reaching its decision, the Retail Store Court not only engaged in
sophisticated interest balancing, it also struck a compromise between the ma-
jority and dissenting positions enunciated in Tree Fruits. The Tree Fruits majori-
ty apparently concluded that secondary consumer appeals directed solely at the
products of the struck employer were not unfair labor practices under the
Landrum Amendment, regardless of how economically harmful such appeals
might be to neutral enterprises selling such struck products." The Tree Fruits
dissent, by contrast, viewed the Amendment as banning all secondary con-
sumer appeals, whether directed at the neutral employer or merely at primary
products of the struck employer were not unfair labor practices under the
Landrum Amendment, regardless of how economically harmful such appeals
shutting off all consumer trade with neutrals, bans secondary picketing of
primary products that will predictably cause substantial loss to neutrals selling
those products, the Retail Store Court thus took a middle path between the dif-
fering views expressed in Tree Fruits. This middle path represents an improve-
ment on the rigid, formalistic analysis propounded by the Tree Fruits majority.
Unfortunately, while improving on the Tree Fruits approach to judging the
legitimacy of secondary consumer appeals, the Retail Store Court did not ar-
ticulate any guidelines to indicate just what quantum of economic harm a
neutral employer must suffer, or reasonably anticipate, from secondary site
picketing against primary products it sells before the picketing becomes coer-
cive of the neutral and thus an unfair labor practice. The Court instead chose
to leave the Board and the courts free to interpret and apply the Retail Store
"substantial loss" standard on a case-by-case basis." While such a flexible ap-
proach is in all likelihood the soundest method the Court could have adopted, it
places upon the Board and the courts the difficult task of developing and refin-
ing practical standards by which to judge the validity of a secondary consumer
appeal.
In developing these practical standards, the Board and the courts must
recognize that the degree of economic harm that will cause a neutral to be
coerced into joining a dispute between a primary employer and unions
picketing at the site of the neutral will inevitably vary from case to case. In
determining whether the neutral has suffered, or will suffer, a coercive degree
of economic harm from a secondary site consumer appeal directed against
primary products it sells, numerous factors should be considered. For example,
how large a portion of the neutral's sales revenue and total income is derived
from sales of the products of the struck employer? Is the neutral so identified
with the struck product that a boycott of that product will predictably cause
patrons to shun the neutral entirely, even though the neutral sells other pro-
ducts which are not the target of the consumer appeal and which account for
5S NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 70-73 (1964).
54 Id. at 92 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372, 2377-78 n.11
(1980).
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the bulk of its sales revenue? How long has the consumer appeal been in pro-
gress and how long is it likely to continue? How healthy is the neutral financial-
ly, will it be able to draw on a substantial earned surplus in order to offset any
short-term losses caused by the boycott? Since the relevant factors to be ex-
amined, and the relative importance of each of those factors, will vary ineluc-
tably from case to case, the Retail Store Court was probably wise in not attempt-
ing to fix an inflexible rule governing the determination whether a secondary
boycott appeal directed against the products of the struck employer has in-
flicted, or will inflict, a coercive degree of economic damage on a neutral.
The Retail Store substantial loss standard will therefore provide the Board
and the courts with a salutary degree of flexibility in judging the validity of
secondary consumer picketing in any given case. Nevertheless, this flexible
standard promises to provoke much litigation because the Retail Store decision
injects a new element of uncertainty into the law governing secondary con-
sumer appeals. Under the Retail Store standard, as Justice Brennan observed:
Labor unions will no longer be able to assure that their secondary
site picketing is lawful by restricting advocacy of a boycott to the
primary product, as ordained by Tree Fruits. Instead, picketers will
be compelled to guess whether the primary product makes up a suffi-
cient proportion of the retailer's business to trigger the displeasure of
the courts or the Labor Relations Board."
By contrast, the Tree Fruits standard for judging the legitimacy of a second-
ary consumer appeal was quite clear: so long as the secondary consumer
pickets restricted advocacy of a boycott to the product(s) of the struck employer
and did not call for a boycott of the neutral itself, it was not an unfair labor
practice under the Landrum Amendment." Now, under Retail Store, the kind
of secondary consumer appeal formerly protected by Tree Fruits will be an un-
fair labor practice if it threatens the neutral with a certain, albeit only vaguely
defined, quantum of economic harm."
In summary, the Retail Store decision improves on Tree Fruits in at least two
ways. First, the Retail Store Court recognized, as the Tree Fruits Court apparent-
ly did not, that a neutral employer can be coerced to join a labor dispute either
because of a secondary boycott openly directed against it, or as a consequence
of a secondary boycott of primary products whose sales are important or essen-
tial to the neutral's economic survivial. While Tree Fruits protected neutrals
against coercion arising from secondary consumer appeals explicitly directed
against them," it arguably offered no protection against coercion from boycotts
directed against primary products sold by the neutrals. 6° Retail Store thus
stepped into the breach left unguarded by Tree Fruits by holding that unions
56 Id. at 2382 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
" NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 70-73 (1964).
56
 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372, 2377 (1980).
" NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
6° Id. at 63, 70.
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may not accomplish indirectly, by primary product boycott appeals at neutrals'
sites, what they are prohibited from accomplishing directly, by secondary
boycotts directed against neutrals themselves: forcing neutrals to join labor
disputes in which they are not primarily involved. Retail Store thus more fully
effectuates the purpose of the Landrum Amendment — preventing the coer-
cion of neutral employers — by appreciating and effectively responding to the
coercive potential of secondary consumer appeals which are directed against
primary products whose sale is vital to neutral employers.
Second, Retail Store improves upon Tree Fruits by striking a better balance
between the legitimate interests of neutral employers, which seek to avoid en-
tanglement in the labor disputes of others, and the interests of unions which
seek to enlist public support in their battles with primary employers. Unfor-
tunately, the standard by which Retail Store better effectuates the purpose of the
Landrum Amendment and accomplishes this delicate balancing of interests is
necessarily more uncertain in practical application, and thus more prone to
provoke litigation, than the clear, if ultimately unsatisfactory, standard of Tree
Fruits.
b. Precedent Affirmed:
Soft Drink Workers Union, Local 812 v. NLRB*
Secondary site consumer picketing occurs when employees involved in a
labor dispute with one, "primary" employer, picket at the site of another,
"secondary" employer that is neutral in the union's dispute with the primary
employer. The immediate object of such picketing is either to cause a consumer
boycott of the products of the primary employer sold by the neutral, or to per-
suade consumers to shut off all trade with the neutral.' The ultimate purpose of
secondary site consumer picketing is to force the neutral enterprise to reduce or
terminate its purchases of the primary employer's products, and thus to
pressure indirectly the primary employer into agreeing to the picketing union's
demands. In 1959 Congress, in an attempt to prohibit or at least substantially
restrict consumer picketing at secondary sites, amended the National Labor
Relations Act2 by adding section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) (the Landrum Amendment).'
* By Steven D. Eimert, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REviEw,
' R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 1 at 240 (1st ed. 1976).
2 29 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. (1976).
29 U.S.C. 5 158 (b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). The relevant part of the provision reads as
follows:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
*	 •
(4)	 (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
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The Landrum Amendment was thus enacted in an effort to prevent the use of
secondary site consumer boycott appeals to coerce neutral employers into par-
ticipating in the labor disputes of others. 4
In construing the statute in 1964 the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers Local 7605
 (Tree Fruits), held that the Landrum Amendment
does not prohibit all peaceful picketing at secondary sites. 6 Specifically, the Tree
Fruits Court ruled that peaceful picketing at the site of a neutral employer does
not violate the Landrum Amendment if it is directed solely at convincing
patrons of the neutral to refrain from purchasing goods supplied to the neutral
by an employer with whom the picketing union is engaged in a primary labor
dispute.' While the Tree Fruits holding was recently modified by the Court, 8 it
continues to protect secondary site consumer boycott appeals that are restricted
to the struck primary product and that are not likely to be economically
devastating to the neutral enterprise. 9
Implicit in the proposition that secondary site consumer picketing may be
permissible when directed only against struck primary products, is the require-
ment that the pickets clearly identify for consumers the products to which they
are objecting. In fact, a series of decisions subsequent to Tree Fruits explicitly
required pickets to adequately identify the struck product in order to benefit
from the protection offered by Tree Fruits.'° In Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son
I	 *	 *
Provided further, That for the purpose of this paragraph (4) only, nothing con-
tained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including con-
sumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does
not have the effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other
than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up,
deliver, or transport any goods, or not perform any services, at the establish-
ment of the employer engaged in such distribution; ...
• See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
3 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
6 Id. at 63.
• Id. at 71.73.
o The Court, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372
(1980), ruled that even in situations where the secondary site picketing advocates nothing more
than a consumer boycott of the struck primary product, such picketing may violate the Landrum
Amendment if it "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial
loss .	 . ." Id. at 2377.
9 Id. The Court in Retail Stare did not overrule Tree Fruits. Indeed, the Retail Store Court
explicitly envisioned situations in which Tree Fruits will continue to protect secondary site con-
sumer picketing. Id. at n.11.
"I E.g. , NLRB v. San Franciso Typographical Union 21, 465 F.2d 53, 56, 80
L.R.R.M. 3076, 3077 (9th Cir. 1972); Bedding, Curtain & Drapery Workers Union, Local 140
v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 495, 502-03, 67 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2397 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968); Meat & Allied Food Workers Union, Local 248, 230 N.L.R.B. 189, 202-04, 96
L.R.R.M. 1221, 1222 (1977); Independent Routemen's Ass'n & Urban Distributor, Inc., 206
N.L.R.B. 245, 248, 84 L.R.R.M. 1265, 1266 (1973).
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v. NLRB," decided during the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this identification requirement,
albeit in an unusual set of circumstances.
The dispute in Soft Drink arose when Local 812 of the Soft Drink Workers
Union (the Union), representing employees of firms that bottled, canned, and
distributed soda in the New York City area, 12 attempted to stem a serious loss
of jobs at these firms by mounting a campaign to persuade consumers to buy
only "locally" made soda.' 3 As part of this campaign, members of the Union
began picketing and distributing handbills on a sidewalk in front of a Long
Island retail store selling beer and soda." Their signs and handbills urged
customers to buy soft drinks made in the "local" area, but failed to define that
term and did not otherwise specify which brands of soda were being picketed. 15
The Union continued this picketing daily, posting six to sixteen pickets at
a time." The picketing, however, was peaceful, did not prevent patrons from
entering the store, and did not impede deliveries.° Nevertheless, approximate-
ly two weeks after the picketing began, the owner of the retail store — Monarch
Long Beach Corporation (Monarch) — filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the Union with the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)." In
response to this charge, the Board issued a complaint against the Union. 19 The
case was thereafter tried before an administrative law judge, who found the
Union's picketing to be violative of the Landrum Amendment. 2° Finally, the
Board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law reported by the
judge, and ordered the Union's picketing of Monarch's store stopped. 2 '
In its appearance before the administrative law judge, the Union
presented three major arguments to support the contention that its picketing
was not an unfair labor practice. The Union asserted first that it was not urging
consumers to boycott nonlocal soda, rather it was asking them to buy soda
made locally. 22 Thus, the Union maintained that its pickets were not appealing
for any boycott whatsoever. Second, the Union contended that, even if its " in-
formationl picketing" could be viewed as a boycott appeal, it was not a second-
" No. 79-1888, 105 L.R.R.M. 2658 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
12 The Union represented workers at soda bottling, canning, and distributing firms
located in the five boroughs of New York City as well as in six nearby counties: Nassau, SulTolk,
Westchester, Putnam, Dutchess, and Columbia. Id. at 2-3, 105 L.R.R.M at 2659.
" Id. at 3-5, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2659-60.
14 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 803, 102 L.R.R.M. 1272
(1979).
' 5 Id. at 809, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
16 Id. at 803-06, (L.R.R.M. summary of case does not state the number of pickets).
17 Id. at 808-09, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
t" Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 5, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2660 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
19 Id_
2° Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 809-10, 102 L.R.R.M.
1272, 1273 (1979).
21 Id. at 801, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
22 Id. at 806, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1272.
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ary boycott appeal, since there was no primary dispute between it and the
nonlocal soda companies or between it• and Monarch." Third, the Union
argued that even if its picketing were a secondary boycott appeal, it fell within
the Tree Fruits exception to the Landrum Amendment's general proscription of
such activity. 24 Implicit in this argument would seem to be the contention that
the Union had restricted its boycott appeal to the "primary" product — the
nonlocal soda.
The administrative law judge dismissed each of the Union's three ex-
culpatory arguments. The judge concluded first that the Union's pickets clear-
ly were urging consumers to shun nonlocal soda. 25 In reaching this conclusion,
the judge noted that although the pickets' signs and handbills urged only that
consumers buy locally manufactured soda, the pickets themselves clearly
demonstrated their hostility to soda that they regarded as nonlocal by fre-
quently chanting slogans such as "'Ft -lead the label before you put it on the
table,'" and do not buy "`scab"' soda. 26 The pickets also booed customers
who emerged from Monarch's store carrying soft drinks that the pickets con-
sidered to be nonlocal." The judge therefore concluded that the real object of
the Union's picketing was "to convince Monarch's customers not to buy non-
local soft drinks,. and thereby to force Monarch not to sell or purchase soft
drinks that were non-local. "28
Having found that the Union's picketing was indeed a consumer boycott
appeal, the administrative law judge next considered whether the picketing
could violate the Landrum Amendment in the absence of a conventional, face-
to-face primary labor dispute between the Union and Monarch or the nonlocal
soda companies." The judge found the lack of such a primary labor dispute to
be irrelevant to the applicability of the Landrum Amendment. 3 ° The ad-
ministrative law judge thus accepted the view that a consumer boycott appeal
could coerce a neutral employer, and thus violate the Landrum Amendment,
even where such an appeal was not ancillary to a traditional primary labor
dispute.
Having decided that the Union's picketing constituted a secondary boy-
cott appeal, the judge then considered the Union's claim that Tree Fruits pro-
tected that picketing from the Landrum Amendment's ban against coercing
neutral employers. The judge ruled that the picketing in question could not
claim protection under the holding in Tree Fruits because the pickets' signs and
handbills failed to identify with sufficient clarity the picketed manufacturers
23 Id., (L.R.R.M. summary of case does not mention this contention of the union).
24 Id. at 807, (L.R.R.M, summary of case does not mention this contention of the
union).
25 Id. at 806, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1272.
26 Id., (L.R.R.M. summary of case does not present these facts).
" Id., 102 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
28 Id., (L.R.R.M. summary of case does not contain this quotation).
29
 Id., (not contained in L.R.R.M. summary of case).
" Id. at 806-07, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1272-73.
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and their products. 31
 More specifically, the judge reasoned that while Tree
Fruits protected secondary consumer boycott appeals directed solely at the
struck or disfavored product, the picketing in the instant case was not clearly
restricted to any particular product." Additionally, the administrative law
judge noted that, because visual inspection often cannot disclose where a bottle
or can of soda was prodtced, Monarch's customers were further handicapped
in attempting to distinguish the favored from the picketed soda." Thus, had
the Union's pickets defined what they meant by the term "local," many of
Monarch's customers would still have been unable to determine whether a par-
ticular bottle or can of soda was manufactured within or without the "local"
area. The judge therefore held that the Union's picketing of Monarch's store
did not "meet the Tree Fruits exception to the . . . [Landrum Amendment's]
prohibition on secondary situs picketing." 34
Reviewing the Board's ruling, a divided United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Board's decision and enforced
its order directing the Union to cease picketing at Monarch's store. 35 The ap-
pellate court first considered the Board's ruling that the Landrum Amendment
can be applied to consumer boycott appeals even in the absence of a primary
labor dispute. The court then scrutinized the Board's conclusion that Tree
Fruits did not protect the Union's picketing from proscription by the Landrum
Amendment. Finally, the court considered whether the Landrum Amendment
was unconstitutional as applied to the Union's picketing of Monarch.
The appeals court agreed with the Board that the Landrum Amendment
can be violated even in situations which do not involve a discernible primary
labor dispute." The court noted that "although many passages in the legisla-
tive history of the ... [Landrum Amendment] invoke conventional primary —
secondary situations as examples, ... the very term 'secondary boycott' does
not even appear in the statute. "37 Concluding that the Union had no legitimate
dispute with Monarch, the court ruled that Monarch was a "neutral employer
presumptively meriting the protection of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), regardless of
whether the union had a conventional labor dispute with any other
employer. "38
After finding that the Landrum Amendment presumptively protected
Monarch, the court then considered the Union's contention that Tree Fruits ex-
empted its picketing from the operation of the Amendment. The court em-
barked upon its analysis of the relevance of Tree Fruits to the picketing at issue
by observing that there are two separate elements to a violation of the Landrum
" Id. at 809-10, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
32 Id.
33 Id,
" Id. at 810, (L.R.R.M. summary of case does not contain this quotation).
35 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 2, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2659 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
36 Id. at 12-14, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2663-64.
37 Id. at 12, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
98 Id. at 14, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
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Amendment. 39
 First, the union's conduct must be directed, at least in part, at
forcing or requiring a neutral employer to cease doing business with another
employer. 40
 Second, the union must pursue this goal by "threatening, coerc-
ing, or restraining the neutral business. „41
In regard to the first requirement, the court determined that the Union's
picketing was directed in part at forcing Monarch to cease selling nonlocal
soda, thereby forcing Monarch to cease doing business with the nonlocal soda
companies. 42 The court accorded no more credence than did the Board to the
Union's insistence that its picketing had the affirmative goal of stimulating
sales of local soda rather than the negative object of reducing sales of nonlocal
soda.” Like the Board, the court observed that the pickets on the sidewalk in •
front of Monarch's store had clearly expressed their hostility to soda they
regarded as nonlocal by chanting slogans and by booing customers carrying
containers of nonlocal soda." The court also reasoned that the Union could not
have reasonably expected sympathetic consumers to respond to its picketing by
increasing their total soda consumption in order to augment their purchases of
local soda while not reducing their purchases of nonlocal soda. Rather, the
court concluded, the predictable effect of successful picketing by the Union
would be that sales of nonlocal soda would decline as sales of local soda in-
creased." The court further determined that the Union could be held to have
intended the predictable consequences of its picketing. 46 Those predictable
consequences were a diminution of customer purchases of nonlocal soda and,
ultimately, a reduction or termination of Monarch's business with the nonlocal
soda companies.'" Thus, the court ruled that the Union's intention to reduce or
shut off trade between Monarch and its nonlocal soda suppliers displayed the
unlawful object that constitutes one of the two necessary elements of a violation
of the Landrum Amendment."
Having found in the Union's picketing of Monarch the first element of a
Landrum Amendment violation, the court turned its attention to whether the
second component of such a violation — pursuit of an unlawful object by
threatening, coercing, or restraining a neutral employer — was present in the
instant case. The inquiry concerning this second element of a violation focused
"not ... [on] the motive underlying the boycott [appeal], but ... [on] the
nature and foreseeable consequences of the pressure which the union actually
placed on Monarch." Although the court affirmed the continuing vitality of
39 Id. at 16; 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
4° Id,
4 ' Id.
42 Id. at 17-20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664-66.
" Id. at 17-18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665.
+4
 Id. at 17, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665.
" Id. at 17-18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665.
46 Id. at 18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665-66.
" Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2666.
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Tree Fruits as a safe harbor protecting certain kinds of secondary site consumer
picketing from proscription by the Landrum Amendment, it emphasized the
identification requirement which necessarily limits that safe harbor. Specifical-
ly, the court observed that "the Board and the courts have inferred from Tree
Fruits the principle that otherwise legal consumer boycotts of struck or
disfavored products do 'threaten, coerce, or restrain' neutral employers if they
fail to distinguish favored from disfavored products with sufficient clarity.""
The court stressed that any union picketing at the site of a neutral, and seeking
the protection of Tree Fruits, must confine its picketing to the struck or
disfavored product. 5 ' By failing to identify adequately the target of its second-
ary site boycott appeal the Union had, according to the court, failed to properly
confine its picketing to the disfavored product." Accordingly, Tree Fruits did
not protect the Union's picketing from the strictures of the Landrum Amend-
ment. The picketing was deemed by the court to be coercive of a neutral
employer, Monarch, and thus violative of the Landrum Amendment."
Finally, the court entertained the Union's claim that applying the Land-
rum Amendment , to the picketing in question violated the first amendment."
The court dismissed this argument, noting that the Supreme Court had recent-
ly held, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 55 "that a careful
reading of the ... [Landrum Amendment], geared only to prevent the special
evils with which Congress was concerned [coercion of neutral employers in the
pursuit of an unlawful object], posed no threat to the First Amendment." 56
The Board, in the opinion of the court, correctly determined that the picketing
in the instant case was coercive of Monarch, a neutral employer, and was
therefore a "special evil" which Congress constitutionally could, and did, pro-
hibit by enacting the Landrum Amendment."
A vigorous dissent maintained that the picketing in question did not fall
within the scope of the Landrum Amendment." Declaring that the Amend-
ment's restrictions on picketing must be construed narrowly to be consistent
with first amendment freedoms of expression, the dissent did not perceive in
the Union's picketing any of the "isolated evils" which prompted Congress to
enact the statute. 59 For example, the dissent found the Union's "ultimate" ob-
jective in picketing Monarch to be the lawful one of saving its members' jobs
rather than the unlawful one of reducing or terminating Monarch's trade with
3° Id. at 21-22, 105 L.R. R.M. at 2666. For cases enunciating this identification require-
ment, see note 10 supra.
51 Id. at 24-25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2667.
" Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2668.
" Id.
54 Id. at 33-34, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2670.
" 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
56 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 33, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2670 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
57 Id.
5 ' Id. at 1, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 1-3, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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nonlocal soda manufacturers and distributors. 60 Thus, the dissent failed to find
the first of the two requisite elements of a Landrum Amendment violation."
In addition, the dissent stated that while a primary labor dispute was not
essential to a finding of a violation of the Amendment, the absence of such a
dispute should cause courts great reluctance to authorize bans on secondary
site consumer picketing. 62 Indeed, the dissent viewed the presence of a primary
labor dispute as a kind of "automatic guidepost limiting the scope of regulation
of speech to those situations" in which a neutral employer is being coerced into
joining the labor disputes of others."
Finally, according to the dissent's reading of the Supreme Court's opin-
ions in Tree Fruits" and Retail Store Employees, 65 a violation of the Landrum
Amendment was not demonstrated in' the case at bar because the Union's
pickets neither exhorted consumers to shut off all trade with Monarch nor did
they pose a realistic threat of causing it " 'ruin or substantial loss.'' "66 Absent a
showing that the Union's pickets had urged a complete consumer boycott of
Monarch or that its picketing of nonlocal soda was likely to cause Monarch
severe economic harm, the dissent concluded that Monarch was not being
coerced by the secondary site picketing of which it was complaining. 67 Thus, in
the dissent's view, not only was the Union's objective in picketing Monarch
lawful, the means by which the Union pursued that goal were not coercive of
Monarch, and thus were not violative of the Landrum Amendment.
The importance of the Soft Drink case does not lie in its result, since it
breaks no new doctrinal ground. Its significance arises instead from its unusual
facts, an instance of secondary site picketing not related to any conventional,
face-to-face primary labor dispute, to which the Soft Drink court applied rules
grounded in two quite different lines of precedent. First, the Soft Drink court af-
firmed the proposition that a violation of the Landrum Amendment can occur
even in the absence of a primary labor dispute." Second, the court upheld the
principle that secondary site consumer boycott appeals seeking the safe harbor
of Tree Fruits must clearly distinguish the disfavored products from the other
goods sold by the neutral employer. 69
In ruling that the Landrum Amendment may be violated even in situa-
tions in which there is no primary labor dispute, the Soft Drink court clearly was
" Id. 'at 3, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting).
It will be recalled that the first element of a Landrum Amendment violation is an
unlawful object. That is, "[t]he challenged union conduct must have as an object forcing or requir-
ing a neutral business to cease doing business with another business." Id. at 16, 105 L.R.R.M.
at 2664.
62 Id. at 4-5, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2672 (Wald, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 6, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2672-73 (Wald, J., dissenting).
" NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
65
 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 100 S. Ct. 2372 (1980).
66
 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 12-18, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2674-76 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (Wald, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 17-18, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2676 (Wald, J., dissenting).
68 Id, at 9-14, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2662-64.
69 Id. at 20-32, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2666-70.
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supported by the text of the statute. The Amendment, which makes no
reference to "secondary" site picketing, provides simply that it shall be "an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person [with the objective of] forcing or requiring
any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing
in the products of any other producer. . " 70
 Although the Landrum Amend-
ment's prohibition of the coercion of neutral employers may most often be
violated by a boycott appeal that grows out of a primary labor dispute, the
operation of the statute is in no way restricted to such situations. If Monarch
was a neutral employer, as both the Soft Drink majority and dissent readily
assumed:7 ' it was entitled by the text of the Landrum Amendment to protec-
tion from attempts to coerce it into ceasing its trade with the nonlocal soda
companies, regardless of whether those attempts grew out of a conventional
primary labor dispute. In taking this position, the Soft Drink court was not
adopting a novel interpretation of the Amendment. Rather, it was reaffirming
a line of decisions rendered by the Board, 72
 other circuits," and its own
circuit. 74
Also well grounded in reason as well as precedent was the court's ruling
that Tree Fruits does not protect secondary site consumer picketing that fails to
identify clearly which products sold by the neutral are disfavored. 75 Indeed,
this identification requirement is implicit in the exemption from the Landrum
Amendment carved out by the Court in Tree Fruits. The rationale for exempt-
ing from the Landrum Amendment secondary site picketing which merely calls
for a consumer boycott of a specified struck or disfavored product was well
stated by the Tree Fruits Court itself. According to the Tree Fruits Court,
"[w]hen consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to
buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to the primary
dispute. . . . [In such a situation,] if the appeal succeeds, the secondary
employer's purchases from the struck firms are decreased only because the
public has diminished its purchases-of the struck product." 15 In other words,
7° For the text of the Landrum Amendment, see note 3 supra.
" Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 14, 10, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2664, 2673 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
72 E.g., Sound Shingle Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1161-63, 31 L.R.R.M. 1202, 1203-04
(1952), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers Dist. Council, 211 F.2d
149, 152-53, 33 L.R.R.M. 2656, 2658-59 (9th Cir. 1954) (interpreting 8 (b)(4)(A) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, which made it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a
strike or similar action in order to force any employer to cease dealing in the products of any
other enterprise).
73 E.g., National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538, 542-44, 58 L.R.R.M. 2578,
2582-83 (2d Cir. 1965) ("Congress did not intend to confine the effect of .5 8 (b) (4) to a strict or
precise definition of the term 'secondary boycott' nor did it intend to require the existence of a
`primary employer' as a prerequisite to the applicability of the subsection." Id, at 543, 58
L.R.R.M. at 2582).
74 E.g., National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 416-19, 58 L.R.R.M.
2827, 2831-34 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" See text at notes 51 and 52 supra.
76 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964).
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where the secondary picketing is clearly limited to appeals for a consumer boy-
cott of the disfavored goods, the picketing , retains a primary-like quality in that
it is aimed solely at generating consumer hostility toward the disfavored prod-
uct, not the neutral seller of that product. Such product-oriented picketing is
consequently less likely to coerce the neutral employer than picketing directed
at the neutral itself. It was this reasoning that led the Tree Fruits Court to rule
that the Landrum Amendment does not ban secondary consumer picketing
that is exclusively directed against the struck or disfavored product."
When pickets do not clearly identify the disfavored product, however,
there is a danger that sympathetic consumers will interpret the picketing more
broadly than is intended by the union, and boycott other products sold by the
neutral as well. As a result, the neutral employer may suffer economic harm
that is much greater than if the consumer boycott were directed only at the
products actually disfavored by the pickets. Indeed, vague descriptions of the
disfavored product create a danger of the neutral enterprise itself becoming the
target of the consumer boycott. Consequently, where secondary site pickets fail
to identify precisely which products they are objecting to, they make it difficult
or impossible for their picketing to be, as required for protection by Tree Fruits,
"closely confined to the primary dispute, ... [and] employed only to persuade
customers not to buy the struck product." 78
In the case at bar, the pickets described the disfavored product as any soda
that was not canned, bottled, or distributed by "local" companies." The term
"local" was not, however, defined by the pickets' signs or handbills. 8° Further-
more, the labelling and design of the soda containers in question were such that
consumers often could not ascertain by visual inspection the place where a par-
ticular container of soda had been produced. 8 ' In fact, in the proceedings
before the administrative law judge, two veteran business agents of the Union
itself were unable to agree on the place where a particular can of "Seven-Up"
soda had been manufactured. 82
The failure of the Union to identify clearly for customers of Monarch
which products it was picketing justified the Soft Drink court's ruling that the
picketing was not protected by Tree Fruits. A secondary site consumer boycott
appeal can hardly be employed — as it must for protection under Tree Fruits —
" only to persuade customers not to buy the struck product, "83 if the pickets are
unwilling or unable to inform consumers what the struck product is.
The dissent in Soft Drink pursued a course of analysis that was flawed in
several respects. For example, the dissent concluded that because the Union's
" Id. at 71-73.
78 Id. at 72.
" See text at note 15 supra.
80 Id.
8: See text at note 33 supra.
" Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 805, 102 L. R. R. M. 1272,
1273 (1979).
" NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964).
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"ultimate" goal of preserving its members' jobs was lawful, its secondary
picketing could not be deemed violative of the Landrum Amendment." While
the Soft Drink majority readily admitted the legitimacy of this ultimate objec-
tive, it correctly pointed out that the text of the statute provides that it is an un-
fair labor practice for a union to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person
engaged in commerce . . . where ... an object thereof is ... (B) forcing or re-
quiring any person to cease using, selling, ... or otherwise dealing in the prod-
ucts of any other producer. ... " 85 Thus, as the majority recognized, the
Landrum Amendment can be violated when only one of several goals motivat-
ing the secondary site picketing is the unlawful one of forcing a neutral em-
ployer to stop doing business with another enterprise. In other words, "the
legality of a union's ultimate goal cannot immunize any otherwise illegal inter-
mediate objective." 86 By focusing solely on the lawfulness of the Union's ulti-
mate objective in picketing nonlocal soda sold by Monarch, the dissent ignored
the text of the Landrum Amendment.
The dissent also failed to recognize that the Union sought to achieve its
lawful ultimate objective by resort to an unlawful intermediate objective, shut-
ting off trade between Monarch and the nonlocal soda companies. 87 The dis-
sent was persuaded by the Union's contention that its pickets were com-
municating the affirmative request that consumers buy locally manufactured
and distributed soda rather than the negative appeal that patrons of Monarch's
•store reduce or cease their purchases of nonlocal soda." Such reasoning ig-
nores, however, the practical fact that a family consuming, for example, three
quarts of nonlocal soda each week would be most unlikely to respond to the
pickets by continuing to consume those three quarts each week while drinking
an additional quart or two of local soft drinks. From a practical point of view,
therefore, a favorable response to the Union's picketing would likely result in
consumers replacing nonlocal soda with local soft drinks. This diminution in
sales of nonlocal soda would surely force Monarch to reduce or terminate its
purchases from the nonlocal soda companies. Therefore, the Union was in fact
attempting to force Monarch to cease dealing in the soft drinks of its nonlocal
suppliers, an unlawful objective under the Landrum Amendment."
Although the dissent accepted in principle the identification requirement
as a logical emanation of Tree Fruits, 90 it concluded that the requirement had no
84 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 3, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2671 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (Wald, J., dissenting).
" See text of Landrum Amendment at note 3 supra (emphasis added).
88 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 17, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2665 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
U Such an objective is, under the Landrum Amendment, unlawful. See text of the
Amendment at note 3 supra.
88 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 16-17, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2676 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (Wald, J., dissenting).
89 See text of Landrum Amendment at note 3 supra.
'° Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888, slip op. at 16, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658, 2676 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (Wald, J., dissenting).
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relevance to the facts of Soft Drink because the signs and handbills of the pickets
were affirmative in nature, urging customers to buy, rather than to boycott,
certain types of soft drinks sold by Monarch. 9 ' The dissent's conclusion that
the "vague sign" doctrine did not apply to the Union's picketing is sound only
if one accepts the premise that the pickets were not urging a boycott of
anything. Since this premise is, as explained above, tenuous, the Union's
failure to identify clearly the disfavored products created a danger that the
neutral employer — Monarch — would become the actual target of a con-
sumer boycott of nonlocal soda. This was a danger that the dissent did not
specifically address.
To summarize, Soft Drink represents not an enunciation of new law, but
rather a consolidation of existing precedent. The decision's significance stems
from its affirmation of two discrete lines of authority in the context of an
unusual set of facts — a secondary site consumer boycott appeal not related to
any conventional primary labor dispute. The District of Columbia Circuit to-
day clearly embraces the view that a conventional, face-to-face primary labor
dispute is not a prerequisite to a violation of the Landrum Amendment. In ad-
dition, it takes the position that secondary site pickets seeking the haven of Tree
Fruits must identify for the public precisely which products they are protesting.
3. Area Standards Picketing on Employer's Property:
Giant Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB*
Although section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) grants
to unions the right to engage in certain types of union activities without in-
terference, this right must be balanced against an employer's private property
rights when a union chooses to engage in the activities on the employer's prop-
erty. 2 In such cases, the question presented is whether the employer may re-
quest the union members to leave the premises without committing an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3
 The Supreme Court first faced
9L Id. at 16-17, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2676 (Wald, J., dissenting).
" By Thomas P. Dale, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' This provision reads as follows:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976).
2
 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1955); see text
and notes at notes 4-6, infra. The court in Giant Food Markets noted that first amendment con-
siderations do not come into play when the picketing takes place in a private shopping center. 633
F.2d at 22, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2918 (6th Cir. 1980); See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
520-21, 91 L.R.R.M. 2489, 2494-95 (1976).
' This statutory provision reads as follows: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer—to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
December 1981]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 189
the difficulty of balancing non-employee union members' rights against an
employer's private property interests in NLRB v. Babock & Wilcox. 4 In that
case, non-employee union organizers entered upon the employer's business
property to solicit membership among its non-union employees. 5 The Court
held that when other reasonable attempts to communicate with employees are
not available, the employer's private property rights must give way to the
union's right to engage in organizational activities. 6 The Court has since made
it clear that this rationale could be extended to balance the employer's private
property rights against other types of union activity protected by section 7. 7
This balancing test was subsequently discussed by the Court in a case in-
volving area standards picketing. 8 In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters, 9 union members engaged in area standards
picketing on the property of a department store owner who had hired non-
union carpenters." The participants were charged with trespassing and
teed in [Section 7 of the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. 157]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1)(1976); for the rele-
vant text of 5 7 see note 1 supra.
351 U.S. 105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1955).
Id. at 106, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2002.
6 Id. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004. The court stated:
The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may
not always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility
of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-employees to com-
municate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property
has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of infor-
mation on the right to organize.
Id.
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 91 L.R.R.M. 2489 (1976). The Court made it
clear that the principles enunciated in Babcock & Wilcox could be applied to 5 7 rights generally:
The Babcock & Wilcox opinion established the basic objective under the Act: ac-
commodation of S 7 rights and private property rights "with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." The locus of that accom-
modation, however, may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on
the nature and strength of the respective 7 rights and private property rights
asserted in any given context.
Id. at 522, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2495, quoting from NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 112,
38 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (1955).
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282 (1978).
The NLRB has described area standards picketing in the following fashion:
Area standards picketing is engaged in by a union to protect the employment
standards it has successfully negotiated in a particular geographic area from the
unfair competitive advantage that would be enjoyed by an employer whose labor
cost package was less than those of employers subjected to the area contract stand-
ards. Failure to protect these standards could result in an undermining of wage
and benefit gains in such areas. Therefore, in its attempt to protect the area stand-
ards, a union acts not only in its own interest, but in the interest of employees of
employers with whom it has negotiated more beneficial employment standards.
Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 100 L.R.R.M. 1598, 1599 (1979), quoted in
Giant Food Markets Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 633 F.2d 18, 23 n.11, 105 L.R.R.M. 2916, 2919 n.11
(6th Cir. 1980).
9 436 U.S. 180, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282 (1978).
'° Id. at 182, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2283.
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defended on the grounds that they had been engaged in an activity protected by
section 7 of the NLRA." The Supreme Court held that, even though a union
activity is "arguably protected" by section 7, a state court is not deprived of
the power to enforce state law against the union." The Court noted that the
union has an obligation to respond to the employer's demand to depart by fil-
ing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), thus placing the matter within the jurisdiction of an agency with ex-
pertise in balancing the private property rights of employers against a union's
section 7 rights.' 3 In dicta, the Court indicated that the rights of non-employee
union members to engage in area standards picketing should not be given the
same weight as the organizational activities conducted in Babcock & Wilcox
because the former type of union activity lacked a close nexus to the rights of
workers employed on the premises." Still, the Court stopped short of sug-
gesting exactly how the Board should determine when union activities directed
at customers justified an intrusion upon the employer's private property.
During the Survey year, in Giant Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB," the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals gave the Board some additional guidance as to how
the Babcock & Wilcox standard should be applied to determine whether a union
is entitled to engage in area standards picketing on an employer's property. In
Giant Food Markets, the court was called upon to review a decision by the NLRB
that an employer had committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1)
when it demanded that non-employee union members engaged in area stand-
ards picketing leave its property." The court held: (1) that area standards
picketing is as strongly protected by section 7 of the NLRA as other types of
union activity;" and (2) that there was insufficient evidence in the record to
support the Board's determination that the employer's request to leave con-
stituted an unfair labor practice." Accordingly, the court remanded the case to
the NLRB for further consideration."
The significance of the court's decision in Giant Food Markets is two-fold.
First, it requires the NLRB to determine the proper balance between the con-
flicting rights of the union and the employer based upon a consideration of
whether substantial evidence indicates that the union had no reasonable alter-
" Id. at 184, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2284..
12 Id. at 207, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292.
" Id.
14 Id. at 206 n.42, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2292 n.42. The Court remarked: "Babcock makes it
clear that the interests being protected ... are not those of the organizers but of the employees
located on the employer's property Area-standards picketing, on the other hand, has no such
vital link to the employee located on the employer's property." Id. The Court also noted that the
right to organize, present in Babcock, was at the "core" of the purpose of the NLRA, while area-
standards picketing was a recently recognized right. Id.
15
 633 F.2d 18, 105 L.R.R.M. 2916 (6th Cir. 1980), reh. denied, slip opinion, No. 79-
1248 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1981).
16 Id. at 19, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2916.
" Id. at 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919.
" Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2922.
15 Id.
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native means of engaging in its protected activity. 20 Second, the court endorsed
an approach that would accord more weight to the union's right to engage in
area standards picketing on the employer's property than was suggested by the
Supreme Court in Sears. 2 ' In fact, the Sixth Circuit's approach would have
private property rights yield more often to area standard picketing than to
other types of protected union activities."
In Giant Food Markets," the defendant leased and operated a supermarket
in a building separated from a major thoroughfare by a privately owned park-
ing lot". Prior to Giant Food's lease, the premises had been occupied by
another food store that had employed union workers." When that store failed,
Giant Food opened its business and employed non-union workers. 26 The Retail
Clerks Union, believing that the wages and benefits offered by Giant Food
were less than those earned by employees of the previous employer, 27 picketed
in front of the store." The pickets, none of whom were Giant Food employees,
urged customers not to patronize the store because it was paying less than the
union's area standards wage." The picketing was peaceful and did not directly
disrupt the store's Operations. 3 °
After being requested by Giant Food's management to leave the premises,
and served with a temporary restraining order, the pickets relocated. 3 ' They
chose an area at the entrance to the parking lot just beyond the store's proper-
ty. 32 The union then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. 33 In-
itially, an administrative law judge dismissed the complaint, finding that the
request to leave was not an unfair labor practice. 34 The NLRB reversed,
" Id. at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920. This approach is in accord with the Supreme
Court's view in prior cases, such as Babcock & Wilcox and Scars, which leaves to the NLRB initial
responsibility for weighing the competing interests in each case. See text and notes at notes 6, 7,
13, 14 supra and note 56 infra.
21 633 F.2d at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920; compare with note 14 supra.
22 Id. at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920. The court observed:
It may be assumed that, in general, it will be easier to communicate with a
specific, discrete number of employees by means other than intrusion on private
property than to communication with potential consumers of a large retail store
located on a major thoroughfare in a metropolitan area. This assumption,
however, leads to a rather anomalous conclusion that private property rights may
have to yield more often to the protected right to engage in area standards
picketing than to other union activities for which the law has forged a long-
standing protected status.
23 633 F.2d 18, 105 L.R.R.M. 2916 (6th Cir. 1980).
21 Id. at 19, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917.
Id. at 19-20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917.
26 Id. at 20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917.
22 Id. at 20 n.4, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917.
26 Id.
26 Id. at 20, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917; see also note 8 supra.
3° Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917.
31 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917-18.
31 Id. at 21, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2917-18.
33
 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2918.
3. Id.
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holding that the union activity was protected under section 7 of the NLRA and
that the request to leave was unfair labor practice. 35
In reviewing the Board's decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first
addressed the issue of whether area standards picketing is a protected activity
under section 7 of the NLRA. 36 The court noted that at the time of the Sears
decision, area standards picketing was regarded as a "recently evolved
right."" The court maintained, however, that this "mere lack of longevity"
should not affect the degree to which the National Labor Relations Act protects
that right." Accordingly, it concluded that area standards picketing falls within
the protective ambit of section 7 and is entitled to no less protection than other
types of protected union activity."
The court then addressed the problem of how the conflicting rights of the
union and the employer should be balanced." It emphasized that the balancing
test set forth in Babcock & Wilcox'n called for a consideration of the relative
strength of the competing interests in view of any alternative methods of com-
munication open to the union. 42 Unlike the union activity in Babcock & Wilcox,
however, the communication involved in area standards picketing is not
directed at employees on the employer's property, but rather at customers. 43
The court reasoned that this difference called for a modification of the test to
focus on whether the union had a reasonable alternative means of com-
municating with its "intended audience." 44 Where, as in this case, the union's
communication is directed toward a single store's potential customers diffused
throughout a major metropolitan area, the court ruled that expensive media
campaigns should not be considered a reasonable option for the union. 45
Therefore, the court concluded that the choice open to the union was between
" Id.
36 Id. at 22, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919.
" Id. at 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919; see also note 14 supra.
36 Id. The court reasoned: "If area standards picketing is protected under section 7 of
the NLRA, no matter how long the protection has existed, area standards pickets must be al-
lowed a reasonable means of communicating with the consumers." Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920.
99 Id.
" Id. at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920.
4 ' 351 U.S. 105, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1955).
42 633 F.2d at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920; see note 44 infra.
" See note 8 supra.
44 633 F.2d at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920. The court stated: "It is ... necessary to fit
this case into the Babcock & Wilcox construct and thereby balance the conflicting rights while ex-
ploring the potential alternative means of communication with the intended audience." Id. (em-
phasis added).
" Id. The court reasoned as follows:
When the consumers potentially come from a large metropolitan area and cannot
be categorized as a specific group patronizing a specific type of store, expensive,
extensive mass media or mailer campaigns should not be required. If
reasonableness is a criterion for determining whether or not an alternative means
of communication exists, the union should not be forced to incur exorbitant or
even heavy expenses.
Id.
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picketing on the employer's property and picketing at the entrance to the
store's parking lot."
In the proceedings below, the NLRB had concluded that picketing at the
parking lot entrance was not a reasonable option and that therefore the union
was entitled to picket on the employer's property.'" The court found that the
Board's determination on this point rested upon two theories." First, the
Board had believed that if the union was required to picket at the parking lot
entrance its.
 message would be diluted by its distance from the store." Second,
the Board had reasoned that picketing at the entrance would enmesh in the
dispute a neutral employer located in a store adjacent to Giant Food Market."
The court held that although the Board's theories were based on logical reason-
ing, 5 ' they were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 52 The
court therefore urged the Board to consider testimony from the pickets and
store owners, as well as other available evidence, in deciding whether there was
a reasonable alternative site available to the union." Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the Board for further consideration. 54
The Sixth Circuit Court's decision in Giant Food Markets, to some extent,
adopts the approach taken by the Supreme Court in prior cases by delegating
the delicate balancing of the union's right to engage in its protected activities,
and the employer's private property rights, in the first instance, to the
NLRB. 55 In particular, this decision requires the Board to make more detailed
factual findings when it applies the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Babcock & Wilcox to cases involving area standards picketing." The
court recognized that the NLRB had logically assumed that picketing at the
parking lot entrance would be less effective than picketing on the employer's
property." However, it considered this assumption an insufficient basis for
concluding that the alternative was so ineffective that the employer's private




5° Id. Even the neutral employer, supposedly harmed by the union's picketing, disputed
the Board's finding on this matter. Id. at n.14.
" Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921.
52 Id. The court remarked: "Both the dilution of message and enmeshing neutral
employer theories, which appear to be at the crux of the Board's opinion, are cited by the Board
without case authority and, perhaps more importantly, without reference to supporting facts in
the record." Id.
53 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921-22.
54
 Id.
55 In Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme Court asserted that the balancing of interests is a
process best left to the NLRB. As the Court noted: "The determination of the proper ad-
justments rests with the Board. Its rulings, when reached on findings of fact supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole, should be sustained by the courts unless its conclu-
sions rest on erroneous legal foundations." 351 U.S. at 112, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2004 (1955); see
also text at notes 13-14 supra.
56 633 F.2d at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921-22.
" Id. at 25, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921.
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property rights should yield." Instead, the court listed various types of
evidence that should have been considered by the Board, including testimony
from the pickets and the neutral store owner supposedly enmeshed by the
union's activity." The court's opinion also indicates that the Board should
have considerd a wide range of objective factors, such as traffic flow outside the
parking lot," and the potential for interaction between the picketers and car
drivers in evaluating whether the site was a reasonable alternative. 61 The court
thus defined the critical issue as a factual one: whether the effectiveness of the
alternative site was so diluted by distance from the store, or by confusion con-
sidering the neutral store adjacent to Giant Food, that it was an unreasonable
option. 62 -
More generally, the Sixth Circuit's approach reflects the view that the
union's right to engage in protected activity should override the employer's
property interest only when it is reasonably necessary for the activity to take
place on the employer's property in order to be effective. 63 This approach thus
attempts to find the locus of the accommodation between the union's right to
engage in protected activities, and the employer's private property rights, as
suggested in the Supreme Court's prior decisions." This is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's reading of the limits of section 7 protection in Babcock &
Wilcox, namely, that Congress did not intend section 7 to grant to unions the
ability to ignore an employer's private property rights whenever they find it
more effective, or otherwise in their interests to do so." Thus, under the Sixth
Circuit's approach the mere fact that an alternative site is less effective is not
sufficient to conclude that the employer's property rights must yield to the
rights of the union. 66
 Instead, the particular circumstances of each case should
be examined fully to determine if the union can communicate its message in a
manner which reaches the public in an effective manner, while not imposing on
58 Id. at 26, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921-22.
85 Id.
68 Id.
61 Id. The court clearly intended the Board's factual inquiry to be wide-ranging. It
noted: "Other facts having bearing on the reasonableness of the alternative locations could have
been elicited from various sources." Id.
62 Id.
65 Id. at 22-23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919. This view originated in Babcock & Wilcox, where
the Court stated that the NLRB must accommodate the employer's property rights and the
union's S 7 rights in a manner which assures "as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other." 351 U.S. 105, 112, 38 L.R.R. M. at 2004 (1955). This principle has
been observed by the Court in subsequent decisions. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521,
522, 91 L.R.R.M. 2489, 2494-95 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 529, 544,
80 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2771 (1972).
64
 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 204, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282, 2291-92 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522, 91
L.R.R.M. 2489, 2495, (1976). See text and notes at notes 6, 7, 63 supra.
65
 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 112, 38 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (1955);
see notes 6, 7, 56 supra.
66 See text at note 63 supra.
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the union undue burdens or expenses. 67 In effect, the court's approach suc-
ceeds in keeping the burden of proof on the union to show that the employer's
property rights must give way in order for it to conduct its protected activity ef-
fectively. This approach thus seems to balance the competing interests correct-
ly insofar as it requires the union to make use of whatever reasonable alter-
native locations are available before it can enter upon the employer's property.
Yet, in applying the Babcock & Wilcox standard in the context of area
standards picketing, the Sixth Circuit Court measured the strength of the
union's interest in a way that differs markedly from what was suggested by the
Supreme Court in Sears. In Sears the Court had drawn attention to the nexus
between the union's activity and the rights of the employees located on the
business premises." It drew a distinction between the strength of a union's in-
terest in entering the employer's property to attempt to organize its employees
and the strength of the union's interest in participating in area standards
picketing, placing a lesser value on the latter activity since it was only indirectly
related to the rights of those working on the property in question. 69 Yet, the
Sixth Circuit Court's decision in Giant Food Markets ignores that possible
distinction by focusing on the union's accessibility to its "intended audience"
to evaluate the strength of the union's right to engage in area standards
picketing." In rejecting the nexus view suggested in Sears, the circuit court
reasoned that the rather attenuated relationship between area standards
picketing and the rights of the non-union employees on the property was irrele-
vant since section 7 protected area standards picketing as strongly as other
types of protected union activity!' The court stated that the central issue in
determining whether property rights must yield to the union's desire to locate
its activity on that property is the union's accessibility to its "intended au-
dience." 72 Therefore, when the union can show that no reasonable alternative
means of reaching its intended audience exists, it would be entitled to conduct
its protected activity on the employer's property. 73
The decision in Giant Food Markets certainly does not provide a simple for-
mula for applying the Babcock & Wilcox balancing test to area standards
picketing and, in fact, it raises some new issues that will have to be addressed
67 633 F.2d at 22-23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919-20.
68 436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42, 98 L.R.R.M. 2282, 2292 n.42 (1978); see note 14 supra.
69 Id.
7° 633 F.2d at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920; see note 44 supra.
" Id. at 23, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919; see text at notes 37-39 supra. The Sixth Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the Scars approach by remarking:
Although Justice Stevens did command a majority of the Court [in Sears], there
was far from unanimity on his dicta relating to area standards activity. It would be
stretching this dicta too much to conclude that his statements were necessarily
meant as pronouncements for the future rather than descriptions of the past.
Id. at 24 n.13, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919-20 n.13. Note also that the definition of area standards
picketing endorsed by the NLRB and the court makes no mention of the rights of employees on
the property in question. See note 8 supra.
72 Id. at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920; see note 44 supra.
73 Id.
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by the courts in future cases. The chief difficulty with the Sixth Circuit's ap-
proach is that it allows the strength of the union's interest in conducting area
standards picketing on the employer's property to vary according to how its
"intended audience" is defined. As the court noted, when the intended au-
dience consists of potential customers of a single store diffused throughout a
large metropolitan area, the only reasonable means of communicating with
them may be on-site picketing, either on or near the employer's property. 74
The court also recognized that this approach may require private property
rights to yield more often in cases involving area standards picketing than in
cases involving other types of protected union activities." This outcome would
be completely contrary to the result suggested by the Supreme Court in Sears, 76
and, as such, may be subject to both criticism and modification.
Problems of interpretation will also arise in defining the union's "in-
tended audience." It is in the union's best interests to define its audience in a
manner that precludes the effective use of forms of communication other than
picketing on the employer's property. Thus, the union could lessen its burden
of proof by eliminating a number of reasonable alternatives. Since the union
has the first opportunity to determine its audience, it may come to have an in-
ordinate influence over the way that the audience is subsequently defined.
Moreover, in cases involving area standards picketing, the possible use of
conventional means of contacting consumers, such as radio and other forms of
media, should be more fully explored. The court in Giant Food Markets rejected
the idea that the media may provide a reasonable alternative means of com-
municating with a single store's potential customers scattered throughout a
large metropolitan area because of the expense involved in such a campaign. 77
Yet, this does not foreclose the possibility that the media might be a reasonable
alternative to on-site picketing in a situation where it can be used effectively
and inexpensively. Presumably, the fact that a media campaign is physically
removed from the employer's business does not automatically render it ineffec-
tive as a means of conveying the union's message. 78
 But, since these issues re-
main unsettled, it is likely that the NLRB will be forced to resolve questions in-
volving the definition of a union's intended audience and the reasonableness of
media alternatives to on-site, area standards picketing on a case-by-case basis.
Conflicts involving area standards picketing on an employer's property
will probably continue to generate difficulties for the NLRB and the courts.
Since there is no simple formula for resolving such conflicts, it is also likely that
the courts will continue to insist that the NLRB rely on detailed findings in
balancing the competing interests of union and employer. Nevertheless, if the
' 4 Id.; see note 45 supra.
" Id.; see note 22 supra.
76 See text at notes 69-70 supra, and note 14 supra.
" 633 F.2d at 24, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920; see note 45 supra.
7a Id. The court observed that a mass media campaign would "diffuse the effectiveness
of the communication." Id. Nevertheless, it did not conclude that this prevented the use of such
an alternative under all circumstances.
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Sixth Circuit's approach is widely adopted, the Giant Food Market decision will
have helped to provide another piece of the framework within which such con-
flicts can be resolved. The critical issues left open are how a union's intended
audience is to be defined and how the media will be viewed as a possible alter-
native means of communication open to a union seeking to reach consumers.
In addition, the NLRB will need to develop criteria for evaluating the effec-
tiveness and reasonableness of picketing sites outside of the employer's proper-
ty. The future of the balance between the union's protected activity and the
employer's property rights will then depend upon how the courts respond to
the NLRB's resolution of these matters.
4. Secondary Boycott in Protest of Foreign Governments:
Baldovin v. ILA and Allied International, Inc. v. ILA*
The secondary boycott provision of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) prohibits labor unions from engaging in or encouraging strikes or
work refusals when the purpose of these activities is to further a dispute be-
tween a union and a third party.' When a union has violated the secondary
boycott provision, an aggrieved employer is entitled to a private cause of action
under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 2 The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) also may enjoin the union from conducting such
strikes or refusals. 3 The scope of the secondary boycott provision is limited,
however, so that the provision applies only when the employer is "engaged in
commerce" or•"in an activity affecting commerce." 4 Although the language of
the provision requires that the employer be "in commerce," courts occasional-
ly have expanded the statutory requirement. Thus, in some instances, courts
have required that the union's activity be in commerce, 5 or that the object of
the union's dispute be in commerce. 6 When the requirement of commerce is
found to be lacking, the NLRB may not enjoin the union activity,' and the
employer may not bring a federal action under the LMRA. 8 The employer
" By Edward J. Neville, III, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 The secondary boycott provision provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
* *
(4)(1) to engage in ... a strike ... where	 an object thereof is —
• * •
(B) ... requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization.
29 U.S.C. S 158(b) (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. 5 187(b) (1976).
3 29 U.S.C. S 160(a) (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4) (1976).
5 E.g., Windward Shipping, Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 112
(1974), and cases cited therein.
6 E.g., Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445, 453, 105 L.R.R.M. 2549, 2554 (5th Cir.
1980).
• 29 U.S.C. 5 160(a) (1976).
'3 29 U.S.C. 5 187(b) (1976).
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may have state law remedies available to prevent employee work stoppages,
however, even if the "commerce" requirement of the secondary boycott provi-
sion is lacking. 9
The "commerce" requirement of the secondary boycott provision was in-
terpreted by two circuit courts during the Survey year." Both cases arose from
the International Longshoremen's Association's (ILA) refusal to handle Soviet
ships and Soviet cargoes, in protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." At
issue in both cases was whether the object of the union's dispute was in com-
merce, so that the secondary boycott provision could be applied." Although
both courts were presented with the same set of facts, they reached different
results. The Fifth Circuit held that the dispute was in commerce," but the First
Circuit disregarded the Fifth Circuit's decision and held that the dispute was
not in commerce." In reaching opposite results, both courts relied on the same
series of Supreme Court cases as precedent. In these cases, the Court had
delineated how the requirement of "commerce" should apply to disputes be-
tween American labor unions and foreign flagships. This line of cases will be
discussed first, in order to determine which of the circuit courts ruled correctly
on the issue of whether the ILA's boycott was in commerce.
In the first of these Supreme Court cases, Benz v. Compania Naveira
Hidalgo,'s the Court held that a dispute between an American union and a
foreign flagship was not in commerce within the meaning of the secondary
boycott provision.' 6 In Benz, American unions had picketed a foreign ship that
had been in port in Portland, Oregon." The purpose of the picket had been to
offer collateral support for a strike that was being conducted on board the ship
by its foreign crew. la
 The Court held that the picketing by the American union
was beyond the scope of the secondary boycott provision because the primary
dispute was between the foreign ship and its foreign employees.' 9
 The Court
stressed that the NLRA had been enacted "to alleviate the industrial strife be-
tween American employers and American workers" 20
 and not to regulate con-
flicts between foreign employees and their foreign employers. 21
 The Court also
stated that the legislative history "inescapably describes the boundaries of the
9
 E.g., Windward Shipping Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 105 (1974).
10
 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d 1368, 106 L.R.R.M. 2659 (1st Cir. 1981);
Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445, 105 L.R.R.M. 2549 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Allied Intl, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d at 1369, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2660; Baldovin v. ILA,
626 F.2d at 447, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
12
 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d at 1369, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2660; Baldovin v. ILA,
626 F.2d at 447, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
" Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d at 447, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
' 4
 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d at 1369, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
" 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
16 Id. at 139.
" Id. at 139-40.
10 Id.
19 Id. at 143-44.
20 Id. at 144.
21 Id.
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Act as including only the workingmen of our own country and its
possessions." 22 Since Congress could have included union activity against
foreign vessels specifically within the coverage of the Act, the Court concluded
that the pickets in Benz should be beyond that coverage." Another basis for the
Court's conclusion was the Court's hesitance to interfere "in such a delicate
field of international relations" without a clear direction from Congress to do
so. 24 Thus, the Court decided that the union's activity in Benz had not been in
commerce, in order to avoid judicial interference in international affairs and in
the labor disputes of a foreign employer. 25
Six years after the Benz decision, the Court reaffirmed the Benz approach
in Incres Steamship Co. , Ltd. v. International Maritime Workers Union. 26 In Incres, the
Court held again that union activity directed at furthering a dispute between a
foreign ship and its foreign crew should not be covered by the NLRA. 27 In
Incres, American unions had picketed a foreign ship that had been in port in the
United States. The object of the union's picket had been to unionize the
foreign seamen who had formed the crew of the ship. 29 In a suit brought by the
shipowner to enjoin the picket, the Court determined that the "maritime
operations of foreign flagships employing alien seamen are not 'in commerce'
within the meaning [of the NLRA1." 3° Consequently, the Court reasoned, the
picket could not be enjoined. 3 ' In Incres, the Court again stressed that the
NLRA had been enacted primarily to govern American disputes, and that,
consequently, interference by American courts into the affairs of a foreign
employer should be avoided. 32
Although the Benz and Incres decisions recognized that interference in the
affairs of foreign employers should be avoided, the Court also has indicated
that union activity is not automatically outside of "commerce" merely because
the activity is directed at a foreign employer. In ILA, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Ship-
ping Co., Ltd.," the Court held that pickets conducted by American unions to
protest the substandard wages paid by the owners of foreign ships to non-union
American longshoremen were within the scope of the NLRA. 34 The Ariadne
22 Id.
23 Id. at 146-47.
" Id. at 147.
25 Id. at 143.
26 372 U.S. 24 (1963).
" Id. at 27.
28 Id. at 26.
29 Id.
38 Id. at 27.
" Id. at 26-27.
32 Id. at 27.
" 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
3♦ Id. at 200. Consequently, the Court held that the state courts had no jurisdiction to
enjoin the pickets, because this activity was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at
200-01. The Court explained:
The jurisdiction of the [NLRB] is exclusive and preemptive as to activities
that are "arguably subject" to regulation under [29 U.S.C. S§ 157, 158]. (Cita-
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Court distinguished Beni and Incres, which had held that union activity directed
at foreign ships is beyond the scope of the NLRA, by emphasizing that in both
Benz and Incres, the dispute causing the union activity had concerned the rights
of foreign workers." In Ariadne, by contrast, the Court stressed that the dispute
focused upon wages paid to American workers. 36 The Ariadne Court also noted
that these workers had not been regular members of the foreign ship's crew.
Rather, they had been occasional employees who had worked for the foreign
ship on an irregular basis. 37 Therefore, the Court reasoned, applying
American law to resolve the dispute between the union and the foreign ship
would not threaten to interfere with the internal affairs of the foreign ship."
The Court also found that the concern for the principles of comity and accom-
modation in matters of international trade, which had been the persuasive fac-
tor in Benz and in Incres, was not implicated under the facts of the Ariadne case."
Because this factor was not implicated, the Court held that the labor dispute in
Ariadne should be governed by the NLRA. 4 °
Whether union activity directed at a foreign ship should be governed by
the NLRA was addressed again by the Court in Windward Shipping, Ltd. v.
American Radio Association.'" In Windward, an American seamen's union had
picketed foreign ships. The picketing was conducted to publicize the negative
impact that the hiring of foreign seamen by these ships had had on American
seamen. 42 The stevedore unions honored the seamen's picket line and refused
to service the foreign ships." The owners of these ships brought suit in state
court to have the picket enjoined." In the state court proceeding, the union
argued that its activity was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and
that the state court jurisdiction was therefore preempted. 45 The Supreme Court
later framed the jurisdictional issue as whether the union's activities "were ac-
tivities 'affecting commerce' " within the meaning of the secondary boycott
dons omitted). The activities [of the union] in this case met that test. The union's
peaceful primary picketing to Protest wage rates below established area standards
arguably constituted protected activity under [29 U.S.C. 157].
Id.
" Id. at 199.
36 Id. at 200.
" Id.
" Id.
39 Id. Although the Court spoke frequently of the principles of comity and accommoda-
tion in the line of cases beginning with Benz, the Court never defined these terms. Black's Law
Dictionary defines comity as a principle whereby "courts of one state or jurisdiction will give ef-
fect to laws of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and
mutual respect." Black's Law Dictionary, 242 (5th ed. 1979). Accommodation is defined as'
 an ar-
rangement or engagement made as a favor to another, not upon consideration received."
Id. at 15.
46 397 U.S. at 200.
41 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
42 Id. at 108.
43 Id. at 109.
44 Id. at 106.
45 Id.
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provision of the NLRA." The Court decided that the activities were not "af-
fecting commerce," based on the precedent of Benz, Incres, and Ariadne. 47 The
Court recognized that, literly speaking, the union activity in the Windward case
and in each of the precedent cases could be considered to be "in commerce. ' '48
The Court noted, however, that those cases which had held the union activity
to be beyond the scope of the NLRA had used the jurisdictional requirement of
"commerce" to avoid a result that would "erase longstanding principles of
comity and accommodation in international trade."" Applying this rationale
to the facts of the Windward case, the Court observed that, "[alt the very least,
the pickets must have hoped to exert sufficient pressure so that foreign vessels
would be forced to raise their operating costs to levels comparable to those of
American shippers . . . ." 5° Exerting such an influence on the foreign ships, the
Court reasoned, "would have more than a negligible impact." 5 ' Thus, the
Court concluded that holding the union activity within the scope of the NLRA
would run afoul of the principles of comity and accommodation."
After holding that the union's activity in Windward was not covered by the
NLRA, the Court was confronted with a similar issue in American Radio Associa-
tion v. Mobile Steamship Association." The Mobile case arose from the same union
activity as the Windward case." In Mobile, however, the plaintiffs were the
stevedore companies, who sought to enjoin the pickets so that the ships could
be unloaded." The stevedore companies originally had filed suit in state
court. 56 The union again challenged the state court's jurisdiction, arguing that,
because its activity arguably was prohibited by the NLRA, the NLRB should
have exclusive jurisdiction over any suit arising from the activity." Again, the
Court found that the union's activity was not in commerce, and that the state
court's jurisdiction was not precluded by that of the NLRB." The Court stated
that it wanted to avoid the "bifurcated result" that would obtain if, at one
picket site, the foreign shipowners could bring suit in the state courts (under
Mobile), but the American businesses could not do so. 59 The Court again em-
phasized that the primary purpose of the picket had been to alter the internal
management of a foreign ship. 6° Consequently, the principles of comity and ac-
46
 Id.
" Id. at 112.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 112-13.
5G Id. at 115.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 115-16.
53 419 U.S. 215 (1974).
54 Id. at 219-20.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 220-21.
58 Id. at 228.
59 Id. at 221, 225.
60 Id. at 225.
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commodation again militated against the application of the NLRA, even
though the suit had been brought by an .American business to enjoin a picket
by an American union.
In summary, after the Mobile case, it appeared that the Court had fashioned
a mechanical test to determine whether union activity directed at a foreign
flagship was within the scope of the NLRA. The test focused upon the primary
purpose of the union activity. If the primary purpose was to alter the internal
affairs of a foreign ship, then the activity was not governed by the NLRA. It
would not matter, under the Benz-Mobile line of cases, whether suit was brought
by the foreign ship or by an American plaintiff. Conversely, if the primary pur-
pose of the union activity was to affect only the relationship between the foreign
ship and its American workers, the union activity would be within the scope of
the NLRA. 6 '
Although the Benz-Mobile test easily could determine whether the NLRA
should be applied to union activity directed at a foreign flagship, the test did
not specify how the NLRA should be applied to union activity directed at
foreign nations.
During the Survey year, two circuits applied the Benz-Mobile line of
Supreme Court cases to determine whether union activity that is conducted to
further that union's dispute with a foreign nation should be governed by the
NLRA. 62
 Although both circuits applied the same line of cases, they reached
opposite results. A discussion of the reasoning each court employed to reach its
decision will follow. The merits of each court's reasoning then will be tested
against the approach of the Supreme Court in the Benz-Mobile line of cases.
Both cases arose from the same basic dispute. To protest the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) had
ordered a suspension in the handling of all Soviet ships and Soviet cargoes in
American ports." In the Fifth Circuit case, Baldovin v. ILA," the union activity
was held not to be "in commerce" within the meaning of the NLRA. 65 Conse-
quently, the NLRB was denied an injunction of the union's boycott. 66 The
First Circuit, conversely, held in Allied International, Inc. v. ILA° that the
union's boycott was in commerce." Thus, Allied International, an American
importer whose business had been affected adversely by the longshoremen's
strike, could state a claim for damages under the NLRA. 69
 Therefore, by ap-
6L Accord, Annual Survey of Labor Lau, 16 B.C. L. REV. 966, 972 (1975).
67 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d 1368, 106 L.R.R.M. 2659 (1st Cir. 1981);
Baldovin v. ILA, 626 F.2d 445, 105 L.R.R.M. 2549 (5th Cir. 1980).
63
 Allied Int'l, Inc. v. ILA, 640 F.2d at 1369, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2660; Baldovin v. ILA,
626 F.2d at 447, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
64 626 F.2d 445, 105 L.R.R.M. 2549.
65 Id. at 446, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2549.
66 Id.
67
 640 F.2d 1368, 106 L.R.R.M. 2659.
64 Id. at 1374, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
69 Id. at 1379, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2668.
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plying the same body of precedent to virtually indentical facts, the First and
Fifth Circuits reached inconsistent decisions.
In the Baldovin case, the Fifth Circuit applied the test implicitly established
by Mobile. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that the ILA's boycott was not
in commerce." The Baldovin court reasoned that the teaching of Mobile was that
the nature of the primary dispute should determine whether the union's activi-
ty was in commerce. 7 ' Under this simplified test, where the primary purpose of
the union activity is to effectuate some change in a foreign entity, the NLRA
cannot apply to the primary dispute." When the primary dispute is beyond the
scope of the NLRA, so are any secondary effects on disputes the activity may
have caused." In the Baldovin case, the primary dispute was found to be be-
tween the union and the Soviets. 74 The court noted that, compared to the
disputes between unions and foreign flagships in the Supreme Court cases, this
dispute was "even further removed from the type of domestic relations that the
[NLRA] was intended to cover. "75 Since only a political decision by the Soviet
Union could have accommodated the union's demands, the court found that
the union's activity 'was not in commerce." Because the activity was not in
commerce, the court found that the NLRB lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the
ILA's allegedly unfair secondary boycott."
Rejecting the Fifth Circuit's application of the mechanical Mobile test to
disputes involving foreign governments, the First Circuit held in Allied Interna-
tional, Inc. v. ILA that the ILA's boycott to protest the invasion of Afghanistan
was in commerce. 78 Therefore, the boycott was held to be within the scope of
the NLRA. In analyzing the Benz-Mobile line of Supreme Court cases, the First
Circuit emphasized that most of those cases had considered whether union ac-
tivity directed at working conditions aboard a foreign flagship should fall
within the ambit of the NLRA. 79 The court acknowledged that when the
union's primary dispute is over conditions aboard the foreign ship, the prin-
ciples of comity and accommodation militate against the applicability of the
NLRA." The First Circuit concluded, however, that where the primary
dispute is with a foreign government, the same analysis should not obtain."
The court found that "it would be absurd to contend that application of the
secondary boycott provisions would imply NLRB jurisdiction over this primary
70 626 F.2d at 449-54, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554.
" Id. at 453, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554.
77 Id. at 452-54, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554-55.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 453, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554.
75 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554.
76 Id.
" Id. at 453-54, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2554-55.
78 640 F.2d at 1374, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
79 Id. at 1372, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2662.
a° Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
81 Id. at 1374. 106 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
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dispute, i.e. , over Soviet military policy. " 82
 The court also noted that "the only
labor-related activity in issue ha[di been played out by an all-American
cast. "" Thus, the First Circuit restricted the Mobile case to its facts." The First
Circuit also emphasized that in Mobile the Supreme Court had been unwilling
to reach a bifurcated result, whereby the foreign shipowners could bring suit in
state court, but the American shippers could not." This type of bifurcated
result, the First Circuit noted, is only possible when the primary dispute
focuses on foreign labor relations. 86 Consequently, the First Circuit found that
the considerations of comity and accommodation, which had influenced the
Supreme Court's reasoning throughout the Benz-Mobile line of cases, were
without force under the facts in Allied."
Because the fact pattern in Allied and in Baldovin did not raise issues of
comity and accommodation, the First Circuit's resolution of the jurisdictional
issue is the better reasoned one. In Baldovin, the Fifth Circuit merely applied
the Mobile test mechanically, without considering whether the policies behind
the test are applicable when the union activity is directed against a foreign
government." Conversely, the First Circuit in Allied looked to the policies
which led the Supreme Court to develop the Mobile test."
In the cases leading up to the Mobile test, the Court had been influenced
consistently by the policies of comity and accommodation. The Court had been
fearful that, by applying the NLRA to union activity directed against a foreign
flagship. the Court would imply that the NLRA should apply to the labor rela-
tions on board the ship as well. Thus, the Court would be overreaching the
limits set upon it by the principles of comity and accommodation." In the only
case in which the Supreme Court had deemed the NLRA applicable to union
activity directed against a foreign ship, the primary dispute had been between
the ship and American workers." Thus, in that case, applying the NLRA to
the union activity could mean only that the foreign ship's dispute with the other
American workers should be governed by the NLRA as well. Because Con-
gress was found to have had the right to regulate American workers, the prin-
ciples of comity and accommodations did not militate against the application of
the NLRA to the union activity."
The First Circuit correctly applied this approach to determine that the
NLRA should govern the dispute in Allied. It is beyond question that the
NLRA cannot resolve a dispute between American workers and the Soviet
87 Id. at 1372-73, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
83 Id.




00 626 F.2d at 450, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2553.
89
 640 F.2d at 1371-74, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2662-64.
'° See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naveira Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
9' ILA, Local 141 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., Ltd., 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
92 Id.
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Union, especially when that dispute concerns the Soviets' decision to invade
another country." The First Circuit also noted that the only labor dispute in
the case was "played out by an all-American cast." Because the only labor
issue was strictly an American one, the decision did not imply that American
labor law would govern labor disputes between foreign employers and their
foreign employees. Thus, the principles of comity and accommodation are not
invoked.
Since the principles of comity and accommodation are not invoked when
unions engage in political protests against foreign governments, it is most likely
that the First Circuit's approach will be followed when the issue arises before
other circuits. Under this approach, American employers will be protected by
the secondary boycott prohibition of the NLRA, regardless of whether the
union's boycott is directed at other American businesses or at foreign nations.
The only instance when a secondary boycott may not be prohibited by the
NLRA is when the purpose of the boycott is to influence a foreign employer.
When a foreign employer is the victim of the union's wrath, the applicability of
the NLRA to the union's activity will be determined by reference to the Mobile
test. When the primary purpose of the union's activity is to influence a foreign
employer, neither the activity, nor the employer is in commerce. Because
neither the activity nor the employer is in commerce, the NLRA cannot be ap-
plied.
III. EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN
A. Multi-Employer Bargaining Associations:
NLRB v. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc.*
The question of whether an employer may withdraw unilaterally from a
multi-employer bargaining unit when an impasse occurs in the course of collec-
tive bargaining is one which has created a split among the federal courts of ap-
peals. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) has held that a party may
withdraw from a multi-employer association once negotiations have been in-
itiated only when mutual consent is given or when an "unusual circumstance"
exists.' The Board's early cases resulted in uncertainty as to whether a bargain-
ing impasse was an unusual circumstance. 2 Finally, in 1973 the Board un-
" See also 640 F.2d at 1372 n.3, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2663 n.3, where the First Circuit ex-
plained how it was possible to characterize the primary dispute as one between the Soviet Union
and Afghanistan. Therefore, the primary dispute would not involve a labor law issue. Id.
* By Barbara Rohan Gilmore, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW,
' Retail Assocs., Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 395, 41 L.R.R.M. 1502, 1504 (1958). Prior
to the actual commencement of negotiations, the employer or union may withdraw from the unit
freely. NLRB v. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25, 28, 105 L.R.R.M, 2477, 2479 (1st
Cir. 1980).
Compare Ice Cream, Frozen Custard Indus. Employees Local 717, 145 N.L.R.B.
865, 870-71, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1061 (1964) (bargaining impasse would not justify unilateral
withdrawal from unit) with Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 323, 191 N.L.R.B. 592, 592 n.1, 77
L.R.R.M. 1769 (1971) (impasse could justify withdrawal).
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equivocally held that a bargaining impasse was not an unusual circumstance
justifying unilateral withdrawal from a multi-employer unit. 3 Despite this rul-
ing, several courts of appeals, including the First Circuit (in dicta) 4 concluded
that a genuine impasse in collective bargaining did justify an employer's
unilateral withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit. 3 During this
Survey year, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in NLRB v.
Bonanno Linen Service, 6 declined to follow its own dicta and upheld the Board's
exclusion of a bargaining impasse from its definition of unusual
circumstances.'
In Bonanno, the employer had joined nine of its competitors in a multi-
employer bargaining association which for several years had negotiated the
contracts with the Teamsters Local Union 25 (the union). 8 The union
represented the truck drivers and certain other employees of the ten members
of the association.° Bonanno continued as a member of the association and
negotiations for a new contract had begun when the parties reached an impasse
on the issue of compensation.'° After the parties had been at impasse for ap-
proximately one month, the union initiated a selective strike against Bonanno
and, in response, most of the association members conducted a lockout."
Eventually Bonanno replaced all of its striking employees with permanent
3 Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23, 81 L.R.R.M. 1161, 1163 (1973),
enf't denied, 500 F.2d 181, 184, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2206 (5th Cir. 1974). The Board has limited
the scope of the term "unusual circumstances" to two situations: where dire financial hardship
threatens the employer's existence, see, e.g., Atlas Electrical Serv. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 827, 830,
71 L.R.R.M. 1625, 1629 (1969); Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557, 558, 68 L.R.R.M. 1121,
1122 (1968); and where the bargaining unit has been fragmented substantially through consen-
sual withdrawals, see, e.g., NLRB v. Southwestern Colo. Contractors' Ass'n, 447 F.2d 968, 969,
78 L.R.R.M. 2129, 2130 (10th Cir. 1971); Typographic Serv. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 1565, 1566,
99 L.R.R.M. 1649 (1978). Certain courts, although not the Board, have interpreted "unusual
circumstances" to include situations in which the negotiating committee does not represent fairly
the interests of a particular employer. See NLRB v. Siebler Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.,
563 F.2d 366, 371, 96 L.R.R.M. 2613, 2617 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 911 (1978);
NLRB v. Unelko Corp., 478 F.2d 1404 (without published opinion), 83 L.R.R.M. 2447, 2449
(7th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
Andino v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 147, 151, 104 L.R.R.M. 2183, 2186 (1st Cir. 1980).
See NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135, 146, 98
L.R.R.M. 3150, 3157 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v.
NLRB, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., Inc., 522 F.2d 475, 483, 90
L.R.R.M. 2089, 2094 (3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., Inc., 512 F.2d
230, 232, 88 L.R.R.M. 3024, 3025 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB v. Hi-
Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 184, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2205-06 (5th Cir. 1974); Fairmont
Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1172, 82 L.R. R.M. 2017, 2018 (8th Cir. 1972) (alternative
holding). See also Note, Effect of Negotiating Impasse on an Employer's Right to Withdraw from a Multi-
Employer Bargaining Association - NLRB v. Beck Engraving Go., 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 525
(1976).
6 630 F.2d 25, 105 L.R.R.M. 2477 (1st Cir. 1980).
7 Id. at 27, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2477.
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employees.' 2
 Bonanno notified both the association and the union that it was
withdrawing from the association because of the ongoing bargaining impasse."
About a year after the initiation of negotiations, the union and the association
reached an agreement and entered into a new contract which the union claimed
was binding upon Bonanno.' 4 The Board agreed" and sought enforcement of
its decision. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the Board's deci-
sion, reasoning that the employer's ability to withdraw freely from an associa-
tion would undermine the structure of multi-employer bargaining."
In reaching its decision, the court reviewed the policy considerations
underlying multi-employer bargaining. Central to the Bonanno court's decision
is the Supreme Court's conclusion in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo
Linen)." In Buffalo Linen the Court found that Congress, by rejecting proposals
to limit or outlaw multi-employer bargaining units, recognized such bargain-
ing associations as "vital factorts] in the effectuation of the national policy of
promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining." 18 One
way in which the Court found that multi-employer associations promoted labor
peace is by ensuring the uniformity of contract terms." If employers were com-
pelled to bargain with a union on an individual basis, different terms might be
negotiated by each employer. With multi-employer bargaining, however,
industry-wide benefits can be developed. As a result, there is no disparity of
employee benefits to give rise to employee dissatisfaction and strife. 20 Second,
because all employers are bound by the same terms, one employer cannot use
collective bargaining to gain an economic advantage over competitors. 21 Final-
ly, a multi-employer bargaining unit not only increases the efficiency of the
bargaining process 22 but also allows smaller employers to band together to ob-
tain a more equal bargaining position vis-a-vis a large labor union."
Because of the role multi-employer units play in promoting labor peace,
the Bonanno court concluded that the stability of such units was of great impor-
tance. 24 A rule which allowed employers to withdraw freely at any time during
the negotiations would create distrust among all the parties. In addition, the
court noted that such a rule would allow an employer to manufacture an im-
passe so that he might be allowed to withdraw from the unit." Because the
stability of the association would be weakened if an employer were able to
' Id.
13 Id.
" Id. at 27-28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2478.
15 See Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 140 (1979).
16 630 F.2d at 35, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2484.
17 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
" Id. at 95.
". Id. at 96.
20 630 F.2d at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2478.
21 353 U.S. at 96.
22 630 F.2d at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2478.
23 353 U.S. at 96.
24 630 F.2d at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2479.
25 Id. at 29, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2480.
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withdraw whenever a bargaining impasse arose, 26 the court rejected such a
rule. 27 Nonetheless, because other courts have held that an employer may
withdraw when a genuine impasse is reached, the Bonanno court closely ex-
amined those decisions.
The Bonanno court first considered the rationale applied by other courts in
the so-called "whipsawing" cases, where the existence of interim agreements
allowed employers to withdraw from a bargaining unit when an impasse was
reached. 28 These cases, represented by NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc.," in-
volved interim agreements between the union and some members of the unit at
impasse which stated that those employers would be bound by the final agree-
ment reached by the bargaining process." The Hi-Way Billboards court reason-
ed that a union could enter into an interim agreement with an employer or
employers and then successively strike the remaining members of the associa-
tion. 3 ' Such a strike placed an employer at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis his
economic competitors who avoided a strike by entering into the interim agree-
ment. By this technique., known as whipsawing, the union could force the
employers to accept terms more favorable to the union. It is for this reason that
when a union has negotiated interim agreements with some members of the
association, and a bargaining impasse has been reached, many courts have
held that employers may withdraw unilaterally to avoid being whipsawed into
accepting the union's offer. 32
After considering the Hi-Way Billboards court's rationale, the Bonanno
court turned to NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., Inc." Beck held that the mere right
of the union to enter into interim agreements justified an employer's unilateral
withdrawal from the unit after an impasse was reached. 34 According to the Beck
court, the mere existence of the right to enter into such agreements, rather than
its exercise, gave the union excessive bargaining power." The right of the
employer to withdraw from the association, therefore, was necessary to balance
the power of the union to force the agreement upon the employers."
After reviewing the underlying principles of the cases which allowed an
employer to withdraw unilaterally from a bargaining unit when an impasse
was reached, the Bonanno court found two reasons why the application of those
26 Id. at 28, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2479.
" Id. at 35, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2484.
28 Id. at 33, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2483. This group included NLRB v. Independent Ass'n
of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135, 98 L.R.R.M. 3150 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom.
Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB, 439 U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Associated Shower
Door Co., Inc., 512 F.2d 230, 88 L.R.R.M. 3024 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975);
and NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir. 1974).
29 500 F.2d 181, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203 (5th Cir. 1974).
3° Id. at 183, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2204.
3L Id., 87 L.R.R.M. at 2205.
32 Id. at 184, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2205.
33 522 F.2d 475, 90 L.R.R.M. 2089 (3d Cir. 1975).
34 Id. at 483, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
35 Id., 90 L.R.R.M. at 2095.
36 Id., 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
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principles to the case at bar was inappropriate." First, the court concluded that
a balancing of bargaining strength should not be the key to determining when
an employer may leave the unit. The Bonanno court found that, under Buffalo
Linen and its progeny, such a manipulation of bargaining weapons by the court
was inappropriate." Congress did not intend either the Board or the courts to
dispense bargaining weapons. Second, even if bargaining strengths were ap-
propriate considerations, the court rejected the conclusion that the employer
could not protect against whipsawing without the right to withdraw from the
association. 39
 The court found that the power of the union to whipsaw was off-
set by the employer's right to lockout employees." Therefore it was not
necessary to give employers the additional weight of the right to unilaterally
withdraw.
In holding that an employer does not have the right to unilaterally
withdraw when a bargaining impasse occurs, the First Circuit has reached a
decision that is in opposition to those of the Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits. 4 ' While the result reached by the Bonanno court appears to be
the correct one, certain elements of the decision are susceptible to criticism. For
example, the court rested the decision at least partly on the belief that an
employer might create a bargaining impasse simply to justify his withdrawal
from the bargaining unit. This concern is only valid if it is assumed that the
authenticity of an impasse cannot be determined. Yet it is exactly this kind of
determination that is within the expertise of the Board. Indeed, in Taft Broad-
casting Co. , 42
 the Board stated that the test of an impasse is whether a continua-
tion of the bargainng sessions will result in a bargaining agreement. 43 In apply-
ing this standard the Board has recognized that certain factors must be con-
sidered. These factors include the bargaining history of the parties, the good
faith of the parties, the duration of the negotiations, the relative importance of
the issue over which the parties are at impasse, and the contemporaneous
understanding of the parties as to the state of the negotiations.'" Thus, while an
employer could advocate a position which he knew would be unacceptable to
the union, such bad-faith conduct would negate the existence of a true impasse.
Under Taft Broadcasting Co. the question whether a true impasse exists is a ques-
don for the fact finder. Appellate courts should limit their scope of review of a
Board finding that an impasse exists to whether there is substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole to support such a conclusion. 45
 Therefore it is
37
 630 F.2d at 32, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2481-82.
38 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2481.
39 Id., 105 L.R.R.M. at 2482.
40 Id. at 33, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2483.
'' See, e.g., cases cited at note 3 supra.
* 2 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 64 L.R.R.M. 1386 (1967), enforced sub nom. American Fed. of
Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
43 163 N.L.R.B. at 478, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1388.
44
 Id; see also H	 D, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 139 (withdrawn from publication), 105
L.R.R.M. 3070 (9th Cir. 1980).
45 Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
210	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
incorrect for the Bonanno court to assume that no test for the determination of
an impasse exists and that employers may use that device frivolously to justify
withdrawal from a bargaining unit. Notwithstanding the Bonanno court's
mistaken belief that the authenticity of a bargaining impasse cannot be deter-
mined, the decision remains a correct one for at least two reasons. To begin,
the court properly rejected the Beck court's conclusion that judicial equalization
of bargaining weapons not only was not prohibited but indeed was necessitated
by the union's great strength. 46 The Beck court found that the union had a
statutory right to strike" while the employers had a counter-balancing
judicially-oriented right to lockout employees. 48
 In addition, the union could
enter interim agreements with individual members of the association. 49 The
Beck court, however, found no counter-balancing right in the employer. The
court therefore concluded that equity required the court to create a correspon-
ding right for the employer." Thus, the employer's right to withdraw from the
bargaining association was upheld.
The Third Circuit's balancing of economic weapons is premised on an er-
roneous interpretation of Buffalo Linen and its progeny. In NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' International Union 51
 the Supreme Court held that the use of economic
weapons and the duty to bargain in good faith were not mutually exclusive. 52
Instead the Court expressed concern that the Board would attempt to
manipulate the economic weapons available to each side under the guise of en-
forcing the duty to bargain in good faith." The Court held that any manipula-
tion of weapons was outside the control of the Board" and thus by implication
the judiciary. It was exactly this type of equalizing of bargaining power,
however, which the Beck court sought to accomplish. The Bonanno court, then,
was correct in rejecting such an approach.
Even if it were proper for the judiciary to undertake a cataloguing of
weapons in order to equalize employer and union power, the Beck court
overlooked important employer-controlled weapons. As the Bonanno court cor-
rectly indicated, the union's ability to negotiate interim agreements can be
negated by the employer's refusal to enter into such agreements. Furthermore,
the employer may stockpile goods, readjust contract schedules, or transfer
work to deflect the full economic impact of whipsawing. 55
 Moreover,
employers may use the lockout in several ways, including locking out
46 522 F.2d at 483, 90 L.R.R.M, at 2094.
47 Id. at 480, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2092. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) found a statutory right to strike based on 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1976). Id. at 233-34.
" 522 F.2d at 482, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2093.
49 Id. at 482-83, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
59 Id, at 483, 90 L.R.R.M. at 2094.
51 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
Id. at 494-95.
" Id. at 497-98.
" Id. at 490.
55 630 F.2d at 32-33, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2482-83.
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employees regardless of whether the union was engaged in selective striking. 56
Because employers are not as defenseless against whipsawing as Beck would in-
dicate, the balance of strength does not fall squarely on the side of the union.
Even the Beck standard then, if properly applied, does not require recognition
of the right of an employer to withdraw from a bargaining unit because an im-
passe has been reached. It remains to be seen whether courts currently taking a
balancing approach which allows employers to withdraw at impasse will follow
the Bonanno court's lead and desist in their attempts to balance bargaining
strengths. Those courts that continue to engage in a balancing test could be
guided by Bonanno in reevaluating the weapons which comprise the employer's
arsenal. Nevertheless, as a result of Bonanno there is a significant split in the cir-
cuits over whether an employer may withdraw from a multi-employer bargain-
ing association at impasse. The split results from the differing interpretations of
Buffalo Linen and until it is resolved, confusion will persist concerning the im-
pact of a bargaining impasse on multi-employer bargaining units.
IV. UNION MEMBERS' BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Right to Sue and Free Speech: Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of America*
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA)' contains a Bill of Rights of Union Members section.' The right to
sue provision within the Bill of Rights, section 101(a)(4), states that a labor
organization shall not limit the right of any member to institute actions in court
or before an agency, to appear as a witness in any proceeding, to petition any
legislature or to communicate with a legislator.' Previous decisions concerning
section 101(a)(4) have dealt with union discipline of a member for bringing suit
against the union or its officers. 4 All of these cases held that the right to sue pro-
vision prohibits labor unions from disciplining their members for bringing such
actions.' The Bill of Rights section also contains a provision, section 101(a)(2),
" Id. at 32 n.15, 105 L.R.R.M. at 2482 n.15.
By Cheri L. Crow, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. 411 (1976).
3 29 U.S.C. 5 411(a)(4) (1976) in pertinent part provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right or any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, ... or
the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any
judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or
to communicate with any legislator. . . .
See Phillips v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Workers,
Local 118, 556 F.2d 939, 95 L.R.R.M. 2875 (9th Cir. 1977); Operating Eng'rs Local Union No.
3 v, Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370, 72 L.R.R.M. 2577 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916
(1970); Ryan v. IBEW, 361 F.2d 942, 62 L.R.R.M. 2339 (7th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, sub 120M.
IBEW v. Ryan, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); Carroll v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 235 F. Supp.
161, 52 L.R.R.M. 2950 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Phillips v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Workers, Local
118, 556 F.2d 939, 942, 95 L.R.R.M. 2875, 2877 (9th Cir. 1977); Operating Eng'rs Local
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which guarantees a union member's right of freedom of speech and assembly. 6
Most of the cases construing the meaning of this guarantee of free speech have
focused on the protection it offers to the numerous types of communications
made by union members.' While decisions regarding sections 101(a)(2) and
101(a)(4) have helped to define union members' rights to pursue litigation and
exercise free speech, the full scope of these provisions has yet to be addressed by
the courts.
During the Survey year, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
in Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 8 was confronted with the legitimacy of a pro-
vision in a union constitution, which prohibited candidates for union office
from receiving financial or other support from non-members. 9 The court held
that the union provision was invalid because it violated section 101(a)(4), the
right to sue provision, and also unreasonably impinged on the right to free
speech and association guaranteed by section 101(a)(2)." The court explained
that the union rule restricted a candidate's right to sue by preventing a can-
Union No. 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370, 373, 72 L.R.R.M. 2577, 2579 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Ryan v. IBEW, 361 F.2d 942, 945-46, 62 L.R.R.M. 2339, 2341-42
(7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, sub nom. IBEW v. Ryan, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); Carroll v. Associated
Musicians Local 802, 235 F. Supp. 161, 172, 52 L.R.R.M. 2950, 2958 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
6 29 U.S.C.	 411(a)(2) (1976) in entirety provides:
Freedom of speech and assembly. - Every member of any labor organization
shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to ex-
press any views, arguments or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor
organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided,
That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization
to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
' See, e.g., Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 550-51, 77 L.R.R.M. 2916, 2919-20 (5th Cir. 1971) (members not per-
mitted to engage in activities diametrically opposed to performance of specified duties); Fulton
Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212,
218-19, 71 L.R.R.M. 3124, 3219 (5th Cir. 1969) (false statements against union leadership);
Giordani v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 403 F.2d 85, 89-90, 69 L.R.R.M. 2548, 2551-52 (2d Cir.
1968) (accusations of union fund misappropriation); International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 311-12, 59
L.R.R.M. 2821, 2824 (9th Cir. 1965) (circulation outside the union of handbills proposing by-
law revisions); Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881, 881, 58 L.R.R.M. 2125, 2126 (2d Cir. 1965)
(malicious vilification of union officers); Farolwitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999, 1000,
56 L.R.R.M. 2082, 2082-83 (2d Cir. 1964) (exhortation to fellow members not to pay dues
believed to he illegally excessive); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 446, 52 L.R.R.M.
2908, 2908 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963) (libelous statements).
645 F.2d 1114, 106 L.R.R.M. 2942 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9 Id. at 1115, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2942. Article V, Section 27 of the Constitution of the
United Steelworkers of America in pertinent part provides that, "frilo candidate (including a
prospective candidate) for any position set forth in Article IV, Section 1, and supporter of a can-
didate may solicit or accept financial support, or any other direct or indirect support of any kind
(except an individual's own volunteered personal time) from any non-member." Id. at 1126 app.
L° Id. at 1125, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2950.
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didate from accepting contributions to finance litigation." The court found
that the guarantee of free speech was violated because the union provision
would inhibit candidates from making effective challenges to union leadership
thereby denying union democracy." This case is a landmark decision because
not only does it prevent a union from prohibiting all outside contributions to
candidates, but it also is the first major decision expanding the scope of both
the right to sue provision and the free speech and assembly provision of the
LMRDA.
The Sadlowski case arose when the union enacted an amendment to its
constitution prohibiting outside financial contributions to union candidates. 13
The enactment followed the 1977 election for International President of the
United Steelworkers of America." In that election, Lloyd McBride, who en-
joyed the support of the Union's incumbent leadership, was opposed by
Edward Sadlowski, Jr., the insurgent candidate. 15 Sadlowski received substan-
tial financial support from sources outside the union, while McBride received
most of his campaign contributions from the staff of the union. 16 Sadlowski lost
the election.' 7 Shortly thereafter, the union amended its constitution by enact-
ing Article V, Section 27. 18 This amendment prohibited candidates from
receiving support from persons other than union members, with an exception
for volunteered time. 19 Section 27 also empowered the International Executive
Board to promulgate implementing regulations and created the Campaign
Contribution Administrative Committee (CCAC) to administer and enforce
the amendment. 2° This constituional amendment was the first attempt by a
labor union to so restrict financial support for union candidates. 21 The lower
court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, Sadlowski, holding that the
amendment violated section 101(a)(4), the right to sue provision. 22 Both the
union and Sadlowski appealed those parts of the district court's order that were
adverse to them. 23
The appellate court held that the union's outsider rule on its face violated
the right to sue provision of the LMRDA. 24 In support of this decision, the
court noted that the outsider rule was all-encompassing and absolute. 25 Thus,
" Id. at 1117, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944.
12 Id. at 1121-22, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947.
" Id. at 1115, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2942.
14 Id.
1 ' Id. at 1115, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2943.
16 Id. at 1116, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2943.
" Id.
to Id. See id. at 1126 app.
19 Id. at 1126 app.
20 Id. at 1126-27 app.
21 Id. at 1116, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2943. See Note, Restrictions on "Outsider" Participation in
Union Politics, 55 CHI-KENT L. REV. 769, 769 (1979).
21 645 F.2d at 1116, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2943.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1117, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944.
25 Id.
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the rule would prevent a candidate from using outside money to pay for a
lawyer's services, or from receiving reduced rates from an attorney, or from ac-
cepting a lawyer's donated services if a paid employee of the lawyer con-
tributed to the product."
In finding that the outsider rule violated the right to sue provision of the
LMRDA, the court rejected the conclusion reached by the CCAC in an ad-
visory opinion to the union concerning the impact of the outsider rule on the
right to sue. The union claimed that the CCAC's construction of the rule
demonstrated that the rule did not affect a member's right to sue." In
response, the court declared that the CCAC's advisory opinion conflicted with
the clear language of the outsider rule and its regulations." Moreover, the
court noted that the opinion left open the question of whether a candidate could
be disqualified or disciplined for retaining counsel and bringing a suit which
the union later determined was not a bona fide attempt to secure an adjudication
of legal rights but was, instead, motivated by a desire to promote a candidate's
political campaign. 29 In this context, the court examined a regulation adopted
by the union which in part declared that "[a]ctivities which are designed to ex-
tract political gain from legal proceedings are subject to the support limitations
of Section 27."" The meaning of the word "activities" in this regulation was
interpreted by the court to include steps in the legal proceedings themselves. 3 '
If any step was found by the union to be "designed to extract political gain," it
would be subject to the contribution limitations." The court declared,
however, that the right to sue was an absolute right which could not be
diminished by only permitting those suits that a union found to be bona fide, or
not designed to extract political benefit, to be exempt from the ban on outside
contributions."
In determining what remedy to apply, the court declared that an injunc-
tion prohibiting the outsider rule's application to litigation would not suffice
because the rule also violated the free speech guarantee of the LMRDA. 34 The
court began its analysis of the rule's violation of the free speech provision by
asserting that the LMRDA's guarantee of free speech was patterned after the
first amendment of the United States Constitution and that this guarantee
under the LMRDA was not confined to the exercise of that right among union
members. 35
 Further, the court stated that the right of free association is an in-
separable aspect of freedom of speech."
26 Id.
27 Id..
" Id. at 1118, 1118 at n.6, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944, 2944 at n.6.
" Id. at 1118, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944.
3° Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944-45.




Id. at 1120-21, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2946.
36 Id. at 1121, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947.
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The court recognized that one of the principal purposes of the LMRDA
was to insure union democracy. 37 It then declared that union democracy could
only occur if effective challenges could be made to the union leadership and
that measures that would operate to inhibit insurgents must be carefully
scrutinized." As a result, the union outsider rule was held to violate the
LMRDA's guarantee of free speech and to fly in the face of Congress's intent
to insure union democracy. 39
In support of its conclusion that the union provision inhibited union
democracy, thereby violating rights of free speech, the court analogized to the
contribution limits in federal elections. 4° The court cited Buckley v. Valeo4 t in
which the Supreme Court recognized the significant connection between finan-
cial support and political speech. 42 In the court's view, the LMRDA's
guarantee of free speech limits a union much as the first amendment limits
Congress in the restrictions that can be placed on campaign ,finance, except
that the LMRDA does not require state action. 43 Relying on Buckley and the
legislative history of the LMRDA, the court concluded that the union's out-
sider rule could operate to prevent candidates from obtaining the resources
necessary for effective advocacy."
Although the court recognized that a union has a legitimate interest in
protecting its internal affairs from nefarious influences, it ruled that this in-
terest could not be used to justify a rule prohibiting a candidate from receiving
any contributions or loans from non-members. 45 Hence, the court found that
the union provision was not permissible under the section 101(a)(2) proviso
which allows "reasonable" rules to protect unions as institutions." The court
reasoned that nothing would inhibit union democracy more than to prohibit in-
surgent candidates from receiving financial support from outside sources that
are not prohibited by statute. 47
The court asserted that its view that the outsider rule violated section
101(a)(2) was supported by the implicit intent of section 401(g) of the
LMRDAla and the legislative history of that section." It was noted that in sec-
tion 401(g), Congress dealt with the subject of financial support to union can-
didates in a comprehensive manner. 5° That section, however, only prohibits
candidates from financing their campaigns with money collected as employer
" Id.
38 Id. at 1121-22, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947.
39 Id. at 1122, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947.
40 Id.
" 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42 645 F.2d at 1122, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947.
43 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947-48.
44 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2948.
45 Id. at 1123, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2948.
46 Id. at 1123-24, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2948-49.
47 Id. at 1123, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2948.
48 29 U.S.C. S 481(g) (1976).
49 645 F.2d at 1124, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2949.
5° Id.
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contributions, union dues, assessments or similar levies. 51
 Acknowledging the
widespread corruption in unions discovered by the Select Senate Committee
prior to the LMRDA's enactment, the court concluded that it was likely that
when Congress outlawed only union and employer contributions, it intended
to permit outside support from legitimate sources to enable a candidate to have
a realistic opportunity to challenge union incumbents." Although admitting
that Congress may not have intended to completely preempt the area of cam-
paign support, the court determined that it was highly unreasonable to expect
that Congress intended to allow an absolute prohibition of outside support."
Unable to find any justification for the amendment's restriction on free speech,
the court held that the outsider rule was completely invalid. 54
The Sadlowski decision is significant because it expands the scope of the
right to sue provision of the LMRDA. All of the previous cases dealt with the
provision as a prohibition of union discipline of a member for bringing suit."
The Sadlowski court was the first court confronted with the issue of whether a
union provision limiting the means which could be used to obtain an attorney's
services was a limitation of the right to sue in violation of section 101(a)(4) of
the LMRDA. Although the court did not explain its reason(s) for holding that
a limitation of the sources of support which could be used in retaining an at-
torney was a violation of the right to sue provision," the decision is an ap-
propriate application of that provision. The average person cannot adequately
assert his rights in court because he does not know the intricacies of the legal
system as an attorney does. Thus, by limiting the means of obtaining represen-
tation, the union was, in effect, limiting the union member's right to sue.
The Sadlowski court was on more established ground when it expressed its
concern over the union's interpretation of the outsider rule as giving the union
the power to determine if suits brought by candidates were bona fide and not
designed to extract political benefit." Such a determination could result in
union discipline of a member for pursuing litigation." The courts have con-
sistently held that union discipline of a member for bringing suit is a violation
of the right to sue provision."
The Sadlowski court also found that the union outsider rule violated the
LMRDA's guarantee of free speech. 6° This decision is significant because of
the broad interpretation given to the free speech provision by the court. This
was the first major court decision interpreting the LMRDA's guarantee of free
5
32 Id.
" Id. at 1125, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2949.
54 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2950.
" See notes 4-5 supra.
56 See 645 F,2d at 1117, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2943-44.
57 Id. at 1119, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2945.
38 See id. at 1118, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944.
59 See note 5 supra.
6° 645 F.2d at 1125, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2950.
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speech as including the right of free association. 6 ' Furthermore, the court held
that this freedom of association applied to the receipt of monetary contribu-
tions. 62
The court's assertion that the LMRDA `s guarantee of free speech was
patterned after the first amendment of the Constitution and should similarly
include the freedom of association 63 is supported by the legislative history of the
LMRDA." Further support can be found in the Fifth Circuit's observation in
Airline Maintenance Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk65 that the courts have looked upon the
free speech provision of the LMRDA as a codification of some of our most
basic liberties and that the substantive rights of the LMRDA have been broad-
ly construed. 66
While the court's application of the freedom of association to a union can-
didate's right to receive contributions from non-members is not at first glance
required by the LMRDA, this interpretation is supported by Congress's intent
in enacting the LMRDA. The Supreme Court has declared that in enacting
the LMRDA, "Congress emphatically asserted a vital public interest in assur-
ing free and democratic elections that transcends the narrower interest of the
complaining union member." 67 The legislative history demonstrates that one
of the principal purposes of the LMRDA was to insure union democracy." As
the Sadlowski court acknowledged, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo69 has
already recognized that the first amendment's guarantee of free speech protects
61 See id. at 1121, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2946-47. The only other court to decide that the
freedom of association is a part of the LMRDA's guarantee of free speech is the District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Ostrowski v. Utility Workers Local 1-2, 104 L.R.R.M.
2343, 2350 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
62 See 645 F.2d at 1122, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2947-48.
63 Id. at 1120-21, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2946-47.
64 Several comments made during the congressional debates on the LMRDA support
the view that the Act was modeled after constitutional provisions. For example, Representative
Griffith stated that, "Nhese basic guarantees are hardly new or novel — they are the essential
and fundamental rights which every American citizen is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the
Federal Constitution." 105 CONG. REC. 15530 (1959). In addition, Senator McClellan declared
that Congress should make those inherent constitutional rights apply to union membership as
well as to other affairs of life. Id. at 6476 (1959).
The legislative history also supports the conclusion that Congress intended the freedom of
association to be read into the LMRDA's guarantee of free speech. The clearest example of this
intention was made in a statement by Senator McClellan:
Out basic labor policy is grounded in freedom of choice. In it we sought to
make effective full freedom of association, with the right assured to associate or not
to associate, to participate in collective action, or not to participate, according to
the free decision of each individual for himself, without either restraint or coercion
from any source. .. .
Id. at 6472 (1959).
65 444 F.2d 719, 77 L.R.R.M. 2721 (5th Cir. 1971).
66 Id. at 723, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2724.
67 Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 436, 475 (1968) (cited in Local
3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977)).
68 See S. REP. NO. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959); H.R. REP. NO. 741, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
69 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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political expression and political association. 7 ° The first amendment thus im-
poses limits on the restrictions Congress can impose on campaign contribu-
tions." Therefore, the court was correct in extending the freedom of associa-
tion implicit in the LMRDA's guarantee of free speech to limit the restrictions
a union can place on campaign contributions.
Further support for the Sadlowski court's finding that the outsider rule is
violative of the LMRDA can be found in Hall v. Cole. 72 In Hall, the Supreme
Court stated that sections 101-105 of the LMRDA were specifically designed to
promote the full and active participation of the rank and file in the affairs of the
union." The Court held that the rights embodied in these sections were
deemed vital to the independence of the membership and the effective and fair
operation of the union as the representative of its membership. 74 Were the out-
sider rule to remain operative, "full and active participation of the rank and
file in the affairs of the union," as mandated by the Hall Court, would be un-
duly inhibited. The Hall decision also lends support to the Sadlowski court's
declaration that the union outsider rule does not fall within section 101(a)(2)'s
proviso, which allows unions to enact reasonable rules concerning the respon-
sibility of union members toward the organization as an institution," because
the outsider rule in Sadlowski would unduly inhibit an area of union democracy
— that of elections.
In addition, the Sadlowski court asserted that section 401(g) of the
LMRDA supported its conclusion that the free speech provision prohibits a
complete ban of outside contributions to union candidates. 76 The court noted
that when Congress outlawed only union and employer contributions to cam-
paigns in section 401(g), it intended to permit candidates for union office to ob-
tain outside financial support from legitimate sources." This interpretation is
consistent with the Supreme Court decision of Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of
America." In Trbovich, the Supreme Court recognized that after Congress had
conferred substantial power on labor unions, it became concerned that union
leaders would abuse that power. 79 The Court further observed that Congress
realized that the principle of union democracy was one of the most important
safeguards against such abuse, and as a result, Congress included a com-
prehensive scheme for the regulation of union elections in the LMRDA. 9° This
observation supports the view that Congress intended to limit only those areas
it covered by statute.
7° Id. at 15.
7 ' Id. at 21.
72 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
" Id. at 7-8.
74 Id.
75 645 F.2d at 1123-24, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2948-49.
76 Id. at 1124, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2949.
77 Id.
78 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
79 Id. at 530.
80 Id.
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Under Sadlowski, then, an absolute ban on outside contributions to the
campaign of a candidate for union office violates both the right to sue and free
speech provisions of the LMRDA. What the Sadlowski decision leaves unde-
cided is what restrictions, if any, a union could "reasonably" impose on the
sources of a union candidate's campaign contributions. The court emphasized
that this particular union rule was an ''absolute" prohibition of "all" outsider
contributions implying, perhaps, that more narrow restrictions might not
iolate the LMRDA." It is also uncertain if other courts will adopt the
Sadlowski court's expansive interpretation of the LMRDA's right to sue and
free speech provisions.
V. APPEALS FROM NLRB ORDERS
A. Parties Must be "Aggrieved": Liquor Salesmen's Union v. NLRB,
and Amalgamated Transit Union v. NLRB*
The National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) provides that persons ag-
grieved by decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), may ob-
tain judicial review in the United States courts of appeals.' Section 10(f) of the
NLRA further restricts the choice of forum to the circuit in which the unfair
labor practice was alleged to have taken place, the circuit in which the person
aggrieved either resides or transacts•business, or the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia.' When an appeal is filed in more than one circuit, the
record will be consolidated for review in the court of first filing. 4 Although that
court may subsequently transfer the case to another circuit "for the conve-
SL See 645 F.2d at 1117, 1123, 1124, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2944, 2948, 2949.
* By Thomas P. Dale, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
29 U.S.C. $ 151-168 (1976).
2 Section 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 160(f) (1976).
3 Id. Section 10(f) provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
' or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States
court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was
alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by
filing in such a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be
modified or set aside.
Id.
4 28 U.S.C. $ 2112(a) (1976). Id. The relevant portion of 5 2112(a) provides:
If proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect to
the same order the agency, board, commission, or officer concerned shall file the
record in that one of such courts in which a proceeding with respect to such order
was first instituted. The other courts in which proceedings are pending shall
thereupon transfer them to the court of appeals in which the record has been filed.
For the convenience of the parties and in the interest of justice such court may thereafter
transfer all the proceedings with respect to such order to any other court of ap-
peals. (emphasis added)
Id.
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nience of the parties and in the interest of justice," 5 it has become more com-
mon for the court simply to keep the case for review. 6
This practice has placed great emphasis on the first-to-file rule as the
determinative factor in selecting a proper forum for review.' Naturally, this ap-
proach has resulted in races to the courthouse between parties seeking to con-
trol the choice of forum, even when one party has received all the relief it re-
quested from the NLRB and, consequently, is not an "aggrieved person" en-
titled to seek review. 8 In response, the courts of appeals have begun to exercise
their discretion more often in selecting a proper forum in an effort to
discourage this practice known as "forum shopping." 9 As these cases have
shown, factors to be considered in selecting a proper forum are the location of
the parties and their counsel, whether the case has an impact largely on one
region, whether one circuit is more familiar with the parties and the issues in-
volved in the case, and whether there is only one party that has been "ag-
grieved" by the outcome of the proceedings below."'
During the Survey year, the definition of a party "aggrieved" was clarified
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its review of ap-
peals filed in two cases by parties who had received substantially all the relief
that they requested from the NLRB." The court, in a single opinion, granted
motions to transfer the cases because it found that the parties first to file were
not "genuinely aggrieved" by the NLRB's decisions.' 2 The court held that in
order for a party's appeal to be considered that party must be adversely af-
fected by a significant part of the action taken by the NLRB.' 3 The court's
decision curtails the practice of forum shopping in instances where it is ap-
parent from the pleadings that a party's claims for relief from the Board's order
are insubstantial."
The first of the two cases, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 15
involved an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Amalgamated Transit
Sec note 4 supra.
Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB, 106 L.R.R.M. 2953, 2956 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
7 Id. As the court noted: It is a commonly held belief among members of the bar that
the courts of appeals have read into 2112(a) a rebuttable presumption that the court of first fil-
ing will also decide the case." Id.
8 Id.
9
 Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607, slip op. at 14 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 4, 1980); United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693, 696-98 (3d Cir.
1979); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 970 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'° United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977); American Pub. Gas Ass'n
v. FPC, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" There were four petitions stemming from two separate NLRB orders. The court con-
solidated three of the petitions into a single proceeding. Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v.
NLRB, 106 L.R.R. M. at 2954.
" Id. at 2960.
13 Id .
14 Id. at 2959; see text at notes 58-60 infra.
15
 Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB, 106 L.R.R.M. 2953 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Union against Bayshore Transit Management, Inc., alleging Bayshore's
failure to bargain with the union's certified representative." In proceedings
before the NLRB, the union filed a motion for summary judgment and re-
quested that the NLRB order Bayshore to cease its unfair labor practice and to
bargain with the union representatives.' 7 The General Counsel for the NLRB
filed an identical motion requesting the same relief." The NLRB granted the
General Counsel's motion and issued an order granting all the relief that the
General Counsel and the union had requested."
The union, nevertheless, filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals." Bayshore, filing later, sought review in the Ninth Circuit,
where the unfair labor practice was alleged to have taken place." Since the
union was first to file, the NLRB sent the record of the proceedings to the D.C.
Circuit." Bayshore subsequently filed a motion to have the case transferred to
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the union was not in any way aggrieved by the
NLRB's order, since it had received all the relief requested. 23 The union
countered` that the NLRB's failure to address specifically its motion for sum-
mary judgment was a denial of due process, which left it aggrieved by the
Board's order."
The D.C. Circuit viewed the union's argument as a poor disguise for the
union's desire to control the choice of forum. 25 Noting that the union had failed
to request any additional relief which the NLRB or the courts could award, the
court observed that the union was, at best, technically aggrieved by the NLRB
order. 26 The court further noted that, lacking a showing of "adverse effect in
fact," the union had failed to prove that it was genuinely aggrieved by the
Board's order. 27 Thus, it concluded that the union's petition for review was en-
titled to no weight," and it transferred the case to the Ninth Circuit. 29
The second case, Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB," dealt with an
16 Id. at 2954-55.





22 Id.; see note 4 supra.
" Id.
' Id. at 2957-58.
" Id. at 2958.
26 Id.
22 Id. at 2958 n.8. The court remarked:
One has standing to appeal an order of the Board within the meaning of S 10(f) if
there is demonstrated an "adverse effect in fact" on the petitioner. The refusal to
rule specifically on Local 1309's motion for summary judgment arguably does not
even amount to technical aggrievement as it is not clear how Local 1309 is adverse-
ly affected by such refusal.
Id.
" Id. at 2958.
" Id.
3°
 Id, at 2953.
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appeal from an NLRB order requiring several employers to cancel a unilateral
change they had effected in the working conditions of their union employees."
The Board's order, while granting all the relief requested by the union," had
left undisturbed a prior finding made by an administrative law judge, that the
union was not entitled to attorney's fees. 33 The union filed an appeal first in the
D.C. Circuit. It alleged that the failure to award attorney's fees left it "ag-
grieved" by the Board's order. 34 The employers, in contrast, sought review in
the Second Circuit, 35 and argued that the union had no right to file because it
was not "aggrieved" by the Board's order. 36 The matter was consolidated in
the D.C. Circuit.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit noted that each and every part of the
NLRB's order was directed against the employers. 37 It pointed out that an
award of attorney's fees, although routinely requested in matters brought
before the NLRB, was only granted in those few cases where the employer's
defenses are clearly without merit." Moreover, since the claim for attorney's
fees was ancillary to the underlying dispute between employer and union, the
court concluded that a denial of that claim was not enough to render the union
"genuinely aggrieved" by the Board's order." Therefore, the union's forum
preference was disregarded" and the matter was transferred to the Second Cir-
cuit for review.. 41
The approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit in these cases reflects its deter-
mination to discourage the race to the courthouse between parties seeking
review of an NLRB decision in cases where only one of the parties has been
"genuinely aggrieved." The court reiterated the view it had taken in prior
cases by ruling that section 10(f) of the NLRA, 42
 which allows an aggrieved
party to file an appeal in the D.C. Circuit, was intended to provide an option to
the losing party that was not open to the NLRB." The court contended that
31






" Id. at 2959.
38
 Id. The NLRB will grant attorney's fees only when there is "clearly aggravated and
pervasive misconduct" or where the defenses are "palpably without merit." International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1250, 73 L.R. R.M.
2870, 2874 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
39
 106 L.R.R.M. at 2959.
4° Id.
4 ' Id. at 2960.
42 29 U.S.C. 5 160(1) (1976); see note 3 ROM.
43 The court remarked:
Congress, in enacting 5 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 160(f) (1976), "place[d] this
court on a par with the courts of appeals for the circuits in which the alleged unfair
labor practices occurred." International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979). This is in contrast to 5 10(e) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 160(e) (1976), which authorizes the Board to seek enforcement of
its order only in the circuit in which the unfair labor practice allegedly took place,
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this congressional intent to aid the losing party would not be served by allowing
the choice of forum to be open to a party who had prevailed before the Board."
For this reason, the court's approach restricts the right to appeal available
under section 10(f) to a party "genuinely aggrieved" ; 4 5 one that has suffered
an "adverse effect in fact" from a significant part of the NLRB's action
relating to the underlying dispute between the parties." Where, as in
Amalgamated Transit, the claimed aggrievement is harmless error,'" the party
will not have suffered an adverse effect in fact. Similarly, as the Liquor
Salesmen's case demonstrates, when the source of aggrievement is only ancillary
to the dispute, the party will not be entitled to the status of one genuinely ag-
grieved by the Board's disposition of the case." The court's decision thus
clarifies factors which will determine when a party is not "genuinely
aggrieved" and therefore not entitled to file a petition for review under section
10(f ) of the NLRA.
The court also emphasized that it regards section 2112(a), 49 which pro-
vides for consolidation of the case in the court of first filing, as merely an expe-
dient means of choosing which court will determine venue, not a means of pick-
ing the court that will ultimately hear the case. 5° This is not the first occasion
on which the D.C. Circuit has held that the choice of venue is left to the discre-
tion of the court of first filing." Yet, in its opinion, the court also expressly
adopted the view that this discretion is limited by a statutory presumption in
favor of the court of first filing." This view is in accord with the position it has
taken in prior cases that, subject to certain exceptions, the filing of the first
petition should determine venue." The court's opinion, therefore, indicates a
continued reluctance to exercise discretion to insure that "the interest of
or in which the respondent resides or transacts business. "By not eliminating, but
expressly acknowledging, the District of Columbia as an alternative forum, the ap-
parent aim of Congress is to ease the situation of a losing party desiring review. It
affords the losing party a choice denied the Board when it proceeds under section
10(e)." Ball v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 1962), quoted in International
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 610 F.2d at 962 n.49. This respect due
an aggrieved party who chooses to file in this court emanates from the congres-
sional desire to assist the losing party. No such respect is due a person who has
substantially prevailed before the Board.
106 L.R.R.M. at 2956 (footnote omitted).
" Id.; see note 49 infra.
" Id.
46
 Id. at 2958 n.8, 2960.
47 Id. at 2958.
48 Id. at 2959.
49 28 U.S.C. 2112(a) (1976); see note 4 supra.
" The court asserted: It must be emphasized that § 2112(a) is a mechanical device to determine
which court will determine venue, not which court will ultimately hear the case. Transfer is entirely discre-
tionary with the court of first filing." 106 L.R.R.M. at 2956 (emphasis in original).
" See, e.g., International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB,
610 F.2d 956, 102 L.R.R.M. 2455 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Public Service Comm' n v. FPC, 472 F.2d
1270 (D.C. Cir. 1972); UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671, 64 L.R.R.M. 2225 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
52 106 L.R.R.M. at 2957 n.6.
53 See, e.g., Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 472 F.2d at 1273; UAW v. NLRB, 373
F.2d at 674, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2226-27.
224	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 1V01. 23:82
justice," and not the race to the courthouse, will be the primary factor govern-
ing the selection of the proper forum when both parties are entitled to review....
Another significant feature of the court's decision in these cases is that it
applies the standard for determining when a party is not genuinely aggrieved in
a manner which carefully restricts its use to cases in which it is obvious that one
of the parties is not entitled to petition for review . 54 Indeed, the court specifical-
ly disclaimed any intention to look beyond the pleadings in making this deter-
mination. 55 Thus, only where the deficiencies in the pleadings reveal that the
party has not actually suffered from a significant aspect of the Board's action
will the court disregard the petition for review." This approach would seem to
be a sufficient safeguard against allowing the right to file an appeal to be deter-
mined with regard to the merits of the controversy. On this same point, the
court also emphatically rejected any suggestion that the comparative aggrieve-
ment of the parties should be considered in determining whether they may ap-
ply for review." Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the interest of
justice is better served when the party less aggrieved is denied the right to file an
appeal. Neither is there any support for such a denial in the language of the
venue provision, section 2112(a), 58 or in section 10(f) of the NLRA. 59 It is like-
ly, therefore, that the court's observation on this point will be persuasive in
leading other circuits to distinguish more carefully between cases in which only
one party is genuinely aggrieved, and those in which both parties, although not
equally aggrieved, are equally entitled to petition for review.
At the same time, it is, perhaps, regrettable that the court's decision sup-
ports the notion that section 2112(a) creates a rebuttable presumption that the
case will be heard by the court of first filing. On its face, this decision purports
to encourage the use of judicial discretion, rather than a mechanical applica-
tion of the first-to-file rule, in the selection of a proper forum." Yet, its support
for a presumption in favor of the court of first filing seems to suggest a more
limited role for the rather generalized guidelines which have developed on how
that discretion is to be exercised. 8 ' The probable result is that courts will con-
tinue to rely on the outcome of a race between the parties, rather than on their
discretionary authority in selecting a forum. From a practical viewpoint this is
particularly disturbing. As the race to file an appeal becomes increasingly more
important, it consequently provides an even greater incentive for parties to file
frivolous appeals. In addition, in those cases where it appears likely from the
pleadings that both parties are genuinely aggrieved, the first-to-file rule may
" 106 L.R.R.M. at 2959.
55 Id.
56 Id.
" Id. at 2957.
58 See note 4 supra.
59
 See note 3 supra.
'° 106 L.R.R.M. at 2957.
81 See text and notes at notes 49-55 supra.
December 19811	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 225
continue to play an inordinately important role in determining the choice of
forum.
In sum, the court's decisions in these cases sets limits on the meaning of a
"party aggrieved" by an NLRB order for purposes of appeal under section
1 0(f ) of the NLRA. 62 Where a party has not sufferred an adverse effect in fact
from a significant part of the Board's action," or where the harm claimed does
not relate to the Board's disposition of the underlying dispute between
employer and union, the party is not "genuinely aggrieved. "54 The court's ap-
proach also limits the inquiry to deficiencies in the pleadings 65 and does not
allow for a comparison of the aggrievement of the parties." In effect, by help-
ing to define who is entitled to seek review, the decision also represents a step
toward eliminating the practice of forum-shopping for review of NLRB orders.
It remains to be seen whether the courts will more fully develop criteria for
selecting a proper forum, or whether they will remain dependent on the first-to-
file rule in all but the most egregious cases of forum-shopping.
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. Contractual Waiver of Federal Action in Favor of Arbitration:
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.*
Collective bargaining agreements now frequently provide for the private
resolution of disputes over their terms,' with the goal of minimizing costly
litigation and its related problems. 2 The National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) itself endorses such private resolution, stating that the adjustment of
disputes by the parties themselves is "desirable." 3 Nevertheless, there may be
limits to this desirability. During the Survey year, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc. , 4 the United States Supreme Court for the second time' con-
sidered whether an employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement
which calls for the private resolution of a claim based on a right protected by
62 See text and notes at notes 11-13 supra.
65 Sec text at notes 25-29 supra.
64 See text at notes 37-41 supra.
65 See text at notes 54-56 supra.
66 See text at notes 57-59 supra.
By Thomas L. Barrette, Jr., Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' See F. ELKOURI AND E. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS, 7 (3d ed. 1973).
See id. at 8-10.
29 U.S.C. $ 173(d) (1976). The statute provides, in pertinent part: "Final adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settle-
ment of grievance disputes . . ." Id.
4 101 S.Ct. 1437 (1981).
s The Court's first consideration of the issue was in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1974).
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both federal statute and the agreement, loses the right to have that claim heard
by a federal court . 6
In the earlier case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,' the Court held
unanimously that by submitting a claim of racial discrimination for private
resolution, pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement , 8 an
employee was not thereby barred from bringing suit under Title VII.°
In Gardner-Denver, a black employee filed a grievance under his union's
collective bargaining agreement, alleging that his discharge was based on racial
discrimination.'° After failing to prevail under that procedure," the employee
brought a civil action in federal court, alleging a violation of his rights under
the federal statute prohibiting racially discriminatory employment practices. 12
The claim presented the issue of what effect the employee's agreement to use
private methods of dispute resolution had on his right to a trial under the
federal statute."
The Court approached the problem by considering first the statute's
legislative history.I 4 It determined that Congress did not intend Title VII to
supplant other methods of resisting employment discrimination." This deter-
mination led the Court to find a "clear inference" that the statute also did not
require an individual to forfeit his private cause of action under it because he
had pursued a grievance procedure." The Court emphasized that the two pro-
cedures, arbitration and civil suit, were complementary." Whereas arbitration
vindicated a contractual right," a lawsuit vindicated independent statutory
rights." In addition, the Court found that the employee had not prospectively
waived his statutory cause of action, either by agreeing to the terms of the con-
tract, 20 or by submitting to the arbitration procedure." The Court reasoned
that there could have been no prospective waiver of the statutory right by
agreeing to the collective bargaining contract, 22 because the statute concerned
individual rights unrelated to collective activity. These individual rights,
therefore, could not be subject to collective bargaining." The Court found that
6 See 101 S.Ct. at 1439.
▪ 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
o Id. at 37, 48-49.
9 Id. at 48-49.
'° Id. at 38-39.
ti Id.
12 Id. at 43; see 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
" 415 U.S. at 38.
14 Id. at 48 &1-1.9.
Id.
16 Id. at 49.
' 7 Id, at 50.
18 Id. at 49.
' 9 Id. at 49-50.
20 Id. at 51.
21 Id. at 52.
22 Id. at 51-52.
23 Id. at 51.
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the employee's actual submission to the grievance procedure was not a waiver
of his statutory rights," because that would mean he had been required to con-
cede statutory rights to exercise contractual rights which were supposed to exist
without reference to the statutory rights. 25 Finally, the Court found that ar-
bitration was an inappropriate forum for the final resolution of the employee's
rights under the statute. 28 It was unwilling to entrust the statutory issue to an
arbitrator for a number of reasons. The Court observed first that the role of the
arbitrator was to enforce the terms of the agreement, not the statute, 27 and that
arbitrators generally were expert in industrial relations, rather than the resolu-
tion of statutory issues. 28 In addition, theCourt stressed that the fact-finding
process in arbitration was not up to judicial standards; in arbitration there are
no rules of evidence, and basic rights and procedures such as discovery and
cross-examination are unavailable. 29
Thus, the Court held that an employee's submission to the private
grievance procedure to protect his contractual right against discrimination did
not bar a suit in federal court to protect a similar statutory right. In so holding,
the Court relied on . the following three factors: congressional intent to en-
courage private enforcement of rights under the statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion by employers; the individual — rather than contractual — nature of those
rights; and the inadequacy of the arbitral forum to decide issues concerning
those rights."
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue
whether an employee who uses a procedure under a collective bargaining
agreement to vindicate a right protected by both the agreement and a federal
statute loses the right to bring a suit based on the statutory right in court. The
narrow issue in that case, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 31 was
whether employees who had unsuccessfully brought wage claims under a
grievance procedure set out in their collectively bargained agreement could
also bring an action in court for violations of the minimum wage provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 32 In Barrentine, the Court followed
Gardner-Denver and held that a claim based on the minimum wage statutes" was
not barred by the claimant's prior submission of the issue to a contractual
dispute resolution procedure." This result made it clear that the general
24 Id. at 52.
" Id.
26 Id. at 56-58.
27 Id. at 56-57.
29 Id. at 57.
29 Id. at 57-58.
39 Id. at 48-49.
31 101 S.Ct. 1439 (1981).
32 29 U.S.C. SS 206(a), 254 (1976).
33 Id. at 1439.
3+ Id. at 1447.
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reasoning of Gardner-Denver's applied to cases involving statutes on subjects
other than racial discrimination."
The plaintiffs were truck drivers employed by Arkansas-Best," who alleged
that they were entitled to compensation under federal minimum wage laws for
certain tasks which their employer required them to perform. 38 Before begin-
ning a drive, the drivers were required to conduct a pre-trip safety inspection."
If the truck failed the inspection, the drivers were required to make a fifteen- to
thirty-minute drive to the Arkansas-Best repair facility." Although the drivers
were compensated for time spent waiting for their trucks to be repaired, they
were not compensated for the drive to the repair facility.'" Accordingly, one
subject of the drivers' claim for compensation was the time spent driving to the
repair facility. 42 As to trucks which passed the inspection, the drivers' claim
related to the time taken to inspect, for which they also were unpaid. 43 The
drivers alleged that according to the terms of their collective bargaining agree-
ment with Arkansas-Best," they should have been compensated for the time in
question. 45 To pursue their claim, the drivers submitted it to a joint grievance
committee for a final decision, as provided for in the collective bargaining
agreement. 46 The joint committee, comprised of three union representatives
and three representatives of the employer, considered the claim and rejected it
without explanation.'" The drivers then brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging inter alia that the
time spent inspecting the truck and/or driving it to the repair facility was com-
pensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 48 The district court did not ad-
dress the drivers' FLSA claim,'" concentrating instead on the drivers' alter-
native allegation that the grievance process itself was unfair." Nevertheless,
35 See text and'notes at notes 14-30 supra for a discussion of the Court's reasoning in
Gardner-Denver.
36 But see 101 S.Ct. at 1449 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (arguing that Gardner-Denver
should be limited to statutes prohibiting racial discrimination).
" Id. at 1439.
36 Id. at 1440. Section 6(a) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 5 206(a) (1976), which was in effect
when the employees' complaint arose, 101 S.Ct. at 1440, required employers to pay minimum
wages to their employees. Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. S 216(b) (1976), states that an
employer who violates the minimum wage laws is liable to the employee or employees affected.
Thus, any employee who receives a sub-minimum wage may bring a private action to enforce the
federal minimum wage laws. See 101 S.Ct. at 1444; Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neill, 324 U.S.
697 (1944).




" Id. at 1440.
44 Id. at 1439-40.
45 Id. at 1440.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. See also note 38 supra.
49 Id. at 1441.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194, 1199, 103 L.R.R.M.
2732, 2736 (8th Cir. 1980). The district court opinion in Barrentine was unreported, but the
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the court's references to federal statutes which encourage the settlement of
disputes by a method agreed on by the parties" implied that the court believed
the grievance committee's decision operated as a bar to further wage claims."
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in affirming the district court's
decision," did address the drivers' FLSA claim." The circuit court found that
FLSA wage disputes could be decided by binding arbitration," if employees
submitted to the procedure voluntarily. 56 It concluded, therefore, that the
Arkansas-Best drivers were barred from asserting their FLSA claim in federal
court."
In rejecting the Eighth Circuit's argument, the Supreme Court held that
an employee's submission of his or her wage claim to a private grievance pro-
cedure did not bar a suit based on wage claims under the FLSA. 58 The Court
first observed a tension between the national labor policy in favor of collective
bargaining between employers and unions, and statutes guaranteeing in-
dividual employees specific substantive rights." The Court determined that
courts should not disturb results reached through arbitration when the
employee's claim is based on rights derived solely from a collectively bargained
agreement. It reasoned that Congress had expressly endorsed the desirability of
having the parties themselves settle disputes over collectively bargained
agreements. 6° In contrast, the Court also found that courts may disturb such
results when considering rights derived from a statute providing substantive
guarantees to individual workers." The Court asserted that "different con-
siderations" were involved in such cases." To delineate these considerations,
the Supreme Court described its decision in Gardner-Denver. 63 That case, it
found, had emphasized that the federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
employers granted a right separate and distinct from rights granted "through
majoritarian processes of collective bargaining."" Gardner-Denver had also con-
cluded, according to the Barrentine Court, that since Congress had allowed
employees asserting discrimination claims access to the courts and since ar-
bitration was an inadequate forum in which to adjudicate those claims, the
claims should be considered de novo. 65 Having set out in this fashion the major
Eighth Circuit provided a good summary of the lower court's decision in its own consideration of
the case.
" See 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (1976).
52
 615 F,2d at 1199, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2736.
" Id. at 1199.1200, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2736-37.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1199, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2736.
56 Id.
" Id. at 1199-1200, 103 L.R.R.M. at 2736-37.
58 101 S.Ct. at 1447.
59 Id. at 1441.





55 Id. at 1443.
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points of its decision in Gardner-Denver, the Court then rejected an attempt by
Arkansas-Best to distinguish Barrentine. from Gardner-Denver. 66 Arkansas-Best
had argued that Barren tine, unlike Gardner-Denver, was merely a wage and hours
dispute, well-suited to arbitration. 67 In response to Arkansas-Best's conten-
tion, the Court observed that the major issues of the drivers' claim involved
compensability under the FLSA, a question of statutory interpretation."
After identifying Gardner-Denver as controlling precedent, the Court then
proceeded with an analysis which echoed that which it had employed in its
earlier decision. 69 The Court began its discussion by emphasizing that the
FLSA was designed to protect "individual" workers." The Court noted that
workers' rights under the FLSA had often been held to be non-waivable," and
to take precedence over conflicting provisions in collectively bargained
agreements." It also stressed that the statutory scheme of the FLSA gave in-
dividuals broad access to the courts. 73 Having emphasized the individual and
non-waivable nature of FLSA rights, as well as the statutory scheme to enforce
these rights through private suits, the Court then considered the appropriate
forum issue. The Court stated that the union represented employees at arbitra-
tion74 and that its interest in benefiting all union members might Iead it to
sacrifice an individual employee's statutory rights to gain a benefit for the unit
as a whole." It also pointed out that arbitrators may be limited in their ability
to understand the complex issues of fact and law presented by most FLSA
claims." Even if they had this ability, the Court remarked, they would have no
authority to invoke statutes beyond that authority which might be given them
under the collective bargaining agreement.'" Finally, the Court concluded that
arbitrators would usually be powerless because arbitrators typically would be
limited by the wage compensation terms of the agreement, to award the li-
quidated damages, attorney's fees and costs which the FLSA permits" a court
to award." The Supreme Court's rationale in Barrentine, was therefore three-
fold. It found first that FLSA rights existed for individual workers, indepen-
dent of the collective bargaining process." It then considered two factors: the
66 Id.
67 Id.
66 Id, at 1443-44 n.13.
69
 See text and notes at notes 63-65 supra.
'° 101 S.Ct. at 1444.
71 Id. at 1444-45.
" Id. at 1445.
73 Id. at 1444.
74 Id. at 1445-46.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1446.
" Id.
76 29 U.S.C. S 216(b) (1976). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "[a]ny employer
who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee
or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid wages, or their unpaid overtime compensa-
tion, as the case may be, and in an additional amount as liquidated damages." Id.
" 101 S.Ct. at 1447.
86 Id.
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congressional intent to give employees the right to bring wage claims under the
FLSA in federal court, 8 ' and the forum where those rights would best be pro-
tected. 82 In addition to its basic finding that FLSA rights are for individuals,
the Court found that Congress had intended those rights to be protected by
private actions in court and that arbitration was an inadequate substitute for
those actions." Based on these findings, the court held that, in submitting a
claim based on collectively bargained rights to a grievance procedure, the
drivers were not thereby barred from seeking further relief in federal court."
The dissenting opinion agreed that the FLSA had created a non-waivable
employee right to minimum wages," and that it also had created a right to a
private cause of action to enforce that right." It found, however, that the ques-
tion of the validity of an agreement under which the right to a federal action
would be waived in favor of private arbitration," was totally different from the
question of whether the right to a federal court forum existed." The dissent
argued that the issue of whether a statutory right could be waived depended on
the intent of Congress in drafting the statute." It then pointed out that the
employees in Barrentine had offered no legislative history to show that the FLSA
right to bring an action in federal court was not waivable." The dissent went
on to state a number of policy reasons for encouraging arbitration in resolving
labor disputes. 8 ' It distinguished Gardner-Denver as a case involving the fun-
damental right to have a workplace free from discrimination," which right
should not be subject to any waiver by a collective bargaining agreement." To
support this point further, the dissent observed that unions themselves had a
history of discrimination" and that arbitrators had little experience with
policies against discrimination." The FLSA, in contrast, arose from a very dif-
ferent legal and historical context." Unions, the dissent asserted, were nearly
always allied with individual employees on the issue of wage claims, thus mak-
ing it a "rare" possibility that the union would fail to protect a member's in-
terests in a wage dispute." Furthermore, in the dissenting judge's opinion, the












92 Id. at 1449.
93 Id.
94 Id.




232	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
factors relevant to the "compensable time" issue under the minimum wage
laws," the dissent labled the instant controversy an "elementary wage
dispute. '"°° The dissent concluded its discussion with a general call for the in-
creased use of extra-judicial means of dispute resolution.'°'
Despite the dissent's criticism, the Barrentine Court's decision to use the
principles of Gardner-Denver in a case involving the rights arising under the
FLSA was correct. The reasons which the Gardner-Denver Court used to support
its decision were not in any way dependent on the anti-employment
discrimination subject matter of the statute in question in that case. The Court
in Gardner-Denver stressed that the statute created individual rights without
reference to the collective bargaining process, 102 that the statute's legislative
history showed a congressional intent to allow individual pursuit of the rights
which it created,'°3 and that the resolution of statutory issues was primarily
within the responsibility and expertise of courts, not arbitrators.'" The central
concerns of the Gardner-Denver Court were therefore of a general nature, quite
reasonably applicable to cases where a different statute is at issue. The
Barrentine Court demonstrated this generality by applying the first two prongs
of the Gardner-Denver analysis without difficulty. It noted that the FLSA created
individual rights because it refers to "each" employee, in contrast to the
Labor-Management Relations Act, which refers to "workers." 1 °5 The court
also found the second prong of the Gardner-Denver analysis, congressional intent
favorable to private suits, to be satisfied by the express language of the FLSA
permitting wage claims in any federal or state court.'" Indeed, the dissent ex-
pressly accepted both of these points.'" Thus, the strength of the Barrentine
decision was partly established by its logical application of two of the three
basic points in Gardner-Denver.
The Barrentine Court's discussion and application of the third basic point
in Gardner-Denver, the appropriate forum"° analysis, was less straightforward,
but in the final analysis also was reasonable. Where the Gardner-Denver Court
found the arbitral forum inadequate for the statutory construction required to
decide Title VII claims,'" the Barrentine Court emphasized that similar limits
existed for abitrators in determining the complex fact-law questions raised by
the various terms of the FLSA."° The dissent criticized this view of the
FLSA,'" finding that the determination of the "compensable time" issue was
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1451.
102 415 U.S. at 51.
103 Id. at 48.
104 Id. at 57.
105 101 S.Ct. at 1444.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1448. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
108 415 U.S. at 56.
109 Id. at 57.
110 101 S.Ct. at 1446.
1 1 Id. at 1450 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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simply one of fact. 112
 It went on to list five factors relevant to determining
whether the time at issue was compensable under the FLSA," 3 but failed to
state where those factors came from or why a fact-finding arbitrator should be
expected to make the same list. The dissent also criticized the majority's asser-
tion that unions may not represent adequately the interests of individual
employees in a wage dispute.''' Even if the dissent was correct in asserting that
a union almost always will support an employee in a wage-hour dispute,'"
however, this would not undermine the conclusion in Barrentine that the arbitral
forum is inadequate to resolve FLSA claims.' 1b
 The adequacy of the
employee's representation at arbitration was not an essential element of the
Gardner-Denver analysis on the adequacy of the arbitral forum. Finally, Barren-
tine added a significant factor to the Gardner-Denver analysis of the adequacy of
an arbitral forum. It observed that arbitrators very often do not have the
power, under a collective bargaining agreement, to grant the range of relief
which the statute authorizes a court to grant."' The dissent's assertion that ar-
bitrators have whatever powers the parties grant to them, 18 does not really
answer the majority's contention that such broad ability to grant relief is rarely
given to arbitrators. 119 Barrentine's convincing application of the Gardner-Denver
appropriate forum analysis shows it to be a reasonable application of that case.
Some questions remain, however, about the Barrentine Court's consideration of
the kind of relief an 'arbitrator can grant.
Barrentine added the factor of an arbitrator's ability to grant relief' 2° to the
Gardner-Denver analysis of the arbitral forum's adequacy. By adding this factor,
the Court raises the narrow question of whether a given arbitration procedure
would adequately protect an independent statutory right if the relief granted by
the statute and that offered by arbitration were sufficiently similar. The short
answer would appear to be "no," because the Court in Barrentine also con-
sidered factors such as an arbitrator's ability to interpret statutes"' and did not
question the concern shown in Gardner-Denver for other limitations of arbitra-
tion, such as inadequate rules of procedure and evidence.' 22 A more general
question, however, concerns the flexibility of the arbitral forum analysis used
in both Barrentine and Gardner-Denver. The Gardner-Denver analysis was couched
in terms of the specific statute in question, ' 23 but its points were very general. It








 Id. at 1447.
'" Id. See also text and notes at notes 78-79 supra.
18 Id. at 1450 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 1445.
120 Id.
' 2 ' Id. at 1446 & n.22.
122 Sec 415 U.S. at 57-58.
123 Ste id. at 56-58.
124 Id. at 57.
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observed that arbitration fact finding was not the equivalent of judicial fact
finding."6 Before Barrentine, a reasonable interpretation of Gardner-Denver was
that if a statute created a separate individual right' 26 and Congress intended
that the right be enforced in federal courts,'" then no arbitral process would be
sufficient to protect the right. Barrentine, however, casts some doubt on the ap-
parent absoluteness of the Gardner-Denver attitude toward arbitration. In
Barrentine, the Court stressed that the FLSA granted rights to individuals 129 and
that the FLSA granted those individuals broad access to the courts.' 29 The
Court, however, did not conclude summarily that Gardner-Denver required the
finding that no arbitration procedure could be adequate to determine those
rights. Instead it re-examined the issue, looking especially at the ability of ar-
bitrators to decide the relevant statutory issuesm and to grant relief commen-
surate with that offered by the statute."' Summarizing its rationale, the Court
noted that one reason for its decision was that FLSA rights were better pro-
tected in a judicial, rather than an arbitral, forum. 132 Barrentine leaves the im-
pression, then, that in some contexts an arbitral forum may be held adequate
to protect an individual right granted by a statute which accords a private cause
of action to enforce its terms.
Thus, Barrentine refines the implication in Gardner-Denver that an arbitral
forum could never be adequate for the resolution of a dispute based on a claim
under a federal statute. If the application of the statute could be determined by
simple factual analysis, and the statute offered no relief superior to that which
could be granted pursuant to the agreement, Barrentine leaves open the
possibility that an attempt to bar further action might prevail. Realistically,
however, the application of any statute requires some of the statutory inter-
pretation mentioned in Gardner-Denver'" and Barrentine. t34 In addition, the
other factors concerning the limits of arbitration procedures, such as the lack of
procedural fairness and the inadequacy of the factual record, were considered
equally important in Gardner-Denver,' 35 a view not questioned in Barrentine. It
therefore seems unlikely that a court would defer to a result reached by arbitra-
tion, even where the statute was not difficult to interpret and the arbitrator had
contractual authority to grant relief commensurate with the statute.
125 Id
126 See id. at 49-50.
127 See id. at 56.
128 101 S.Ct. at 1447.
129 id.
' 3° Id. at 1446.
131 Id. at 1447.
132 Id.
'" 415 U.S. at 57.
134 101 S.Ct. at 1446.
135 See 415 U.S. at 57-58.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SUITS
A. Timely Filing
1. Under 5 1981 of Title VII in Denial of Tenure:
Delaware State College v. Ricks*
An employer is exposed to liability for a discriminatory employment act
only when such an act is the basis of a timely charge of discrimination.'
Employment discrimination charges may arise under various statutes, in-
cluding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C.
1981 3 (§ 1981). A Title VII action must be filed within 180 days after the al-
leged unlawful employment practice occurred, 4 while the statute of limitations
under 1981 is the time period applicable to similar claims arising under state
law.' The date of the alleged discriminatory act must be ascertained to deter-
mine when the limitations period begins. 6
In most situations it is easy to ascertain what constitutes the alleged viola-
tion and when that act occurred. If the claim alleges discriminatory discharge,
the act is the discharge of the employee, and the limitations period commences
to run when the employment relationship is terminated.' A charge of
discriminatory denial of academic tenure, however, makes precise delineation
of the alleged violation and date of its occurrence more difficult. A denial of
tenure is normally the result of a series of actions. The initial step is a vote on
an individual's tenure bid by a faculty committee on tenure, often followed by
a vote of a larger group of faculty representatives. 8 This determination is then
acted upon by the college administration or board of trustees. 9 If a negative
tenure recommendation is endorsed, the individual is officially notified and of-
fered the option of remaining on the faculty for a terminal year." After the en-
dorsement of a negative recommendation, review procedures are often
* By Charles Purinton Shimer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE. LAW REVIEW.
I United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 556, 558 (1977).
2
 42 U.S.C. S 2000e (1976).
42 U.S.C.
	 1981 (1976).
• 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) (1976). The filing period is extended to 300 days where pro-
ceedings are "initially instituted" with a local or state agency with authority to grant the com-
plaint relief. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b) (1976).
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
• To present a timely action, some violation must be alleged to have occurred within
the appropriate period prior to the filing of the action. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431
U.S. at 558.
• See International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229,
234-35 (1976).
a See, e.g., Delaware State College v. Ricks, 101 S. Ct. 498, 501, 24 FEP Cas. 827, 828
(1980); Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Wagner,
Tenure and Promotion M Higher Education in Light of Washington e. Davis, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 95, 97
(1977).
9 See Wagner, supra note 8, at 97.
'" See id.
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available, and at some colleges reconsideration and an offer of tenure is possi-
ble." Finally, if reconsideration is denied; the individual terminates employ-
ment at the college at the end of the next academic year."
Prior to the Survey year, a split existed among the circuits over which ac-
tion in the denial of tenure process triggered the statute of limitations for filing
an action alleging discriminatory denial of tenure. In 1976, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, in Egelston v. State University College at Geneseo,"
held that a suit filed during the "terminal" year of employment, more than
180 days after initial notification of tenure denial, was timely. The court deter-
mined that the point at which the Title VII time limit began to run was the date
of discharge, not the date of notification.' *
 In a more recent case, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with this assessment. In
Abramson v. University of Hawaii,' 5
 the court reasoned that the proper focus was
upon the time of the discriminatory act, the final denial of tenure, not upon the
time at which the consequences of the act become most painful, the date of
discharge. 16
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in Delaware State College v.
Ricks' 7
 rejected the view that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date
of discharge. The Court held that the district court was justified in concluding
that the limitations period began to run at the date on which the board of
trustees officially notified the plaintiff of its endorsement of a negative recom-
mendation of tenure and its intent not to renew his contract beyond a terminal
year. 18
The plaintiff in Ricks, a black Liberian, joined the faculty of Delaware
State College in 1970) 9
 Three years later, a faculty committee on tenure
recommended that Ricks, not receive tenure. 2° The committee agreed,
however, to reconsider its tenure recommendation the following year. 2 ' In
" See Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710, 712, 20 FEP Cas. 1373, 1375 (3d
Cir. 1979); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 101 S. Ct. 498, 508-09 n.3, 24 FEP Cas. 827,
833-34 n.3 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2
 See Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d at 711, 20 FEP Cas. at 1374.
' 3
 535 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1976).
•	 ' 4 Id. at 755. The court also noted the possibility that the crucial date could even be
when a replacement was hired. Id. Several district courts in the Third Circuit similarly deter-
mined that the date of discharge was the proper date to trigger the statute of limitations. See, e.g. ,
Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1006-07 (F.D. Pa. 1974); Johnson v. University
of Pittsburgh, 359 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
15
 594 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1979).
16 Id. at 209. The Abramson court, however, reversed the lower court's holding that the
critical date was the time of notification of tenure denial and remanded the case to allow the
plaintiff the opportunity to show that the ordinary tenure decision process included a review of
reconsideration requests and, therefore, was not final until this review was denied. Id. at 210.
Such a finding would trigger the limitations period as of the review denial during the terminal
year.
' 7
 101 S.Ct. 498, 24 FEP Cas. 827 (1980).
Id. at 504-05, 24 FEP Cas. at 830-31. The Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.
19 Id. at 501, 24 FEP Cas. at 828.
" Id.
21 Id.
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February 1974, the committee again recommended a denial of tenure. 22 In
March, the faculty senate voted to support this recommendation and the col-
lege board of trustees voted to endorse the senate's decision. 23 Ricks then filed
a grievance with the appropriate board of trustees committee." This commit-
tee held a hearing on the plaintiff's grievance. 25 In a letter dated June 26, 1974,
the president of the board of trustees officially notified Ricks that the board had
endorsed the recommendation to deny him tenure and that he would be offered
a "terminal" contract for the 1974-75 academic year. 26
 On September 12,
1974, the board of trustees notified Ricks that it had denied his grievance."
During the "terminal" academic year, the president of the college reconfirmed
the board's decision and the plaintiff's contract of employment expired on June
30, 1975. 2 '
While still employed under his "terminal" contract, Ricks attempted to
file an employment discrimination charge, claiming denial of tenure based on
his national origin, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). 29 Thereafter, he filed a charge of discrimination with the state fair
employment practices agency, which under Title VII has primary jurisdiction
over employment discrimination complaints. 30 The state agency waived its
jurisdiction and the EEOC accepted the complaint for filing on April 28,
1975. 3 ' Following receipt of an EEOC "right to sue" letter in July of 1977, 32
Ricks filed suit in the district court on September 9, 1977, 33 charging that the
college" had violated Title VII and 1981 by discriminating against him on
the basis of his national origin."
The district court concluded that the only violation alleged in Rick's com-
plaint was the college's decision to deny tenure. Accordingly, the court deter-
mined that the statutes of limitations began to run on June 26, 1974, when the
plaintiff was officially notified of the tenure denial." Since Ricks neither filed
22 22 FEP Cas. 788, 790 (D. Del. 1978).
23 101 S.Ct. at 501-02 n.2, 24 FEP Cas. at 828 n.2. The faculty senate voted on March
11 and the board of trustees voted two days later. Id.
24 Id. at 501, 24 FEP Cas. at 828.
25 Id. The hearing was held in May of 1974. Id.
26 Id. at 501 & n.2, 24 FEP Cas. at 828 & n.2.
27 Id. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 828.
28 22 FEP Cas. at 790.
29 101 S.Ct. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 828-29.
3° 22 FEP Cas. at 789.
3 ' 101 S.Ct. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 829.
32 22 FEP Cas. at 789.
" 101 S.Ct. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 829.
" The defendants also included members of the board of trustees, the administration,
and the faculty. Id. at 502 n.3, 24 FEP Cas. at 829 n.3.
" Id. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 829. Since the Supreme Court in Ricks determined that
both claims failed because they were not timely filed, it expressly did not decide whether a claim
of national origin discrimination could be brought under $ 1981. Id. at 503 n.6, 24 FEP Cas. at
829 n.6.
36 Id. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 829.
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his Title VII charge within 180 days of June 26, 1974, nor commenced his
1981 suit within the applicable threel .rear limit from that date, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss both claims as untimely. 37
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the
statutes of limitations did not begin to run until June 30, 1975, the date on
which the terminal contract expired and Ricks was discharged." While agree-
ing that the only alleged violation was the denial of tenure, the court noted
that, at other colleges, denials of tenure that seemed final had been recon-
sidered and sometimes reversed." The court reasoned that it did not want to
encourage litigation that might thwart internal processes of reconsideration. 4°
Further, the court remarked that encouraging the initiation of litigation prior
to the date of termination would result in reducing an employee's effectiveness
during the remainder of his or her employment period." Finally, for ease of ap-
plication and avoidance of complex litigation to determine when the decision
became final, the court adopted the date of termination as the point at which
the statutes of limitations begin to run."
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that where, as in Ricks,
the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date,
the statutes of limitations begins to run at the time of the alleged discriminatory
act." Ricks' complaint alleged discrimination only in denying him tenure, not
in terminating his employment. 44
 Since Ricks neglected to allege any other
discriminatory acts, the Court reasoned that his argument, in effect, was that a
"continuing violation" of Title VII existed until the end of his "terminal"
contract." The Court noted, however, that the proper focus is upon the
discriminatory act itself, not upon its effects." Following an earlier decision,
the Ricks majority stated that the mere continuity of employment is insufficient
to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination."
Therefore, the Court concluded that since Ricks failed to allege discriminatory
acts that continued or occurred until the end of his employment, he was
precluded from claiming that a violation continued until the date of termina-
" Id.
38 Id. at 503, 24 FEP Cas. at 829.
" 605 F.2d at 712, 20 FEP Cas. at 1375.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 712-13, 20 FEP Cas. at 1376.
43 101 S.Ct. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
44
 101 S.Ct. at 503-04, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
" Id.
46 Id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
* 7 Id. In an earlier decision, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 556 (1977), the
Court determined that the continuing impact of a prior discriminatory act did not constitute a
"continuing violation" that would allow the filing of a timely claim of discrimination. Id. at 558.
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tion. 48
 If Ricks intended to complain of a violation at the time of discharge, the
Court remarked that he would have to identify discriminatory acts that con-
tinued until, or occurred at, the date of discharge:49
The Court concluded that the statutes of limitations began to run when
the alleged discriminatory act, the decision to deny tenure, occurred and Ricks
was notified. 5 ° Having identified this point, the Court next examined . three
dates advanced by the parties as alternative dates of accrual of the cause of ac-
tion: June 26, 1974, the date of official notification; September 12, 1974, the
date of the grievance denial; and June 30, 1975, the date of termination. 5 ' The
plaintiff contended that the date of termination, when the "terminal" contract
expired, should be the crucial date." This contention failed due to the Court's
rejection of the continuing violation claim, in the absence of any allegations to
support it." In addition, the Court rejected the argument advanced by the
court of appeals that the termination date should be accepted because of its ease
of application . 54
Next, the Court considered and rejected September 12, the date on which
the board of trustees notified Ricks of its denial of his grievance." In its amicus
brief, the EEOC advanced two arguments supporting September 12 as the
crucial date. 56
 First, it contended that the decision to deny Ricks tenure did not
become final until the denial of his grievance." Second, it contended that even
" Ste 101 S.Ct. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
44 Id. On the facts of Ricks, it would seem difficult to find continuing discriminatory
acts. The Court noted that Ricks would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which he
was terminated differed discriminatorily from treatment accorded other unsuccessful tenure ap-
plicants. Id. Instead, in accordance with college practice, Ricks was offered a terminal contract
with express notice that his employment would end upon its expiration. Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 504-06, 24 FEP Cas. at 830-32.
" Id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830-31.
53 Id., 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
54 Id. at 505, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
" Id. at 505-06, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
56 Id. at 505, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
" Id. The EEOC argued that the June 26 letter held out to Ricks the possibility that he
would receive tenure if the board of trustees sustained his grievance. Id. The letter indicated that
Ricks was being notified at that time primarily to ensure compliance with college and AAUP re-
quirements for advance notification of non-reappointment for non-tenured faculty. The text of
the June 26 letter stated:
Dear Dr. Ricks:
On March 13, 1974, the Board of Trustees of Delaware State College official-
ly endorsed the recommendations of the Faculty Senate at its March 11, 1974
meeting, at which time the Faculty Senate recommended that the Board not grant
you tenure.
As we are both aware, the Educational Policy Committee of the Board of
Trustees has heard your grievance and it is now in the process of coming to a deci-
sion. The Chairman of the Educational Policy Committee has indicated to me that
a decision may not be forthcoming until sometime in July. In order to comply with
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if the board decided - to deny tenure earlier, the pendancy of the grievance
should toll the running of the limitations period." The Court dismissed the
former. argument, reasoning that the board had made it clear well before
September 12 that it had rejected Ricks' tenure bid. 59 The Court concluded
that its decision in International Union of Electrical Workers, v. Robbins & Myers"
precluded the latter argument. In Robbins & Myers the Court held that the exer-
cise of a contractual right to initiate a grievance procedure after discharge, the
alleged discriminatory act, did not toll the running of the limitations period. 6 '
Finally, the Court held that the district court was not erroneous in con-
cluding that the statutes of limitations began to run no later than the last date
argued, June 26, 1974, when the letter from the president of the board of
trustess officially notified Ricks of the board's intent not to renew his contract
beyond the terminal year. 62 The majority reasoned that by June 26 the faculty
committee on tenure had twice recommended against tenure, the faculty senate
had voted to support the negative recommendation, and the board of trustees
formally had voted to deny Ricks tenure." Therefore, in light of this series of
"negative decisions," the majority concluded that the district court was
justified in finding that the college had established its official position — and
made that apparent to Ricks — by June 26, 1974."
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. He
concluded that the case should be remanded to allow Ricks to prove that tenure
was not effectively denied until he was notified of the grievance denial on
September 12, 1974. 65 Stewart agreed that a discriminatory discharge had not
been alleged and, therefore, that the judgment of the court of appeals focusing
on the date of termination was erroneous. 66 He emphasized, however, that the
the 1971 Trustee Policy Manual and AAUP requirements with regard to the
amount of time needed in proper notification of non-reappointment for non-
tenured faculty members the Board has no choice but to follow actions according
to its official position prior to the grievance process, and thus, notify you of its in-
tent not to renew your contract at the end of the 1974-75 school year.
Please understand that we have no way of knowing what the outcome of the
grievance process may be, and that this action is being taken at this time in order
to be consistent with the present formal position of the Board and AAUP time re-
quirements in matters of this kind. Should the Educational Policy Committee
decide to recommend that you be -granted tenure, and should the Board of
Trustees concur with their recommendation, then of course, it will supersede any
previous action taken by the Board.
Sincerely,
/s/Walton H. Simpson, President
Board of Trustees of Delaware State College
58 Id.
59 Id. The Court also noted that a grievance procedure constituted a remedy for a prior
decision, not an opportunity to influence a future decision. Id. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
6° 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
6 ' Id. at 236.
62 101 S. Ct. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 832.
63 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 507, 24 FEP Cas. at 832.
66
 See id. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 832.
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district couirt had dismissed Ricks' claims on the pleadings, so it never made
any factual determinations." Stewart reasoned that the complaint included a
plausible allegation that the college actually denied Ricks tenure on September
12, 1974. 68
 He noted that the June 26 letter raised the possibility of a subse-
quent board decision superseding any previous action, if a favorable recom-
mendation ensued from the grievance committee. 69 Therefore, Justice Stewart
would have allowed Ricks a hearing to determine whether the board's vote to
deny him tenure was not a final decision, but rather only a step in the process
of which the grievance committee constituted the next conventional stage."
Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that a discriminatory denial of
tenure claim should be treated the same as a discriminatory discharge clAim. 71
Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that June 30, 1975, the date of termina-
tion, was the proper time to begin the limitations period. 72 He reasoned that
the "terminal" contract offered to an individual denied tenure is analogous to
the two-weeks advance notice of discharge accorded to an employee by an
employer in other contexts." He noted that, prior to the date of discharge, the
allegedly wrongful act is subject to change. 74 Stevens also reasoned that, more
importantly, the discharge date was the date identified with the least difficulty
or dispute." Stevens added that this date would further the interest of har-
monious working relationships in the remaining period of employment, and
would avoid the involvement of the EEOC until the college's decision to deny
tenure is final." Thus, Stevens would have affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeals. 77
The Ricks decision clarifies the allegations which must be contained in an
employment discrimination complaint involving a denial of tenure, but leaves
unanswered the factual determination of when the statute of limitations begins
to run. After Ricks, it is clear that a charge of discrimination in the denial of
tenure is to be treated as a violation separate and distinct from a charge of
discriminatory discharge. Absent a claim of discriminatory discharge or other
violations, the limitations period will begin when the decision to deny tenure is
made and the faculty member is notified accordingly." If a terminal contract is
" Id. at 507 & n.1, 24 FEP Cas. at 832 n.1, 833.
68 Id. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 832.
68 Id. at 507, 24 FEP Cas. at 832. The letter provided a basis for this allegation when it
suggested that the board notified Ricks at that time only to ensure technical compliance with ad-
vance notification requirements in case it should later decide to abide by its earlier acceptance of
the negative recommendation. Id.
" Id. at 507-08, 24 FEP Cas. at 833.
7' Id. at 508, 24 FEP Cas. at 833. Stevens did not consider this treatment to be based on
any "continuing violation" theory. Rather, he regarded a case in which a college denies tenure
and offers a terminal one-year contract, in conjunction with the denial as part of the adverse






" Id. at 509, 24 FEP Cas. at 834.
78 See id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
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offered to individuals denied tenure, the limitations period will run concurrent-
ly with the terminal employment offer. In the aftermath of Ricks, a faculty
member who believes he or she has been denied tenure discriminatorily is well
advised to file an EEOC complaint within 180 days after learning of the
authorized administrative body's negative vote on his or her tenure bid,
simultaneously with any pursuit of internal grievance procedure.
While Ricks clarified the applicable law, the majority's analysis was not
completely correct.' The majority appropriately rejected the "final date of
employment rule" adopted by the court of appeals." It also properly treated a
discriminatory denial of tenure case differently from a discriminatory discharge
case. In dissent, however, Justice Stewart accurately analyzed the procedural
posture of the case and correctly concluded that under certain plausible facts
the date which the majority applied to commence the limitations period would
be improper.
Policy considerations support the majority's focus upon the time of the
alleged discriminatory act, the denial of tenure, rather than upon the time of
the effects of an employment decision, the date of termination. The acceptance
of the termination date as the point in time when the limitations period begins
to run would allow the complainant to prolong the life of a cause of action.
Congress set definite limits on the life of a Title VII cause of action, just as state
legislatures set limits on the life of a state employment discrimination claim.
The limits reflect value judgments made by legislative representatives concern-
ing the point at which the interests favoring protection of valid claims are
outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims."
Tenure is denied regardless of whether the individual voluntarily chooses to ac-
cept the terminal contract and remain on the faculty an additional year. If the
date of termination is the crucial date, the statute of limitations for filing a
discriminatory denial of tenure claim begins to run immediately upon the end
of the current contract for the individual who chooses not to accept the terminal
contract offer. The individual who chooses to accept the terminal contract of-
fer, however, has postponed the running of the statute of limitations for the
length of the terminal contract — in Ricks, a period of one year. The
discriminatory act, denial of tenure based on impermissible criteria, occurred
at the same time in each of these situations; yet one individual is allowed to
alter the legislative value judgment concerning when a claim should become
stale. Because an individual should not be able to alter the life of a cause of ac-
tion set by the legislature, the Ricks majority correctly rejected the termination
date as the time to begin the limitations period.
In addition, the majority correctly rejected the view, expressed in the
Stevens dissent, that a denial of tenure case should be treated as a discharge
case." Stevens analogized the custom of offering a terminal contract im-
79 Id. at 505, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
" Id.
Bi Stewart, in his dissent, also refused to treat the case as a discriminatory discharge
case. Id. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 832.
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mediately after a tenure denial to the custom of giving two weeks advance
notice of discharge. 82
 The denial of academic tenure followed by a terminal
contract, however, is not analogous to a two-week advance notification of
discharge. In the former situation, the denial of tenure is the act alleged to be
discriminatory. The terminal contract is offered when tenure is denied and is a
consequence of the alleged discriminatory act." In the latter situation, the
discharge itself is the alleged discriminatory act. When tenure is denied
discriminatorily, the tenure denial results immediately in the faculty member
being denied rights and status that would have been granted absent the
discrimination." But for the discriminatory denial, the faculty member would
have enjoyed the benefits of being tenured immediately. By contrast, the
employee alleging discriminatory discharge from employment is not denied the
benefits of being employed discriminatorily until the act has occurred and he or
she is terminated. Although the employee on two-week notice knows the
benefits of employment soon will be different, the actual discrimination against
him or her has not yet occurred." Thus, basic differences exist between a
denial of tenure and a discharge case, and the majority correctly treated them
accordingly.
While the majority correctly treated the case differently from a discharge
case and rejected the termination date as the appropriate date on which to
begin the limitations period, it was incorrect in not remanding the case for fur-
ther factual findings. Justice Stewart's approach was a better analysis both of
the role a factual determination must play in ascertaining the date on which the
final decision to deny tenure occurred and of the procedural posture of the case.
The crucial date to commence the running of the limitations period is the date
on which Ricks was notified that the board had completed the tenure process.
Ricks should have been allowed the opportunity to show that the grievance
procedure was an ordinary and generally accepted step in the process." If the
grievance committee has in fact recommended reconsideration in the past and
the board has concurred with these recommendations, the date of denial of the
grievance, September 12, 1974, should be considered the final denial of tenure.
If, however, the board's original response to a tenure bid is final in all but the
most extreme cases, then a date at or before June 26, 1974, should be con-
sidered the final denial. This approach has been used by lower courts. For ex-
82 Id. at 508, 24 FEP Cas. at 833.
83 See id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
84 For example, compared to tenured faculty, the non-tenured faculty member enjoys
greatly limited procedural rights protecting his or her employment. Note, Non-Tenure Teachers'
Procedural Rights Upon Dismissal, 3 LOY.-CHI. L.J. 114 (1972). See also Note, Constitutional Law..
Procedural Thu Process, The Rights of a Non-Tenured Teacher Upon Non-Renewal of His Contract at a State
School, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 702, 706 (1973).
85 As the Ricks majority noted, to become a discriminatory discharge case, the plaintiff
would have had to allege and prove that the manner in which the college terminated his employ-
ment differed discriminatorily from the manner in which it terminated other individuals who also
had been denied tenure. 101 S. Ct. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
86 Id. at 507, 24 FEP Cas. at 833 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Abramson v. University of
Hawaii, 594 F.2d at 210.
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ample, although the Ricks majority cited Abramson favorably, the court in
Abramson in fact followed the approach .proposed in Stewart's dissent and
remanded a similar tenure denial case for a factual finding on this issue."
The district court dismissed Ricks's claim on the pleadings. Justice
Stewart recognized the procedural posture of the case and noted that no factual
findings were made on the actual practice of the college in denying tenure."
The language of the June 26 letter provided a reasonable basis for alleging that
the board effectively did not deny tenure until September 12 by suggesting that
the June 26 notification was sent solely to comply with advance notification re-
quirements should the board later decide to finalize its acceptance of the
negative tenure recommendation." Thus, Ricks should have been afforded a
hearing and determination of this factual issue.
The Ricks majority expressly declined to decide whether the district court
correctly focused on June 26, 1974, rather than on an earlier date to establish
final denia1. 9° Accordingly, Ricks does not provide a clear standard for deter-
mining the correct point to commence the limitations period.°' The termina-
tion date appears to be precluded totally from consideration after Ricks, absent
separate allegations of discriminatory discharge. It remains to be seen whether
different allegations, or a sufficient showing of the actual practice of a college in
denying tenure, would allow the limitations period to commence to run on the
date of a refusal to reconsider a denial of tenure. This too seems less likely after
Ricks, absent allegations of a separate discriminatory act: a discriminatory
refusal to reconsider.
The Ricks Court stated the principle that the limitations period com-
mences to run when the tenure decision is made and the affected faculty
member is notified. 92 In classifying the grievance procedure as a "remedy for a
prior decision,"" absent factual determination of the college's actual tenure
practice, the Court narrowed the available dates to be considered in the future
as the appropriate time at which to commence the limitations period." Three
dates remain to be considered: (1) the date when the administrative body
" 594 F.2d at 210. The Abramson court expressed willingness to allow the statute of
limitations to commence running upon the refusal to reconsider a denial of tenure, if this were
found to be the final denial in the procedure the school uses to make tenure decisions. Id. at 209.
88 101 S. Ct. at 502, 24 FEP Cas. at 829.
"' See note 57 supra.
9° 101 S. Ct. at 506 n.17, 24 FEP Cas. at 832 n.17. The Court held that even under a
limitation period commencing to run on June 26, 1974, the plaintiff's complaints were not time-
ly. Therefore, the issue of whether the period should have commenced earlier was not required to
be addressed.
9 ' The majority noted that "itihe application of the general principles discussed herein
necessarily must be made on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 504 n.9, 24 FEP Cas. at 830 n.9.
" Id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830.
93 Id. at 506, 24 FEP Cas. at 831.
94 This is the case where the allegations are similar to Ricks, and no additional
discriminatory acts are alleged. See id. at 504, 24 FEP Cas. at 830. Other dates may be considered
where additional discriminatory acts such as discriminatory denial to reconsider the decision, or
discriminatory discharge, are alleged.
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authorized to grant tenure initially votes to accept a negative recommendation
on tenure, (2) the date when this vote is communicated to the faculty member,
and (3) the date when the administrative body officially notifies the faculty
member of its denial and intent not to renew his or her contract beyond the ter-
minal year. 95 Faced with these three dates, the second date is the correct choice
under Ricks. By this date, the decision has been made and the faculty member
is aware of the denial. The first date, when the board votes, does not satisfy the
notification requirement of Ricks. 96 The third date signifies no relevant change
in the elements of the tenure denial.
In the aftermath of Ricks, three factors have become relevant to faculty
members claiming discriminatory denial of tenure. First, courts are not
foreclosed from concluding that the limitations period begins to run prior to of-
ficial notification and offer of a terminal year contract. Under the Ricks
guidelines, it seems likely that the limitations period will be held to commence
to run upon communication of the denial to the faculty member. Second, since
it is not clear how early the limitations period will be held to commence, allega-
tions of discriminatory discharge or refusal to reconsider should be included in
the complaint in situations where a grievance is denied or employment is ter-
minated. To avoid dismissal on the grounds of untimeliness, a complaint
should establish the basis for claiming a discriminatory act at a date later than
the initial denial of tenure. Finally, the filing of an EEOC complaint should be
considered upon notification of the denial of tenure, regardless of the existence
or pursuit of an internal review.
B. Class Actions
1. Interlocutory Appeals of Orders Denying
Consent Decrees: Carson v. American Brands, Inc. *
Under section 1291 of the United States Code, appeals can be taken only
from "final decisions" of the district courts.' The purpose of the finality rule is
to prevent "the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piece-
meal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single
" See id. at 506 nn.16 & 17, 24 FEP Cas. at 833 nn.16 & 17.
96 The first date, that of the board's vote, would only satisfy the notification require-
ment if the faculty member was aware of the negative recommendation to the board and the
affirmance of that recommendation by the board was entirely predictable. This may have been
the case in Ricks. See id. at n.16, 24 FEP Cas. at 833 n.16.
By Anne C. Haberle, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
28 U.S.C. 1291 (1976) provides:
The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court.
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controversy." 2 The principle has been considered so fundamental to the
United States judicial system that the statutes regulating federal procedure
consistently have maintained a finality rule, beginning with the First Judiciary
Act of 1789. 3
Exceptions to the finality rule, however, have developed in the common
law, and within the statutory framework. One such exception is the "collateral
order" exception. This common-law exception to the finality rule permits in-
terlocutory appeals of final rulings which are separable from the main cause of
action. 4 The purpose of the collateral order exception is to provide for the im-
mediate, separate appeal of those issues which are "too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate con-
sideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."' The collateral
order exception thereby facilitates the efficient administration of justice.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Congress began to enact a
series of limited exceptions to the finality rule, emphasizing the effects, upon
the requesting parties, of the interlocutory order. 6 The present statutory provi-
sion for the appeal of interlocutory decisions, section 1292(x)(1), permits the
appeal of interlocutory orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."' The purpose of ex-
cepting orders affecting injunctions from the finality rule was not specified in
the legislative history of section 1292(a)(1). 8 The Supreme Court, however,
2 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
3
 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-79 (1955).
E.g., Williams v. Mumford, 511 F.2d 363, 366-67, 10 FEP Cas. 487, 489-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975).
In addition to the requirement of severability, some decisions specify additional re-
quirements for immediate appeal. For example, in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949), the Supreme Court held that before the collateral order doctrine could be
applied, the rights affected must be substantial enough to merit review. The Third Circuit set
forth another criterion for applying the doctrine. In Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508
F.2d 152, 10 FEP Cas. 80 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), the court required a
showing that an irreparable injury to the affected rights would result from delaying review.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
6 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 180 (1955).
When the circuit courts of appeals were established in 1891, Congress included among the
actions within their jurisdiction appeals from interlocutory orders in equity granting or continu-
ing injunctions. Id. In 1895, the class of appealable interlocutory orders expanded to include
orders refusing or dissolving injunctions, and orders refusing to dissolve an injunction. Id. at 180
n.6.
" 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) (1976) provides as follows:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... or of the
judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-
tions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court; ....
Id.
8 Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
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subsequently determined that, in enacting section 1292(a)(1) Congress in-
tended to provide a balance between "the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review" and "the danger of denying justice by delay." 9
Prior to the Survey year, in a manner entirely consistent with the statutory
language, section 1292(a)(1) had been construed by the Supreme Court to pro-
vide a right of immediate appeal for litigants who had been denied an injunc-
tion.° Section 1292(a)(1) had also been construed, in a manner consistent with
the spirit if not the language of the statute, to provide a right of immediate ap-
peal for litigants who would suffer some "serious, perhaps irreparable conse-
quence" from the approval or denial of some other requested relief." Such
"serious, perhaps irreparable consequences" had been held to exist where the
lower court's ruling had passed on the merits of the case. 12 Such consequences
had been held to be absent, however, where the lower court's ruling had been
characterized as "strictly a pretrial order.""
These two formulations of the "irreparable consequence" standard were
developed in two Supreme Court cases decided prior to the Survey year. The
first case, Switzerland Cheese Association, Inc. v. E. Home's Market, Inc. , pro-
pounded the principle that "irreparable consequences," justifying an im-
mediate appeal under section 1292(a)(1), could not be found where the trial
court's ruling did not pass on the merits of the case.' 4 In Switzerland Cheese, the
petitioners, plaintiffs in a trademark infringement case, had moved for sum-
mary judgment, praying for permanent injunctive relief and awarding
damages." The motion had been denied by the federal district court because of
unresolved issues of material fact." The Supreme Court, agreeing with the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit," rejected petitioner's argument that the
motion for summary judgment had in effect requested a preliminary injunction
and therefore qualified for immediate appeal under section 1292(a)(1)." The
Court observed that the denial of a motion for summary judgment "does not
settle or even tentatively decide anything about the merits of the claim.'" 9 In
9 Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (footnote omit-
ted).
1 ° Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Switzerland Cheese].









I' Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 24.
19 Id, at 25.
See text and notes at notes 14-20 infra.
Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25; see text and notes at notes 21.31 infra.
385 U.S. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 351 F.2d 552, 553 (1st
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the absence of any indication that a final decision on the merits of the case had
been rendered the Court concluded that appeal under the statute was imper-
missible."
Although the "failure to pass on the merits of the claim" standard was
relied upon in Switzerland Cheese, an alternative standard for determining
whether "irreparable consequences" resulted from a lower court's ruling also
evolved from that decision. This standard was derived from the Court's state-
ment that the trial court's denial of a motion for summary judgment was
"strictly a pretrial order that decide[d] only one thing — that the case should
go to trial." 21 Thus, prior to the Survey year, where the result of the in-
terlocutory order was to continue rather than to terminate the litigation in
question, and no other irreparable injury was established, an effort to appeal
under section 1292(a)(1) was unlikely to succeed.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. 22
illustrated the operation of the standard applicable where a court's order could
be characterized as "strictly pretrial." In the Gardner case, the trial court had
denied class certification to the putative litigants in a Title VII action. 23 The
plaintiffs had not requested a preliminary injunction in their complaint, 24 but
had requested injunctive relief for all members of the class. 25 The plaintiffs' ef-
fort to appeal, under section 1292(a)(1), the order denying certification was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 26 The Supreme Court
agreed with the court of appeals that section 1292(a)(1) did not provide the
right to immediate appeal in this case. 27 The exceptions to the finality rule per-
mitted under the statute, the Court repeated, were limited to orders with
"direct or irreparable impact on the merits of the controversy. "28
 The Court
noted that the excluded class members retained the opportunity to have an ad-
judication of the merits of their claims, despite the denial of class certification. 29
In the absence of any holding regarding the legal sufficiency of any plaintiff's
claim, the Court concluded, an interlocutory appeal under section 1292(a)(1)
could not lie. 30 The appeal was therefore dismissed. 31
During the Survey year, the principles which had been established in
Gardner and Switzerland Cheese with respect to the appealability of interlocutory




 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
23 Id. at 479-80.
24 Id. at 479 n.3.
25
 Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209, 210, 16 FEP Cas. 88, 89
(3d Cir. 1977).
21 Id. at 214, 16 FEP Cas. at 92.
27
 437 U.S. at 479.
28
 Id. at 482.
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The Court held that plaintiffs in a class action who request a preliminary in-
junction, and subsequently are denied a motion for the court's consent to a
negotiated settlement which incorporates the relief prayed for in the
preliminary injunction, may appeal immediately under section 1292(a)(1)
without awaiting a final judgment in the case." By recognizing the denial of a
consent decree as a "serious, perhaps irreparable consequence" to the plain-
tiffs in an employment discrimination action, the Carson opinion elevates the
preference for negotiated settlements expressed in Title VII" to the status of
positive law.
The plaintiffs in Carson represented a class of black, present and former
seasonal employees and job applicants at a tobacco processing plant." They
sued the operator of a branch plant, and the union serving its employees, under
42 U.S.C. section 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 36
 The
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions, and damages for the defendants' alleged discrimination in its hiring and
employment policies. 37
 The plaintiffs' complaint asserted that "they would suf-
fer irreparable injury unless they obtained that injunctive relief at the earliest
opportunity." 38
 Shortly before trial, the parties negotiated a settlement."
The proposed settlement provided in detail for remedial measures to be
taken by the employer. The terms of the agreement required the employer to
give the seasonal employees, all of whom were black," preference over outside
applicants in filling job vacancies in regular positions.'" The settlement
established a goal of filling one-third of the supervisory positions with qualified
blacks by December 31, 1980. 4 ' Although the defendants agreed to the terms of
the settlement, they "expressly denied any violation of ... any ... equal
employment law, regulation, or order. "" As required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure when class actions have been dismissed or compromised," the
' Id. at 999.
3* 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976).
" 101 S.Ct. at 994.
36
 42 U.S.C. S 2000e (1976).
97
 101 S.Ct. at 995.
" Id. at 999 n.15.
99 Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 781-82, 16 FEP Cas. 1064,
1065 (E.D. Va. 1977).
4° Id. at 782, 16 FEP Gas. at 1066.
4 ' Id. at 783, 16 FEP Cas. at 1067. When the seasonal employees became regular
employees, the employer was to credit the time worked as seasonal employees in determining
seniority and eligibility for fringe benefits. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id., 16 FEP Cas. at 1066.
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs in a class action are subject to
special provisions governing the conduct of their suit. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In contrast to in-
dividual plaintiffs, who may terminate an action without a court order, FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1),
the parties to a class action must, if they achieve a compromise prior to trial, secure the formal
approval of the court before the class action can be dismissed. FED. R. C1V. P. 23(e). The pur-
pose of this requirement is to protect the interests of the class members who are not directly in-
volved in the settlement negotiations. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
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parties moved the district court to approve and enter the proposed settlement."
The district court refused to approve the settlement." In doing so, the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the merits of the case justified entry
of the proposed settlement." Thus, the decision did not turn on whether, based
on the merits of the case, there was a discrepancy between the terms of the set-
tlement and the relief the plaintiffs would probably have won at trial." Rather,
the court considered its conclusion that the agreement itself discriminated im-
permissibly on the basis of race to be sufficient for refusing to enter the
decree."
The established pattern of employment practices at the tobacco plant pro-
vided the factual context determining the district court's interpretation of the
agreement. Four of the settlement's provisions conferred hiring preferences
upon "seasonal employees," and a fifth established a goal of promoting
denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971). Once the class action has been filed, therefore, it is mandatory that
the parties obtain the court's approval to a negotiated settlement before the case can be dis-
missed. Sagers v. Yellow Freight Syss., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 686, 688, 11 FEP Cas. 439, 439 (D.C.
Ga. 1975). The court's approval of the settlement is entered by means of a "consent decree," a
judgment whose terms are negotiated by the parties to the action, but whose entry requires the
consent and sanction of the court. Gurwitz v. Singer, 218 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(quoting 49 C.J.S. Judgments 173, at 308) (1947).
45'
	 S.Ct. at 995.
46
 Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 791, 16 FEP Cas. 1064, 1072
(E.D. Va. 1977).
47 Id. at 790, 16 FEP Cas. at 1072. The Court's discussion of the merits of the case was
limited to the following paragraph: "The parties suggest that the decree is intended to overcome
the last vestiges of racial discrimination. But the Court perceives no such vestiges. Indeed, the
facts admitted by the parties show that with great rapidity and without any decree the artificial
racial barriers have completely dissolved at the plant." Id.
40
 The approval of a proposed settlement is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial
court. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1975). In reviewing a proposed settlement, the
trial court's function is to ensure that it is lawful, reasonable, and just. United States v. City of
Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1361, 22 FEP Cas. 874, 874 (5th Cir. 1980). The trial court must in-
clude in its considerations the likelihood of the plaintiffs' success, if the case were tried, and
whether the benefits available under the consent decree approximate those which could be ob-
tained at trial. See, e.g., Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173, 12 FEP Cas. 1069, 1070-71
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes,
513 F.2d 114, 124 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974). This evaluation, which necessarily incorporates some assess-
ment of the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, has been described as one of the most important fac-
tors in the court's decision whether to enter a consent decree. Grunin v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d at 124 (quoting State of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1085 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971)). Permitting or denying entry of a consent
decree, however, signifies no final disposition of the merits of the case. City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d at 456.
49
 446 F. Supp. at 791, 16 FEP Cas. at 1072.
The district court closed its opinion with the statement:
When the parties have settled their differences without a violation of the law and
without violating the right of any class members, the Court will enter an ap-
propriate order without prejudice to the right of any person to seek redress for
racial discrimination. But this Court will not, by entering the proposed Consent
provide the parties with a judicial license to practice racial discrimination.
Id.
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"qualified blacks.”" Since the seasonal employees at the plant traditionally
had been and continued to be all black," the court concluded that the benefits
promised to seasonal employees under the settlement were actually to be pro-
vided on the basis of race. 52 According to the court's reading of Title VII,"
preferential treatment on the basis of race could be permitted as a remedy only
where racial discrimination had been proven," and only where the benefits
were limited to the victims of the discrimination. 55
 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that, even if the facts submitted in support of the proposed settlement
had established past or present discrimination, 56 the sections of the agreement
which provided preferential treatment to seasonal employees violated Title VII
because they applied to all present and future seasonal employees, not just to
those who had been injured by the employers' racial discrimination." The pro-
posed settlement's fifth provision, which established a goal of promoting
qualified blacks to supervisory positions, was rejected by the district court
because it established an illegal racial quota." The court concluded, that the
agreement before it violated the law in its remedial use of racial preference, and
therefore refused to approve the settlement." The court invited the parties to
revise their agreement, and to arrive at a settlement that would violate neither
the law nor the rights of any class members. 6°
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, under section
1292(a)(1), to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit." A
closely divided court of appeals concluded that the trial court's interlocutory
decision could not be appealed prior to final judgment. 62 The court stated that
although the proposed settlement did provide for injunctive relief, the district
court's refusal to approve the settlement merely delayed, rather than denied,
the opportunity to attain the relief.° The court of appeals observed that the
" Id. at 783, 16 FEP Cas. at 1067.
" Id. at 788, 16 FEP Cas. at 1070.
52 Id. at 788-89, 16 FEP Cas. at 1070-71.
53 Id. at 785-87, 16 FEP Cas. at 1068-70.
" Id. at 787, 16 FEP Cas. at 1069 (discussing Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535
F.2d 257, 12 FEP Cas. at 314 (4th Cir. 1976)).
Although the court refrained from passing formally on the merits of the plaintiffs' case, it
responded to the parties' suggestion that the decree was "intended to overcome the last vestiges
of racial discrimination," 446 F. Supp. at 790, 16 FEP Cas. at 1072, by remarking that "the
facts admitted by the parties show that with great rapidity and without any decree the artificial
racial barriers have completely dissolved at the plant." Id.
55 Id. at 786, 16 FEP Cas. at 1071.
56 Id, at 789, 16 FEP Cas. at 1071.
37 Id.
58 Id. at 789-90, 16 FEP Cas. at 1072.
59 Id. at 791, 16 FEP Cas. at 1072.
60 Id. See also note 49 .supra.
61 Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 421, 20 FEP Cas. 1186, 1187 (4th
Cir. 1979).
62 606 F.2d at 421, 20 FEP Cas. at 1187. Three judges joined in the majority opinion,
authored by Judge Hall, while two judges joined in Judge Winter's dissenting opinion.
63 Id. at 423, 20 FEP Cas. at 1188; set also id. at 429 n.1 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs retained the opportunity to win final injunctive relief at trial, to cir-
cumvent trial by revising the settlement until it met with judicial approval, or
to appeal the trial court's order after final judgment." Furthermore, postpon-
ing appellate review until after the conclusion of trial would serve the policy
behind Federal Rule 23(e), by permitting the district court to retain super-
visory control of the litigation pending before 11. 55 A single appellate review
would also serve the policies of the finality rule by providing the appellate court
with a fully developed factual record against which to determine whether the
trial court's refusal of any proposed settlement had constituted an abuse of
discretion. 66 Therefore, the circuit court reasoned that delaying review of the
trial court's denial of the consent decree until after final judgment in the case
would entail no irreparable injury to the plaintiffs, and would serve the in-
terests of judicial policy. The court therefore concluded that the district court's
order was not appealable under section 1292(a)(1), and dismissed the appeal. 67
Three justices dissented on the jurisdictional issue, reasoning that the loss of
the opportunity to settle the case was itself an irreparable consequence creating
jurisdiction for an immediate appeal."
The petitioners appealed the ruling of the court of appeals to the Supreme
Court." The Court, noting a conflict in the circuits on the issue of whether
denial of a consent decree was appealable under section 1291 or section
1292(a)(1)," granted certiorari." In a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice
Brennan, the Court held that the district court's refusal to enter the consent
decree was appealable under section 1292(a)(1) as an order refusing an injunc-
tion. 72
In keeping with the precedents decided under the statute, the Court's
analysis focused on whether the denial of the consent decree would have a
"`serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' ' "3 which to be challenged effec-
" Id. at 423, 425, 20 FEP Cas. at 1188, 1190.
65 Id. at 424, 20 FEP Cas. at 1189.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 425, 20 FEP Cas. at 1190.
68 Id. at 429, 20 FEP Cas. at 1190 (Winter, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices,
having determined that the appeals court did have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, considered the
merits of that appeal. Id. at 430, 20 FEP Cas. at 1193. The dissenting justices concluded that the
trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to enter a consent decree. Id., 20 FEP Cas. at
1194. They found that the terms of the settlement submitted to the trial court had satisfied the
standards for consent decrees established in the Fourth Circuit. Id. The dissenting justices noted
that the Supreme Court's opinion in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), had established that voluntary agreements such as those in the proposed consent decree
did not violate Title VII. Carson, 606 F.2d at 431, 20 FEP Cas. at 1194-95. The Weber decision,
according to the dissent, vitiated the trial court's holding that the voluntary use of racial
preference in the proposed settlement had violated Title VIE. Id. Therefore, the dissent con-
cluded that the trial court's refusal to enter the consent decree had constituted a reversible abuse
of discretion. Id. at 432, 20 FEP Cas. at 1195.
69 Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 101 S.Ct. at 995.
7° Id. at 995.
" Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 447 U.S. 920 (1980).
72 101 S.Ct. at 999.
" Id. at 996 (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 181).
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tively would require an immediate appeal." The Court concluded that there
were two such consequences of the lower court's order. The first "serious,
perhpas irreparable consequence" identified by the Court was the loss by the
plaintiffs of the opportunity to settle their case." The second such consequence
found to justify an immediate appeal under section 1292(a)(1) was the tem-
porary loss of the injunctive remedies guaranteed by the settlement. 76 Turning
to the first such consequence, the Court observed that the trial court's refusal to
approve the settlement had jeopardized the plaintiffs' opportunity to settle their
case on terms agreeable to both parties." By agreeing to a settlement, the
Court remarked, the parties had waived the "right to litigate the issues in-
volved in the case"" in exchange for the freedom from the expense and uncer-
tainty of trial." This waiver, according to the Court, constituted "an express
or implied condition that the parties would, by their agreement, be able to
avoid the costs and uncertainties of litigation. " 80
 The district court's refusal to
approve the settlement altered that condition, the Court observed, by "effec-
tively order[ing] the parties to proceed to trial." 8 ' In a footnote to the opinion,
the Court assessed the possibility of securing the approval of a revised settle-
ment as "effectively foreclosed" by the district court's criteria. 82
 The Court
found that denial of a proposed consent decree could irreparably deprive the
parties of "their right to compromise their dispute on mutually agreeable
terms" 83 because either party might legally be able to withdraw its consent to a
pending settlement." The Court concluded that losing the opportunity to effec-
tuate a settlement was in itself a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,"
justifying immediate appeal under section 1292(a)(1). 85
The Court addressed, in a footnote, the policy considerations pertinent to
denials of consent decrees. The legislative history of Title VII indicated a
"strong preference" for the voluntary settlement of Title VII claims, the Court
noted." Rejecting the reasoning of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
concluded that postponing review of the refusal of a consent decree until after
final judgment would hinder appellate review." The Court reasoned that such
a delay could oblige the appellate court to choose between the remedies agreed
upon by the parties, and those ordered by the trial court after judicial deter-
24 101 &Ct. at 996.
" Id. at 998.
" Id. at 999.
" Id. at 998.
7 " Id. at 998 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971)).
79 Carson, 101 S.Ct. at 998.
80 Id.
" Id.
82 Id. at 998 n.12.
83 Id. at 998 (footnote omitted).
" Id. The defendants in Carson had tried to withdraw their consent to the agreement
during the course of the litigation. Id. at 998 n.13.
" Id. at 998.
86 Id. at 998 n.14.
87 Id.
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mination of the facts of the case and the Iiabilitites of the parties." This poten-
tial result was unacceptable to the Court." Furthermore, since an estimate of
the plaintiffs' likely chances for success at trial determines whether approval of
the settlement will be granted, post hoc review would be less equitable than a
review preceding the conclusive establishment of the parties' rights and liabili-
ties." The Court concluded that, in the circumstances presented by the denial
of a decree approving the settlement of a Title VII action, the policy against
"piecemeal appeals" did not apply."
The Court identified as an additional injury justifying immediate appeal
under section 1292(a)(1) the temporary loss of the injunctive remedies
guaranteed by the settlement." In their original complaint, the petitioners had
requested preliminary and permanent injunctions which would have restruc-
tured the employers' employment practices." The Court determined that the
provisions of the proposed settlement were equivalent to those requested as in-
junctive relief." The Court therefore concluded that the trial court's refusal to
approve the settlement had denied the petitioners the immediate injunctive
remedies available under the agreement."
Under Carson, the loss of the opportunity to settle a case, and the loss of
the injunctive benefits of settlement agreement, constitute "serious, perhaps
irreparable consequences" justifying an immediate appeal under section
1292(a)(1). 96 The decision alters the law regarding interlocutory appeals under
section 1292(a)(1) 97 in several respects. One consequence of the Carson decision
is that interlocutory orders now may be appealed under section 1292(a)(1) even
if the lower court's ruling does not pass on the merits of the case. Cases decided
prior to Carson had maintained that a court order which did not on its face grant
or deny a request for an injunction could be appealed before final judgment
only if it resulted in a "serious, perhaps irreparable consequence."" Under
these earlier cases, such an effect would be found only if the lower court's rul-
ing passed upon the merits of the case." If the only result of the ruling was to
oblige the parties to pursue the litigation,'" or to have the parties' claims
decided in some later suit,'°' no appeal could be taken under section
88 Id.
B9 Id.
9° Id. at 998-99 n.14.
9i See text and notes at notes 1-3, 6-9 supra.
92 101 S.Ct. at 999.
91 Id. at 999 n.15.
" Id. The Court, after quoting the plaintiffs' prayer for injunctive relief, stated, "(t)his
is essentially the relief that petitioners would have obtained under the proposed consent decree."
Id.
95 Id. at 999.
96 Id.
97 28 U.S.C.	 1292(a)(1) (1976). See text and notes at notes 6.13 supra.
" See, e.g., Gardner, 437 U.S. at 482; Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25; Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. at 178-79.
99 See, e.g., Gardner, 437 U.S. at 480-81; Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25.
100 Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25. See also text at note 21 supra.
'°' Gardner, 437 U.S. at 480-81. See also text at note 29 supra.
December 1981]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 255
1292(a)(1).102 These principles were followed in order to preserve the policy
against "piecemeal appeals" expressed by Congress in its statutory regulations
of the federal courts.'° 3
Carson departed from the principles that the Court had established in prior
cases. In Carson, the trial court's decision to disapprove the proposed consent
decree did not pass on the merits of the case.'" The order was nevertheless held
to be appealable under section 1292(a)(1). Carson therefore creates an exception
to the requirement that the interlocutory orders of a district court may not be
appealed unless the order passes on the mertis of the case. In carving out this
exception to the finality rule, the Court employed two novel rationales. First,
the Court reasoned that the loss of the opportunity to settle a case on "mutually
agreeable terms" visited "serious, perhaps irreparable consequences" on the
plaintiffs. The Court also reasoned that because the provisions in the proposed
consent decree were equivalent to the preliminary injunctive relief requested in
the complaint, denying approval to the consent decree was tantamount to
denying preliminary injunctive relief. In the next section, these two threads of
the Court's reasoning will be tested for their merit and will be evaluated
against the background of the Court's prior decisions construing section
1292(a)(1).
The Court's reasoning concerning the loss of the opportunity to settle the
case implicitly overrules its earlier decisions regarding appeals under section
1292(a)(1). In the Switzerland Cheese decision, the Court held that the denial of a
motion for summary judgment meant only that the parties were obliged to pro-
ceed to trial.'" The Court expressly rejected the notion that an order whose
only result was to require trial could present the kind of consequence permit-
ting immediate appeal under section I 292(a)(1). ' 13° In the Carson case, the par-
ties' loss of the opportunity to settle on "mutually agreeable terms" meant that
their respective liabilities and remedies would be established at trial, rather
than compromised out of court.'"
It is difficult to distinguish between the effects of the interlocutory orders
at issue in Carson and Switzerland Cheese. The denial of the motion for summary
judgment was held not appealable in the Switzerland Cheese decision, because it
"decide[d] only one thing — that the case should go to trial. " 1 °8 Refusing to
approve the proposed settlement in Carson, however, did not even require trial;
the parties retained the opportunity to avoid trial by revising the agreement un-
til it satisfied the standards articulated by the trial court. l° 9 Carson and
1 °' Gardner, 437 U.S. at 482; Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25.
1°' Gardner, 437 U.S. at 482.
1 °4 Approval or denial of a proposed settlement implicitly considers the merits of the
case, but only to determine whether the settlement fairly represents the relief which the plaintiff
was likely to have won at trial. See note 48 supra.
'° Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25.
to Id.
"7 Carson, 101 S.Ct. at 998.
1 ° 8 Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 25.
109 See text and notes at notes 60 & 64 supra.
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Switzerland Cheese are therefore inconsistent in their conclusions regarding the
appealability of a judicial order which determines, on its face, only that the
parties proceed to trial. To the extent that Switzerland Cheese forbids the im-
mediate appeal of such rulings, Carson modifies the Switzerland Cheese rule.
Cases following Carson also must consider the impact of the ruling upon the
parties during the interim between its issuance and the final resolution of the
case
The Carson Court's holding that the loss of the opportunity to settle a case
constituted a result of serious consequence was based in part on its analysis of a
settlement agreement as a contractual arrangement. The Court found that a
negotiated settlement incorporates an express or implied condition that both
parties are waiving the right to litigate the issues.'" The district court's in-
terference with this agreement was viewed as inflicting a "serious, perhaps ir-
reparable" conseqeuence upon the parties."' The Court has held that entry of
a consent decree, is to be treated as a judicial act, rather than as a contract."'
In circumstances such as those in Carson, where a consent decree is sought for
the settlement of a class action, the court's approval is required to dismiss the
suit." 3 To view the trial court's performance of its duty as interfering with a
contract right is inappropriate in the context of Title VII litigation.
The Court's emphasis on the parties' right to settle a Title VII suit on
mutually agreeable terms also conflicts with the policies expressed in the re-
quirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "4 Rule 23(e) requires final
approval by the court before a class action can be dismissed." 5 Therefore, par-
tics to a class action do not have the right to come to a mutually agreeable ar-
rangement without the trial court's intervention. The purpose of the require-
ment of court approval is to safeguard the interests of those class members who
are not involved directly in the settlement negotiations. "6 The Carson decision,
however, violates the intent of Rule 23(e) by elevating the negotiating parties'
interest in settling the case above the non-negotiating class members' interest
in obtaining a fair redress to the alleged discrimination practiced against them,
hitherto protected by the disinterested judgment of the trial court.
The Carson Court's finding that the denial of the consent decree effectively
denied the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief was the second "serious con-
sequence" justifying immediate appeal under section 1292(a)(1)." 7
 The Court
distinguished the facts of the earlier cases of Switzerland Cheese and Gardner from
the Carson case on the basis of the nature of the injunctive relief requested. " 8 In
1 ° Carson, 101 S.Ct. at 998. See also text at notes 96-99 supra.
"' 101 S.Ct. at 998.
" 2 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
'" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). See note 44 supra.
" 1 FED. R. Clv. P. 23.
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
16 Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1971).
1 " 101 S.Ct. at 998-99.
18 Id. at 997.
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Switzerland Cheese, the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that,
because granting the permanent injunction requested in the motion for sum-
mary judgment would have effected immediate injunctive relief, denial of the
motion for summary judgment could be appealed immediately under section
1292(a)(1). 19
 In contrast, the Carson Court concluded that there was an "ir-
reparable consequence" in the denial of a proposed settlement whose provi-
sions would have instituted prompt injunctive relief. 120 The Carson opinion fails
to identify any distinction between the decisions in terms of the effects of the
respective denials upon the parties. Instead, the opinion distinguished
Switzerland Cheese from Carson on the basis of the preliminary relief prayed for in
the initial complaint in Carson.' 2 ' The plaintiffs in Switzerland Cheese, however,
had also requested a preliminary injunction in their complaint and had re-
quested a permanent injunction in their motion for summary judgment. 122 The
Court's effort in Carson to distinguish Switzerland Cheese on the basis of requests
for preliminary injunctions therefore seems untenable.
The Court repeated its effort to draw a distinction on the basis of a request
for preliminary injunctive relief in its discussion of the Gardner decision. The
Carson case defined as an "irreparable consequence" the loss of the job oppor-
tunities guaranteed by the proposed settlement.'" It is difficult to distinguish
this situation from that in Gardner, where the individuals who were denied class
certification also lost opportunities they might have secured had they been per-
mitted to participate in the named plaintiff's action. 124 Instead of being able to
participate, however, they were required to suffer the loss until after final judg-
ment had been entered.'" While those denied class certification in Gardner
could still litigate their claims, therefore, they suffered the same loss of injunc-
tive remedies as in Carson. To distinguish the cases only on the basis of the
pleadings is an overly technical approach.
Aside from being overly technical in its attempt to distinguish its decision
from previous cases decided under section 1292(a)(1), the Carson opinion ap-
pears to have ignored the statutory language. Carson found determinative the
distinction between requests for preliminary injunctive relief and requests for
permanent injunctive relief. The language of section 1292(a)(1), however,
draws no such distinction between rulings pertaining to preliminary injunc-
tions and rulings pertaining to permanent injunctions. The statute referes only
to orders "granting . or refusing injunctions." 126 Neither the policy against
piecemeal appeals, nor the effort to prevent irreparable injury, is promoted by
distinguishing between requests for preliminary and those for permanent in-
19 Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 24; see text at notes 22-25 supra.
120 101 S.Ct. at 999, 999 n.15.
121 Id.
122 Switzerland Cheese, 385 U.S. at 23.
123 Carson, 101 S.Ct. at 999 & 999 n.15.
124 Gardner, 437 U.S. at 480-81.
125 Id.
126 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). See also note 7 supra.
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junctions. The interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction disrupts litigation as much as the interlocutory appeal
of an order granting or denying a permanent injunction."' Irreparable injury
can result from the order whether the requested injunction was for preliminary
or requested relief.'" Thus, the Carson Court's reliance on the plaintiffs' re-
quest for a preliminary injunction is inconsistent with the language and the
goals of section 1292(a)(1). 129
The Court's opinion in Carson enforces the preference for speedy and
voluntary settlements expressed in the legislative history of Title VII.'" The
opportunity to compromise a class action is, as a result of the Carson opinion,
recognized as a right."' The district court trying a class action is viewed as
having the power to abrogate that right by denying the consent required to ter-
minate the suit. 132
 Prior to Carson, the litigants had no assured recourse against
such an order until after final judgment in the class action." 3 The strictures of
the finality rule prevented the interlocutory appeal of orders denying consent
decrees because they failed to pass upon the merits of the case. 134 The Court's
decision in Carson, 'however, may now provide Title VII litigants with the
guarantee of prompt judicial review of district court decisions preventing the
voluntary settlement of class actions brought under Title VII.
2. Requirement of Numerosity Under Rule 23(b)(2):
Gurmankin v. Costanza*
In order to maintain a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, four prerequisites must be satisified.' The first of these re-
quirements, embodied in Rule 23(a)(1), provides that the class must be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." 2 The numerosity re-
127 EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 511 F.2d 273, 276, 10 FEP Cas.
545, 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
128 Id. at 277, 10 FEP Cas. at 548.
' 29 28 U.S.C.	 1292(a)(1).
'" Carson, 101 S.Ct. at 998 n.14.
' 3 ' Id. at 998.
1 " Id.
'" See, e.g., Seigal v. Merrick, 590 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978).
'" Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 421, 20 FEP Cas. 1186, 1187 (4th
Cir. 1979).
By Jeffrey H. Karlin, Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes four prerequisites for
bringing a class action:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is im-
practicable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
FED. R. Cry. P. 28.
2 See, e.g., Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp., 86 F.R.D. 357, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
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quirement prevents members of a small class from being deprived of their op-
portunity to a day in court by the opposing party or by only a few individuals
seeking class certification.' It also allows a full and fair exposition of the merits
of all parties' claims, where it is impracticable to join the total number of
litigants because of class size. 4 Whether a proposed class will be deemed large
enough to satisfy the numerosity requirement is generally determined by the
facts of a particular case, and courts have exercised broad discretion in for-
mulating the acceptable parameters of class size.' Thus, although the number
of class-members will typically be an important consideration in assessing prac-
ticality of joinder, other factors, such as the type of action and the nature of
relief sought may also be taken into account.'
Many courts now overlook the numerosity requirement in employment
discrimination class actions, reasoning that such suits inherently warrant class
certification.' Rather than seeking pecuniary damages, these suits are fre-
quently brought under Rule 23(b)(2), and seek only injunctive or declaratory
relief to prevent future harm:" Courts which have rejected the importance of
the numerosity requirement in Rule 23(b)(2) employment discrimination ac-
("What is considered 'impracticable' is of course a subjective determination although the indicia
of the number of parties involved, the expectancy of joinder and the inconvenience of trying in-
dividual suits provide guidance.").
3 7 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL S 1762, at
593 (1972).
' Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 88, 19 FEP Cas. 1730, 1739 (3d. Cir. 1979).
5 General Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 22 FEP Cas. 1196
(1980); Stoner v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 327, 328 (N.D. Okla. 1974); Fifth Moorings Con-
dominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712, 715 (S.D. Fla. 1979) ("The judgment as to whether a
given number is sufficient is not susceptible to hard and fast standards. . . ."). Courts have been
inconsistent in granting certification. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 5 1762 (1972); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 123.05 (2d ed. 1978).
6 Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (Nature of the cause of
action and location of class members bear on propriety of class action.); Harris v. Pan Am.
World•Airways, Inc. F.R.D. 24, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (Numbers alone do not determine imprac-
ticability; all circumstances must be viewed, including magnitude of claim and degree of disper-
sion of prospective plaintiffs.); Sturdevant v. Deer, 73 F.R.D. 375, 378 (E.D.Wis. 1976)
(Numerosity requirement lowered where injunctive relief sought.).
7 See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1977) (Employment discrimination is by definition a class action.); Jones v. Diamond, 519
F.2d 1090, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975) (numerosity not at bar in civil rights action seeking injunctive
relief for future class). See also, C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: CIVIL 5 1771 at 663 (1972) (suggesting that due to the nature of claims and type of relief
sought in Rule 23(b)(2) suits, a less stringent application of Rule 23(a) requirements is ap-
propriate). See text and notes at notes 54-59 infra, discussing the rationales of courts which have
overlooked the numerosity requirement.
g Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure divides class actions into three
types. Besides satisfying the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, parties wishing to obtain certification must
demonstrate that their action falls into one of the three categories. Rule 23(b)(2) requires a show-
ing that: "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole," FED. R. CD/. P. 23(b)(2). For a discussion of the Rule
23(b)(2) action see generally Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L. J. 868 (1969); Comment, Rule 23: Categories
of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM, L. REV. 539, 542 (1969).
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tions have used three basic rationales in support of their position. The reasons
cited are that: (1) employment discrimination is a class-wide action by its very
nature; 9 (2) numerosity requirements may be lowered where the relief sought is
injunctive or declaratory rather than pecuniary in nature;'° and (3) Congress
intended the numerosity requirement to be relaxed in employment discrimina-
tion suits brought under Rule 23(b)(2) or title VIP' of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 12 Although the growing trend is toward greatly reducing the vitality of
the numerosity requirement in Rule 23(b)(2) employment discrimination class
suits, the issue is not free from doubt."
During the Survey year the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 should be
retained in employment discrimination suits where the plaintiff requesting cer-
tification seeks only prospective remedial relief rather than pecuniary
damages." In Gurmankin v. Costanza, 15 the court held that the numerosity re-
quirement must be observed in employment discrimination actions regardless
of the relief being sought." Despite its refusal to grant certification, however,
the court did remand the case to the district court for a determination of further
action necessary to correct past, and to prevent future, employment
discrimination.' 7 Thus, although the court refused to follow the current trend
of circumventing the numerosity requirement in actions of this sort, it did in-
dicate a willingness to provide prospective remedial relief through a means
other than class certification."
Ms. Gurmankin, a blind school teacher, first attempted to obtain employ-
ment with the Philadelphia School District in 1969. 19 Because of a medical and
personnel policy which excluded blind teachers from teaching sighted pupils in
the Philadelphia public schools, Ms. Gurmankin was not permitted to take the
examination." In 1974, pursuant to a change in policy, Ms. Gurmankin was
allowed to take the test and she passed. 2 ' Ms. Gurmankin was then .offered
several positions by the school district. 22
 She rejected these offers, however,
because they did not include retroactive seniority to which she claimed to be
9 See, e.g. , Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1977).
'° See, e.g., Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275-76, 14 FEP
Cas. 1460, 1465 (10th Cir. 1977).
"42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
" See, e.g., Rasmatamala v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976).
13 See text and notes at notes 51-77 infra.
14
 See note 26 infra.
15 626 F.2d 1132, 23 FEP Cas. 344 (3d Cir. 1980).
15 Id. at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346.
" Id. at 1136-37, 23 FEP Cas. at 349.
18 Id.
19 411 F. Supp. 982, 985, 12 FEP Cas. 1057, 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
2° Id. at 985, 12 FEP Cas. at 1059.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 988, 12 FEP Cas. at 1061.
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entitled due to past discrimination." Unable to secure a position with retroac-
tive seniority, Ms. Gurmankin filed suit in district court under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 24
 alleging that the school district's hiring policies
were unconstitutional and asking for an order directing the school district to of-
fer her a teaching position with retroactive seniority. 25
 She also requested pro-
spective remedial relief designed to prevent future discrimination, on behalf of
herself and the class of all visually handicapped teachers who had been denied
the opportunity to teach sighted children in the Philadelphia public schools."
Although Ms. Gurmankin produced only two other individuals who qualified
as class members, she urged that to determine numerosity, the court should in-
clude all other blind individuals who might seek employment with the
Philadelphia school district - in the future."
The district court found that the hiring policies of the school district,
which until 1974 had prevented blind individuals from taking the teachers' ex-
amination, had violated Ms. Gurmankin's right to due process." Pursuant to
its findings, the district court issued an injunction ordering the school district to
offer Ms. Gurmankin a teaching position with seniority rights. 29 The district
court, however, declined the plaintiff's request to include future class members
in her class. 30
 The court rejected as too speculative the plaintiff's argument that
because some blind teachers would seek jobs in Philadelphia, a sufficient
number of unidentified class members existed to satisfy the numerosity re-
quirement of Rule 23. 31
 After excluding these future class members, the court
found that the class of three individuals was not so numerous that joinder of all
members was impracticable." Although certification was denied, the court
believed the principle of stare decisis would prevent future discrimination by the
23 Id.
24
 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1976). Ms. Gurmankin also alleged violations of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1976). Id. at 983, 12 FEP Cas. at 1057.
25
 626 F.2d 1115, 1118, 23 FEP Cas. 301, 302 (3d Cir. 1980). Ms. Gurmankin also
asked for back pay awards. Id.
626 F.2d 1132, 1133-34, 23 FEP Cas. 344, 345 (3d Cir. 1980). It is unclear from the
record whether Ms. Gurmankin's class action was brought under Rule 23(b)(2) solely for injunc-
tive relief to prevent future harm. From Ms. Gurmankin's arguments as well as the Third Cir-
cuit's discussion, see 626 F.2d. at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346, this would appear to be the case.
27 Id. at 1134, 23 FEP Cas. at 345.
28 Gurmankin v. Constanzo, 411 F. Supp. at 982, 991-92, 12 FEP Cas. 1057, 1064
(E.D. Pa. 1976). The district court noted that many of Ms. Gurmankin's claims were based
upon actions that occurred prior to her taking the exam. Id. at 989, 12 FEP Cas. at 1062. The
court found that these policies violated the plaintiff's due process rights. Id. at 991-92, 12 FEP
Cas. at 1064. The court also found that the school district's evaluation of Ms. Gurmankin at the
1974 interview was conducted in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 992, 12 FEP Cas. at 1064.
29 Id. at 993; 12 FEP Cas. at 1065, 1066.
3° 626 F.2d at 1134, 23 FEP Cas. at 345.
31 This discussion of numerosity was not alluded to in the district court's opinion at 411
F. Supp. 982, 12 FEP Cas. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
32 626 F.2d at 1134, 23 FE? Cas. at 345. Although Ms. Gurmankin produced six other
individuals, the court found that only two qualified as class members. Id.
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school district." In addition, the district court noted that the school district's
offer to announce its willingness to accept blind applicants would help rectify
the negative effects of past discrimination."
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's order refusing to grant certification." Ms. Gurmankin had urged that
certification was proper on two alternative grounds. She argued first that the
numerosity requirement is unnecessary where class-wide discrimination has
been proven." She also contended that even if the numerosity requirement
were applied, it would be satisfied by including within her class all other blind
individuals who might seek employment with the Philadelphia school district in
the future." The court conceded that several factors tended to support Ms.
Gurmankin's initial argument that fulfillment of the numerosity requirement
was unnecessary. The court first took note of the liberal position adopted by the
Advisory Committee favoring certification in Rule 23(6)(2) actions. 38 The
court also acknowledged that in Wetzal v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 39 it had in-
dicated that employment discrimination actions were particularly well suited
for class action treatment. 4° Finally, the court observed that a number of other
courts and authorities had adopted a more liberal attitude toward applying the
numerosity requirement in employment discrimination class actions. 4 '
Despite acknowledging a trend away from strict enforcement of the
numerosity requirement in cases like the one at bar, the Gurmankin court
declined to read the numerosity requirement out of the class action rule
altogether." The court noted that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites make no men-
tion of particular cases where the requirements for maintaining a class action
may be relaxed.'" The court also observed that in East Motor Freight System v.
" Id. at 1134; 23 FEP Cas. at 345. Exactly what the district court meant by this state-
ment is unclear because this part of the court's opinion is unreported and is only alluded to in the
circuit court's decision.
" Id. See note 33 supra.
" Id. at 1134, 23 FEP Cas. at 346. Two other appeals preceded this action. On the first
appeal the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's finding that Ms. Gur-
mankin's due process rights had been violated by the school district's discriminatory hiring
policy. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 14 FEP Cas. 1359 (3d Cir. 1977). On the second
appeal Ms. Gurmankin was awarded back pay from the date she would have been employed ab-
sent the school district's discrimination policy. Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 23 FEP
Cas. 301 (3d Cir. 1980).
36 626 F•2d at 1134, 23 FEP Cas. at 346.
37 Id.
" Id. See also note 58 infra.
" 508 F.2d 239, 259, 9 FEP Cas. 211, 226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011, 10 FEP
Cas. 1056 (1975).
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Rodriguez" the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that even in cases
involving racial or ethnic discrimination, which by their very nature are class
actions, the requirements of Rule 23 must still be carefully observed."
The court next turned to Ms. Gurmankin's second and "most compelling
argument" which asserted that in order to provide effective class-wide
remedial relief, the potential number of future class members must be taken in-
to account.'" The court did not deal directly with the merits of this argument,
apparently acceding to the district court's determination that this contention
was too speculative.'" The court did find it significant, however, that the
district court had intended to grant broad remedial relief to all blind in-
dividuals who might be deterred from seeking positions in the Philadelphia
public schools." As of the time of this appeal, however, the school district had
failed to initiate steps to inform blind teachers of its change in policy." Noting
that the need for such effective remedial relief was adequately supported by the
record, the court remanded the case to the district court for further considera-
tion of the remedial relief necessary to eliminate unlawful discrimination and
publicize the school district's new policy encouraging blind applicants."
The Gurmankin decision is important because it highlights the uncertainty
concerning the application of the numerosity requirement in employment
discrimination class actions. As the court in Gurmankin noted, it may be ap-
propriate to lower the numerosity requirement in actions of this sort." Never-
theless, pending further legislative clarification, it would seem preferable to
allow the class action prerequisites of Rule 23(a) to retain their vitality, even in
employment discrimination class actions. This conclusion recognizes the
tremendous degree of factual variation in such suits, as well as the feasibility of
providing alternative means of prospective remedial relief. Thus, for example,
" 431 U.S. 395, 405, 14 FEP Cas. 1505, 1509 (1975).
45 626 F.2d at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346. (construing East Motor Freight System v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 405, 14 FEP Cas. at 1509). Rodriguez was not given precedential effect in
Gurmankin, because in Rodriguez the Court addressed the adequacy of representation under Rule
23(a)(4), rather than numerosity under Rule 23(a)(I). Id.
" 626 F.2d at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346. in Scott v. University of Del. 601 F.2d 76, 19
FEP Cas. 1730 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to satisfy
numerosity by alleging the existence of future class members. Id. at 89,19 FEP Cas. at 1739.
Although the Score opinion indicates that this claim was insufficient on the facts of this case, id. at
89, 19 FEP Cas. at 1739-40, footnote 25 of the Scott opinion cites Wetzal for the proposition that
future class members are not to be used at all to determine numerosity. Id. at 88 n. 25, 19 FEP
Cas. at 1739 n. 25. Hence, it is unclear whether the Third Circuit's position is that future class
members are not to be counted at all in determining numerosity, or may be counted, but are not
by themselves determinative of numerosity.
47 See text and note at note 31 supra.
48 626 F.2d at 1136, 23 FEP Cas. at 347.
49 Id.
'° Id. at 1137, 23 FEP Cas. at 347.
" Id. at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346.
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although unwilling to certify Ms. Gurmankin's class, the Gurmankin court did
appear anxious to prevent future discrimination by the school district. 52 As this
was apparently the primary aim of Ms. Gurmankin's class action, the court's
result in remanding the case to the district court does not differ significantly
from class treatment."
In retaining the vitality of the numerosity requirement in employment
discrimination actions and in upholding the trial court's broad discretion in
determining the practicality of joinder, the Gurmankin court reached the correct
result. Nevertheless, by failing to grant certification, the Third Circuit stands
counter to the current weight of authority which has in effect eradicated the
numerosity requirement in employment discrimination class actions brought
under Rule 23(b)(2). 54 Courts which have abandoned the numerosity require-
ment in cases similar to Gurmankin have advanced several arguments in support
of their position. One argument commonly asserted is that employment dis-
crimination by its very nature is a class-wide action. 55 Here it is assumed that a
discriminatory policy which affects one employee will necessarily affect all
other employees similarly situated. 56 A second justification often expressed is
that where the nature of the relief sought is injunctive only, the requirements of
Rule 23(a) should be relaxed." No express reasoning appears to support this
conclusion, although courts using this argument probably reason that injunc-
tive relief subjects defendants to potentially less severe consequences than
pecuniary damages. Many courts also note that Congress intended class cer-
tification to be easily obtainable in suits to enforce statutes governing employ-
" Id. at 1137, 23 FEP Cas. at 347. The court ruled that under the district court's direc-
tion, the school district must actively inform blind applicants of its willingness to accept blind
teachers. Id.
" With respect to providing prospective remedial relief alone, the method of remanding
to the district court for class certification should achieve the same result. Under either procedure,
the school district must cease its hiring discrimination against the handicapped and announce to
this group its willingness to accept applications. There are, however, important differences be-
tween the two procedures. Under the method chosen by the court, for example, any individual
claiming monetary damages such as back pay will have to litigate this claim in a separate action
against the school district. Under class certification, however, it is possible that a class member
claiming injury and seeking back pay awards could use the Gunnankin decision as res judicaza for
his individual claim. See text and notes at notes 75-76 infra.
54 See note 6 supra and text and notes at notes 55-59 infra.
" See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1977) (employment discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin is by definition
class-wide discrimination); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340, 11 FEP Cas. 211,
216 (10th Cir. 1975) (class actions are generally appropriate in Title VII employment discrimina-
tion actions).
56 See, e.g., Afro Am. Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 298, 8 FEP Gas. 22,
24 (6th Cir. 1974) (suit by one employee is similar to class action for fellow employees similarly
situated).
" See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 (5th Cir. 1975) (smaller classes are
less objectionable where injunctive relief is sought on behalf of future class members); Horn v.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 275-76, 14 FEP Cas. 1460, 1464-65 (10th
Cir. 1977) (citing cases in support and concluding that where injunctive relief is sought,
numerosity standards may be lowered).
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ment discrimination, such as title VII and Rule 23(b)(2). 58
 Finally, some
courts, rather than expressing a specific justification, merely state that because
of the inherent impossibility of joining future unknown employees, numerosity
must necessarily be satisfied."
While these justifications are valid reasons for relaxing the numerosity re-
quirement, they do not compel its total eradication. Thus the claim that
employment discrimination inherently warrants class certification overlooks
the argument that in many situations, the status and interests of a class of
employees will differ significantly." The statement that the relief sought is
injunctive only does not erase the possibility that monetary damages may later
be requested and granted. 6 ' Finally, although Congress has evinced an intent
to lower the numerosity•requirement in certain types of actions, no express
legislation authorizes abolishing the requirement that the class be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. "62
The arguments advanced by courts in favor of eradicating the numerosity
requirement contain several flaws and do not adequately justify such a result.
Several additional factors mitigate against abolishing the numerosity require-
ment entirely. First, no legislative directive expressly allows for eradication of
any of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites. Second, the scope of the numerosity re-
quirement is not clearly defined. Third, there are inherent ambiguities within
the Rule 23(b)(2) class action. Finally, prospective remedial relief may be
granted to a group without class certification.
Although the Gurrnankin court conceded that numerosity requirements
may be relaxed in class actions brought for injunctive or declaratory relief, it
nevertheless refused to usurp the trial court's broad discretion in determining
the practicality of joinder." In refusing to overlook the numerosity require-
ment, the Gurmankin court focused on the lack of specific statutory language
authorizing its elimination." The court also apparently felt that effective
remedial relief could be granted without resorting to class certification."
58 See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1977) (legislative history of Title VII shows that Congress itself recognized the importance of
class actions by private litigants in accomplishing the statutory purpose of eliminating
discrimination in employment); Rasmatamala v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th
Cir. 1976) (Class actions are particularly appropriate under Civil Rights Act of 1964.); accord,
Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 (5th Cir. 1975).
" See Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124, 8 FEP Cas. 658, 659 (5th
Cir. 1974) (Joinder of future unknown individuals is impracticable.).
6° See Note, Due Process Rights of the Absentee in Title VII Class Action — The Myth of
Homogeneity of Interests, 59 B.U.L. REV. 661, 673 (1979) (discussing divergent interests of class
litigants).
6 ' See text and notes at note 75 infra. Injunctive relief, in the form of an affirmative ac-
tion plan, may also be quite expensive.
fie FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). See text and notes at note 43 supra.
65
 626 F.2d at 1135, 23 FEP Cas. at 346.
" Id.
" In Gurmankin, the court remanded the case to the district court to insure eradication of
past and prevention of future discrimination by the school district. Id. at 1137, 23 FEP Cas. at
266	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 23:82
Although refusal to grant certification based solely on the availability of an
alternative method of providing relief would not be proper, it should
nonetheless be considered as a factor. in determining the practicality of
joinder." This approach is particularly appropriate in light of the open-ended
nature of the numerosity requirement."
The lack of express legislative authorization and the possibility of alter-
native means of affording prospective remedial relief in situations where
joinder may not be impracticable, present strong arguments against abolishing
the numerosity prerequisite. Two additional reasons not relied upon by the
Gurmankin court, provide further support for the Third Circuit's position
against automatic certification of employment discrimination actions where the
only relief sought is injunctive or declaratory. First, the scope of the numerosity
requirement of Rule 23 is not clearly defined." Congress instead created an
open-ended rule in order to allow courts flexibility in defining the parameters
of numerosity on a case-by-case basis. 69 The varied treatment of acceptable
class number attests to the difficulty courts have in framing set standards." To
adopt a rigid rule compelling certification for certain types of substantive
claims would be over-simplistic and might conflict with the intent of
Congress. 7 ' This approach would automatically assume the satisfaction of the
numerosity requirement regardless of the facts in a particular case. In many in-
stances, however, even in employment discrimination actions brought under
Rule 23(6)(2), joinder of all parties may be feasible." Acknowledging that the
scope of the numerosity requirement is still being developed, trial courts should
be afforded broad discretion in determining whether numerosity has been
satisfied based on all the relevant facts.
Another problem with abolishing the numerosity requirement emanates
from the nature of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action itself. Like Rule 23(a)(1), 73
 the
347. The court did not specify what action the district court should take if the school district failed
to cooperate. The court only noted that "the district court may enter the appropriate remedial
decree which will insure not only the elimination of the unlawful discrimination but the adequate
publication of the new policy." Id.
66
 See Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403, 2 FEP Cas. 842, 843
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (equitable relief may be granted without class action).
67 Sec text and notes at notes 68-72 infra.
" The Gurmankin court recognized that the function of the numerosity requirement in
class actions seeking only prospective .equitable relief is "far from clear." Id. at 1134, 23 FEP
Cas. at 345. See also Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (C.D. Mo. 1979) (discussing the
difficulties with numerosity); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1972) S 1762 (precedents are uneven at best).
69 See 3B, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.05 at 23-149 (2d ed. 1978).
29 See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1972) S 1762;
3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 23.05 (2d ed. 1978).
" See text at note 43 supra.
72 See, e.g., Smith v. Board of Educ. of Morrilten School Dist., 365 F,2d 770, 9 FEP
Cas. 1081 (8th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Macon County Bd., 498 F.2d 1090, 8 FEP Cas, 936 (5th Cir.
1974).
" See text and notes at notes 68-72 supra.
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application of Rule 23(b)(2) is fraught with considerable uncertainty:" Thus,
for example, although Rule 23(b)(2) actions are designed primarily to provide
declaratory or injunctive relief, -Rule 23(b)(2) suits may also embrace monetary
damages." In addition, because Rule 23(b)(2) actions provide res judicata effect
despite lack of notice to class members, individuals not wishing to be a party to
such a suit may be unfairly bound by a poorly litigated claim without receiving
an opportunity to institute an action on their own behalf. 76
 Courts must
therefore be cautious when certifying a class and binding such individuals to
possible adverse consequences. The overall ambiguity which surrounds the
Rule 23(b)(2) class action necessitates that courts carefully scrutinize Rule
23(a) prerequisites so as to insure that the results desired in a decision are
achieved. 77
The Gurmankin decision accentuates the diversity of opinion among courts
concerning the proper scope of the numerosity requirement in employment
discrimination class actions. Depending upon the court, the practitioner may
encounter varying degrees of receptivity toward the granting of certification.
While most courts now discount the importance of demonstrating the imprac-
ticality of joinder in employment discrimination suits, the Third Circuit favors
the retention of the numerosity prerequisite. It is therefore important, when in-
stituting an employment discrimination class action in the Third Circuit, to
stipulate carefully why joinder of all parties is impracticable. Where the
arguments for impracticality of joinder appear weak, the practitioner may con-
sider it preferable to bring suit in a more liberal jurisdiction.
74 See generally Note, Due Process Rights of Absentee in Tide VII Class Action — The Myth of
Homogeneity of Interests, 59 B.U.L. REV. 661 (1979); Note, Anti-Discrimination Class Actions under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.- The Transformation of Rule 23(bX2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979).
75 See, e.g. , Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe, 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974) (back
pay alloWed); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802-804, 3 FEP Cas, 653, 661-62 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971) (back pay award is equitable in nature, hence
allowable in Rule 23 (b)(2) action).
76 See Note, Anti-Discrimination Class Actions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The
Transformation of Rule 23(bX2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979). In Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d
76, 19 FEP Cas. 1730 (3d. Cir. 1979), the third circuit decertified a class action brought by a
black university professor. Id. at 89, 19 FEP Cas. at 1739. The court cautioned that overbroad
classification in anti-discrimination class actions, based upon the "facile" conclusion that
because there exist unidentified future class members numerosity must be satisfied, may cause
the loss of claims, by unidentified class members. Id. See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (dangers of over broad classification to absent
class members).
" See Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24, 38 (N.D. Cal. 1977): see also
Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 19 FEP Gas, 490 (4th Cir. 1979).
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C. Standard for Rebutting a Prima Facie Title VII Violation:
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits employers from
discriminating against an individual in employment because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 In 1973 the Supreme
Court articulated both a Title VII prima facie case model and a standard for
rebutting a prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 3 Following that
case, circuit courts adopted conflicting interpretations of the burden necessary
to rebut a Title VII prima facie case. To resolve this dispute, in two 1978 case?
the Court reiterated its McDonnell Douglas standard for rebuttal which requires
the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection.
In this Survey year, the Supreme Court again clarified the standard re-
quired to rebut a Title VII prima facie case in Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine. 6 The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring the defendant to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenged employment action existed.' Furthermore, the
Court stated that the court of appeals erred in requiring that the defendant
prove the superior qualifications of the individual hired for the position.' The
effect of this holding is to reemphasize two of the Court's previous assertions:
first, that the burden of persuasion in Title VII cases remains with the plaintiff
rather than shifting at any point to the defendant; and second, that Title VII
does not demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or
women.'
* By Joan K. Fine, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 42 U.S.C. 2000c-1 to 2000e-17 (1976).
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. .. .
Id.
' 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff, a black, male, civil rights activist who had
previously worked for McDonnell Douglas Corp., participated in several illegal activities against
the company. Id. at 794. Subsequently he applied for re-employment and was turned down
because of his illegal activities. Id. at 796. The plaintiff brought suit under Title VII. Id. at 797.
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination was successfully
rebutted because the employer had articulated a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection," a. at 802, by evidence of his illegal activities. Id. ai 803.
▪ Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978).
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
101 S.Ct. 1089, 25 FEP Cas. 113 (1981).
7 Id. at 1097, 25 FEP Cas. at 118.
B Id.
9 Id. at 1093, 1097, 25 FEP Cas. at 115, 118.
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The plaintiff in Burdine, a woman, was hired as an accounting clerk' in the
Public Service Careers Division (PSC) of the Texas Department of Communi-
ty Affairs (TDCA)." She received a promotion six months later, and, follow-
ing the subsequent resignation of her supervisor, was given additional duties."
The following year PSC, funded completely by the United States Department
of Labor, was reorganized to remedy inefficiencies as a condition of continued
funding of the program." In reducing the PSC staff, the defendant discharged
the plaintiff along with two other employees while retaining only one profes-
sional employee, a male.' 3
 The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the decision
to terminate her had been predicated upon sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII.' 4
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas entered
judgment for the defendant." The district court found that, although the plain-
tiff had presented a prima facie Title VII case, the defendant's employment
decisions were based on a good faith, rational evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the parties in question." Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that a prima facie case had
been estabiished. 11 It disagreed with the district court, however, regarding the
nature of the evidentiary burden such a prima facie case places on the defend-
ant." Referring to two prior Fifth Circuit cases," the court of appeals set forth
two rules it had developed for a defendant to successfully rebut a prima facie
Title VII case. 2° One rule required the defendant to prove nondiscriminatory
reasons by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 ' The other rule required the de-
fendant to prove that those individuals he hired or promoted were better,
qualified for the position than the plaintiff. 22
 The court of appeals held that the
defendant's case fell short of these evidentiary standards 23
 and reversed the
district court's finding regarding the plaintiff's termination."
The Supreme Court, on appea1, 25
 vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and
10 Id. at 1092, 25 FEP Cas. at 114.
11 Id.
12 Id
13 Id. The plaintiff was soon rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division. Id.
14 Id. In her original suit, the plaintiff also alleged discrimination in the failure to pro-
mote her to the position of director. Id. The district court and the court of appeals agreed that the
plaintiff had not been discriminated against in this matter. Id. at 1092-93, 25 FEP Cas. at 115.
The failure to promote the plaintiff was not an issue raised before the Supreme Court,
L' Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 25 FEP Cas. 118, 120 (1976).
16 Id at 119.
17 608 F.2d 563, 566-67, 21 FEP Cas. 975, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1979).
' 8 Id. at 567 n.7, 21 FEP Cas. at 978 n.7.
19 Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 15 FEP Cas. 746 (5th Cir. 1977);
and East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 11 FEP Cas. 300 (5th Cir. 1975).
2°
 608 F.2d at 567, 21 FEP Cas. at 978.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 568, 21 FEP Cas. at 979.
24 Id. at 570, 21 FEP Cas. at 980. The district court's finding that plaintiff had not been
discriminated against concerning a promotion was upheld by the court of appeals. Id.
" 101 S.Ct. 1089, 25 FEP Cas. 113 (1981).
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remanded the case for an application of the correct standard of the burden of
proof to be borne by the defendant." Reviewing the proper evidentiary pro-
cedures to be followed in Title VII cases, the Court stated that initially the
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's
acts constitute a prima facie case of discrimination." In order to prove a prima
facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standard, the Court noted, a plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he applied for an available
position, that he was qualified for that position, and that he was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of discrimination."
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie violation, according to
the Burdine Court, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate
a nondiscriminatory reason for his actions." This burden requires the defend-
ant to introduce admissible evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a nondiscriminatory reason. 3 ° The defendant needs only
to raise a genuine issue of fact — he need not persuade the court that he was ac-
tually motivated by such reasons. 3 ' The explanation provided, however, must
be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant." The Burdine Court
articulated a two-pronged test for determining the sufficiency of such
evidence." The evidence should (1) present a legitimate reason for the action
and (2) frame the factual issue with such clarity that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate any pretext involved. 34 Thus, to satisfy the
burden, an employer need only produce admissible evidence which would
"allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had
not been motivated by discriminatory animus. " 35
After the defendant articulates the nondiscriminatory reasons for his ac-
tions, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff, who is given the op-
28 Id. at 1093, 25 FEP Cas. at 115. That standard, reaffirmed in Burdine, is the Title VII
standard the Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell Douglas. See text and notes at notes 3-5
supra.
27 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 25 FEP Cas. at 115.
28 Id. at 1094, 25 FEP Cas, at 115. In McDonnell Douglas the Court articulated a four-
part test to show a prima facie case:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted). Although McDonnell Douglas was a race discrimination case,
the same criteria have also been applied to sex discrimination cases. See East v. Romine, Inc., 518
F.2d 332, 337 n.4, 11 FEP Cas. 300, 303 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975). Indeed, in this Surury case the
Supreme Court applied the McDonnell Douglas model to sex discrimination.
29 101 S.Ct. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117.
" Id. .•
si Id.
32 Id. at 1094, 25 FEP Cas. at 116.
33 Id. at 1095, 25 FEP Cas. at 116.
34 Id.
" Id. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117.
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portunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered
by defendant were a pretext for discrimination." The plaintiff retains at all
times the ultimate burden of persuading the court that he has been intentional-
ly discriminated against." This may be shown either directly, by persuading
the court that the employer was motivated by a discriminatory reason, or indi-
rectly, by showing that the employer's explanation was not valid. 38
The Court then applied the facts of the Burdine case to the standards which
it had just enunciated. After ruling that the plaintiff had established a prima
facie Title VII case, the Court turned to the question of the burden such a
showing places on the employer. The Court found that the Fifth Circuit had
misconstrued the nature of the defendant's burden in two respects." First, the
Court ruled that Turner v. Texas Instruments, inc.," a case relied upon by the
lower court which held that a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions existed, was
incorrectly decided.'" In effect, the Fifth Circuit's preponderance of the
evidence standard required a shift of the burden of persuasion to the
defendant." The Supreme Court, however, declared that the burden of per-
suasion never shifts from the plaintiff, 43
 and held that the Fifth Circuit's stand-
ard required a greater burden than merely the production of admissible
evidence which the Court required." In arriving at this conclusion, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument advanced in Turner that a lesser burden
might allow defendants to create fictitious reasons for 'their challenged
behavior.'" The Court found that possibility to be remote for several reasons:
first, the defendant, in order to meet the burden of production, would have to
offer clear and specific reasons for its acts; second, the defendant, although not
bearing the actual burden of persuasion, nevertheless "retains an incentive to
persuade the trier of fact;" and third, liberal discovery rules gave the plaintiff
access to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigation file
concerning her complaint. 46 For all three reasons, then, the Court found it
unlikely that fictitious justifications for the challenged employment action
would be effective.
The second way in which the Fifth Circuit deviated from the standard for
rebuttal of a prima facie case set forth by the Supreme Court was in requiring
the defendant to prove that the person hired or promoted was more qualified
36 Id, at 1093, 25 FEP Cas. at 115.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1095, 25 FEP Cas. at 116.
39 Id. at 1095-96, 25 FEP Cas. at 117-18.
40 555 F.2d 1251, 15 FEP Cas, 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
41 101 S.Ct. at 1095-96, 25 FEP Gas. at 116-17.
42 Id. at 1095, 25 FEP Cas. at 117.
'" Id. at 1093, 25 FEP Cas. at 115.
4* Id. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117.
43 Id.
46 Id.
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than the plaintiff." Referring to McDonnell Douglas again, the Court indicated
that Title VII requires a plaintiff to demonstrate only that similarly situated
employees were not treated equally." Under the Fifth Circuit's standard, the
defendant would be required to show that the plaintiff's qualifications were in-
ferior to those of the person selected." Title VII, according to the Supreme
Court, does not require the employer to reconstruct employment practices to
maximize the hiring of a greater number of women or minorities. 5 °
The Supreme Court's holding in Burdine is consistent with its earlier cases
defining a Title VII prima facie case rebuttal standard as well as with its policy
of providing a fair allocation of the burden of proof. The Court has consistently
drawn circuit courts' attention back to the McDonnell Douglas standard," using
subsequent cases to clarify that standard. For example, in Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters" the Court emphasized the nature of the evidence necessary to
rebut a prima facie Title VII case. 53 Furnco held that a prima facie showing is
not a factual finding of discrimination but rather is an inference of discrimina-
tion in the absence of any contrary explanation. 54 The employer, as part of the
rebuttal, or second step, must be allowed to introduce evidence which bears on
his legitimate motives. 55 In order to prove that he based his employment deci-
sion on a legitimate consideration, an employer need not prove that he used a
hiring procedure that maximized the hiring of minority employees. 56 Rather,
the employer need only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection. ''57




" Id. at 1097, 25 FEP Cas. at 118. The employer may even misjudge the qualifications
of an individual in the protected group without exposing himself to Title VII liability, although
such an act may be probative of pretext. Id.
31
 McDonnell Douglas described essentially three steps in the trial process. 411 U.S. at
802-04. First, the plaintiffs must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. Id. at
802. Second, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Id. Third, plaintiff must be given a fair op-
portunity to show that the employee's reason was pretext. Id. at 804.
" 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco, plaintiffs, three black bricklayers, alleged discrimina-
tion on the part of Furnco because of that company's policy of not accepting applications at the
job site, but hiring only from recommendations. Id. at 569-70. The Supreme Court held that the
company need not use the method of hiring which maximizes the employment of minority
employees but need only articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their hiring
practice. Id. at 576-78.
" 438 U.S. at 569.
34 Id. at 579-80.
53
 Id. at 580.
36 Id. at 577-78.
57 Id. at 578, quoting 411 U.S. at 802. The Furnco Court stated that courts should not at-
tempt to restructure business practices. 438 U.S. at 578.
39 439 U.S. 24 (1978). In its per curial,' opinion, the Supreme Court repeated its McDon-
nell Douglas standard of articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive and distinguished
the appeals court's test requiring the employer to prove absence of discriminatory motive as be-
ing a heavier burden and therefore incorrect. Id. at 24-25. The Court remanded in light of the
correct standard. Id. at 25.
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Supreme Court again emphasized the McDonnell Douglas standard of ar-
ticulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for actions challenged
under Title VII. 59 The Sweeney Court held, in a per curiam decision, that the
standard articulated by the First Circuit requiring the employer to prove the
absence of discriminatory intent was incorrect because it placed too heavy a
burden on the employer. 60
 The employer's burden is satisfied, according to the
Sweeney Court, if he "explains what he has done" or "produc[es] evidence of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. 1,61
The precedent that has been established by McDonnell Douglas, Furnco and
Sweeney is based on the distinction between the burden of persuasion and the
burden of production. This distinction creates a fair balancing of burdens be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant. Initially, the plaintiff must carry the
burden of offering sufficient evidence to create a presumption that the employ-
ment decision was based on a discriminatory reason." Placing this burden on
the plaintiff is fair because the plaintiff is in the best position to know the facts
necessary to establish a prima facie violation regarding his or her own employ-
ment." Once the plaintiff's burden has been met, the burden of production,
but not of persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for
his action." This shift is also fair to both the plaintiff and the defendant. It is
fair to the defendant because he should not be required to persuade the trier of
fact that his position is correct, but only to produce evidence as to why the
plaintiff's position is wrong. It is fair to the plaintiff for four reasons. First, the
defendant-employer should have the burden of production at this point because
he is in the best position to know the reasons for his actions. Second, the plain-
tiff has the opportunity, in the final step, to rebut specific reasons articulated by
the employer. Third, the plaintiff also has access to extensive information in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigation files" with
which to construct a rebuttal. Finally, although a satisfactory explanation by
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination aris-
ing from plaintiff's initial evidence, the initial evidence supporting the in-
ference of discrimination remains in the record for the trier of fact to consider. 66
59 439 U.S. at 24-25.
6° Id. at 25.
61 Id. at 25 n.2.
62
 411 U.S. at 802. McDonnell Douglas articulated one model of a prima facie case. See
text and note at note 28 supra. Other models are also possible. In Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977), for example, the Court noted that an inference of discrimination arises when
the action does not result from the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer
might rely: lack of qualifications or absence of vacancy in the job sought. Id. at 358 n.44.
63 See text and note at note 29 supra.
64 101 S.Ct. at 1093, 25 FEP Cas. at 115.
65 Id. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117.
66 Id. at 1095 n.10, 25 FEP Cas. at 116 n.10. Concern has been advanced that placing
only a burden of production on the defendant, rather than a burden of persuasion, might result
in possible unfairness to the plaintiff because of the possibility that the defendant might put forth
fictitious, invalid or illegitimate reasons for his behavior. Id. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117. This
concern is unfounded because of several safeguards cited by the Burdine court. One of the safe-
guards, however, although valid, obfuscates the issue of the shifting of the burden of persuasion.
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Although the Burdine decision does further clarify the prima facie rebuttal
standard for the Title VII cases, some ambiguity remains doncerning the
nature of the evidence necessary to rebut a Title VII prima facie case. What is
certain is that the defendant need not make a showing of any of the following: a
preponderance of the evidence," clear and convincing evidence," absence of
discriminatory motive, 69 or objective evidence that the person hired or pro-
moted was more qualified than the employee who was rejected." What is not
certain is the definition of evidence legally sufficient to justify a judgment for
the defendant. According to the Court, the defendant's evidence must raise a
genuine issue of fact." To do so the defendant must introduce admissible
evidence explaining the plaintiff's rejection. 72 This evidence must be legally
sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. 73 The Court implied that the
determination of legally sufficient evidence is subject to its twofold guideline. 74
That guideline states that the defendant's burden of production (1) should
meet the prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
(2) should frame the factual issue with enough clarity to give plaintiff a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. 75 The question remains whether this
twofold guideline will be sufficient by itself to justify a judgment for the
defendant in future cases.
The Court stated that the defendant has the incentive to persuade the trier of fact. 101 S.Ct. at
1096, 25 PEP Cas. at 117. The underlying theory is valid — the defendant will not recite facts
that are untrue if he is faced with the requirement of offering admissible evidence. Yet the prac-
tical result of "retain[ing] an incentive to persuade the trier of fact," id. , is so close to a shift in
the burden of persuasion as to be virtually indistinguishable from such a shift.
67 Id. at 1095, 25 FEP Cas. at 116-17. The Burdine Court rejected the preponderance of
the evidence standard applied in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 15 FEP
Cas. 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
68
 Ambush v. Montgomery County Gov't, 620 F.2d 1048, 1054, 22 FEP Cas. 1101,
1105-06 (4th Cir. 1980). Ambush, overruling the district court's clear and convincing standard, is
cited by the Burdine Court as impliedly adopting the correct standard. 101 S.Ct. at 1093 n.4, 25
FEP Cas. at 115 n.4.
69
 Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24.
" 101 S:Ct. at 1096, 25 FEP Cas. at 117. The Burdine Court overruled the court in East
v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 11 FEP Cas. 300 (5th Cir. 1975), which had applied this stand-
ard. In that case the court held that an employer must show that it compared employment history
and that those hired were better qualified. Id. at 340, 11 FEP Cas. at 305. The Court recognized
that Title VII continues to require employers to make fair and neutral employment decisions
regarding minorities and women but does not require preferential treatment. 101 S.Ct. at
1096-97, 25 FEP Cas. at 117-18. The Burdine Court additionally stated that an employer's mis-
judgment of the qualifications of applicants is not, in itself, a violation of Title VII. Id. at 1097,
25 FEP Cas. at 118. Such misjudgment, however, may be used by plaintiff in proving pretext.
Id. Employers, then, so long as they have established valid criteria for a job and applied them
equally to minority and nonminority alike, may choose the person best suited for the position
without being required to prove that the person hired instead of a minority applicant had superior
objective qualifications. Id.
" Id. at 1094, 25 FEP Cas. at 116.
77 Id.
"
" Id. at 1095, 25 FEP Cas. at 116.
" Id.
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D. Discriminatory Impact of an Employee Selection Process:
Teal v. Connecticut*
The Supreme Court has held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forbids the use of employment tests with discriminatory effect unless the
employer meets the burden of showing that the test bears "a manifest relation-
ship to the employment in question."I The burden arises after the plaintiff has
made a prima facie case of discrimination.' When one portion of an employ-
ment selection process has an allegedly discriminatory effect but the process in
its entirety does not, the lower federal courts have been divided over the ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff may make a prima facie case of discrimination.' The
majority of the few courts that have considered the issue have held that in a Ti-
tle VII case the selection process as a whole, rather than just one of its com-
ponents, should be examined for disproportionate impact.'
During the Survey year, in Teal v. Connecticut,' the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact when he establishes that a component of a selection process produced
disparate results and constituted a pass-fail barrier beyond which the candidate
was not permitted to pass. 6 The case is significant in that, at least within the Se-
cond Circuit, it expands the possible circumstances under which a plaintiff may
make a prima facie showing of employment discrimination and increases the
extent to which courts must examine particular segments of a selection process.
The plaintiffs in Teal were four black American citizens employed by the
Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut.' In order to
attain promotion to permanent status as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors, the
plaintiffs had to participate in a selection process, the first step of which was a
written examination. 8 Those employees who passed the written examination
entered an eligibility pool from which candidates would be selected to fill per-
• By John R. Pierce, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
• Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
For cases holding that the selection process as a whole, rather than any portion,
should be examined for disproportionate impact, see Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 66, 18
FEP Cas. 1052, 1056 (4th Cir. 1978); Rule v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 565, n.10,
16 FEP Cas. 35, 40 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 497-98, 10 FEP Cas.
1380, 1384-85 (6th Cir. 1975); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256,
1261-63, 20 FEP Gas. 1377, 1380-81 (D. Conn. 1979) (expressly overruled by Teal, see text at
notes 35-43 infra); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756, 771, 19 FEI 3 Cas. 520, 531 (E.D.
Va. 1978). Contra, League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873,
894-95, 12 FEP Cas. 651, 666-67 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
• Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1261, 20 FEP Cas. 1377,
1380 (D. Conn. 1979).
645 F.2d 133, 25 FEP Cas. 529 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
October 5, 1981) (No. 80-2147).
6 Id. at 134-35, 25 FEP Cas. at 529-30.
7 Id. at 135, 25 FEP Cas. at 530.
9 Id.
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manent positions. 9 The defendants would.then take into consideration the can-
didates' previous performance on the job, recommendations from supervisors,
and to a lesser extent, seniority.'° The defendants also used an affirmative ac-
tion program at that point in the process to ensure that many supervisors
chosen from the eligibility pool would be minority-group members."
On the written test, 54.17 percent of the black candidates and 79.53 percent
of the white candidates received passing scores. 12 The plaintiffs were among
those black candidates who did not receive passing scores." Analysis of the
selection process in its entirety shows that 23 percent of the black candidates
who took the written test and 13.5 percent of the white candidates who did so
were eventually promoted to permanent positions.H The plaintiffs filed a suit
in federal district court alleging that the written test had discriminated against
them on the basis of race in violation of Title VII.' 5
The district court held that the results of the entire selection process should
be used to determine whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had
been made.' 6 In arriving at its conclusion, the district court decided
preliminarily that the claim should be evaluated under the disparate impact
analysis' 7 established by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." The
,
court pointed out tnat the results of the written test did show disparate
impact,' 9 but concluded that the results of the entire selection process must
show such impact for a prima facie case of racial discrimination to be establish-
ed . 2o
Appealing to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs asserted
that the district court had erred in deciding that they had failed to make a




12 Id. at 136, 25 FEP Cas. at 530.
" Id.
' 4 Id., 25 FEP Cas. at 531.
" Id., 25 FEP Cas. at 530.
16 Id. at 137, 25 FEP Cas. at 531.
17 Id. at 136, 25 FEP Cas. at 531. Plaintiffs had asserted their Title VII claims under
both the disparate treatment formula and the disparate impact analysis. Id. Discriminatory
motive must be proved in the former type of action, but need not be proved in the latter type. Id.
at 136 n.5, 25 FEP Cas. at 530 n.5.
18 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
" 645 F.2d at 137, 25 FEP Cas. at 531. The court's evaluation was made under the
four-fifths rule of the Uniform Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures prepared by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1979). 645 F.2d at
136-37, 25 FEP Cas. at 531. That rule provides that "fa] selection rate for any race, sex, or
ethnic group which is less than four-fifths ... of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. I607.4(D) (1979). The
Supreme Court has declared that EEOC Guidelines, while not binding on courts, should be
shown great deference. 645 F.2d at 137 n.6, 25 FEP Cas. at 531 n.6. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
20 645 F.2d at 137, 25 FEP Cas. at 531.
" Id. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that the proof of trial established a prima facie
case under the disparate treatment formula. Id. The circuit court pointed out that the plaintiffs'
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case had been made, 22 and accordingly reversed the decision of the lower
court." The court's reasoning was based on a distinction it drew between two
types of sub-tests in an employment process. 24 Those types are: (1) one of two
or more sub-tests that all applicants take in order to receive a cumulative score
based on performance in all the sub-tests, and (2) a pass-fail barrier sub-test
that prevents failing applicants from going on to other segments of the selection
process. 25 The first type of sub-testing had been presented to the Second Cir-
cuit COurt of Appeals in its 1975 decision in Kirkland v. New York State Depart-
ment of Correctional Services. 26 In that case the court had declined to look into
disparate impact of sub-tests. 27 The Teal court distinguished Kirkland on the
ground that all the candidates for employment in Kirkland had been exposed to
all portions of the selection process." Exposure to all the components of a selec-
tion process is important, in the court's opinion, because some portions of the
process can offset other portions that are discriminatory. 29 In accordance with
such reasoning, if the process as a whole does not produce a disparate impact
on one group, although one portion of the process does, it can be assumed that
such offsetting of one portion against another is taking place." When one por-
tion of a process acts as a pass-fail barrier that some cannot proceed beyond,
however, those who have been the victims of "a discriminatory sub-test have no
chance to benefit from any offsetting elements present in later parts of the pro-
cess." The court considered judicial scrutiny into the first type of process con-
trary to common sense." However, with respect to the second type, the court
stated that judicial scrutiny is required." That requirement is derived, the
court 'reasoned, from congressional intent that Title VII protect individuals
rather than "faceless groups. "34
qualifications were in dispute and that accordingly it might be proper under the disparate treat-
ment formula to assign plaintiffs the burden of proving that the test was not job-related. Id., 25
FEP Cas. at 531-32. Under such circumstances, the court stated that the disparate impact
analysis would better accommodate the case. Id. The court then turned to a discussion of the
dispa.rate impact claim. Id. at 137-40, 25 FEP Cas. at 531-34.
22 Id. at 137, 25 FEP Cas. at 532.	 •
23 Id. at 140, 25 FEP Cas. at 534.
24 Id. at 137-40, 25 FEP Cas. at 531-34.
25 Id.
26 520 F.2d 420, 11 FEP Cas. 38 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
" 645 F.2d at 137, 25 FEP Cas. at 532.
28 Id. at 137-38, 25 FEP Cas. at 532. In Kirkland, in response to the plaintiffs' assertion
that a civil service examination had racially disparate consequences, the defendants argued that
the results of the five sub-tests comprising the examination did not show a consistent racial
disparity, especially when broken down among the different locations at which the examination
was given. 520 F.2d at 425, 11 FEP Cas. at 41. The court held that because a passing score was
dependent upon the cumulative results of the five sub-tests, the defendants' argument was not
relevant to the issue of whether or not the examination as a whole had a discriminatory impact.
Id.
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In the course of its discussion, the court overruled a 1979 decision of the
federal district court for Connecticut, Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board."
The factual basis of Brown, a case which ruled against the plaintiff even though
a portion of the selection process may have had a discriminatory effect, was
similar to that of Teal." The Teal court rejected the two principal bases of
Brown." The first was that examination of components of a selection process
could lead a court on a limitless course." The second was that Title VII should
not be interpreted in a way that would inhibit employers from adopting volun-
tary affirmative action programs." With respect to Brown's first basis, the Teal
court stated that in the case of a pass-fail barrier, "both the discriminatory
component and the affected individuals are readily identifiable."" A court
would not, therefore, need to look into "subscores."" With respect to Brown' s
second basis, the Teal court saw no reason why Title VII could not be inter-
preted to invalidate a selection process that includes an affirmative action com-
ponent. 42 Affirmative action is permitted by Title VII, but is not required by
it
While the Teal decision may have a certain appeal because of its concern
for the protection of individuals, rather than "faceless groups," from employ-
ment discrimination, the decision can be subjected to some criticism. In its
discussion of the Brown case, the Teal court did not address Brown's statement
that "[e]ven in a cumulatively scored application process, a score on any single
component might be so low as to preclude the accumulation of a total score
meeting . a minimum hiring requirement."" In light of that observation, it is
evident that the distinction between the two types of selection processes is not
so neat. Thus, although the court's decision in Teal is based on a distinction
that it draws between two types of selection processes, the court fails to address
the important statement in Brown that casts doubt upon the existence of any
such distinction. Furthermore, it is only on the basis of the existence of the
distinction that the Teal court dismisses the concern that courts will be burden-
ed excessively by examining isolated sub-tests. 45 The court acknowledged that
35 Id. at 138-40, 25 FEP Cas. at 532-34 (overruling Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv.
lid., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 20 FEP Cas. 1377 (D. Conn. 1979)).
36 645 F.2d at 138, 25 FEP Cas. at 532. In Brown, plaintiffs challenged a testing pro-
cedure — for the hiring of police — that consisted of several stages. 474 F. Supp. at 1258, 20 FEP
Cas. at 1377. A written examination and physical agility test were scored separately. Id. A com-
bination of the scores determined whether an applicant had passed or failed. Id. Those passing
were eligible for an interview, which was scored separately. Id. The applicants with the highest
scores in the interview were hired. Id.
37 See 645 F.2d at 138-40, 25 FEP Cas. at 532-34.
' 6 Id. at 138, 25 FEP Cas. at 532.
" Id., 25 FEP Cas, at 533.




4+ 474 F. Supp. at 1262, 20 FEP Cas. at 1380.
45 645 F.2d at 139, 25 FEP Gas, at 533.
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such a concern is justifiable in connection with cumulatively scored selection
processes." The court fails to explain convincingly why the burden of examin-
ing sub-tests is lighter in the process with a pass-fail barrier. Moreover, if, as
Brown suggests, there is no meaningful distinction between the two processes,
then the concern may be equally justifiable in the case of a process with a pass-
fail barrier.
It remains uncertain what impact Teal will have. Since the decision states
that Title VII does not require judicial scrutiny into cumulatively scored selec-
tion processes, the effect of the decision within the Second Circuit may be to
encourage the use of such processes by employers who wish to avoid litigation.
II. THE EMPLOYER'S ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS:
DISCRIMINATION V. NON-DISCRIMINATION
A. Sexual Harassment as a Discriminatory Condition of Employment:
Bundy v. Jackson*
Section 703' of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 2 pro-
hibits sex discrimination. A cause of action for sex discrimination under section
703 is established where it is shown that an employer has discriminated against
an individual with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment" on the basis of sex. 3 In 1977 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in Barnes v. Costle, 4 held that allegations of sexual
harassment, when coupled with an adverse employment consequence, make
+6 Id.
* By Charles Purinton Shimer, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1976). Section 703 reads as follows:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
2 42 U.S.C. 2000e to c-17 (1976).
3 Id. at 5 2000e-2(a). See Taub, Keeping Women In Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se As A Form
Of Ernployrnent Discrimination, 21 B.C. L. REV. 345. 363 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Taub]. The
Taub article presents an in-depth review of sex discrimination in the employment context, in-
cluding a section outlining the legal status of sexual harassment claims prior to Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 24 FEP Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and a proposal to find any stereotyping to be
discrimination per se. Taub at 361-417.
* 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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out a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.' The Barnes court
adopted a "but-for" test in determining whether sex discrimination existed. 6
After Barnes,' which now represents the majority view, 8
 two elements have
been required to prove sex discrimination. First, potential discrimination in the
form of an adverse employment consequence must exist. 9 Second, the "but-
for" test requires a showing that the gender of an individual is a substantial
factor contributing to the discrimination: that if a woman's sex had been dif-
ferent she would have been treated differently." Under this approach, an in-
dividual who shows an adverse career consequence directly linked to the rejec-
tion of sexual advances from a superior authorized to make employment deci-
sions has established a prima facie Title VII case against the employer."
Subsequent cases rejected claims that sexual harassment alone, without a
showing of directly-related adverse employment ramifications, constituted a
valid cause of action. 12
' Id. at 989-90. Later the same year the Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
6 561 F.2d at 990. See Taub, supra note 3, at 364.
' Prior to 1977, the showing that a male supervisor had addressed unwelcomed sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature to a
female subordinate in an employment context, failed to state a cause of action under section 703
even if there were adverse employment consequences. E.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 555-56 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded 568
F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 162-63 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated and remanded without reported decision, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP
Gas. 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded sub nom Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). Courts based this outcome on one of two grounds. Either such acts were found to be
of a "personal" nature, and therefore attributable to the individual supervisor but not to the
employer, Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. at 163, or they were found to discriminate on
the basis of the refusal to engage in the requested activity rather than on the basis of the sex of the
individual. Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP Cas. at 124.
All lower court decisions holding that the rejection of sexual advances, followed by
adverse consequences, is not a Title VII violation have been reversed. Miller v. Bank of
America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979);
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd and remanded,
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated and remanded without reported decision, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). No other circuit has
adopted a contrary view. See, e.g., Garber v. Saxon Business Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032
(4th Cir. 1977).
9 See, e.g., Clark v. World Airways, 24 FEP Cas. 305, 307 (D.D.C. 1980) (no violation
of Title VII where sexual advances by corporation president and submission was not related to
any employment prospects, and no termination ensued); Neeley v. American Fidelity Assurance
Co., 17 FEP Cas. 482, 484-85 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (no violation of Title VII where physical con-
tact and verbal dirty jokes were engaged in by vice-president with female employee but were not
related to employment benefits). Neither the Barnes nor the Tomkins court faced the situation of
sexual harassment without resulting adverse employment consequences, and the Tornkins court
expressly declined to reach this question. See 568 F.2d at 1046 n.1; 561 F.2d at 985. See also Taub,
supra note 3, at 373.
'° See 568 F.2d at 1047 n.4; 561 F.2d at 990.
" See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213.
e.g. , Fisher v. Flynn, 19 FEP Cas. 933 (1st Cir. 1979) (insufficient nexus between
romantic overtures by department head and termination); Cordes v. County of Yavapai, 17 FEP
Gas. 1224 (D. Ariz. 1978) (refusal of prior sexual advances not tied to subsequent termination).
See also note 9 supra.
December 19811	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 281
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in Bundy v. Jackson,' 3
 significantly extended sex discrimination law,
holding that sexual harassment of a female employee by male supervisors in
itself constitutes a violation of Title VII. Since the Bundy court found that sex-
ual harassment amounted to discrimination with respect to the "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment,"" it eliminated any requirement that a .
plaintiff prove she resisted the harassment and that an adverse employment
consequence resulted from this resistance."
A co-worker and various superiors subjected the plaintiff in Bundy, an
employee of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (the depart-
ment), to a series of sexual advances." When the plaintiff complained to the
supervisors' superior about these advances, he responded that " 'any man in
his right mind would want to rape you,'" and, thereafter, he proceeded to
proposition Bundy."
After this latest advance, the plaintiff became eligible for promotion in
January of 1975, but upon contacting her first- and second-line supervisors was
informed that she could not be recommended for promotion due to a promo-
tion freeze." Learning subsequently that other employees nevertheless had
been recommended for promotion, Bundy feared she was being denied a pro-
motion because she rejected her superior's sexual advances.' 9 Based on this
belief, she pursued several informal procedures with the department to register
her complaint. 20
When these repeated attempts to complain proved unsuccessful, Bundy
proceeded to pursue her claim of sexual harassment formally. 2 ' The depart-
" 641 F.2d 934, 24 FEP Cas. 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 943, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
" Id. at 943-44, 945-46, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160, 1161-62.
j6 Id. at 939-40, 24 FEP Cas. at 1156-57. Bundy received and rejected sexual proposi-
tions from a fellow employee, who later became the department director and in his role as such
was the named defendant, id. at 939, 24 FEP Cas. at 1157, as well as from both her first- and




2° Id. at 941, 24 FEP Cas. at 1157-58. First she consulted the department's Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) Officer. Id. at 941, 24 FEP Cas. at 1157. Then Bundy met
with her third-line supervisor and informed him of the harassment and of her belief, based on the
fact that other employees were recommended for promotion, that she was being denied promo-
tion because of her rejection of the sexual advances. Bundy v. Jackson, 19 FE? Cas. 828, 831
(D.D.C. 1979) (Finding of Fact No. 38). The supervisor responded that she had not received the
promotion because of unsatisfactory work, and that she was free to pursue the matter further. 614
F.2d at 941, 24 FEP Cas. at 1158. At this point, the plaintiff informally complained to the depart-
ment's Chief EEO Officer, who advised her that such charges would be difficult to prove and
cautioned against bringing unwarranted complaints. Id. In April of 1975, Bundy presented a
draft summarizing her complaints to the department director, who arranged a meeting with her
second- and third-line supervisors. Id. At this meeting, however, several other people were also
present and the discussion focused not on sexual harassment but on the plaintiff's possible pro-
motion and her alleged work deficiencies. Id. After the meeting, Bundy's first- and second-line
supervisors completed a memorandum offering inadequate work performance as the reason for
denying her a promotion. Id.
" Id.
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ment director took no steps to investigate the plaintiff's formal complaint
beyond asking Bundy's supervisors if they had made improper advances
toward her." In February of 1976, Bundy was recommended for a promotion,
which she received the following July." The plaintiff became eligible for
another promotion in July of 1977, but never received it."
Bundy filed an action with the federal district court in August of 1977,
claiming that the department violated Title VII by imposing different and
more onerous terms and conditions of employment on her than upon similarly-
situated employees. 25 She charged that the department denied her promotions
based on her sex and her refusal to submit to sexual advances. 26 Finding that
improper sexual advances made by male supervisors to female employees were
considered "standard operating procedure, . . . a normal condition of employ-
ment in the office,"" the court held that the allegations with regard to the sex-
ual advances were fully proved." Nevertheless, the district court failed to find
any adverse employment consequences, concluding that the plaintiff was
denied promotion because of her work performance, not because of her rejec-
tion of sexual advances." Therefore, reasoning that sexual advances which do
not lead to the loss or denial of tangible employment benefits do not constitute
Title VII discrimination with respect to "any term or condition of . . employ-
ment," the district court entered judgment for the defendant. 3°
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. 3 ' Ap-
plying the Barnes "but-for" criteria, the court had no difficulty determining
that Bundy suffered discrimination on the basis of sex, since her sex was for no
legitimate reason a substantial factor contributing to her harassment." Based
on the district court's finding that the harassment was "standard operating
procedure" and that the department- director as well as other officials who
made promotion decisions had notice of the harassment yet did nothing to stop
the practice, the court also had no difficulty in ascribing the harassment to the
department. 33
The "novel question" before the court was whether sexual harassment
absent adverse employment consequences amounted to sex discrimination with
respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" under Title
VII. 34 In concluding that it does, the Bundy court reasoned that this result
22 Id,
" 19 FEP Cas. at 832 (Finding of Fact No. 46).
24 641 FEP Cas. at 941, 24 FEP Cas. at 1158.
" Id.; 19 FEP Cas. at 829 (Finding of Fact No. 1).
26 19 FEP Cas. at 829 (Finding of Fact No. 1).
27 Id, at 831 (Finding of Fact No. 38).
28 Id. at 832 (Conclusion of Law No. 2).
29 it (Conclusion of Law No. 3). The court found that Bundy was denied the subse-
quent promotion in July 1977, because she had reached the top of her career ladder. Id. (Conclu-
sion of Law No. 4).
" Id. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 5 and 6).
31 641 F.2d at 938, 24 FEP Cas. at 1156.
32 Id. at 942-43, 24 FE? Cas. at 1159.
" Id. at 943, 24 FEP Cas. at 1159.
94 Id., 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
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"follows ineluctably" from cases finding violations of Title VII where an
employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environ-
ment, regardless of whether any tangible job benefit was lost as a result of the
discrimination." In this regard, the court cited cases holding that racial,"
religious, 37
 or ethnic" slurs, as well as segregated facilities" are potential viola-
tions of Title VII when found to be a pattern in the work environment."
In accepting the plaintiff's argument that "conditions of employment" in-
cluded both the psychological and emotional work environment, and that sex-
ually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions illegally poisoned that
environment,'" the court relied primarily on language in another Title VII
case, Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 42
 In Rogers, a case ad-
dressing race and national origin discrimination, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth -Circuit determined that a work environment heavily charged with
discrimination could destroy the emotional and psychological stability of a pro-
tected class of individuals.'" Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
creating or condoning such an environment could be a violation of Title VII
with respect to an expansive conception of the phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. ''44
Examining the reasoning of Rogers and related cases, the Bundy court noted
that although racial slurs are just verbal insults, they are intentional and
directed at individuals, and thus form the basis for Title VII liability in
"discriminatory environment" cases." The court reasoned that both racial
slurs and sexual harassment could be merely verbal, and yet poison the at-
mosphere of employment when intentionally directed at employees." The
court remarked that sexual harassment "injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotypes" into the work environment and "represents an intentional assault
" Id.
36 Id. at 944, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160-61, (citing Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d
169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (pattern of racial intimidation violates Title VII right to a non-
discriminatory work environment); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631-35
(W.D. N.Y. 1978) (black employees entitled to work environment free from racial abuse and in-
sult); Steadman v. Hundley, 421 F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. III. 1976) (racial slurs may lead to
Title VII liability).
" Id., (citing Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(demeaning religious slurs by supervisor violate Title VII)).
'a Id., (citing Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.
1977) (though employee could only prove isolated incidents, a pattern of offensive ethnic slurs
would violate Title VII)).
39 Id., (citing Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
514-15 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (segregated employee eating clubs con-
doned, though not organized or regulated by employer, violate Title VII by creating a
discriminatory work environment)).
4° Id.
" Id. at 944, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
42 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
43 Id. at 238.
44 Id.
45 641 F.2d at 945, 24 FEP Cas. at 1161. See note 36 supra.
46 641 F.2d at 945, 24 FEP Cas. at 1161.
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on an individual's innermost privacy," 47 Thus, the court found that sexual
harassment, like racial slurs, amounts to discrimination with respect to the
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in violation of Title VII."
Having determined that sexual harassment alone will state a valid cause of
action within the language of Title VII, the Bundy court then gave its justifica-
tion for concluding that neither a showing of resistance to the advances nor the
loss of a tangible job benefit is necessary to establish a violation of section 703.
The court again relied on Rogers in reaching this conclusion. 49 The Rogers court
warned that once patently discriminatory practices become outlawed, those
employers bent on pursuing a discriminatory policy will use subtle, more so-
phisticated methods to perpetuate .discrimination among employees. 50 The
Bundy court noted that, similarly, although it is illegal to deny job benefits as a
result of the rejection of sexual advances, an employee would have no legal
recourse if the employer was sophisticated enough to stop short of taking tangi-
ble action against her in response to a refusal to cooperate sexually. 5 ' The court
reasoned that an employer implicitly and effectively could make endurance of
sexual harassment a "condition" of employment, causing the harassed female
to face a "cruel trilemma: "" endure the harassment, 53 attempt to oppose it
with the likely prospects of making the job even less tolerable, 54 or leave the job
voluntarily with little hope of legal relief and the prospect of facing harassment
anew in a different job."
Upon determining that sexual harassment cases should be treated like
other "discriminatory environment" cases, without a requirement of showing
resistance or subsequent adverse consequences, the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for injunctive relief." The court
suggested several steps it would deem to be appropriate relief. First, the depart-
ment director should "raise affirmatively the subject of sexual harassment with
all his employees," and inform the employees that such harassment is a viola-
" Id.
46 Id. at 943, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
" Id. at 943-44, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160.
" Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 239.
5 ' See 641 FEP Cas. at 945, 24 FEP Cas. at . 1161.
52 Id. at 946, 24 FEP Cas. at 1162.
" The court acknowledged that resistance could be meaningless where the male super-
visor demanded no response to the advances beyond mere tolerance. Id., 24 FEP Cas. at
1161-62.
54
 In many situations, proof of rejection would require the employee to object in a "visi-
ble and dramatic way," at the risk of making her life on the job even more miserable. Id., 24 FEP
Cas. at 1162, (citing C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 43-47
(1979)).
55 Id.
56 Id. In offering its guidance, id. at 946-47, 24 FEP Cas. at 1162-63, including appro-
priate language for an injunction, id. at 948 n. 15, 24 FEP Cas. at 1163 n. 15, the court referred
to the final Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment (Guidelines) issued
by the EEOC on November 10, 1980 and applied by them to the case at bar, id. at 946-47, 24
FEP Cas. at 1162-63, (thing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual
Harassment, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 677 (1980) to be codified at 29 CFR 1604.11 (a)-(g)).
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tion of Title VII and the EEOC Guidelines. 57 Further, the court would require
that the department establish and publicize a procedural mechanism allowing
employees to complain immediately and confidentially about harassment, and
"take all necessary steps to investigate and correct any harassment, including
warnings and appropriate discipline directed at the offending party," as well as
generally develop means of preventing harassment." The court of appeals also
suggested that the district court retain jurisdiction to review the defendant's
plans for compliance. 55
The Bundy decision reaffirmed the District of Columbia Circuit's leading
role in the judicial treatment of sexual harassment. Four years earlier in Barnes,
the District of Columbia Circuit became the first to recognize sexual harass-
ment coupled with adverse employment consequences as a violation of Title
VII. The Bundy decision represents the next logical step in the judicial recogni-
tion of the impact of sexual harassment on female employees. 60 In section 703
of Title VII, practices that discriminate because of an individual's sex are pro-
hibited in the same terms as practices that discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin.°' It has been accepted in the context of racial,
religious, and national origin discrimination that verbal insults could violate
Title VII. 62 Therefore, it is both consistent and logical to interpret the same
language as prohibiting similar practices in the employment context when they
are based on an individual's sex.
In the context of sex discrimination, as in the context of race discrimina-
tion, eliminating stereotypes from the employment environment is a prerequi-
site to achieving treatment based on an individual's qualifications rather than
" Id. at 947, 24 FEP Cas. at 1163.
58 Id.
59 Id. The final portion of the opinion remanded the claim for back pay and promotion,
instructing the district court on a special burden of proof to apply in this type of case. Id. at
948-53, 24 FEP Cas. at 1165-68. However, in light of Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 25 FEP Cas. 113 (1981), reported elsewhere in the Survey, the Bundy
court's reasoning on this issue is suspect. The Bundy court would shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant in cases where sex discrimination is proved independent of any loss of tangible job
benefits. 641 F.2d at 952-53, 24 FEP Cas. at 1165-67. The Bundy court reasoned that the plaintiff
should enter the "ritual order of proof" at an advantage, similar to that enjoyed by plaintiffs in
cases where race discrimination is proved independent of any loss of tangible benefits. Id. at 952,
24 FEP Cas. at 1166-67. To make out a prima facie case, the court would require a showing by
the plaintiff "(1) that she was a victim of sexual harassment attributable to her employer, . . . and
(2) she applied for and was denied a promotion for which she was technically eligible and of
which she had a reasonable expectation." Id. at 953, 24 FEP Cas. at 1167. If this prima facie case
were presented, the burden would shift to the employer to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for denying the promotion. Id, This would entail
a showing by the employer that despite the employee's technical eligibility, the qualification
criteria were more stringent than the employee could meet. Id.
6G See Taub, supra note 3, at 371-77.
61 See note 1 supra.
62 641 F.2d at 944-45, 24 FEP Cas. at 1160-61. See Taub, supra note 3, at 371-73; Com-
ment, Sexual Harassment and Title VII — Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 148,
153-59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
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her status as a member of a particular class." Courts have recognized this,
noting that: "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703 (a)(I)
subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job oppor-
tunities and enjoyment which have plagued women in the past." 64
 Further,
Congress acknowledged that "discrimination against women is no less serious
than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be accorded the
same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimination. "65
Perhaps the requirement of adverse employment consequences in section 703
sex discrimination cases effectively addressed the "irrational impediments to
job opportunities." Impediments to job enjoyment, however, can be addressed
only by recognizing that sexual harassment in itself is also a violation of section
703. 66
 In addition, the fact that sex discrimination is no less serious than other
discrimination will be recognized by employers only if sexual harassment
alone, like racial slurs, can constitute a violation of section 703. For these
reasons, the Bundy result is correct, and its application will help ensure that the
congressional mandate against sex discrimination can be fully realized.
While Bundy goes a long way in advancing the frontier of sex discrimina-
tion law in the area of sexual harassment, several questions remain. First, it is
doubtful whether Bundy will provide a more definite resolution of the question
of the employer's vicarious liability for acts of sexual harassment. Second, the
amount of conduct necessary to constitute sexual harassment violative of Title
VII will have to be clarified. Finally, the immediate impact of the Bundy deci-
sion outside the District of Columbia Circuit remains to be seen.
The first question not resolved in Bundy is whether an employer is always
liable for acts of sexual harassment. 67
 Where a supervisor denies a tangible job
benefit, such as a promotion, because an employee rejects sexual advances
made by the supervisor, imposing employer liability seems logical. The
employer hired the supervisor to make this sort of decision and in this capacity
63 Unwelcome conduct in the employment context such as sexual harassment, or the use
of racial slurs, is based on historical stereotypes of a particular class of individuals' "proper
place" in society. This conduct reinforces a stereotype denoting an inferior status, a position re-
quiring submission to demands from individuals of a favored or "superior" class. See Comment,
supra note 62, at 158; Taub, supra note 3, at 361. Sexual harassment of female employees by male
supervisors implies that the female's primary role is to satisfy male sexual desires, just as de-
meaning treatment of black employees by white supervisors implies that the black's primary role
is to satisfy whites' desires. See Comment, supra note 65, at 158; Taub, supra note 3, at 361.
64
 Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting the
passage from Sprogis with approval).
" H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
" Although data regarding sexual harassment is scanty, recent studies suggest that the
overwhelming majority of women do not enjoy sexual advances on the job and are not flattered
by such conduct. Taub, supra note 3, at 361 n.85.
67
 The facts in Bundy support liability only where the advances are committed by super-
visors, both before and after the plaintiff complained, and when upon notice of such acts the
employer took no action to stop the advances and reprimand those involved. See text at notes
68-70 infra.
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the supervisor is an agent acting directly for the employer. Similarly, where the
employer has notice of sexual harassment committed by supervisory personnel,
regardless of any resulting employment consequences, and implicitly condones
the conduct by failing to take corrective action, the employer's liability is also
clear. But where sexual harassment does not result in adverse employment
consequences and the employer has no reason to know of the conduct, the ra-
tionale for imposing liability on the employer is less compelling.
Although the Bundy court noted that an employer is liable for acts com-
mitted by supervisory personnel, 68
 courts in the future may reject arguments
for broad employer liability and may distinguish Bundy as limited to its specific
facts. Not only Bundy's second- and third-line supervisors, but also the depart-
ment director and EEOC officers were notified of the harassment, yet they took
no corrective action, did not investigate the complaint, and even frustrated her
attempts to complain. In addition, the district court found that sexual harass-
ment represented "standard operating procedure, " 69 within the department.
On these facts, it would seem that employer liability may be limited to cases
where there is notification, actual or constructive, and corrective action is not
undertaken. In dicta, the Bundy court indicated a desire to expand liability
beyond the situation presented in the case by stating only one situation where
an employer might be relieved of liability: where a supervisor acted in con-
travention of the employer's policy, without the employer's knowledge, and
the employer initiated prompt corrective action. 7° In addition, in providing in-
junctive guidance, the court noted that the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment (Guidelines) affirm employer liability
for harassment by supervisors regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of the conduct." The Guidelines make no exception to
employer liability for conduct of an agent or supervisor." The Guidelines
would expand employer liability even further, holding the employer liable for
acts of sexual harassment between fellow employees" and for acts by non-
employees in the workplace" where the employer or supervisory personnel
knows or should have known of the conduct but failed to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action." Whether Bundy will be narrowly construed as
imposing employer liability only where the employer knew of the conduct of its
supervisors yet failed to take corrective action, or whether the much more ex-
pansive concept of employer liability expressed in the Guidelines with respect
to supervisory personnel will be adopted, remains to be seen.
A second question not resolved in Bundy is the extent of harassment neces-
68 641 F.2d at 943, 24 FEP Cas. at 1159.
69 Id.
70 id.
" Id. at 947, 24 FEP Cas. at 1162.
72
 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 677 (1980) (to be codified at 29 CFR 5 1604.11(c)).
79 Id. (to be codified at 29 CFR 5 1604.11(d)).
" Id. (to be codified at 29 CFR 5 1604.11(e)).
" Id. (to be codified at 29 CFR 5 1604.11(d),(e)).
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sary to constitute a Title VII cause of action. Bundy presented a fairly
straightforward situation where sexual harassment continued after the plaintiff
complained about the conduct. In other situations, however, the existence of
harassment may not be so apparent. One commentator recently addressed this
issue and identified two "countervailing considerations" in attempting to
delineate the level of harassment necessary to constitute a Title VII case."
While acknowledging that men may genuinely be,unaware that their conduct is
offensive to women, it also should be recognized that it is often unrealistic to
expect women to express their rejection, since this may invite retaliation, thus
making the victim's job even less tolerable!" In light of these legitimate con-
siderations; this commentator proposed a standard that seems to be both fair
and practical. As a general rule, the standard would require a woman to in-
form the harasser that she finds his conduct offensive." In extreme situations,
however, the standard would not require such a warning before the harassment
would be deemed to constitute a violation of Title VII. 79 In either situation,
after the harasser knew, or should have known, that his conduct was unwel-
come, the commentator would find a violation of Title VII." Regardless of
whether this standard is adopted by courts in the future, the application of
Bundy to claims of sexual harassment will necessitate a clarification of what con-
duct violates Title VII in cases where the harassment does not occur repeatedly
or is discontinued after complaints.
Although Bundy leaves unanswered questions concerning vicarious liabili-
ty and the level of harassment necessary to violate Title VII, the decision
nevertheless represents the broadest expansion of the phrase "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" in the sex discrimination context to date. It
remains to be seen, however, whether other courts will adopt this expansion.
While Title VII existed for seventeen years, 81 the Rogers decision provided a
basis for expanding the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges" for ten
years," and legal commentators argued in favor of such an expansion in the
context of sex discrimination for at least five years before Bundy," the District
of Columbia Circuit is the first court to accept this expansion. Prior to Bundy,
only two other circuits had addressed directly the issue of sexual harassment
76 Taub, supra note 3, at 375.
" Id.
" Id. at 375-76.
79 Id. at 376. These extreme cases include physical conduct such as grabbing the
woman's buttocks or putting hands under the women's clothing, and verbal conduct such as
reference to the size of the woman's breasts. Id.
8° Id. at 377.
It should be remembered that the amendment inserting the coverage of sex into Title
VII was only offered with the aim of defeating the entire legislation, not with the aim of equal-
izing the role of women in the workplace or in society. Comment, supra note 62, at 156 n.41 (citing
L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 103-06 (1969)); Miller,
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN, L. REV, 877,880-84 & n.34
(1967).
es Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238.
88 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 62, at 153-59.
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even when the action was coupled with adverse employment consequences and
found a violation of Title VII." With this dubious historical background of the
treatment of sex discrimination in general, and sexual harassment in par-
ticular, the speed with which other courts follow Bundy will indicate whether the
judiciary is finally ready to treat sex discrimination as no less serious than other
unlawful discrimination, a goal affirmed by Congress over a decade ago."
B. Involuntary Early Retirement: EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad*
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) states as one
of its purposes the prohibition of arbitrary age discrimination in employment.'
Individuals between the ages of 40 and 70 are protected by the ADEA. 2
Subsection 4(a) of the.ADEA provides in pertinent part that it shall be unlawful
for an employer to discharge any individual because of age.' Subsection 4(0(2)
provides, however, that it shall not be unlawful for an employer "to observe
the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit
plan . . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act, except that
no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
.. "4
 Section 4(0(2) has been interpreted as an exception to the Act which
allowed involuntary retirement under certain seniority systems and employee
benefit plans.' In 1978 Congress amended section 4(0(2) to prohibit its use as a
8+ See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d at 1048; Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d at 212, 214.
" See text and note at note 65 supra.
* By Joan K. Fine, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 29 U.S.C. 55 621 et seq. (1976). Section (b) of the Act states its purpose as follows:
"Flo promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. 5 621(3) (1976).
2
 At the time of the alleged discriminatory acts in the Survey case, EEOC v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 23 FEP Cas. 1381 (4th Cir. 1980), which occurred in 1971 and 1972,
the protected ages were 40 to 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631 as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, 3(a), 92
Stat. 189 (1978).
3
 The ADEA provides in relevant part: It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age. ... " 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1) (1976).
+ Section 4(0(2) of the ADEA provides in relevant part: It shall not be unlawful for
an employer ... (2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual. ... " 29 U.S.C. 5 623(0(2) (1976).
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 195 (1977).
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defense to the involuntary retirement of protected individuals. 6
 The amend-
ment was enacted because the courts' interpretation of 4(f)(2) was considered
contrary to congressional intent.'
In this Survey year, the Fourth Circuit in EEOC v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company,' examined the broad issue of whether the involuntary retirement of
employees because they qualify for pension benefits is a violation of the ADEA.
The case posed two questions: first, whether the involuntary retirement of
employees based on their age constituted a violation of the ADEA; and second,
whether the subsequent change in the company's retirement plan reducing the
mandatory retirement age violated the Act. The B. &O. Railroad court avoided
the question of the retroactivity of the 1978 amendment to the ADEA by
holding that the employer's actions violated the pre-1978 Act. 9
In 1971 a nationwide coal mining strike precipitated a financial crisis at
the B. & 0. Railroad Company." This financial condition required the com-
pany to reduce its work force." One hundred and forty-two employees aged 60
to 65 were selected for involuntary retirement because they qualified for pen-
sion benefits. 12
 The following year the company amended its pension plan to
provide for involuntary retirement at age 62.' 3 The plaintiff'* alleged that B. &
0. Railroad violated the ADEA by involuntarily retiring 142 employees based
6 Added to 5 4(0(2) is the following amending language: "[a]nd no such seniority
system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any in-
dividual specified by section 631(a) of this Act because of the age of such individual." 29 U.S.C.
623(0(2) (1979 Supp.).
7
 The Committee on Human Resources, under whose auspices the amendment was
made, reported that the retirement decision should be an individual option for capable older
workers. H.R. REP. NO, 95, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted.in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 504, 506 (hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS]. The Com-
mittee further contends that the original 1967 section 4(0(2) has been misinterpreted by the
courts. Id. at 512. Referring to legislative history of the original section, the purpose of that sec-
tion was to permit employment of older workers without necessarily including them in employee
benefit plans. Id. Furthermore, Senator Yarborough, the floor manager of the original 1967 bill,
stated that 5 4(0(2) " , will not deny any individual employment or prospective employment
but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension retirement or insurance plan."
Id. at 513. Despite such language, not only the Third and Fifth Circuits, Zinger v. Blanchette,
549 F.2d 901, 14 FEP Cas. 497 (3d Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting, 500 F.2d 212, 16
FEP Cas. 501 (5th Cir. 1974), but also the Supreme Court, United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192 (1977), have ruled that pension plans requiring mandatory retirement prior to age
65 do not violate the ADEA under section 4(f)(2). Id. at 513. The Committee disagrees with these
holdings and states that, in their view, "forced retirement extinguishes an individual's rights to
employment and is thus not excused by section 4(0(2) unless the retirement is based on some
reason other than age, such as disability or poor performance." Id. at 512.
B 632 F.2d at 1107, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381 (4th Cir. 1980).
9
 Id. at 1112-13, 23 FEP Cas. at 1385.
'° Id. at 1109, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381-82.
" Id., 23 FEP Cas. at 1382.
Id.
IS Id.
" The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was substituted as
appellant-cross appellee after the briefs were filed for the appeal because the enforcement respon-
sibilities For ADEA were shifted to the EEOC. The Secretary of Labor, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, had originally brought suit. Id. at 1108 & n.1, 1108, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381 & 0.1.
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on their age-related entitlement to a pension, and by amending the pension
plans to lower compulsory retirement from age 65 to 62. 15 The district court
found prima facie violations of the ADEA but held that the company's actions
fell within the permissible exception provided by subsection 4(0(2)." On ap-
peal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the company's actions were not
excepted from the Act under section 4(0(2)."
Both the district court and the circuit court found that the involuntary
retirement of 142 individuals because of their age and pension entitlement con-
stituted a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA.° The
threshold question in determining prima facie violations of the ADEA is
whether age is a determining factor — although not necessarily the sole factor
— in the company's actions.° The court stated that, although the company's
economic crisis precipitated the layoffs, these particular individuals would not
have been selected for retirement "but for" their age. 2° Hence, a prima facie
violation was shown.
Once a prima, facie case has been established, the burden of production
shifts to the company to articulate a reason for its actions which would not be a
violation of the Act. 2 t For pre-amendment cases, which include B. & 0.
Railroad, a successful rebuttal of a prima facie violation is a section 4(f)(2)
defense showing, first, that the action was taken under a bona fide pension
plan, and second, that the plan is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the
ADEA. 22 The court in B. & 0. Railroad set forth a clear and reasonable test for
a successful section 4(f)(2) defense: the involuntary termination must be pur-
suant to the pension plan's design and not be a discretionary act of manage-
ment. 23
Applying this test to the actions of the B. & 0. Railroad, the court first ad-
dressed the issue of whether the involuntary early retirement of 142 individuals
was a violation of the ADEA. 24 In order to prevail under a section 4(f)(2)
Id. at 1108, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381.
16 Id. at 1108-09, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381.
' 7 Id. at 1109, 23 FEP Cas, at 1381.
18 Id. at 1108, 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1381-82.
19 Id. at 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1382.
2° Id.
21 Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011, 20 FEP Cas. 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1979),
22 632 F.2d at 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
" Id. at 1111, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383. The court looked to several prior cases which held
that involuntary retirement as early as age 60 was not a violation of the ADEA when such action
was taken pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan. Id. (citing United Air Lines v. McMann, 434
U.S. 192 (1977); Thompson v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1978); Zinger v. Blan-
chette, 549 F.2d 901, 14 FEP Cas. 497 (3d Cir. 1977)). For example, the Supreme Court in
McMinn rejected any per se rule requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose
as evidence of good faith compliance. 434 U.S. at 203. In that case an employee voluntarily
subscribed to a retirement plan in which the normal retirement age was 60. Id. at 193-94. The
employee signed an application form for the plan which stated that the retirement age was 60. Id.
at 194. The Court held that the retirement plan came within the 4(1)(2) exception and, therefore,
no violation occurred. Id. at 203. The Court further stated that an employer, in order to have a
bona fide retirement plan does not have to show a business or economic purpose to justify in-
voluntary retirement provisions enacted prior to the passage of the ADEA. Id.
24 632 F:2d at 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
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defense, the company had to show that the involuntary retirements were in-
itiated under a bona fide pension plan. 25 A successful section 4(f)(2) defense re-
quires a specific plan and does not include discretionary acts of management. 2t
The court determined that the company's claim of an informal retirement plan
at age 62 was not valid because it was not a bona fide written plan." Although
the company had been retiring individuals before age 65 on an informal basis,
the company's written retirement plan called for involuntary retirement at
65. 28 Thus the court concluded that "normal retirement" occurred at age 65
and retirement prior to age 65 was not pursuant to a bona fide retirement
plan."
After ruling that section 4(0(2) did not provide a defense to the company's
involuntary retirements, the court addressed the issue of whether the revised
retirement plan reducing the age for involuntary retirement from age 65 to 62
violated the ADEA. The court held that, under section 4(0(2), the company's
action was a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the Act." Personnel reductions
based on age are specifically prohibited by the Act.'' The court reasoned that
the company's revised retirement plan, formulated after financial difficulties
had necessitated reductions in the work force, was, in essence, a personnel
reduction based on age, violative of the express purpose of the Act. 32 Further-
more, the court stated that because the company's actions were a violation of
the pre-1978 Act, there was no need to decide the issue of the retroactivity of
the 1978 amendment."
The B. & 0. Railroad court's decision that the early involuntary
retirements violated the ADEA was a proper one. The court based its decision
25 Id.
" Id.
27 Id. at 1111, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
" Id. at 1110-11, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
29 Id. The company further asserted that its action was not a violation of ADEA
because it had relied on published Labor Department opinions in assuming the legality of the in-
voluntary retirements. Id. at 1111-12, 23 FEP Cas. at 1384. This reliance was sufficient, it was
contended, to protect the company under the Portal-to-Portal Act's exception for good faith
reliance. Id. at 111 1, 23 FEP. Cas. at 1383. The Portal-to-Portal Act, incorporated into the
ADEA by 29 U.S.C. 626(e) (1976), states in pertinent part that no employer "shall be subject
to any liability or punishment if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of
was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on any written administrative regulation,
order, ruling, approval, or interpretation of the agency of the United States." 29 U.S.C.
259(a) (1976). On its face this argument appears to be valid. Examination of one of the opinion
letters relied on, however, clearly indicates that the involuntary retirement prior to age 65 must
be done pursuant to a retirement or pension program in which the employees are participants.
632 F.2d at 1112, 23 FEP Cas. at 1384. The B. & 0. Railroad's pension plan did not call for in-
voluntary retirement prior to age 65. Id. at 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383. Therefore, no employees
could be considered to be participants in a plan calling for involuntary retirement prior to age 65
because no such plan existed in which they could participate. The court, accordingly found that
no good faith reliance existed. Id. at 1111-12, 23 FEP Cas. at 1384.
" Id, at 1112-13, 23 FEP Cas. at 1385.
31 Id. at 1113, 23 FEP Cas. at 1385.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1112, 23 FEP Cas. at 1385.
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on the ground that the action was not taken pursuant to a bona fide written
plan. One possible unarticulated factor for the court's decision is that under the
employer's prior practices, management had the luxury of determining when it
would pay early retirement benefits without having to provide such benefits as
a result of an employee's voluntary decision to retire. Thus when the decision
to retire was the employee's, management was under no obligation to provide
such benefits. Consequently, only when management unilaterally decided that
early retirement was desirable would pension benefits be provided.
Although the court's holding that the involuntary retirement of 142
employees violated the ADEA rests on firm ground, its decision that the re-
vised retirement plan was a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the ADEA is
subject' to criticism. The court emphasized that this change in the retirement
plan was made in 1972, after the company had been advised of its violation in
retiring the 142 employees. 34 The court concluded that because of this se-
quence of events, the change could not have been made in good faith." There
is, however, one other possibility that the court did not address. The B. & 0.
vice president testified that the company had involuntarily terminated
employees prior to age 65 in the past and that such a right was inherent in
management." Additionally, the company argued at trial that the right to ter-
minate employees involuntarily was an unwritten part of the plan because of
past practice." By changing the plan, it is possible that the company was at-
tempting to incorporate its established internal practices into its written plan to
ensure that such practices could not be challenged as discretionary acts of
management. The court did not consider this explanation.
Another disappointing aspect of the Fourth Circuit's analysis is its failure
to reach the issue of whether the 1978 amendment to section 4(1)(2) is retroac-
tive. An examination of Supreme Court precedent, 38 the district court holding
in the principal case addressing itself to the retroactivity issue," and the
legislative history of the amendment" produces the conclusion that the amend-
ment is most likely prospective in nature. The district court rejected the argu-
ment put forth by the plaintiff in B. & 0. Railroad that, according to Bradley v.
School Board, 4 ' a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its deci-
sion unless doing so would result in an injustice, or unless statutory direction or
legislative history is to the contrary." Bradley can be distinguished from B. & 0.
Railroad, however. The statute addressed in Bradley was one authorizing the
award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in a school desegregation case." That
34 Id.
35 Id.
" Id. at 1110, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
37 Id. at 1110-11, 23 FEP Cas. at 1383.
38 Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
39 EEOC v. B. & 0. R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 18 FEP Cas. at 1101 (D. Md. 1978).
4° 123 CONC. REC. S17, 304 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977).
41 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
42 461 F. Supp. at 382, 18 FEP Cas. at 1102. See 416 U.S. at 711.
44 416 U.S. at 716. See 20 U.S.C. $ 1617 (1976).
294	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
statute did not alter any substantive obligation nor would earlier enactment
have caused the defendant to change its conduct. 44 Consequently, applying the
statute retroactively did not produce a manifest injustice. In B. & 0. Railroad,
however, retroactive application of a statute regulating retirement plans would
not allow private parties to rely on prior settled law in formulating corporate
and individual plans. 45 Furthermore, had the statute been amended earlier, it
is likely that employers would have responded with different retirement plans
or policies. Thus, while the retroactive application of a statute regulating fee
schedules did not result in a manifest injustice in Bradley, the retroactive ap-
plication of a statute regulating retirement plans in B. & 0. Railroad would
have such a result.
The question then remains whether legislative history or statutory direc-
tion compels retroactive application. The district court considered the statute's
legislative history and concluded that, based on Floor Manager Senator
Williams' responses, the bill was not intended to be retroactive. 46 Statutory
direction indicates that the amendment took effect April 6, 1978 except for cer-
tain collective bargaining agreements in which case its effect was delayed until
January 1, 1980. 47
An earlier case cited by the plaintiff in support of his position that the
amendment should be applied retroactively, Davis v. Boy Scouts of America," ac-
tually sidestepped the issue of retroactivity. Davis specifically determined that
the question was not the retroactivity but rather the application of the existing
rule at the time of trial. 49 The district court avoided applying that construction
to EEOC u. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, but did not find Davis dispositive because
that court did not directly address the timing issue. 5°
Although ambiguity exists as to whether the Fourth Circuit will
automatically find any subsequent age change to be a violation of the ADEA,
or whether it will adopt a' case-by-case analysis of such situations, the issue is
moot for cases arising after the effective date of the amendment. The post-
amendment section 4(0(2) no longer serves as a defense to involuntary retire-
ment based on age. Retirement for cause, however, is permitted under section
4(0(3). 5 ' Presumably, section 4(0(2), post-amendment, will now serve that
purpose expressed in its original legislative history: to permit the employment
of workers without the necessity of including all workers in employee benefit
plans. 52
44 Id, at 721.
45 461 F. Supp. at 379, 18 FEP Cas. at 1103.
46 Id. at 380-81 & n.3, 381, 18 FEP Cas. at 1104-05 & n.3, 1105. Among several com-
ments by Senator Williams was the statement that "the bill is not retroactive. The question of
mandatory retirements prior to the effective date of this bill will be determined by the courts' in-
terpretation of existing law." Id. at 381, 18 FEP Cas. at 1104 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. S17, 304
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977)).
47 CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, supra note 7, at 523.
48 457 F. Supp. 665, 17 FEP Cas. 1546 (D.N.J. 1978).
49 Id. at 673, 17 FEP Cas. at 1551.
5° 461 F. Supp. at 380 n.2, 18 FEP Cas. at 1104 n.2.
31 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(3) (1976).
52 CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, supra note 7, at 512.
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In conclusion, applicability of the section 4(f)(2) defense to rebut a prima
facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA has been eliminated under
the 1978 amendment. 53
 The language of the amendment is clear: "no such
seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involun-
tary retirement of any individual specified in section 12(a) of this Act because
of the age of such individual." 54 The purpose of the amendment, as stated in
the legislative history, is to clarify section 4(f)(2) to prohibit mandatory retire-
ment pursuant to pension plans or seniority systems of individuals in the pro-
tected age category." Thus, section 4(f)(2) no longer validates mandatory
retirement under a bona fide retirement plan based on age after the effective
dates for the amendment." A question remains whether the amendment is
retroactive. Following the effective dates for the amendment, mandatory
retirement will only be available for cause, such as disability or poor perform-
ance. 57
III. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE NLRA AND EEOC
A. Retaliation Charges: Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) both have jurisdiction in certain in-
stances of retaliation by employers against employees who have exercised their
legal rights by group activity. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge ... under
this title."' At the same time, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), in
section 7, gives employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection' and, in section 8, provides that an
53 Id. at 513.
54 29 U.S.C. S 623(0(2) (1976).
55 CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, supra note 7, at 504.
55 Id. at 510-12. Two exemptions to the prohibition against mandatory retirement were
specified: highly compensated individuals and certain employees of educational institutions.
57 Id. at 512.
* By John R. Pierce, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-3(a) (1976).
2 29 U.S.C. 5 137 (1976). That section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title [section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA].
29 U.S.C. 5 157 (1976).
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employer's interference with, restraint or coercion of employees exercising
such a right shall constitute an unfair labor practice. 3
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Frank Briscoe, Inc. v. NLRB,• held that the filing of a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) by a group of
employees under Title VII could constitute concerted activity protected by the
NLRA. 5
 To qualify as a protected activity, the court ruled, the filing must not
violated another important principle of labor law, such as that of a union's
right to exclusive representation of employees. 6 The court further held that
retaliation by the employer against those employees who had filed an EEOC
complaint could then be an unfair labor practice giving rise to the remedial
measures of the NLRA. 7 Thus, the redressing of violations of Title VII is not
necessarily the exclusive province of the EEOC. 3
 The availability of a remedy
from the EEOC under Title VII does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking and
obtaining relief under the NLRA from the NLRB. 9
 In other words, the
jurisdiction of the NLRB and EEOC may overlap in some cases involving
retaliation by an employer.
In Briscoe, twelve ironworkers were laid off in February, 1979, by Frank
Briscoe Inc. (Briscoe), general contractor for the construction of a convention_
center in Pittsburgh."' At that time, the construction project was shut down
because of poor weather conditions." The union steward instructed the laid-off
employees that they would later be called back to work.' 2
 Of those employees,
four black workers filed charges of racial discrimination with the EEOC. 13 In
March, when the company began rehiring, it instructed the union hiring hall
that as long as the discrimination charges were filed with the EEOC, none of
the laid-off workers would be recalled.' 4
 Briscoe's job superintendent told a
union representative that to rehire those who had not filed charges would be
evidence of discrimination.' 3
 Eight of the workers requested that they be
3
 29 U.S.C. 5 158 (1976). That section provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [section 7 of the NLRA]. ..."
* 637 F.2d 946, 106 L.R.R.M. 2155 (3d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 953, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160.
6 Id. at 950, 106 L. R. R.M. at 2158.
7 Id. at 953, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160.
8 See id.
9 Id.
'° Id. at 947-48, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
" Id. at 947, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
12 Id. at 948, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
" Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156. A fifth worker who had been demoted but not laid off
also filed charges. Id. Of the four laid-off workers filing charges, one was a trainee laid off
because of Briscoe's mistaken belief that the collective bargaining agreement required that all
trainees be laid off before any journeymen. Id. at 948 n.2, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156 n.2. That
worker was recalled on February 27 when Briscoe realized its error. Id.
' 4 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156. The decision of the NLRB states that the employer
Briscoe thought that it would be "in some unexplained way 'vulnerable' if it rehired any of that
laid-off group, black or white." Frank Briscoe Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (1980).
" 637 F.2d at 948, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
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rehired, but were refused. 16 Those eight workers, including three of the blacks
who had filed discrimination charges with the EEOC, brought an unfair labor
practice charge against the company."
During the ensuing proceedings before the NLRB,' 8 the employer
asserted that the lay-off and the refusal to rehire were due to the poor work per-
formance of the employees.° The administrative law judge found, however,
that the lay-off had been a general one and that the company had refused to
rehire any of the workers because they had filed charges with the EEOC. 20 The
filing of such charges, the judge continued, constituted protected concerted ac-
tivity under the NLRA, regardless of the merit of those charges." The judge
ordered the employer to cease the violation, and to reinstate the workers with
back pay. 22
 The Board affirmed the findings, conclusions, and rulings of the
administrative law judge. 23
Consequently, Briscoe petitioned the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for
review, and the NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement of the Board's order. 24
Briscoe raised three issues on appeal." The first two concerned the Board's
fact-finding. 26 Rejecting Briscoe's arguments, the court held that the Board's
determinations were supported by substantial evidence." Briscoe's third con-
16 Id., 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
" Id.
" Frank Briscoe Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (1980).
19 Id.
20 Id. The administrative law judge stated that all the discriminatees, white and black,
had been affected by the filing by the blacks of the charges with the EEOC. Id. at n.16. The judge
rejected Briscoe's contention that the protected concerted activity, if it existed, constituted such





 637 F.2d at 947, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (1) (1976). 637 F.2d at 947, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2156.
25
 637 F.2d at 948, 950, 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157, 2158-59.
26
 First, Briscoe argued that the record did not support the finding that the ironworkers
had engaged in protected concerted activity. Id. at 948, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157. Referring to Ed-
ward Blankstein, Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 320, 321, 104 L.R.R.M. 3004 (3d Cir. 1980) (can-
vassing of other employees regarding interest in health plan constituted concerted activity —
"concerted activity requirement is basically a factual inquiry"), the court stated that the question
was one of fact, and found that the Board's determination had been supported by substantial
evidence. 637 F.2d at 949, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157. In accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (1)
(1976) (providing for review of the Board's decision by circuit courts of appeals and stating that
findings of fact by the Board are to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence), the court
was thus bound to uphold the Board's determination. 637 F.2d at 949, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157.
In connection with the question of concerted activity, the court also rejected an argument that the
Board had relied on a so-called "constructive concerted activity" doctrine enunciated in Inter-
boro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966), enforced 388 F.2d 495, 67
L.R.R.M. 2083 (2d Cir. 1967), which had been rejected in NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440
F.2d 881, 76 L.R.R.M. 2958 (3d Cir. 1971). 637 F.2d at 949, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157-58.
Second, Briscoe argued that.evidence on the record did not support the Board's finding that
Briscoe had refused to rehire the workers because of the charges filed with the EEOC. Id. at 950,
106 L.R.R.M. at 2158. The court found that the Board's finding was fully supported on the
record. Id. at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2158.
27 637 F.2d at 949, 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2157, 2158. See note 26 supra.
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tention was that the only remedy available to the workers for the refusal to
rehire them is that derived from section.704(a) of Title VII. 28 That section for-
bids discrimination against an employee who has filed a charge or participated
in proceedings under Title VII. 29 The court noted that Title VII does not itself
address the relation between section 704(a) of Title VII and section 13(a)(1) of
the NLRA. 3° The court then considered the legislative history31 and subse-
quent judicial interpretation of Title VII. 32
Looking at the legislative history of Title VII, the court found an expres-
sion of Congressional intent that the act allow an individual to pursue rights in-
dependently under both Title VII and other applicable statutes. 33 The court
quoted from an interpretative memorandum introduced by Senator Clark, a
sponsor of the bill, stating: "[f a given action should violate both Title VII and
the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would
not be deprived of jurisdiction. " 34 The court pointed out that amendments that
would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for most unlawful
employment practices had been twice defeated. 35
Having found that the legislative history does not support a contention
that the remedies provided by Title VII are exclusive, the court turned to a
consideration of judicial interpretation of Title VII with respect to that conten-
tion. In doing so, the court referred to three Supreme Court decisions that sup-
port a conclusion that the remedies provided by Title VII are not exclusive. 36
First, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 37
stated that section 7 of the NLRA' protects employees from retaliation by their
employers when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to ad-
ministrative and judicial forums." 38 The court in Briscoe noted that Eastex cited
with approval an NLRB case that had held that section 704(a) of Title VII does
not provide the exclusive remedy for retaliation. 39 Second, the Briscoe court
28 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-3(a) (1976). 637 F.2d at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2158-59.
" 42 U.S.C. 2000c-3(a) (1976).
30 637 F.2d at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
31 Id. at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
32 Id. at 952-53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159-60.
33 Id. at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
34
 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964), quoted in 637 F.2d at 951, 106 L.R.R. M. at 2159.
" 637 F.2d at 951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159. The court made reference to 110 CONG.
REC. 13,650-52 (1964) and H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1971). 637 F.2d at
951, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
The court's citations to the Congressional Record are the same as those of the United States
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974) (an employee
does not lose his statutory right to trial de novo under Title VII by prior submission of his claim to
final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement).
" 637 F.2d at 952, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159-60. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556
(1978); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
' 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (distribution of a newsletter by employees was protected activity
under 5 7 of NLRA).
38 437 U.S. at 566, quoted at 637 F.2d at 952, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
39 637 F.2d at 952, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159. See King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. No.
80 (1976).
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made reference to Alexander v, Gardner-Denver Co. , 40 a 1974 case which held that
submission by an employee to final arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement does not preclude a private right of action under Title VII. 41 Third,
the Briscoe court found support" in the Supreme Court's decision in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization. 43 That decision recog-
nized that employees' rights to be free from racial discrimination may arise
from both Title VII and the NLRA. 44 Thus, since the Briscoe court found that
the remedy provided by Title VII for retaliation is not exclusive, the court
granted the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement of its order.'"
In a dissenting opinion , 4 Judge Schwartz asserted that the activity of the
ironworkers, though "concerted activity ... for mutual aid or protection
," not protected by the NLRA.'" He stated that the focus of the court
should be on whether an unfair employment practice that would not have been
illegal before the passage of Title VII is also an unfair labor practice under the
NLRA. 48 Under such an analysis, Judge Schwartz concluded that while
Briscoe's refusal to rehire might constitute racial discrimination under Title
VII, it did not constitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. 49
The result reached by the Briscoe court appears to be the correct one. The
majority recognized that the question of whether retaliation against employees
who have filed charges has occurred is quite distinct from the question of
whether racial discrimination has taken place. The question of whether retalia-
tion for filing of charges occurred is independent of the nature or merit of those
charges, and may be regarded as within the expertise of the NLRB. The occur-
rence of retaliation in a given instance may be a much simpler question of fact
than the existence of racial discrimination. Consequently, the remedy for a
specific instance of retaliation would tend to be simpler than that for a per-
vasive pattern of racial discrimination. The dissent failed to recognize the
distinctness of the two is sues. Furthermore, the holding of the majority is firm-
ly suported by the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act.
The issue of overlapping jurisdiction of the EEOC and NLRB is signifi-
cant because of the differing enforcement mechanisms available to each agen-
cy. Under Title VII, an employee files a charge with the EEOC, which then in-
vestigates the charge and may attempt conciliation between employer and
employee. 50 If the EEOC does not obtain a satisfactory conciliation agreement,
it may institute a suit against the employer in federal district court. 5 ' If the
4G 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
* 1 637 F.2d at 952, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159.
42 Id. at 952-53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2159-60.
45 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (decision by minority employees to bypass procedures of collec-
tive bargaining agreement is not protected by national policy of nondiscrimination).
*4 420 U.S. at 69, cited at 637 F.2d at 952-53, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160.
45 637 F.2d at 953, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160.
45 Id. at 953-57, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160-63 (dissenting opinion).
47 Id. at 953, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2161.
48 Id. at 955, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2162.
42 Id. at 956, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2163.
3° 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5 (1976).
5 ' Id.
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EEOC refrains from filing a suit, the employee may file one:" Thus, the role of
the EEOC is primarily conciliatory. It does not issue orders. If there is to be an
order, it must come from the federal district court after the usual course of
litigation." In contrast, under the NLRA, an employee may file a charge with
the NLRB, which, after investigation, may issue a complaint against the
employer.." The case is tried before an administrative law judge, whose finding
is reviewed by the Board." The Board may issue an order and then petition a
federal circuit court of appeals for a court order to enforce it." The employer
may also petition that court for review of the Board's action."
Thus, as a result of Briscoe, in situations involving retaliation by an
employer against employees who have filed charges with the EEOC, the
employees may have a choice of two procedural routes." The options available
to the employees are accordingly broadened. 59 Practitioners may find that the
NLRB process can provide quicker resolution of a given problem.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Determining Attorney's Fee Awards To Prevailing Title VII Plaintiffs:
Copeland v. Marshall*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' governs employment discrimina-
tion proceedings. One provision of Title VII gives the court discretionary
power to allow the prevailing party to recover from the losing party reasonable
attorney's fees as part of the cost of litigation.' If the prevailing party is the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the United States, the statute
does not give the court authority to award reasonable attorney's fees as part of
the costs.' This recovery is in addition to any other relief granted.*








" One commentary states that such overlapping jurisdiction is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with governmental efficiency. Smith & Schmelzer, Overlapping Jurisdiction of the EEOC and
NLRB, 31 LAB. L. J. 393, 402 (1980).
59 It must be borne in mind that not all conduct protected by 5 704(a) of Title VII is
necessarily protected by 5 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 637 F.2d at 953, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2160. For ex-
ample, concerted activity violative of the principle of exclusive representation by a union would
not be protected by the NLRA. Id. at 950, 106 L.R.R.M. at 2158.
* By Lisa LeFevre DiLuna, Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 42 U.S.C. S5 2000e — 2000e-17 (1976 an&Supplement III, 1980).
2 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-5(k); 2000e-16(d) (1976).
42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
* 42 U.S.C. 55 2000e — 2000e-17 (1976 and Supplement III, 1980).
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discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, creed or national
origin, and to provide monetary and equitable relief to those who have suffered
such discrimination. 5
 The United States Attorney General or the Equal
Employment Commission may enforce the substantive provisions of Title VII
against private employers. Title VII, however, does not authorize the Attorney
General or the Commission to bring suit on behalf of federal employees against
government agencies. 6
 Aware that private enforcement would be essential to
effect the statute's purpose, Congress enacted a fee awards provision.' Con-
gress' intent in allowing recovery of reasonable attorney's fees was two-fold.
First, potential recovery of attorney's fees would make it easier for "a plaintiff
of limited means to bring a meritorious suit,"s thereby providing incentive to
plaintiffs to seek redress of injuries.g Second, the prospect of liability for at-
torney's fees might serve as a deterrent to employment discrimination.") Thus,
one purpose of Title VII's fee award provision is remedial — it is designed to
foster redress of injury after employment discrimination has occurred. The
other purpose is prophylactic — it is designed to prevent or deter such discrimi-
nation before it occurs.
As originally enacted, Title VII did not specifically provide federal
employees access to court for review of employment discrimination claims.
Complaints of employment discrimination were heard first by the agency in
question, with a subsequent review by the Civil Service Commission. Mone-
tary restitution or back pay was not available." In 1972, Congress amended
the attorney's fees provision of Title VII to provide for an impartial adminis-
trative review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and mone-
tary restitution for federal employee discrimination in employment claims. In
addition, the 1972 amendment permitted a prevailing federal employee or job
applicant to recover attorney's fees from the federal government "the same as
a private person." 12
 According to the House report, it was essential that the
federal government have the same obligation to eradicate discrimination in
federal employment that industry and labor organizations have to eradicate
5
 42 U.S.C. 55 2000e-5(k); 2000e-16(d) (1976 and Supplement III, 1980).
6 42 U.S.C.
	 2000e-16 (1976); Parker v. Califano, 516 F.2d 320, 330 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
42 U.S.C. 55 2000e-5(k); 2000e-16(d) (1976 and Supplement III, 1980); see Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); S. REP. NO. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2-4 reprinted in 119761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5909-14; Berger, Court Award-
ed Attorney's Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 306-07 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Berger].
See 110 CONG. REC. 12722 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), 118 CONG. REC.
4940, 4943 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2157-60.
9
 Parker v. Califon°, 561 F.2d 320, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Dawson, Lawyers and In-
voluntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 899 (1975) (discussing the ra-
tionale for non-statutory award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties).
10 See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S., 913 (1978).
" 42 U.S.C. 2000e — 2000e-16(d) (1976).
12 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-5(k) (1976 and Supplement III, 1980); 118 CONG. REC. 4943
(1972).
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discrimination in private employment.I . 3 In addition, the House report stated
that a federal employee should be able to seek judicial redress in the same man-
ner as a private sector employee." Under the 1972 amendment to Title VII,
therefore, a court may grant a discretionary award of reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party regardless of whether the losing party is a public or
private entity.
In neither the original 1964 Act, nor the 1972 amendment to Title VII,
however, did Congress provide guidance for the courts to determine what con-
stitutes a reasonable attorney's fee. The United States Supreme Court also has
not stated what standards should be employed in determining a reasonable at-
torney's fee award. In the absence of such guidance considerable litigation has
been spawned over the amount of court-awarded Title VII attorney's fees."
When the losing fee-paying party has been a private entity, labor organization,
or state or municipal government, the majority of courts have applied a
market-value approach in determining the award of a reasonable fee." For
most courts using this approach," application of a market-value formula re-
quired an analysis of the number of hours the attorney devoted to a variety of
legal activities' 8 and an assignment of a value to the hours reasonably expend-
ed.i 9 Ascertaining the value of the hours the attorney has expended generally
" H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2158-60.
' 4 Id. at 2160.
15 See, e.g. , Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1980); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 448 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Ingram v.
Madison Square Garden Center, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Clark v. American
Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971);
Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (panel decision, Copeland I); Copeland v.
Marshall, 20 FEP Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (panel decision denying petition for rehearing,
Copeland II); Copeland v. Marshall, 20 FEP Cas. 88 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam, petition for
rehearing en bans granted); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (full court, Copeland III).
16 Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (F.D. La. 1970) (private
corporation); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (hotel and
union, applies principles from Johnson case, see notes 17, 31 infra); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d
1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980) (state agencies, Hawaii Dept. of Social Services and Housing).
7 This is the foundation of the approach outlined in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), cited with approval in S. REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913 (Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976). The report also cited with approval Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64
F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); 353 F. Supp. 124 (1972), aff'd, 550 F.2d 464 (1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1977), petition for rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978). The Stanford Daily
case, 64 F.R.D. 680, used the Johnson factors modified by the analysis presented in a Third Cir-
cuit antitrust case, Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). 64 F.R.D. at 682-83. The Stanford Daily case has been cited
with approval in cases in both civil rights and Tide VII Fee awards in all circuits except the
Fourth Circuit.
IS For example, time spent on pre-trial discovery, depositions, or settlement negotia-
tions should be identified. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973). See also City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495
F.2d 448, 470-71 (2d Cir. 1974).
19 487 F.2d at 168.
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starts with determining the attorney's normal hourly billing rate. 2° This rate
then can be adjusted to reflect the contingent nature of the fees, 2 ' the quality of
the attorney's performance," or other variables." This method of determining
the "reasonable" fee that should be awarded consistently has been referred to
as the market-value approach. 24
Although federal courts generally have applied the market-value approach
to fee award determinations when the losing Title VII defendant was a private
party, neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court has stated what
standard should be applied when the federal government is the losing party. In
1976, however, with the passage of the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award
Act, 25 Congress appeared to have endorsed the market-value approach to fee
award determinations when the federal government is the defendant. The Civil
Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act allows a court, in its discretion, to award at-
torney's fees to a prevailing party in a civil rights action. 26
 The Senate report
stated that this Act was modeled on the language of Titles II and VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act." The report stated that the purposes of these Titles in-
cluded encouraging litigants to bring meritorious suits and to deter future civil
rights violations . 28
The Senate report of the 1976 Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act"
" Id. at 167 ("The value of an attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal bill-
ing rate.").
2 ' Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 718-19; 487 F.2d at 168.
23 See Berger, supra note 7, at 318-26; 488 F.2d at 718-19.
24
 COP./and III, 641 F.2d 880, 889-94, 23 FEP Cas. 967, 977-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Berger, supra note 7, at 315-16.
2' Civil Rights Act of 1976, Rev. Stat. 1 722, 42 U.S.C. 1 1988 (1976).
26
 S. REP. NO. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 5908.
22
 42 U.S.C..1 2000e-3(b); 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e-5(k) (1976). Congress also followed the
language of 1 402 of the Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 1 19731(e); [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5909.
26 [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5909, citing Newman v. Figgie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968):
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed it was evident that enforcement
would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law. . . If the plain-
tiff obtains an injunction he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private at-
torney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney's
fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public inter-
est. . .. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees — not simply to
penalize litigants who advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more
broadly, to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial
relief under Title II.
390 U.S. at 401-02.
29
 S. REP. NO. 1101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5910. The Supreme Court had already established, in Ablemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 403 (1975), that the Title II standards for awarding attorney's fees to successful parties
also applied to Title VII cases. 422 U.S. at 415. In the Senate Report to the 1976 Act, Congress
stated that the fee-shifting provisions of Title II apply to Title VII as well. S. REP. NO. 1101,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5910.
304	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
cited Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 3° as the major example of the
standard to be used in determining attorney's fee awards under the 1976 Act.
The Johnson case was a Title VII action which adopted a market-value ap-
proach to attorney's fee determinations. The Johnson market-value approach
involved assessing twelve factors of an attorney's performance to establish a
reasonable fee award." The persuasiveness of the Senate report to the 1976
Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act, however, should not be overestimated
as an index of congressional intent in providing for attorney's fee awards in
Title VII. Because the report concerned an Act passed twelve years after Title
VII was enacted, the observations of the Senate committee cannot be consid-
ered a part of Title VII's legislative history. 32 Rather, the report constitutes •
secondary authority — an authoritative, expert opinion concerning Title VII's
correct interpretation. 33
Confronted with this scanty legislative history, and the absence of a
United States Supreme Court decision on the appropriate measure of
attorney's fee awards, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia was the first court of appeals to consider what the appropriate standard
should be when the federal government is the losing party in Title VII litiga-
tion. A series of decisions rendered by that court from 1978 to 1980 — the Cope-
land v. Marshall litigation. — demonstrated the court's attempt to resolve the
issue." During this Survey year this series of decisions culminated in Copeland v.
Marshall" (Copeland III). In that opinion the majority set forth a more exacting
version of the market-value standard than prior decisions by other courts. 36
The vigorous two-judge dissent proposed that a "cost-plus" formula rather
than a market-value formula be used when the federal government is the losing
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) cited in S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5913.
3 t 488 F.2d at 717-19. These twelve factors arc: the time and labor required; the novel-
ty and difficulty of the question; the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; the
preclusion of other employment; the customary fee for similar work in the community; the fixed
or contingent nature of the fee; the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
the amount involved and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the at-
torney; the undesirability of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and the amount of awards in similar cases. Id. at 717-19. These factors are based on
the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility Standards governing fees for legal services. See
ABA; COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-106 at 12C-13C (August, 1976 amendment).
52 Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d at 339 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33 Id. at 339 n.11 (citing 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TIONS S 949.11 (4th ed. 1973)).
' 4 Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Copeland 1); Copeland v.
Marshall, 20 FEP Cas, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Copeland 11); Copeland v. Marshall, 20 FEP Cas. 88
(D.C. Cir. 1979 petition for rehearing en banc granted, panel order vacated); Copeland v. Mar-
shall, 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Copeland III).
35 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
36 641 F.2d at 888-94, 23 FEP Cas. at 974-82.
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litigant." Prior to the Copeland III decision, a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court
had considered this same question. The panel of the full court, composed of the
same two judges who dissented in Copeland III," initially enunciated the "cost-
plus" formula in two separate panel opinions." The dissenters in Copeland III
asserted that attorney's fee awards, when the government is the losing litigant,
should be lower than comparable awards against private parties." The court in
Copeland III, however, rejected the use of a different standard for the federal
government as opposed to a private party. The court reasoned that employing
different standards could result in lower fee awards, which would violate the
goals of the Title" VII fee awards provisions. These goals were to enable liti-
gants to bring meritorious suits and to deter the federal government from dis-
criminating in employment." Instead of embracing a cost-plus formula the
court's market-value approach attempted to simplify and organize the twelve
factors presented in the Johnson case into a manageable format for district court
judges to apply in making fee determinations." The D.C. district court, in the
interim between the circuit court's panel opinion in Copeland I, and the majori-
ty opinion of the full court in Copeland III, considered the question of the appro-
priate standards for attorney's fee awards against the federal government." In
Bachman v. Pertschuk," the district court did not follow the cost-plus formisla ar-
ticulated in Copeland I. Instead, the court attempted to implement that portion
of the Copeland I decision that admonished the district court to apply the Johnson
factors carefully to avoid windfall fee awards." Collectively, the majority and
dissenting opinions in Copeland III, preceded by the panel opinions in Copeland I
" Id. at 908-30, 23 FEP Cas. at 987-1005 (Wilkey and Tamm, J. J., dissenting).
39 Judges Wilkey and Tamm.
39
 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 20 FEY Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
4° After the Copeland I panel opinion, the plaintiffs petitioned the panel for a rehearing
on the standards to be applied in determining attorney's fee awards. Although the panel denied
the petition, it wrote another opinion explaining the cost-plus standard, and the rationale for,
and practical application of the standard in greater detail. Copeland v. Marshall, 20 FEP Cas. 79
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (Copeland II). In a brief, per curiam opinion issued the same day as Copeland II,
the full court reversed the panel's denial of the petition for rehearing. The full court granted a
petition for rehearing, en bane, and vacated the Copeland I order which had remanded the at-
torney's fee award question to the district court for reconsideration in light of the Copeland 1 deci-
sion. Copeland v. Marshall, 20 FEP Cas. 88 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
41
 Copeland III, 641 F.2d at 889-95, 23 FEP Cas. at 966-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
49 Id. at 905-08, 23 FEP Cas. 974-82.
4' Bachman v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) appeal pending No.
79-1650 (D.C. Cir.).
44 Id.
" Id. at 1049-51. In April of 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in-
corporated the Johnson factors into its regulations determining fee awards for prevailing parties in
administrative processings of Title VII claims. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.271(c) (1980). While this agen-
cy apparently adopted a market-value approach, the Justice Department, not surprisingly, en-
dorsed the Copeland I and Copeland II position that a different fee standard for reasonable at-
torney's fees should be used when the government is a losing party in a Title VII action. Justice:
Are There Any Public Inkiest Lawyers.?, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, 5 (February 18, 1980).
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and II, as well as the variations of the market-value standard when used by the
federal courts," demonstrate that the issue of the appropriate standard to apply
when awarding Title VII attorney's fees against the federal government re-
mains in doubt.
This chapter will analyze both the market-value and the cost-plus stand-
ards that can be used to determine the proper measure of attorney's fees in
Title VII cases. In particular, the chapter will examine whether the court in
Copeland III established a viable market-value standard for courts to use in
granting Title VII attorney's fee awards against the federal government. First,
the chapter will discuss the evolution of the D.C. Circuit Court's response to
the question of the appropriate standard for attorney's fee awards by consider-
ing its decision in Copeland v. Secretary of Labor,'" Copeland I and Copeland 11. 48
The discussion will consider the policy reasons stated in other cases and con-
gressional reports which led the court to conclude that a market-value standard
should be used to award attorney's fees when the federal government was the
losing party." After discussing the market-value standard, this chapter then
will explain the cost-plus standard and the policy reasons that caused Judges
Wilkey and Tamm to adopt this standard." Both standards then will be
analyzed to determine which better effectuates the policies behind Title VII,
and which standard seems easier for a district court to apply. Concluding that
the market-value standard best effectuates Congress' intent in allowing fee
awards in Title VII cases, and that it is easier for judges to apply than the cost-
plus approach, this chapter agrees with the Copeland III majority that the
market-value test is the best method for determining attorney's fee awards. 51
1. The History of the Copeland Decisions
In Copeland v. Marshall" (Copeland III), the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia considered whether it should adopt a market-value test for
determining Title VII attorney's fee awards or accept the cost-plus test devel-
oped by a panel of the court in Copeland I and Copeland II." The Copeland case
had a seven-year history before this issue gained the attention of the full circuit
46
 Two other federal courts have considered the closely-related question of the ap-
propriate measure of attorney's fee awards when the losing party is a state governmental agency.
In each of these decisions the court used a version of the market-value formula. Bolden v. Penn-
sylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 963-66 (E. D. Pa. 1980) (a claim under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1988); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1307-09 (9th
Cir. 1980).
47 414 F. Supp. 647 (D. D.C. 1976); see also Copeland v. Brennan, 414 F. Supp. 644
(D.D.C. 1975).
48 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 20 FEP Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
49 Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Copeland
III). See text and notes at notes 84-89 infra.
50 See text and notes at notes 129-148 infra.
5 ' See text and notes at notes 183-219 infra.
52 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53 594 F.2d 244 (1978); 20 FEP Cas. 79 (1979).
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court. In Copeland v. Secretary of Labor" the district court had found in favor of
the plaintiff on her own behalf and on behalf of female employees similarly
situated. Plaintiff and other class members were employed in the Data Process-
ing Center of the United States Department of Labor (Department). 55 One
week before trial, after extensive discovery had taken place, the Department
stipulated that it had subjected plaintiff-appellee and other class members to
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and agreed to establish an affirm-
ative action plan." The Department also stipulated that the appellee was the
prevailing party for the purpose of entitlement to attorney's fees and costs." At
trial the judge ruled in favor of the appellee's individual claim for relief and
ordered that she be promoted to a higher G.S. level and be granted back pay of
$4,169.80. Two district court hearings were required to resolve the negotia-
tions between the appellees and the Department involving the affirmative ac-
tion plan. 58 A special master was appointed to determine the retroactive pro-
motion and back pay for other class members."
After substantial additional discovery class members were awarded ap-
proximately $33,000 in back pay." In addition, class members were awarded
either promotion and opportunity to participate in a training program — in-
stead of, in combination with or in addition to back pay. 6 ' Following this
award, the appellee filed a documented request for attorney's fees and costs."
The request stated that four attorneys had spent 3,602 hours on the case." Ap-
plying their normal billing rates, the legal fee requested was $206,000. 64
Plaintiff-appellees supported their request for reimbursement with detailed af-
fidavits." Although the Department objected to any award approaching
$206,000 it did not request an evidentiary hearing on the attorney's fee
award. 66
5. 414 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1976). See also Copeland v. Brennan, 414 F. Supp. 644
(D.D.C. 1975).
55 414 F. Supp. at 648-50.
36
 Id.
" 594 F.2d at 274 n.9.
58 414 F. Supp. at 652-53; 594 F.2d at 214 n.11 (citing Brief for Appellees at 17).
Copeland III stated that she was awarded $6,169.80 in back pay. 641 F.2d at 887 n.12, 23 FEP
Cas. at 971, n.12. "Some of the plaintiff's proposed changes that the District Court ordered in-
corporated into the plan concerned 1) reporting, 2) training programs, 3) employee notification,
4) composition of evaluation panels, and 5) retention of jurisdiction by the court to insure com-
pliance." Id.
59 Id., 23 FEP Cas. at 971 n.12.
60 Id.; see also 594 F.2d at 247.
61 641 F.2d at 887, 23 FEP Cas. at 971.
62 Id. at 887-88, 23 FEP Cas. at 971-72.
63 594 F.2d at 247. The hourly rates were $51.65 for one associate and $54.32 for the
other. The hourly rates for the partners were $72.46 and $89.92. Id. Eighty percent of the total
number of hours charged was logged by the junior associate with little or no courtroom ex-
perience or special Title VII expertise. Id. at 248.
" Id. at 247. The actual requested figure was $205,916.50, but all the decisions refer to
the amount as $206,000.00.
65 Id. at 247-48.
66 641 F.2d at 887, 23 FEP Cas. at 972.
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On the basis of the record and his personal experience with the pro-
ceedings, the trial judge awarded $160,000 in fees and accompanied his order
with a four-page memorandum analyzing the award. 67 The trial judge stated
that the discrepancy between the amount of damages the plaintiff ultimately
received and the amount of the attorney's fee award was irrelevant because an
employment discrimination suit was an equity action that had achieved bene-
fits such as increased job opportunities whose value could not be measured
solely in monetary terms." Moreover, the trial judge stated that he had taken
into account the factors itemized in Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel69 in determining
the award." In the Evans case, the D.C. Circuit accepted the 12 Johnson fac-
tors 7 ' as the proper basis from which to determine attorney's fee awards. 72
Concluding that the promotion and training program benefits of the affirma-
tive action plan established by the Department were substantial, and that he
had balanced correctly all relevant factors to arrive at a reasonable award, the
trial judge reduced the requested award from $206,000 to $160,000. 73
The Department appealed the award as excessive and a two judge panel
of the circuit court heard this appeal in Copeland /. 74 The panel remanded the
fee award to the district court, stating that the trial court should determine the
fee award on the basis of more detailed data on billing." In addition, Copeland I
stated that the traditional method of determining fees by using the hourly rate
as the starting point for calculations was incorrect when the federal government
was the losing party." The panel suggested that the trial judge determine the
fee award by applying the panel's formula for reimbursement of "costs plus a
reasonable and controllable margin for profit." 77 On plaintiff's petition for
rehearing on the award and the cost-plus standard, the panel, in Copeland 11, 78
reaffirmed its original ruling that attorney's fee awards in Title VII cases
should be determined by using the cost-plus formula." The panel stated that
the trial judge should weigh the quality factors enumerated in Evans (the
Johnson factors) to determine the appropriate profit to be awarded." On the
same day that the panel rendered its Copeland II opinion, 8 ' however, the court,
67 Id.; 594 F.2d at 238.
68 641 F.2d at 888, 23 FEP Cas. at 972.
" 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
7 ° 414 F. Supp. at 655.
503 F.2d at 187-88. See note 31 supra for a listing of these factors.
" 503 F.2d at 188.
73 641 F.2d at 887, 23 FEP Cas. at 972.
74
 594 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 257.
76 Id. at 256.
" Id. at 251. See text and notes at notes 147-61 infra for an explanation of the panel's
''cost-plus'' test.
78 20 FEP Cas. 79 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
79 Id. at 80.
8U Id. (citing Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
°' 20 FEP Cas. at 82.
December 1981]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 309
sitting en Banc, granted a petition for rehearing82 and vacated the panel's
Copeland / judgment and remand order. 83
2. The Market-Value Standard
In Copeland III the full court decided what formula should be used to deter-
mine a reasonable attorney's fee in a Title VII suit when the government is the
losing party." The court stated that the language of the Title VII attorney's fee
awards provision" and the policies that underlie it do not support the conclu-
sion that the amount of the fee should depend on the losing party's identity."
The court rejected the cost-plus approach articulated in Copeland I and Copeland
11, 97
 stating that:
the theoretical basis for "cost-plus" is fundamentally inconsistent
' with Congress' purpose in providing for statutory fee-shifting. A fee
should be based on the market value of services rendered, not on
some notion of "cost" incurred by the law firm. That is the conclu-
sion both of the courts that have spoken on the issue and also Con-
gress itself. 88
In lieu of the cost-plus formula, the court fashioned a market-value standard
which it anticipated would achieve a two-fold purpose. The first purpose, the
court stated, was to provide for awards sufficient to ensure that victims of
employment discrimination could secure competent lawyers willing to repre-
sent them. 89 The Copeland III majority quoted the United States Supreme
Court's statement in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., that the primary
purpose of awarding attorney's fees is to "encourage individuals injured by
.. discrimination to seek judicial relief."" In addition, the majority stated
that its market value formula could be applied easily by trial courts and would
make meaningful appellate review possible.
The court discussed the twelve factors enumerated in Johnson9 ' and ac-
cepted by the D.C. Circuit in Evans92 as the starting point for calculating a
82
 Id. at 88.
83 Id.
" 641 F.2d 880, 23 FEP Cas. 967 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
85 42 U.S.C.
	
2000e-5(k) (1976). See note 3 supra for the text of the attorney's fee
award provision.
86 641 F.2d at 894-86, 23 FEP Cas. at 977-78.
87 Id. at 896-900, 23 FEP Cas. at 978-82.
88 Id. at 897, 23 FEP Cas. at 979.
89 Id. at 890, 23 FEP Cas. at 974.
9° Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 309 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (Ti-
tle II case)). See text and notes at notes 5-14 supra for a discussion of the purposes of the fee
awards provision.
91 See note 31 supra.
92 503 F.2d at 187-88.
310	 BOSTON COLLEGE L4 W REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:82
reasonable attorney's fee. 93 It was the- court's view, however, that simply
listing these twelve factors did not provide an analytic framework that a judge
could apply to his deliberations." In order to fashion a more meaningful for-
mulation of the Johnson factors, the court then turned to the Third Circuit's
analysis in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitation
Cor p. 95 According to the Copeland III majority, the Lindy court had articulated
a formula that considered all relevant factors but eliminated the redundancy
that could occur when all twelve Johnson factors were applied. 96 The majority
thus based its market-value formula on the considerations embodied in the
Johnson factors, but applied within the framework provided by Lindy."
The Lindy court stated that the first inquiry to be made in determining a
reasonable attorney's fee award is to ascertain the number of hours spent by
the attorneys in each of several categories of professional activity, such as
pretrial discovery or settlement negotiations." After determining the hours
spent on the particular categories of legal activities the court stated that the
value of the hours spent must be ascertained. According to the Lindy court the
value of an attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal billing rate. 99
The court stated that these two figures constitute the "lodestar" — the number
of hours spent multiplied by the value of this time.'" According to the court,
the trial judge then should reduce or increase the lodestar figure based on the
contingent nature of the lawsuit's success and the quality of the attorney's
work.'°' The Lindy court thus applied the twelve Johnson factors in a stream-
lined manner.
According to the Copeland III court, following Lindy, the lodestar is to be
calculated by multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended jby the
firm] ... by a reasonable hourly rate.'"" The court described the following
method for determining the amount of time reasonably expended by the firm.
First, the law firm must document the amount of work performed.'" Then the
work performed should be segregated by the judge into suitable categories, e.g.,
pretrial discovery and trial work.'" In addition, the hours spent by various
classes of employees'" on different categories of work also should be segregated
" 641 F.2d at 889-90, 23 FEP Cas. at 973-74.
94 Id.
95
 Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitation Corp.
(Lindy), 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
96 Lindy, 487 F.2d at 168-69; 641 F.2d 890, 23 FEP Cas. at 974. See Copeland II, 20 FEP
Cas. at 80 n.2 for the panel's discussion of the possible redundancy and duplication that occurs if
each of the twelve Johnson factors is considered individually.
97 641 F.2d at 890, 23 FEP Cas. at 974.
98 487 F.2d at 167.
99 Id.
'"] Id. at 168.
'" Id.
' 02 641 F.2d at 891, 23 FEP Cas. at 974, citing Lindy, 487 F.2d at 167.
14 ' Id.
'" Id. at 891-92, 23 FEP Cas. at 974-75 (citing Lindy, 487 F.2d at 167).
'°' For example, paralegals, junior associates, senior associates, junior partners, senior
partners.
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and separately calculated.'" After obtaining the total of raw hours spent, the
judge then must determine whether the time was reasonably expended.'" This
determination, the court explained, involves a process similar to the exercise of
"billing judgment" in the private sector.'°8 For example, no compensation
should be provided for non-productive time, such as hours billed for the
presence of three attorneys at a hearing when one would have sufficed. The
court also indicated that time spent litigating claims on which the party did not
prevail, was not time reasonably expended.' 09 After determining the number of
hours reasonably expended, the second step in calculating the lodestar, the
court stated, is to determine a reasonable hourly rate to be assigned the hours
reasonably expended. According to the majority this is the hourly rate
"prevailing in the community for similar work."'" This rate already reflects
such variables as the lawyer's skill, experience, reputation, the undesirability
of the case,'" and time limits."' The court noted that there may be more than
one reasonable hourly rate for each of the attorneys and for each kind of work
involved. "3
Once the lodestar has been calculated, the court continued, this fee should
be adjusted by the judge to reflect two other important considerations — the
contingent nature of the success of the litigation," 4 and the quality of the repre-
sentation provided." 5 The court noted that when either party requests an ad-
justment in the lodestar fee, that party bears the burden of justifying the re-
quested change. "6 The contingency adjustment is not a percentage based on
100 641 F.2d at 892, 23 FEP Cas. at 974-75.
L07 Id.
LOB Id. at 892, 23 FEP Cas. at 975.
102 Id. The court pointed out that sometimes recovery under a variety of legal theories
for the same injury will be sought. Id. at 892 n.18, 23 FEP Cas. 975 n.18. If some of these legal
theories do not prevail but essentially one unitary issue is litigated, the district court judge should
not arbitrarily reduce the award. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 at 684 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (holding that fees based on meritless and "manufactured" claims should be denied, but
fees for legal work reasonably calculated to advance the client's interests but later deemed un-
necessary should be granted).
110 641 F.2d at 892, 23 FEP Cas. at 975.
"I See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483, 485-86
(1975) (attorney's fee awards decision). This decision dealt only with the question of attorney's
fees. The Swann case, however, had a long history. See 311 F. Supp. 265 (1970) (school desegrega-
tion award); 431 F.2d 1387 (3d Cir. 1970) (district court decision vacated and remanded); 328 F.
Supp. 1346 (1971) (school district desegregation plan denied, court plan ordered); 402 U.S. 1
(1971) (district court aff'd, appeals court aff'd in part, rev'd in part); 403 U.S. 912 (1971) (rehearing
denied); 404 U.S. 811 (1971) (petitioner allowed one-half costs); 67 F.R.D. 648 (1975) (case
removed from active docket). In the Swann decision which dealt exclusively with the attorney's
fee award the court discussed the fact that plaintiff's counsel's offices and building were burned at
the height of the litigation and that they had lost and probably would continue to lose business
because of their representation of the "pro-desegregation," "pro-busing" claim. 66 F.R.D. 483,
485-86.
"2 641 F.2d at 892, 23 FEP Cas. at 975 (citing Evans, 503 F.2d at 187-88).
1 " Id., 23 FEP Cas. at 975.
"* Id. at 892-93, 23 FEP Cas. at 976-77.
'" Id. at 893-94, 23 FEP Cas. at 976-77.
116 Id. at 892, 23 FEP Cas. at 975.
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the amount of recovery.'" Rather, it is a percentage adjustment in the lodestar
to reflect the risk present at the outset of the litigation that the party would not
prevail and the attorney would receive no fee. " 9 TO the extent that the at-
torney's usual hourly rate already reflects this contingency, the court noted, no
adjustment would be necessary. The delay in the receipt of payment for serv-
ices rendered also may be incorporated into a contingency adjustrnent." 9 The
court pointed out that such an adjustment may be especially appropriate if the
court uses "historical rates" (those prevailing at the time the services were per-
formed) as opposed to current rates, to calculate the lodestar.' 20 If the litigation
has been protracted and the fee award delayed, the court stated that the current
value of the payment based on the historical figures may not reflect accurately
the services rendered.' 2 ' The court recognized that determining the appropri-
ateness of any contingency adjustment would be a difficult exercise of discre:
tion. 122 The majority stated, therefore, that the district court judge should state
clearly his reasons for adjusting the lodestar for any contingency.'" The ma-
jority also reiterated that the standard to be applied by an appellate court when
reviewing a fee award determination is that such awards should be upheld in .
the absence of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.'" In addition to an ad-
justment for the contingent nature of the litigation, the court stated that the
lodestar also may be adjusted to reflect the quality of the representation pro-
vided.'" This adjustment to the lodestar should be made only if the services
rendered by the lawyer deviate significantly, either positively or negatively,
from the "level of skill normally expected of an attorney commanding the
hourly rate used to compute the 'lodestar' .'" 29 The court stated that when ex-
ceptional results are obtained, given the time expended and the hourly rates,
the fee justifiably may be increased."' The court cautioned, however, that the
amount of dollar recovery is not the measure of exceptional results.'"
Equitable relief, such as an affirmative action plan of national scope, the court
observed, can have a more significant, long-lasting result than a large financial
recovery. 129
"' Cf. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits: The
Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COL. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1971) (vigorous argument against
the suitability of Percentage fee awards in antitrust case settlements).
" 8 641 F.2d at 893, 23 FEP Cas. at 976.
"9 Id.
"D See Bachman v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. at 1052-53 (court used historical rates).
' 21 641 F.2d at 893, 23 FEP Cas. at 976.
132 Id.
123 Id.
"4 Id. at 901, 23 FEP Cas. at 982.
'" Id. at 893-94, 23 FEP Cas. at 976-77.
126 Id. at 893, 23 FEP Cas. at 976.
127 Id. at 894, 23 FEP Cas. at 976.
129 Id. The court stated that, for example, if a substantial monetary judgment was to be
expected, that expectation usually is reflected in the hourly rate and therefore in the lodestar fee.
Id.
129 The court discussed promotions, affirmative action training programs, and guaran-
teed promotions upon training completion as examples of the kind of non-monetary relief that
would justify a substantial attorney's fee award in spite of a relatively small monetary recovery.
Id. at 905-06, 23 FEP Cas. at 986-87.
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In sum, the market-value approach, as formulated by the court in Copeland
III, requires the trial judge to determine the number of hours reasonably ex-
pended by each lawyer in each category of legal work. After ascertaining the
hours reasonably expended, the lodestar is calculated by multiplying these
hours by a reasonable hourly rate for lawyers of similar skill and experience in
the community. The trial judge then can increase or reduce the lodestar figure
to reflect the contingent nature of the success of the particular litigation, or the
quality of the representation provided.
3. The Cost-Plus Standard
In Copeland I, Copeland II, and the dissent to Copeland III, two judges of the
D.C. Circuit Court set forth a different test for determining a reasonable at-
torney's fee. The dissenters in Copeland III stated that a new approach was
necessary because the market-value standard, even as modified by the court,
was resulting and would continue to result in "windfall" or "bonanza" fee
awards for the prevailing party's attorney(s). 130 The dissenting judges set forth
five reasons for their opposition to a market-value standard. First, they stated
that the market-value standard for fee awards would spur lawyers to extend the
pre-litigation phases of a Title VII suit.' 3 ' If a private firm knew that eventual
success meant compensation for all relevant work at their customary rate, the
dissent reasoned, this would provide a tremendous incentive for the firm to ex-
tend and expand the pretrial stages of the litigation so that it would become
financially advantageous for the government to settle, rather than to run the
risk of liability for enormous attorney's fees. 132
 The panel expressed concern
that a proliferation of these cases would induce the government to give in to
claims "however unjust" in order to cut off the litigation and thereby limit its
liability for attorney's fees.'" In' Copeland II, the panel reiterated its concern
that the market-value formula would yield inflated attorney fee awards. For ex-
ample, it stated that an attorney's fee award of $160,000 for a case in which the
entire prevailing class of plaintiffs received a monetary recovery of approx-
imately $34,000 made out "at least a prima facie case that something is wrong
with the previously constructed standards — when applied to fix a fee award in
a Title VII case against the government. "134
 The judges stated that nothing in
the statutory history of the Title VII fee awards provision"' indicated that
Congress intended the standard for calculation of a reasonable fee when the
government is the defendant to be identical to that for a private party"' or that
130 Id. at 920-21, 23 FEP Cas. at 997 (dissenting opinion).
11 Id. at 911, 23 FE? Cas. at 989-90.
" Id.
133 Id. at 911-12, 23 FEP Cas. at 990.
14 Copeland II, 20 FEP Cas. at 86.
135 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k) (1976).
"° 641 F.2d at 915-17, 23 FEP Cas. at 992-94 (dissenting opinion). The panel also read
the legislative history of the 1976 Civil Rights Fee Awards Act differently from the majority. See
text and notes at notes 25-41 supra. According to the panel, the citation of Title VII cases using a
market-value approach was not meant as endorsement of that formula but was done only to show
that a reasonable, non-windfall fee was awarded in the cited cases. 641 F.2d at 916-17, 23 FE?
Cas. at 994 (dissenting opinion).
314	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:82
Congress even considered at all the method of fee calculation.'" In addition to
disagreeing with the Copeland III majority over Congress' recognition and en-
dorsement of the market-value approach, the dissent also did not agree that fee
awards served to deter discrimination when the losing party was a government
agency.'" The dissent reasoned that because the fee came directly out of the
United States Treasury and not from the agency or person discriminating, the
fee award would have absolutely no deterrent effect.' 39
The panel also determined that a different test than market value was re-
quired because the private attorney was functioning like an attorney general,
who traditionally has never been compensated at the same level as attorneys in
private practice.'" The plaintiff's private attorney in a Title VII case, the
panel noted, functions like an attorney general because normally it is the at-
torney general who brings an employment discrimination suit against a private
or local government employer for the benefit of the injured private party."'
Consequently, the dissenters concluded that an attorney acting like an attorney
general should be compensated at the same level. The court stated that
"government counsel defending and plaintiff counsel bringing suit should have
compensation of roughly the same amplitude. "142 Alternatively, in the
Copeland II opinion, the panel compared a Title VII suit on behalf of a federal
employee with pro bona publico service. 143
 The court concluded, therefore, that a
cost-plus formula would result in a fee awards of a sufficient amount, equaling
or exceeding what the attorneys were compensated for pro bono work. Thus the
panel concluded that awards based on a cost-plus formula would be sufficient
to encourage attorneys to continue to take Title VII suits, even if the fee they
received was lower than the attorney's usual fee.'"
The dissent's most fundamental disagreement with the Copeland III
market-value formula, however, stemmed from the panel's contention that
there is simply no "market" for Title VII suits against the federal
government.'" The dissent in Copeland III stated that a prospective plaintiff
who was a government employee could rarely, if ever, afford to buy the
necessary services to bring a Title VII suit.'" Thus, there are no ready
"buyers" bidding for the services of attorneys who litigate Title VII claims
against the government. Consequently, there are no agreed fees between a
client and a lawyer, as there are in other areas of private litigation, to indicate
what limits the normal buying public of clients will set on attorneys' fees in the
'" Id. at 916, 23 FEP Cas. at 993 (dissenting opinion).
"8 Id. at 912, 23 FEP Cas. at 990 (dissenting opinion).
138 Id.
'" Id. at 912-13, 23 FEP Cas. at 990-91 (dissenting opinion).
'u 20 FEP Cas, at 81.
"' 641 F.2d at 912, 23 FEP Cas. at 990 (dissenting opinion).
'" 20 FEP Cas. at 81.
144 641 F.2d at 913, 23 FEP Cas. at 991 (dissenting opinion).
148 Id. The dissent pointed out that no real market value forces set the fees.
146 Id.
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market place."' In light of these concerns the dissent maintained that a
market-value formula was inappropriate for determining attorneys' fees in Ti-
tle VII suits against the government because no market exists to limit a
reasonable fee.' 48
In light of these concerns the dissent advocated the cost-plus standard for-
mulated in Copeland I and Copeland II. Instead of starting calculations with a
commercial "going hourly rate," as the court in Copeland III did, the panel
suggested that a proper formula should attempt to provide attorneys reim-
bursement for their costs plus a reasonable profit margin.'" In Copeland II the
panel judges stated that the intent of a cost-plus formula should be to return to
the firm the actual out-of-pocket costs for its attorney's legal services and the
attorney's overhead costs, plus a "reasonable and controllable profit." 18° The
dissenters stated that three factors should determine a fee award under the cost-
plus formula. These factors are salary, overhead and a reasonable profit.
Unlike the market-value approach, the dissent's cost-plus formula would not
start with a lodestar calculated by determining the number of hours reasonably
expended and multiplying that figure by the reasonable value of those hours in
the community.
The first step in the panel's cost-plus formula is the calculation of the ap-
propriate salary figures that the firm may charge for Title VII litigation."' In
Copeland I the panel referred to the services, salary, costs and overhead of an in-
dividual firm member.'" In Copeland II, however, the judges stated that an
average salary for a class of firm members, or an average overhead as opposed
to an individual-by-individual calculation would be an acceptable figure to use
in fee award determinations.'" Following the Copeland II approach a firm
claiming attorney's fees would have to provide the trial judge with the average
salary of associates in the firm with the same number of years experience as the
associate for whom fees are claimed.'" As the panel pointed out, the salary of a
partner is more difficult to ascertain because "all income earned by a partner
above that chargeable to overhead may be considered profit."'" The panel
stated that a partner's salary may be extrapolated upwards from the highest
associate's salary. 156
After determining the salary, the next step in the "cost-plus" calculus is to
determine the chargeable overhead. According to the panel, overhead includes
rent, supplies, services, secretarial and paralegal help.'" The panel stated that
'" Id. at 913-14, 23 FE? Cas. at 991-92 (dissenting opinion).
"9 Id. at 914, 23 FEP Cas. at 991.
"9 20 FEP Cas. at 81-82.
"° Id. at 81.
'" Id. at 82-83; 594 F.2d at 251-52.
12 594 F.2d at 251-52.
"" 20 FEP Cas. at 83.
"4 Id. at 82.
'" 594 F.2d at 251.
"° 20 FEP Cas. at 83.
"7 594 F.2d at 251.
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every firm will know its overhead on at least an annual basis and thus could
submit to the trial judge an average, per-attorney overhead cost.'" If the firm
found that there were significant differences in overhead costs between an
associate and a partner, the firm could provide the court with an average
overhead cost for each class of attorney involved in the Title VII proceeding.' 59
Once the court knew the applicable salary and overhead costs it would "make
an accurate appraisal of the number of hours and type of work performed in a
particular case, and then reimburse the firm for that share of each . . . [at-
torney's] ... hourly fee equivalent to ... [his] overhead and salary plus a cer-
tain margin for profit. "9160
The final step in the panel's cost-plus test is to determine the amount of
reasonable profit.' 61 The panel's decisions do not suggest what a reasonable
profit should be. Rather, the decisions state that the amount of profit is deter-
mined by considering the relevant quality factors derived from the Evans-
Johnson factors. 162 These quality factors include such things as the speed with
which the attorney completed the Title VII action, the novelty and complexity
of the issues, and the extent of the recovery — both monetary and equitable. In
Copeland I, the panel suggested that the judge's evaluation of the quality of the
attorney's services that determines the amount of reasonable profit awarded
might be "leavened . . . by a reference back to the firm's earning performance
on other legal business. "163
4. An Analysis of the Cost-Plus and Market-Value Formulas
In Copeland I and Copeland II, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia devised an innovative cost-plus formula for determining a
reasonable attorney's fee award when the government is the losing party in a
Title VII action. In order to determine whether the cost-plus or the market-
value formula should be used by courts in determining a reasonable attorney's
fee award it is necessary to analyze both formulas in light of two variables.
First, both formulas should be examined in light of the policies underlying the
Title VII fee award provision. The more appropriate standard is the one which
best effectuates Congress' intent in giving government employees the right to
recover reasonable attorney's fees. The second variable which must be con-
sidered when assessing the value of a cost-plus as opposed to a market-value
standard, is the practical utility of either standard. If a formula is too cumber-
some, difficult or impractical to use it will be of little value to judges who must
apply it to grant fee awards. This section will analyze both the cost-plus and
market-value formulas to determine the extent to which each effectuates con-
gressional intent in creating the Title VII fee awards provision, and the ease
with which each standard can be employed by a district court judge.
1 " 20 FEP Cas. at 83.
159 Id.
160
 594 F.2d at 251-52.
' 6 ' 20 FEP Cas. at 83.
162 Id. See note 31 supra.
165 594 F.2d at 253.
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a. The Amount of the Fee Award Under the Market-Value
and the Cost-Plus Formulas
The panel opinions expressed concern that attorneys in Title VII cases
were reaping "windfalls" or "unreasonable" profits when a market-value for-
mula for fee award determinations was used.'" This assertion was unsup-
ported by any cited authority. The assertion that the market-value standard
yields an unreasonable award, however, is contradicted by Title VII and other
civil rights cases. In these other cases, the court reduced either the hourly rate,
the allowable hours or a requested increase in the lodestar because of the con-
tingency nature of a fee or the quality of the representation.' 65
 One scholar has
noted that:
[w]hile the mean hourly rate awarded by the courts under the fee
provisions of the private antitrust statutes was $181 in the cases sur-
veyed, the mean hourly rate awarded in Title VII suits in the cases
surveyed was $40. A general review of the reported decisions ines-
capably confirms the conclusion that statutory fee awards under civil
rights ... statutes have been substantially lower than awards under
. fee statutes involving commercial rights.' 66
In almost every Title VII fee award case where the court used a market-value
formula, including Copeland v. Marshall, the court has reduced the requested fee
award. 167
In spite of the contention of the Copeland //judges that the use of a market-
value standard results in a windfall fee award, nothing inherent in a market-
value formula insures that it will automatically produce a higher fee. Both the
market-value and the cost-plus tests allow the trial judge considerable discre-
tion in adjusting the fee. Under the market-value test, for example, the court
164 20 FEP Cas. at 82.
' 64 See, e.g., Bachman 'v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. 1046 (D.D.C. 1980). Bachman was
decided after Copeland I, but nevertheless applied the Evans factors rather than the cost-plus for-
mula in determining the fee award. The judge increased the award for the two principal at-
torneys in Bachman in consideration of the quality of their performance. He also reduced another
attorney's hourly rate from $50 to $35 an hour, and reduced the number of allowable hours from
853 to 501.25. Fifty-five of these hours were reimbursed at the paralegal hourly rate of $25 an
hour. Id. at 1056. A fourth applicant's hourly rate was reduced from $60 to $35 per hour and her
total number of reimbursable hours was reduced from 59.6 to 50. Id. at 1057. See also Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (1975). See note Ill supra for the history of
the Swann case. After commending counsel for an outstanding job in this major civil rights case,
and noting that defense counsel already had received over $200,000 in fees, the court reduced the
attorney's requested fee from $204,237.50 to an award of $175,000.00. Id. at 485-86. See also
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Bolden was a major case
aimed at eradicating racial discrimination in state police employment practices. This case took
over three years to resolve, and the dispute over attorney's fees lasted an additional two years. Id.
at 959-60. Plaintiff's counsel had asked for three times the lodestar award as an adjustment for
quality of representation. Id. The court agreed to adjust the lodestar by a factor of 50% to reflect
quality of representation. Id.
166 See Berger, supra note 7, at 310 (citing Helfman, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: A
Statistical Survey of One Hundred and Forty Recent District Court Cases Involving Attorney's
Fees (Project submitted to the faculty of Antioch School of Law, 1975)).
' 6 ' See note 165 supra.
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can adjust the lodestar itself by determining whether the hourly rate and the
number of work-hours claimed are reasonable.'" In addition, while clients
may be willing to pay extremely high fees for legal "stars," a judge has the
discretion under the market-value formula to reduce the lawyer's hourly rate if
his performance does not equal his billing. Furthermore, the judge can adjust
the lodestar fee up or down to reflect the contingent nature of the case.'"
The cost-plus formula is similar to the market-value formula in that when
using the cost-plus formula the judge also can reduce the number of hours
claimed by the attorney. It appears, however, that he must accept the salary
and overhead figures presented by the attorney.'" In addition, the judge must
determine the amount of "reasonable profit" using the relevant Evans Johnson
factors which reflect quality of performance variables."' The panel opinions in
the Copeland v. Marshall litigation appear to assume that the basic cost figures
arrived at under the cost-plus formula will be less than the lodestar fee under
the market-value formula. 12
 While the dissenters may have incorrectly
asserted that the use of a market-value formula would have resulted in a wind-
fall fee award for attorneys, they were correct in cautioning that judges should
not always allow a lawyer to recover the highest fee he could have obtained
since such "opportunity rates" may not reflect the market or his
performance.'" In addition to assuming that the "cost" figure invariably will
be lower than the "lodestar" figure, the panel opinions also appear to assume
that the reasonable profit adjustment to the cost, plus overhead, will be less
than the adjustments to the lodestar fee. 14 Since "reasonable profit" was not
defined by the dissenting judges it is not possible to say that adjustments to the
cost-plus formula will result necessarily in a lower fee award. Moreover, there
is always the potential with either formula for a trial judge to adjust the formula
incorrectly to produce a windfall, or a shortfall, as well as a reasonable fee."'
While the dissent in Copeland III was critical of the market-value formula
because supposedly it would result in an inflated total at the end of the suit, the
dissenting judges had an additional criticism of the standard. This second im-
portant criticism was that the use of the market-value standard itself would pro-
vide an incentive to prolong all stages of litigation prior to final judgment and
1 ° 9 See text and notes at notes 98-113 supra.
169
 See text and notes at notes 114-29 supra.
10
 See text and notes at notes 151-60 supra.
1 " See text and notes at notes 161-63 supra.
"7 See 594 F.2d at 252-53; 20 FEP Cas. at 81; 641 F.2d at 909, 23 FEP Cas. at 988
(dissenting opinion). Judges Wilkey and Tamm stated that a lawyer should be entitled to recover
his costs plus a reasonable profit. They asserted that people who claim that the cost-plus formula
will result in lower fee recoveries are saying, in effect, that attorneys should be entitled to, and
are reaping "unreasonable" profits. 641 F.2d at 909, 23 FEP Cas. at 988. If lawyers are recover-
ing more from the government in Title VII cases than they are in other contingent fee, complex
federal litigation cases, then the panel judges' concerns about the amount of fee awards are clear-
ly justified. It appears, however, that such problems are caused by judges failing to scrutinize fee
requests closely, and not by the market-value formula itself.
173
 641 F.2d at 920-21, 23 FEP Cas. at 997 (dissenting opinion).
"4 Id.
15 Id. at 896-900, 23 FEP Cas. at 979-81.
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thus increase the fee award. Because the market-value standard allows firms to
be paid an hourly rate for the hours reasonably expended, the dissent contend-
ed that the firm would be encouraged to delay litigation, thus forcing the
government into settlement of unjust causes to avoid liability for excessively
high attorney's fees.' 7
€ This reasoning, however, is faulty for several reasons.
First, since the award of attorney's fees is dependent upon the plaintiff prevail-
ing in the suit, the government should defend vigorously against unjust claims
on the grounds that clearly unjust claims will not prevail and that therefore, no
liability for the plaintiff's attorney's fees will result. Both the plaintiff's at-
torney and the government should have an equal interest in speedy resolution
of cases that clearly could go either way, since the plaintiff's attorney is taking a
serious risk that he will not recover anything for the time he has spent on the
case if the plaintiff does not prevail. Second, the panel's reasoning ignores the
reality that most Title VII settlements involve the creation of an affirmative ac-
tion plan. Implementing such plans with training programs, reporting systems
and promotions will nearly always generate costs in excess of a single fee
award.'" In all but the most flagrant cases of discrimination — e,g., those
where the government expects to lose its case — there is a definite financial ad-
vantage to litigation, at least through discovery. This advantage is particularly
evident when both sides become aware through the discovery process, that the
weight of the evidence clearly favors the plaintiff. The government may settle
less obvious claims more quickly than a private party because it may be more
sensitive to discrimination claims.' 78 This policy question, however, has
nothing to do with the government's desire to avoid liability for attorney fees.
The dissenting judges in Copeland III also claimed that the market-value
approach encouraged expanded pre-trial litigation because an attorney knew
that if his client was successful, then all his time spent on the suit would be
compensable. 19
 Under the market-value approach formulated in Copeland III,
however, an attorney's fee award is limited to the hours he has reasonably ex-
pended on the suit.'" The attorney seeking a fee award also always faces
potential lodestar reduction. Furthermore, if all salary and overhead are reim-
burseable under the cost-plus formula, a law firm could find incentive to ex-
tend the time spent in litigation. 18 ' Since the costs submitted by the firm ap-
parently are not reviewable by the trial judge, incentive to extend litigation
under the cost-plus formula could be a particular problem if the firm's
"6 Id. at 910-11, 23 FEP Cas. at 989-90 (dissenting opinion).
1 " By way of illustration, if each of the 24 Copeland II class members were granted a pro-
motion which over the course of their employable life yielded $10,000 each in additional pay, the
cost would be $240,000. If the Department established a training program on a $20,000 yearly
budget with two trainers, each receiving a $10,000 a year salary, the cost over a 10 year period
would be $400,000. Presumably, persons trained in the program would receive promotions with
higher salaries; there would be increased reporting, management and other costs.
1 " 641 F.2d at 914 n.12, 23 FEP Cas. at 992 n.12 (the dissent's analysis of the govern-
ment's commitment to resolve Title VII suits).
19 Id. at 911-12, 23 FEP Cas. at 990 (dissenting opinion).
"(1 Id. at 891, 23 FEP Cas. at 974.
181 Id. at 897, 23 FEP Cas, at 979.
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legitimate salary and overhead figures grossly exceed the prevailing market
rate. 182
 In addition, the cost-plus approach in government contracting has been
criticized for increasing costs by removing the incentive for efficiency.'"
Although the dissenting judges argued that the market-value formula produces
excessive awards and that the cost-plus formula would produce more
reasonable fee awards, nothing inherent in either formula compels this result.
Courts using the market-value formula consistently have reduced either
the lodestar, or the requested adjustments to the lodestar, to reflect the quality
of representation or the contingent nature of success. Under the cost-plus for-
mula the trial judge is free to adjust the hours expended on the Title VII suit,
but apparently must accept the firm's overhead and salary costs. Using the
cost-plus formula, therefore, he actually may have less flexibility to reduce a
submitted fee request than he would have if he were using the market-value
formula. Moreover, the dissenting judges have not defined the reasonable prof-
it adjustment applicable to the cost-plus overhead figures. Therefore, a court
using a cost-plus formula might grant windfall fee awards because of an ex-
cessively high profit adjustment. While the dissent also criticized the market-
value standard for providing an incentive to plaintiff's attorney' to expand
pretrial litigation to force settlement, it appears that either formula has the
potential for this kind of abuse.
b. The Market Value Formula and The Advancement of Title VII
The foregoing analysis has revealed that neither the market-value nor the
cost-plus formula automatically yields a lower attorney's fee in Title VII cases.
The important inquiry, then, becomes which formula better effectuates the in-
tent of Congress in passing Title VII. It will be suggested in this section that
the market-value formula more effectively advances the purposes of Title VII.
In Copeland III, the dissent and the majority opinions differed con-
siderably, both in their interpretation of the legislative history of Title VII and
in their understanding of the practical effect each formula would have on im-
plementing congressional intent. Both the dissent and the majority agreed that
the purpose of the Title VII attorney fee awards provision is to encourage the
enforcement of Title VII by making it easier for individuals injured by
discrimination to seek judicial relief.'" Both the dissent and the majority also
recognized that a secondary purpose of the fee provision is to deter discrimina-
tion. 185
The majority and dissenting judges in Copeland III disagreed, however, on
whether Congress had endorsed the market-value formula as the correct
measure of attorney's fee awards in Title VII cases when the government is the
182 Id. at 897-9 and n.34, 23 FEP Cas. at 979 and n.34.
183 Id.
184
 594 F.2d at 249; 641 F.2d at 889-90, 23 FEP Cas. at 972, 974.
1a5
 641 F.2d at 912 n.9, 23 FEP Cas. at 990 n.9 (dissenting opinion); 641 F.2d at 888
and n.13, 23 FEP Cas. 972 and n.13 (majority opinion).
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defendant. The dissent assumed that when Congress amended the Title VII fee
awards provision to entitle prevailing parties to recover attorney's fees and
costs from the government it did not consider what the standard for fee deter-
mination should be. 186
 The majority opinion, however, relying heavily on
Congress' statements concerning the 1976 Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards
Act,'" stated that Congress had accepted the market-value formula as the cor-
rect standard regardless of the losing party's identity.'"
If Congress did endorse the market-value formula, as it appears it did,
then the courts should implement its judgment. Even if Congress did not
specificaly adopt the market-value formula for determining a reasonable fee, it
would still be the court's responsibility to fashion a fee award formula that best
fulfilled the intent of the Title VII fee award provision. The market-value for-
mula should be adopted by the courts because it better effectuates the domi-
nant purposes of the legislation. Congress' intent in enacting these provisions
was to make legal services accessible to prospective clients seeking to vindicate
their civil rights. Therefore, anything that detracts from that purpose, either
because it results in fee awards lower than those an attorney ordinarily could
make in other areas of practice, or because it requires disclosure of private in-
formation from participating attorneys, should not be endorsed by the courts.
Attorneys will be more likely to litigate Title VII claims if they receive fee
awards that are commensurate with what they could earn in other, equally
complex litigation. Conversely, lawyers are less likely to litigate Title VII
claims if they are required to disclose their overhead, salary and profit margin
prior to reimbursement for services rendered, when such information need not
be disclosed in other lucrative areas of practice.
Courts and commentators who have examined fee awards in Title VII and
other suits against private entities are virtually unanimous in their opinion that
the market-value approach most effectively achieves this purpose in a variety of
circumstances.'" Only the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has examined
directly whether this standard is suitable when the federal government is the
defendant. Under the cost-plus formula sole practitioners, public interest at-
torneys, and legal services attorneys generally would receive lower awards than
large private firms because their salaries and overhead are lower than that of
private firms.'" According to the panel this is a fair result. 19 ' The panel opin-
ions state that if public interest and legal services attorneys and firms have
developed special expertise in litigating Title VII claims this should be reflected
les Id. at 916, 23 FEP Cas. at 993 (dissenting opinion).
187
 See text and notes at noteq 25-33 supra for a discussion of the 1976 916, 23 FEP Cas.
at 993 (dissenting opinion).
187
 See text and notes at notes 25-33 supra for a discussion of the 1976 Civil Rights At-
torneys Fee Awards Act.
"a 641 F.2d at 894-95, 23 FEP Cas. at 977-78.
588
 See cases cited at note 15 supra, excluding Copeland I and Copeland II; see Berger, supra
note 7, at 314.
188
 20 FEP Cas. at 83-85.
191 Id. at 85.
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in the amount of "reasonable profit" awarded.'" Market-value fee awards are
essential, however, in order to ensure that public interest firms can continue to
develop expertise and to allocate their financial and legal resources to Title VII
adjudication. 193 The dissent forcefully points out that there is no indication that
Congress intended to use Title VII fee awards to sponsor or support public in-
terest firms.'" Yet, if the private or public interest firm can win larger fee
awards in other litigation where a market-value formula is used, both private
interest firms and legal services organizations with limited resources will direct
their energies into these other areas rather than Title VII litigation. This result
would decrease the pool of available expert attorneys and would hinder rather
than advance the statute's purposes. 195 Given the contingent nature of success
in Title VII claims, and the complexity of the legal and factual issues involved,
it is essential that fee awards be sufficient to encourage attorneys to develop
and maintain expertise in Title VII litigation.
Another argument that has been advanced in support of lower fee awards
in Title VII suits than an attorney might receive under the market-value for-
mula is that the private attorney either is acting as an attorney general, or is
performing pro bono publico service. According to this argument the private at-
torney, therefore, should not expect to be paid a fee equivalent to what he could
make in private practice. 196 This argument does not appear defensible.' 97 First,
it is the plaintiff who is the private attorney general in a Title VII suit, rather
than the lawyer. The analogy to the attorney general's role thus is of limited
utility in resolving the question of whether a market-value or cost-plus stand-
ard better effectuates Congress' purpose in allowing prevailing parties to
recover attorney's fees against the federal government. Moreover, the
statutory fee award provision exists to benefit the potential litigant by enabling
him to bring suit; it is only incidentally concerned with the plaintiff's attorney.
The cost-plus formula would produce lower fees than a market-value formula,
thus serving only to reduce the pool of available lawyers by making Title VII
cases financially less enticing.'"
192 Id. See generally Cahn and Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession.? — The Public Interest
in Public Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1033 (1970).
193 See Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d
10, 10-13 (2d Cir. 1976) (Voting Rights Act); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973) (Clean Air Amendment); Note,
Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COL." OF LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 381, 408-11 (1971).
194
 641 F.2d at 926-30, 23 FEP Cas. at 1002-04 (dissenting opinion).
193 See Berger, supra note 7, at 312-13.
196
 594 F.2d at 257-58; 20 FEP Cas. at 84; 641 F.2d at 911-13, 23 FEP Cas. at 990-91
(dissenting opinion).
' 9 ' In New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) the United States Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the prevailing party's representation by a public interest law
firm against a private party was a special circumstance that should result in a denial of attorney's
fees. Id. at 70, 71 n.9.
198 Berger, supra note 7, at 312. See also the Attorney General's position stated in his
Memorandum of the United States in Response to Court's Request For Its Views on Rehearing
En Banc at 4-5:
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Second, it is not appropriate to characterize the attorney's relationship to
the client as a pro bona publico representation. In most cases it would be more
proper to compare the relationship to a contingent fee arrangement. The Title
VII attorney does not recover a portion of the client's monetary recovery under
either the market-value or the cost-plus formula, but his right to recovery is
dependent on the success of the Title VII action. Given the statutory fee provi-
sion in Title VII cases an attorney can intend not to "charge" the client for his
services and still fully expect to be paid for his time via a fee award against the
government.' 99 Furthermore, it is incorrect for courts to determine that
representation of a particular Title VII client is pro bono representation and
therefore entitled to a lesser fee than a similar contingent representation in an
antitrust case. Courts then would be assigning "relative priorities to the
statutes Congress has itself selected for enforcement incentives. "200 In practical
terms higher fee awards in antitrust as opposed to Title VII litigation makes
specialization in antitrust work more attractive to the legal profession. 20 ' Con-
gress has not established that there should be such a difference in priorities. 202
c. Government and Private Violators of Title VII —
Support For the Single Standard Approach
Proponents of the cost-plus standard for determining reasonable
attorney's fees in Title VII litigation rely on the basic premise that the govern-
ment should not be held to the same standard of accountability as are private
entities. Nothing in the language of the legislative history of Title VII,
however, reveals any congressional intent to treat the federal government dif-
ferently from a private party. The United States Supreme Court, in a Title VII
action, has refused to treat the federal government differently from a private
party when the United States, as plaintiff, was required to pay attorney's fees
to a prevailing private defendant. 203 At least one circuit court has stated that
awarding attorney's fees against a state government agency would serve a
deterrent effect,'" and consequently, fee awards should be computed in the
same manner as fee awards granted against private parties.
[F]ees to these [public interest] law firms should not be less than would be the case
had a for-profit law firm brought the suit. Strong considerations of public policy
require that such firms and lawyers receive fee awards equal to those made to firms
and attorneys at large.
641 F.2d at 900 n.36, 23 FEP Cas. at 981 n.36 (dissenting opinion).
199 641 F.2d at 900, 23 FEP Cas. at 981 (citing Keyes v. School Distr. No. 1, 439 F.
Supp. 393, 406-07 (D. Colo. 1977)).
2" Berger, supra note 7, at 311.
291 Id. at 312.
2°2
	
at 315. If Congress had believed that the charity of lawyers was sufficient to pro-
vide a ready pool of lawyers to Title VII litigants, it probably would not have enacted the at-
torney fee award provision. If attorneys do not earn in Title VII litigation what they would
reasonably expect to earn in other litigation, the courts, in effect, are still forcing these clients to
rely on the partial charity of lawyers. See 641 F.2d at 899-900, 23 FEP Cas. at 98-102.
209
	
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 n.20, 422-23 (1977).
2" Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Another reason for not according the government preferential treatment
in fee award determinations as compared to private parties, is that it is
especially important to eradicate discrimination in government itself. Tax-
payers, in a sense by paying taxes, have accrued a fund for legal services to vin-
dicate these legal rights. It is imperative that equal employment opportunity be
of "paramount significance" in federal service. As stated in the House report
on the 1972 amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
"Americans . . . traditionally measure the quality of their democracy by the
opportunity they have to participate in government processes. It is therefore
imperative that equal employment be the touchstone of the Federal system. ' ' 2 °8
Conversely, proponents of the cost-plus formula argue that a different fee
scale for awards paid by the government is appropriate because the
statutorially-created right to attorney fee recovery has the effect of making the
taxpayer finance both sides of the litigation. 206 The taxpayer pays the salaries
and costs for the government lawyers defending the federal agency, and if the
litigant prevails, he pays the successful plaintiff's attorney fees as well. The
dissenting judges in Copeland III, therefore, deemed it imperative that the
government which created the right to the fee also be allowed to determine its
limit. 207 In addition, because the right to the fee award is a creature of statute,
the dissent argued that normal market forces have no place in establishing a
limit to what can be charged. 208
There are problems, however, with this line of reasoning. First, there is no
indication that Congress intended to limit attorney fee awards against the
federal government. The cost-plus formula is a creature of the courts, not the
legislature. Second, Title VII created a new legal right to sue the federal
government for employment discrimination. Yet, the creation of this right did
not change in any way the nature of the services attorneys would provide
litigants seeking relief for employment discrimination from the federal govern-
ment as compared to private parties. While advocates of the cost-plus formula
are correct that the "market" did not create the right to sue the federal govern-
ment, the market does set the price for attorney's fees in cases of comparable
complexity. Third, the federal government often pays the prevailing rate or
more, when it retains private defense counsel in cases where the plaintiff's right
to sue also has been created by statute. 209 Presumably, the government would
not pay market-value rates if it thought it could obtain the expertise it sought
for less. It would be anomalous to assign lesser value to the plaintiffs right to
secure competent counsel than to the government's. Such a discrepancy in fee
awards would not effectively implement Congress' purpose to vindicate civil
rights by granting attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
2O H.R. REP. No. 328, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2157.
2" 641 F.2d at 911-14, 23 FEP Cas. at 990-92 (dissenting opinion).
29' Id. at 914, 23 FEP Cas. at 992 (dissenting opinion).
208 Id.
209 Bachman v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. 1046, 1051-52 (D.D.C. 1979).
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The market-value formula for determining Title VII attorney's fee awards
will yield fees closely approximating what lawyers could earn in similar com-
plex litigation. Therefore, it best effectuates Congress' intent to assure that
lawyers are available to enable claimants to obtain judicial redress of federal
employment discrimination. The market-value test also is preferable to the
cost-plus approach because it provides greater flexibility. Under the market-
value test the court can adjust the hours expended, and the hourly rate, as well
as the lodestar fee to reflect the quality of representation and the contingent
nature of success of the Title VII action."°
The market-value approach thus provides a flexible standard that is easily
applied.'" In addition, contrary to the contentions of proponents of the cost-
plus formula that the potential of being paid for all hours reasonably expended
under the market-value formula may encourage attorneys to prolong pretrial
litigation, it seems likely that the attorney's awareness that the trial judge can
adjust his lodestar fee down, as well as up, maximizes his incentive to work
rapidly and efficiently."' While the "cost-plus" formula also offers a judge
flexibility there are two drawbacks in its application that for practical reasons
militate against its use as a formula for determining awards against the govern-
ment. One drawback is that firms may be reluctant to reveal to the court as a
public matter such things as average salary for each class of firm member,
overhead and profit margin. Such disclosures are necessary for any court using
the cost-plus formula. The application of' this standard may deter firms from
engaging in Title VII litigation. Furthermore, compilation of, and disputes
over such data could increase the time spent litigating the fee award since time
spent determining the fee is compensable. Thus, the potentially extended
discovery and litigation surrounding the fee that the cost-plus formula creates
may itself increase the amount of the fee awarded. 213
Even if it is assumed that revealing salary, overhead and profit margin in-
formation will not require extensive disclosure or documentation, 214 it is still
necessary under the cosi-plus formula for the judge to arrive at a basic cost and
then balance a range of quality factors to determine a reasonable profit. 2 " An
initial problem in calculating such a profit is that "it would be . . . anomalous
210 594 F.2d at 250.
211 Id,
212
	 Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R. D. at 683.
2 " The District of Columbia District Court determined a Title VII attorney's fee to be
paid by the Federal Trade Commission in the interim between the Copeland I and Copeland II deci-
sions in Bachman v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. 1046 (D.D.C. 1979). The court rejected the cost-
plus formula and instead attempted to weigh all twelve Evans (Johnson) factors as requested by the
circuit court panel in the first portion of the Copeland I decision. Id. at 1048-50. The court award-
ed approximately $5000 in additional attorney's fees for services rendered in determining the fee
request. Id. at 1055. In a footnote the court explained how using all the Evans factors greatly in-
creased the costs: "Pit should be noted that a substantial part of this cost is attributable to the ex-
tensive procedural and evidentiary requirements for court-awarded attorneys' fees imposed by
the Copeland opinion." Id. at 1054 n.5.
71+ See 20 FEP Cas. at 84-85.
215 Id. at 83-86.
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for [a] court to attempt to fix an appropriate return of profit for the public in-
terest law firm. . . ." 2 " A second problem in implementing the cost-plus for-
mula is posed by the lack of guidance offered by the panel as to what constitutes
a reasonable profit, or as to how to weigh and apply each of the Evans factors.
Using the market-value approach the judge need only consider adjusting the
basic rate for two factors — contingency and quality. Using the cost-plus ap-
proach, factors such as the amount of recovery, or the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client are to be considered as well."' It is
readily apparent that the intent of the Title VII fee awards provision is not to
make lawyers rich, 218 but to make vital services available to prospective
litigants. By the same token, if a formula for determining a reasonable fee is
not to involve the courts in protracted and complex litigation over the fee itself,
but to streamline the fee determination process, then the cost-plus formula
seems counterproductive.
CONCLUSION
The market-value approach seems to provide a more appropriate formula
for determining reasonable Title VII attorney's fees than does the cost-plus for-
mula. It allows for compensation commensurate with private work, and
therefore provides sufficient financial incentive for lawyers to litigate Title VII
claims. Furthermore, the lodestar and accompanying adjustments seem less
complicated to apply than the cost-plus formula. The market-value approach
also requires less disclosure of a firnk's financial affairs than the cost-plus for-
mula. Because the market-value standard seems more likely to enable prospec-
tive litigants to find competent lawyers to represent them and because it is
relatively easy to apply, it is recommended that courts continue to use this
standard to determine fee awards. The cost-plus standard does not eliminate
any of the discretionary elements of the market-value formula, and, therefore,
does not prevent inflated recoveries. In addition, it allows for different fee
levels not only when the government and private parties are footing the bill,
but also among public interest, legal services, solo practitioners, and large
216
 Bachman v. Pertschuk, 23 FEP Cas. 1046 at 1050 (D.D.C. 1979).
217 See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 117, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In a civil
rights action, where the equitable relief is often the most important and far-reaching result it is
debatable whether the money damages the plaintiff receives should have any bearing on the at-
torney's fee award. An outstanding legal performance which results in a broad range of equitable
relief for a large class of plaintiffs under the market-value approach, may cause the judge to in-
crease the lodestar fee because of the exceptional quality of representation. See, e.g., Bolden v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The Copeland III dissent asserted,
however, that the discrepancy between the plaintiff's monetary and the plaintiff's attorney's fee
recovery was an anomaly. See 641 F.2d at 910-11, 23 FEP Cas. at 989 (dissenting opinion). In at
least one case against a private entity attorney's fees of $20,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs' at-
torneys. These attorneys did not secure any back wages for their client, but had "skillfully and
successfully attacked a covert pattern of discrimination in employment ..." Clark v. American
Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 710 (E.D. La. 1970).
210
 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 482 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974).
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private firms. Moreover, the cost-plus approach requires the disclosure of a
firm's financial matters and a consideration of all twelve Evans Johnson factors,
which makes it a cumbersome and time-consuming formula for courts to apply.
With respect to the application of a fee award standard, neither Congress
nor the judiciary has made a clear statement as to whether the same standard is
to be applied to government defendants and private defendants in Title VII
employment discrimination cases. If Congress does wish a different, lower fee
award standard to apply to government defendants, in spite of the market-
value standard's apparent advantages, it is suggested that an explicit provision
be enacted. 2 t 9
 This provision should define a "reasonable" fee, or establish a
formula to be used by courts in determining a reasonable fee when the govern-
ment is the losing party.'"
219 See 20 FEP Cas. at 87.88 (Memorandum of the United States). In Copeland II the
panel invited the Attorney General to submit the views of the United States. The panel quoted
the Attorney General who remarked that "[t]he traditional customary approaches, as
demonstrated by what has occurred in this case, may not be accurate. More refined analysis and
consideration of alternatives are required." Id. at 87.
229 In Copeland I the panel stated that "Nhe Government has urged that a maximum $40
per hour fee be allowed to attorneys for a prevailing party in Title VII litigation . " 594 F.2d at
251. This suggestion reveals one of the difficulties with a congressionally-established maximum
or minimum fee. This drawback is that such limits are necessarily rigid and arbitrary and do not
accommodate extreme cases of lawyer expertise or inefficiency. Moreover, considerable impetus
on the federal level would be necessary to change the statutory fee once it was established. A fee
that was set too low might be difficult to change quickly and therefore might serve to deter
lawyers from readily assuming Title VII cases.
There has been at least one statutory attempt to define a reasonable fee which seems to
adopt a market-value approach. It is the Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvement
Act of 1976:
[A] reasonable attorneys' fee is a fee (A) which is based upon (i) the actual time ex-
pended by an attorney in providing advice and other legal services in connection
with representing a person in an action under this subsection, and (ii) such
reasonable expenses as may be incurred by the attorney in the provision of such
services, and (B) which is computed at the rate prevailing for the provision of
similar services with respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding the
fee.
15 U. S.C. 5 2059(e)(4) (Supp. 1977). See also Note, Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUM.
J. OF LAW & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 381, 410-11 (1971) (discussion of the necessity for and problems
with a statutory definition of a reasonable attorney's fee).
